Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was a joint applicant with his father for a licence to run a private market under Travancore Act, VII of 1092 for the year ending the last day of December 1952. The authority to grant the licence was at the time the application was presented, the District Collector, who passed an order dated 1.4.1952 in favour of the applicants sanctioning the opening of a market. That order was liable to be challenged by an appeal presented to the Board of Revenue within 30 days of its date excluding the time taken for obtaining a copy thereof or within such further time as the Board may see fit to allow, condoning delay. Act IX of 1950 enacted by S. 9 that: "Government may at any time call for and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by the Board and may pass such order in reference thereto as Government think fit." Neither within the time allowed not at any time was there an appeal preferred to the Board against the order of the District Collector. On 14.5.1952 respondents 2 and 3 herein who felt aggrieved by the order, presented a petition before the Government for setting aside the order of the District Collector and for granting a license to them. On 14.10.1952 the Government allowed their application and set aside the order of the Collector, after notice to and hearing the petitioner. It is this order of Government that is challenged in this Original Petition and it is sought to be set aside on the ground that the Government acted without jurisdiction in passing it. 2. The only question for consideration is whether the complaint of the petitioner as regards the impugned order is well-founded. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the revisional jurisdiction of the Government under S. 9 can be invoked and exercised only after presentation of a proper appeal before the Board of Revenue and in this case there having been admittedly no appeal presented before the Board, the revisional jurisdiction of the Government to interfere was non-existent. 3. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the State, Mr. Parameswaran Pillai, contends that the jurisdiction of the Government in this matter is concurrent with that of the Board, by whatever name that jurisdiction may be called. 3. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the State, Mr. Parameswaran Pillai, contends that the jurisdiction of the Government in this matter is concurrent with that of the Board, by whatever name that jurisdiction may be called. Under S. 9 which has been already read, he submits, that it was competent for the Government to withdraw pending appeal from the Board of Revenue and dispose of it. The Government in a case like that, would be exercising appellate jurisdiction though in the marginal note to S. 9 the jurisdiction is stated to be "power of revision of Government". The word 'revision' there, it is contended, indicates merely superiority of the powers of Government the authority to pass such order as Government think it fit is wide and comprises appellate powers, that is, all the powers the Board could exercise in appeal. Learned Government Pleader also contends that the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Government in this matter by appearing before them pursuant to the notice and by presenting an objection petition. Though in his petition exception was taken to the jurisdiction of the Government, the petitioner had also sought an order in his favour on the merits. 4. The order passed by the Government is a very elaborate order but does not deal with the objection regarding jurisdiction. The learned Government Pleader urges that the omission to consider the question of jurisdiction must necessarily have been due to that point not having been pressed by the petitioner at the hearing though it was there in his written objection. The absence of a complaint in the petition before this Court that the objection to jurisdiction raised by him was not considered by the Government, justifies the Government Pleader's position. But whatever that may be the other ground that the Government Pleader takes is tenable, namely, that though the petitioner took objection to the jurisdiction of the Government, he having appeared before the Government and invited an adjudication on that question of jurisdiction as also on the merits of the case, he has submitted to the Government's jurisdiction to decide not merely on the question of jurisdiction but on the merits of the case as well. This being not a case of inherent absence of jurisdiction but the defect pointed out being one merely of procedure, jurisdiction could be conferred upon the Government by consent. This being not a case of inherent absence of jurisdiction but the defect pointed out being one merely of procedure, jurisdiction could be conferred upon the Government by consent. Dicey's Conflict of laws, 6th edition, 1949, page 166, in the comment under R. 24, states that: "A defendant in an action, who appears even if merely to take objection to the jurisdiction of the court, without defending his case upon the merits, submits to its authority". This supports the learned Government Pleader, a fortiori, in the present case, because the petitioner appeared before Government not only to take objection to jurisdiction but also to defend his case on the merits. 5. An authority whose jurisdiction is questioned has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction as well as to exercise jurisdiction conferred by consent, except in a case where there is absence of inherent jurisdiction. The observation of the Privy Council in Meenakshy v. Subramonia (I.L.R. XI Mad. 26) that "the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert it (a suit) into a proper juridical process" applies "when the judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit". 6. It is not contended that the Government had no inherent jurisdiction to decide this matter. What is contended is merely that the procedure pursued was a departure from the one prescribed, namely that there was not as there must have been an appeal presented before the Board of Revenue, before the Government interfered. Existence of jurisdiction is different from its exercise. Exercise of non-existent jurisdiction would be void but irregular or defective exercise of existing jurisdiction would only be voidable. Where jurisdiction does exist but has been exercised in a defective manner, the defect is not fatal but is curable and will stand cured if the parties antecedently assented, concurred by participation or afterwards accepted or acquiesced in such exercise. The present is a case of the exercise of existing jurisdiction with the assent and on invitation of the petitioner in a manner whose irregularity was obvious. The petitioner agreed to Government considering the petition challenging the Collector's order though there had been no appeal to the Board, and by the result of Government's consideration, he must abide. 7. The present is a case of the exercise of existing jurisdiction with the assent and on invitation of the petitioner in a manner whose irregularity was obvious. The petitioner agreed to Government considering the petition challenging the Collector's order though there had been no appeal to the Board, and by the result of Government's consideration, he must abide. 7. Learned Government Pleader also pointed out that the period for which the licence was asked for was till the end of the year 1952 and that year having expired, no purpose is served by this Court considering the question as regards the propriety of the impugned order because, even assuming the order impugned is vacated, the result would nevertheless be that the petitioner may at best be regarded as having obtained a licence to run a market for the period for which he applied. Learned counsel for the petitioner in answer to this only stated that if the order is vacated it may be of use to him in making an application for another year which would only be an application for renewal and not for a fresh licence for which there is a different and difficult procedure which requires the calling in of objections. I do not consider that this is a good enough ground to induce me to embark upon an enquiry which would not result in any advantage to any of the parties. Under the circumstances, as I consider that the applicant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Government in the matter and taken the chance of a decision in his favour, he is estopped from turning round and impeaching the order when it happened to be adverse to him and further the period having expired, I do not think it desirable to interfere. In this view, it is unnecessary to discuss the other objections to this court's interference in this matter which were urged by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State. 8. The result is that the petition is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent with Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. Respondents 2 and 3 appear through separate counsel but in the circumstances, I do not award them separate costs especially as there was no argument on their behalf. Dismissed.