JUDGMENT : 1. Shivchand and Nandlal, father end son, obtained a decree for Rs. 3128-8-0 against Kavarlal in the Court of Civil Judge Garoth. 2. An application for execution of this decree was filed by Shivchand and in this in the column regarding names of parties he mentioned all the three names but name of Nandlal was mentioned after that of Kavarlal. 3. Notices were issued both to Kavarlal and Nandlal of this execution. In response to these notices both Nandlal and Kavarlal appeared. Nandlal asserted that he had settled the claim in execution with judgment-debtor Kavarlal in his capacity as a decree-holder and had certified the adjustment to the Court and the execution application was incompetent. Judgment-debtor Kavarlal too asserted that he had effected an adjustment of the decretal debt with Nandlal and had obtained a receipt of complete satisfaction on 30-10-1949 and that Nandlal had certified the adjustment to court on 9-11-1949. He therefore also prayed for the dismissal of the execution application. 4. On 9-10-50 an application was submitted on behalf of the judgment-debtor and pressed by his counsel stating that the claim in execution had been adjusted and adjustment had been certified and that the decree-holders are father and son, were joint, the decree too was obtained while they were joint and further that Nandlal was fully authorised to recover the amount. At the end of the main part of the application, a statement was made that the application was not in accordance with law and a prayer was made for time being allowed for argument. 5. This application was granted and the case was fixed for argument. 6. The Court after hearing argument held that so called adjustment by Nandlal was not binding upon Shivachand by reason of provisions of O. 21, R. 15 and also because Nandlal was the son and not the father. He therefore directed the execution to proceed in respect of the full amount. 7. In appeal preferred against this decision, apart from the contentions already raised one more contention was put forward viz., the decree-holder cannot take out execution for the full amount but only to the extent of his half share. 8. The District Court in its decision held that although the decree-holder Shivchand has described Nandlal as a judgment-debtor this error could be corrected and the application is not bad for this reason. 8. The District Court in its decision held that although the decree-holder Shivchand has described Nandlal as a judgment-debtor this error could be corrected and the application is not bad for this reason. The adjustment according to its view, though certified by Nandlal was not on behalf of and for the benefit of both. It was therefore not binding. With regard to the new contention raised before it, it held that it was not possible to determine Shivchand's share in the absence of a statement on behalf of the judgment-debtor as to the extent of it. This could only be determined, according to its view in the trial court. Other contentions raised viz., that the claim in execution was not within the competency of the trial Court and the execution was not for benefit of all the decree-holders, were found to be incorrect on facts. The appeal was dismissed. 9. Kavarlal, the judgment-debtor has now preferred this 2nd appeal. 10. Question for consideration in this appeal is where there is a decree in the name of father and son and the son certifies the payment or adjustment can the father execute the decree again if he is not shown to have authorised the receipt of this payment by the son. 11. In order to arrive at the decision on this point on the facts of the present case it is necessary to refer to certain authorities bearing on the point. 12. First important case bearing on this point is - 'Periasami v. Krishna Ayyan', 25 Mad 431 (FB) (A). 13. In that case a joint decree was passed in favour of three brothers who were then minors. Later, at the time when first application for execution was made two of them attained majority while the third continued to be minor. This was done more than three years after the decree. More than three years later another application was made. By this time the third brother also had become major but when this was done more than three years had not elapsed since he attained majority. It was held by the Full Bench that this was barred by time. 14. During the course of this decision Bhashyam, J. expressed some opinion regarding the position of the joint decree-holders which became foundation for consideration in later cases. It was held by the Full Bench that this was barred by time. 14. During the course of this decision Bhashyam, J. expressed some opinion regarding the position of the joint decree-holders which became foundation for consideration in later cases. He observed as follows : "A payment made out of Court only to one of several joint decree-holders cannot bind the others unless he was also constituted, by them, an agent for the purpose, in which case alone the payment can be recorded as certified under S. 2i38, Civil P.C. The mere fact that one of the joint decree-holders is the managing member of an undivided Hindu family consisting of the joint decree-holders will not empower him to give a valid discharge of the decree-debt, without the concurrence of the remaining members, any more than it will empower him to execute the whole decree, as of right, without the concurrence of the remaining decree-holders. Under S. 231, Civil P.C., any one of several joint decree-holders, constituting a Hindu family whether he be the managing member or not, may if the Court sees sufficient cause, be allowed to execute the whole decree and in that case the court should pass such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application. As a general rule, such order will be a direction to the applicant for execution to furnish sufficient security for the protection of the interests of such persons. If payment be made, out of Court, to a sole decree-holder or several joint decree-holders, as the case may be, such payment will of course be a sufficient discharge of the decree-debt (vide S. 259 (b) ) and it is not the act of the Court in recording such payment as certified that operates as a discharge, as held in - 'Seshan v. Rajagopala', 13 Mad 236 (B) and - Zamir Hasan v. Sundar', 22 ALL 199 (C). Under S. 258, Civil Procedure Code, the act of the Court simply consists in recording satisfaction, if the decree-holder or decree-holders certify to the Court payment to them out of Court or if such payment is proved by the judgment-debtor, adversely to the decree-holder or decree-holders, within the time prescribed by Art. 173A of the 2nd schedule to the Limitation Act. A discharge not so recorded cannot be recognised by the Court executing the decree, since, for purposes of executing the decree, such record is by Statute made indispensable evidence for proving the alleged discharge. But payment to one or some of several joint decree-holders cannot operate as a discharge of the decree-debt, nor be recorded as certified under S. 258, Civil Procedure Code, unless, of course, such person or persons were duly authorised by the others to accept such payment in entire or partial satisfaction of the decree." Referring to the position of the managing Member of the family as a joint decree-holder the learned Judge said : "The mere fact that one of the joint decree-holders is the managing member of an undivided Hindu family consisting of the joint decree-holders will not empower him to give a valid discharge of the decree-debt, without the concurrence of the remaining members, any more than it will empower him to execute the whole decree, as of right, without the concurrence of the remaining decree-holders." 15. The opinion expressed in this was followed in the cases reported in - 'Muthuswamy Iyer v. Narasimha Ayyar', AIR 1934 Mad 330 (D); - 'Fatimabai v. Mt. Tukabai', AIR 1945 Nag 95 (E). However the aforesaid case in - ' AIR 1934 Mad 330 (D)' was considered in - 'Hanumanthappa v. Seethayya and Co.', AIR 1949 Mad 790 (FB) (F). This was a Full Bench case and arose in connection with a discharge given by one of the partners of a firm when the decree was obtained in the name of the firm. The majority of Full Bench including Rajamannar, C.J. and Vishwanath, J. expressed dissent from very wide words in the aforesaid observations and it was held that under certain circumstances one of the decree-holders can give valid discharge if he occupied a position of agency under general law. Their Lordships overruled earlier Madras cases reported in - 'Mohomed Silar Sahib and Co. v. Nabi Khan Sahib', AIR 1917 Mad 988 (G) and - ' AIR 1934 Mad 330 (D)', wherein the observations of Bhashyam Ayangar, J. were followed. They however expressed their approval with regard to the view in the case from that High Court reported in - 'Duraisawmi Sastrial v. Venkatarama Iyer', 21 Mad LJ1088(H). In the latter case, Sundar Ayer and Phillips, JJ. They however expressed their approval with regard to the view in the case from that High Court reported in - 'Duraisawmi Sastrial v. Venkatarama Iyer', 21 Mad LJ1088(H). In the latter case, Sundar Ayer and Phillips, JJ. has expressly dissented from the view expressed by Bhashyam Ayangar, J. in - 25 Mad 431 (FB) (A)', in the following terms : "If the learned Judge really meant to lay down that the provisions of S. 257, should be construed without reference to the substantive law of the parties in deciding whether one of them is entitled to receive moneys for which a decree is passed in favour of a joint Hindu family, then, with all deference, we are unable to concur with him." Their Lordships explained the case in - 'Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row', 40 Ind App 132 (PC) (I) wherein their Lordships of the Privy Council had taken the view that where a, natural guardian or a next friend acts as such in suit on behalf of a minor he cannot enter into a compromise on behalf of the minor without express leave of the court under O. 32, R. 7, by stating thus : "The manager of a joint Hindu family, once he accepts the position of a next friend or guardian of a minor coparcener, to that extent, must be deemed to have himself surrendered his rights under general law as manager of the family. There is no such express provision when the manager is not also the next friend or guardian of any of the minor coparceners." Their Lordships further referred to the case of - 'Administrator General, Madras v. Radhakrishna Chettiar', AIR 1936 Mad 434 (J) wherein it was held that if the manager is not the next friend or guardian of the minor his right to receive the amount of the decree and to give a discharge so as to bind the minor is not taken away on account of the provisions of O. 32, R. 6 or 7. The learned Judge observed at p. 797 as follows : "So in my opinion, the legal effect of a payment out of court. So one of the partners of a firm must be determined by the general and personal law applicable to the parties. The learned Judge observed at p. 797 as follows : "So in my opinion, the legal effect of a payment out of court. So one of the partners of a firm must be determined by the general and personal law applicable to the parties. If before the passing of the decree one of the partners, by receiving payment of the debt which is the subject-matter of the suit can give a valid discharge binding on the other members of the firm, logically, I fail to see why he cannot do so after the passing of the decree." In - 'Kumaid Kumar Singh v. Amar Nath Singh, AIR 1943 Pat 10 (K) view was taken that a payment to a member of a joint Hindu family who is not Karta regarding the amount of the decree obtained in favour of the members of the family jointly does not operate as satisfaction, wholly or in part of the decree. 16. The ruling no doubt expressly follows Madras cases referred to above viz., - 'AIR 1917 Mad 988 (G)'; 25 Mad 431 (FB) (A)'; 'Appaswamy Chettiar v. N. Baikrishna Pillai', AIR 1925 Mad 588 (L), the proposition laid down and applied in this case as stated above cannot be disputed. On consideration of all these authorities, it is clear that so far as decrees in favour of joint Hindu families are concerned, courts are unanimous that where payment is said to have been made to a member who is not the Karta it cannot be binding upon other members and will not operate as a valid discharge of even as regards the share of the person receiving because in a joint Hindu family during the continuance of its status as such no one coparcener has a defined share. This no doubt will put the debtors at a disadvantage but he has to take the law as it stands and act with caution in making the payment. 17. If however the status of the Joint Hindu family is broken after the decree then the position changes and one time manager cannot give valid discharge and any one of the decree-holders can give discharge and enter satisfaction of his share. In the present case Nandlal has stated that he was authorised to receive payment. This does not appear to have been believed on evidence. 18. In the present case Nandlal has stated that he was authorised to receive payment. This does not appear to have been believed on evidence. 18. There are other authorities besides - 'AIR 1936 Mad 434 (J)' in which the view appears to have been taken that a valid discharge can be given by a managing member of a joint Hindu family where the decree is in favour of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and other junior members. These cases are - 'Ramkrishna v. Shankar', AIR 1935 Nag 25 (M); - 'Achhaibar Singh v. Ram Samp Sahu', 35 All 380 (N); - 'Inderdawan Singh v. Jairaj Singh', AIR 1941 Oudh 336 (O), etc. 19. As a result of these authorities the principle deducible is that where the payment has been made outside the court to a decree-holder who has a subsisting right, to the knowledge of the judgment-debtors, to represent others by reason of his position under the substantive law, that payment and consequent certification or adjustment would bind the rest but where his position is that of a guardian or a next friend by reason of his having been so appointed or having assumed that position then inspite of his position under the substantive law he cannot give a valid discharge without the leave of the court. On the other hand, if he is not entitled so to represent them then he cannot give a valid discharge and his action cannot prejudicially affect the rights of others under the decree in anyway or to any extent. In the case of a decree in favour of members of joint Hindu family if payment is made to a member who is not the Karta it would not bind his own interest and cannot operate to discharge the debtor's liability under the decree to the extent of payee's interest either. There is further qualification to the above viz., if after the decree the status of the family is broken then payment made to any one will bind his share only and to that extent it would be competent for him to give a discharge, enter satisfaction or to certify. 20. It appears that no enquiry was made by the trial court and it straightway held the decree to be executable to the full extent. 20. It appears that no enquiry was made by the trial court and it straightway held the decree to be executable to the full extent. As the case involved question of fact whether it was a case or a subsisting joint Hindu family and whether Nandlal had either express or implied authority to represent, the rest of the family it will not be possible to come to the conclusion whether the decree can be held to be completely or partially satisfied. 21. I therefore set aside the order of the lower court and remand the case to the trial Court to afford opportunity to the parties to lead such evidence as they may like on the question involved in this case indicated above and decide the case according to law in light of the observations made above. The costs incurred so far will abide the final result of these proceedings. Case remanded.