SHARMA, J.—These are 105 petitions filed by various State grantees and cultivators of the territories included in the former Jaipur State, which have now been included in the Districts of Jaipur, Jhunjhunu, Sawai Madho-pur, Sikar and Tonk of the present State of Rajasthan. In the year 1947 the then Jaipur State passed an Act known as the Jaipur District Boards Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). This Act came into force on the 3rd October, 1947. 2. Sec. 3 of the Act provided as follows: — "(3)(i) There shall be one Board for every district or any area which the Government may, by notification in the Jaipur Gazette, declare. The jurisdiction of the Board shall not extend to Town Municipalities. (ii) Every Board shall be a body corporate by the name of "the (name of district) district board" and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be vested with the capacity of suing and being sued in its corporate name, of acquiring, holding and transferring property moveable or immovable, and of entering into contracts." 3. Under sec. 4 of the Act every Board was to consist of (a) elected members and (b) such persons as might be nominated by the Government. It was also provided in the said section that the number of elected members was not to be less than two-thirds of the whole Board. 4. On 4th October, 1948 while the erstwhile Jaipur State was still in existence an amendment was passed by which a new section (Sec. 4-A) was added to the Act and it ran as follows :— "4-A (1) The Government may, pending the formation of a Board under sec. 4, constitute provisionally for any area a Board consisting wholly of members nominated by the Government." (2) The term of a Board constituted under sub-sec. (1) shall be two years or until a Board consisting of both elected and nominated members is formed under sec. 5, whichever period may be less." 5. By sec. 2(6) of the Amendment Act which will hereinafter be referred to as the First Amendment Act "District" was defined as fellows:— "District" means a district constituted under secs. (1) shall be two years or until a Board consisting of both elected and nominated members is formed under sec. 5, whichever period may be less." 5. By sec. 2(6) of the Amendment Act which will hereinafter be referred to as the First Amendment Act "District" was defined as fellows:— "District" means a district constituted under secs. 18 and 19 of the Jaipur Land Revenue Act, 1947, and includes any area which the Government may, by notification in the Jaipur Raj Patra declare to be a district for the purposes of this Act, but does not include any portion thereof which is a municipality under the Jaipur State Town Municipalities Act, 1943, or the City of Jaipur Municipal Act, 1943." 1. Sawai Jaipur. 2. Sawai Madhopur. 3. Jhunjhunu. 4. Malpura. 6. In accordance with the Act four District Boards were constituted, one for each of the following District of the then Jaipur State:— 7. After the merger of the then Jaipur State with the present State of Rajasthan, the District of Malpura was abolished and its area was divided between the newly formed Districts of Tonk and Sikar. Resolutions had been passed by the District Boards of Jaipur, Jhunjhunu, Sawai Madhopur and Malpura when the former Jaipur State was in existence for the levying of the cess in accordance with sec. 31 of the Act. After the present Rajasthan State came into being the District Board of Sikar and Tonk as well as of Jaipur, Sawai Madhopur and Jhunjhunu proceeded to realise the cess from the petitioners of petition Nos. 19, 20, 22, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 45, 52, 53, 57, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 104, 105, 109, 111, 114, 117, 122, 123, 126, 127, 132, 148, 149, 153 and 162 of 1952. They filed these petitions in this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari prohibition, quo-warranto, Mandamus, or any other appor-priate order or direction against the Collectors of each of these five Districts, Tehsildars of the Tehsils concerned, and the District Board concerned. For the sake of brevity I will call all these petitions collectively petitions of Group A in this judgment. 8. For the sake of brevity I will call all these petitions collectively petitions of Group A in this judgment. 8. In all these petitions the common grounds on which the validity of the cess has been attacked are principally as follows:— (1) The District Boards were not properly constituted as all the members were not appointed at the time of their constitution. Some of the members were added afterwards. (2) The Chairman was not appointed first as a member at the time of the nomination of other members. The appointments as a Chairman without being a member first was illegal. (3) No resolution with the previous sanction of the Government was passed or published in the Jaipur Gazette regarding levy of cess as required under sec. 31 of the Act and clause (4) of the cess Rules made thereunder, (4) The Cess was not levied according to the procedure prescribed by law. (5) The Members and the Chairman are required to be appointed by name under the Act but some of them were not appointed by name but only by the post which they held under the Government. 9. On behalf of the respondents replies were filed and it was asserted that all five District Boards were validly constituted and that the cess was imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It was also pleaded that the various writs sought for could not be issued in the cases and that an alternative remedy being available in the shape of a civil suit the petitioners had no right to file the petitions. It was further pleaded that the petitioners were all Jagirdars who had not to pay the cess out of their own pockets but were entitled to realise it from the tenants. They were therefore, not persons sufficiently interested to bring the petitions. It was also pleaded that the fact that the Chairman on some of the members were not notified in the Gazette by name but by the post they held under the Government did not render the constitution of the Boards invalid. They were therefore, not persons sufficiently interested to bring the petitions. It was also pleaded that the fact that the Chairman on some of the members were not notified in the Gazette by name but by the post they held under the Government did not render the constitution of the Boards invalid. In the case of the District Boards of Sikar and Tonk an additional ground was taken by the petitioners that the District Boards of these Districts were not the same as the District Board of Malpura and they could not be called the successors of Malpura District Board and were therefore, not entitled to realise the cess imposed by Malpura District Board. To this it was replied by the respondents that by a Notification of the Rajasthan Government dated the 18th July., 1950 published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated the 22nd July, 1950, Malpura District Board was dissolved and in its place the two District Boards of Tonk and Sikar created and a part of the area of the former Malpura District Board was included in Tonk District Board and another part in the Sikar District Board. The District Boards 6f Sikar and Tonk were therefore, the successors of the former District Board of Malpura and could realise the cess levied by the Malpura District Board. The 44 petitions mentioned above were heard on the 17th and 19th September, 1952 before this very Bench and it was very vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioners that under sec. 31 of the Act it was necessary that the sanction of the Government should be obtained before the levying of the cess which could be levied by a resolution after the sanction of the Government had been given. As in these cases no resolution was passed by the District Boards concerned after the according of sanction by the Government, the District Boards had no right to collect the cess. Judgments were reserved in all the petitions and before they could be delivered applications were made on behalf of the respondents in the cases relating to Sikar and Jhunjhunu District Boards that after the sanction of the Government, resolutions levying cess had been passed by the District Boards concerned and so the defect, if at all, had been removed and praying that the cases be decided after taking into consideration the said resolution. These applications were made on the 3rd October, 1952. Thereafter a motion was made on behalf of the respondents that sec. 31 of the Act had been amended so as to obviate the necessity of passing a resolution after the sanction of the Government and that the amendment was to have retrospective effect and it was prayed that the petitions be decided in accordance with the latest amendment and if necessary parties be heard on the point. It was also moved that by another provision in the same amendment Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Third Amendment Act) newly constituted Boards in respect of any area or vested with jurisdiction over any area under sub-section (1) of sec. 3(a) had been invested with the powers to collect all such cesses realise all such amounts and do all such acts as were being exercised, collected, realised and done in such area by the previously existing Board, if any, immediately before such constitution or vesting as aforesaid. This amendment had also retrospective effect and affected the petitions filed before the amendment and should also be consequently taken into consideration. Objections were filed on behalf of the petitioners that the amendments relied upon by the respondents had neither retrospective effect nor could be taken into consideration at the stage they were sought to be relied upon. Another objection was also taken that the Act itself was void being repugnant to Arts. 13 and 14 of the Constitution of India. A date was, therefore, fixed for rehearing of the petitions. 10. Some time before the arguments were heard in the petitions of Group A some petitions had been filed but they were not heard along with the petitions of Group A because they were not ripe for hearing. After the hearing of the petitions of Group A but before the Amending Ordinance was published in the Rajasthan Gazette (Extra-ordinary) dated the 4th October, 1952 which had the same provisions as the Third Amendment Act some more petitions were filed. All these petitions will be referred to collectively as petitions of group B. 11. After the passing of the above Amending Ordinance which was in the same terms as the Third Amendment Act, the following petitions were filed. They shall be referred to collectively as petitions of C group. 12. All these petitions will be referred to collectively as petitions of group B. 11. After the passing of the above Amending Ordinance which was in the same terms as the Third Amendment Act, the following petitions were filed. They shall be referred to collectively as petitions of C group. 12. All these petitions of A, B and C group were heard together on the 19th and 20th March, 1953 and are being disposed of by this judgment as principal questions raised in all are the same. 13. Before I consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel of parties, it would be more convenient to give a chronological list of the important events which have a bearing upon the present petitions. 3rd October, 1947 Jaipur District Boards Act passed. 4th October, 1948 First amendment of District Boards Act passed by which sec. 4-A was inserted providing for constituting provisionally for any area Board consisting wholly of members nominated by the Government the term of which would be two years or until a Board consisting of both elected and nominated members was framed under sec. 4 whichever period might be less. 16th October, 1948 District Boards of Sawai Jaipur, Sawai Madhopur, Jhunjhunu and Malpura constituted. 22nd October, 1948 Rules framed under the Act. 1st November, 1948 Rules published in the Gazette. 6th November, 1948 District Boards of Sawai Madhopur, Jhunjhunu and Malpura passed resolutions for levy of cess. 19th November, 1948 Proceedings of a meeting under the Chairmanship of Education Minister. 29th November, 1948 Resolution dated the 6th November, 1948 published in the Jaipur Gazette mentioning that sanction of the Government had been accorded. 27th February, 1949 Jaipur District Board passed a resolution levying cess. 6th April, 1949 Resolution dated the 27th February, 1949 published in the Jaipur Gazette mentioning that Government sanction had been received. 8th November, 1949 2nd Amendment of the Act passed sec. 3(a) added regarding constitution of Districts and inclusion and exclusion of areas. Another sec. 4(a) also added, providing for provisional Boards consisting of all nominated members only. This amendment was made by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan after the formation of the present State of Rajasthan. 22nd July, 1950 Following five District Boards constituted:1. Jaipur. 2. Jhunjhunu. 3. Sawaimadhopur. 4. Sikar. 5. TonkMalpura District Board abolished. List of members of District Boards given. 21st October, 1950 An official member added and made Chairman. This amendment was made by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan after the formation of the present State of Rajasthan. 22nd July, 1950 Following five District Boards constituted:1. Jaipur. 2. Jhunjhunu. 3. Sawaimadhopur. 4. Sikar. 5. TonkMalpura District Board abolished. List of members of District Boards given. 21st October, 1950 An official member added and made Chairman. 25th August, 1951 Above District Boards abolished. New Boards with new members constituted. 17th & 19th Sept., 1952 Petitions of Group A heard. 24th September, 1952 Resolution levying cess passed by Sikar District Board. 25th September, 1952 Government sanction accorded to Sikar resolution dated the 24th Sept., 1952. 1st October, 1952 Resolution levying cess passed by Jhunjhunu District Board. 1st October, 1952 After the sanction of the Government resolution for levy of cess passed by District Board, Sikar. 4th October, 1952 Amendment of the Act passed by the Jaipur District Boards Act Amendment Ordinance No. 3 of 1952 by which sec. 31 was amended and a new sec. 59 was inserted. 17th November, 1952 Jaipur District Boards Act (Amendment) No. 24 of 1952 passed with the same provisions as those of amendment Ordinance No. 3 of 1952. 14. From the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties the following points emerge for decision:— (1) Whether the District Boards in question were validly constituted? (2) Whether the Act, the Amending Ordinance or the Third Amendment Act is void being repugnant to Arts. 13 and 14 of the Constitution of India? (3) Whether those petitioners who are State Grantees have sufficient interest to file the petitions? (4) Whether Sec. 31 of the Act, as it stood before the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act, made it obligatory that the sanction of the Government ought to be obtained first and thereafter a resolution passed by the Board levying cess? (5) Whether in view of the amendment made in sec. 31 by the Amendment Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act it is not necessary to obtain Government sanction first and then pass a resolution levying the cess? (6) Whether the amendment made by the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act have retrospective effect. (5) Whether in view of the amendment made in sec. 31 by the Amendment Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act it is not necessary to obtain Government sanction first and then pass a resolution levying the cess? (6) Whether the amendment made by the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act have retrospective effect. If so, whether they effect even those petitions which were filed before the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act came into force i.e., the petitions of Group A and B. (7) Whether the District Boards of Sikar and Tonk could validly realise the cess levied by Malpura District Board? (8) Whether by the passing of resolution dated the 1st October, 1952, the District Boards of Sikar and Jhunjhunu validated the levying of cess? (9) Whether there was any effective and adequate alternate remedy available to the petitioners. If so, are the petitions to be rejected on this ground alone? (10) What relief, if any, are the petitioners or any of them entitled to? 15. Point 1—It was argued on this point by Mr. H.P. Gupta appearing on behalf of the petitioners that it was necessary under the Act that all the members of the District Board should be appointed at one and the same time and not at different times, and that the Act also requires that the Chairman should be first appointed a member and then he should be appointed Chairman. Further, it was argued that the members should be appointed and notified by names and not by their offices which they hold under the Government. In the present cases all the members were not appointed at one and the same time but at different times and the Chairman were not appointed members first before being appointed Chairman. Moreover, some of the members were appointed and notified by the offices they held under the Government and not by their names. The Boards were, therefore, not validly constituted. 16. It was argued by Mr. D.M. Bhandari on behalf of the respondents that it was not necessary that all the members of the District Board should be appointed at one and the same time and that there was no prohibition against the members being appointed at different time. It was also argued that there was no bar to the members being appointed ex-officio and that sec. It was also argued that there was no bar to the members being appointed ex-officio and that sec. 15 of the Jaipur General Clauses Act, 1944, which applied to the Act lays down that where, by any Act or Regulation, a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment may be made either by name or by virtue of office. Nothing is otherwise expressly provided in the Act so far as the appointment of members is concerned. Members could, therefore, be appointed either by their personal names or by virtue of their office. So far as the Chairman is concerned, there is an express provision under sec. 16 of the Act, that he may be appointed ex-officio. The fact that some members were appointed ex-officio did not render the constitution of the District Boards invalid. 17. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel on this point. I do not find any particular provision in the Act, according to which all the members should be appointed by their personal names and none can be appointed ex-officio. According to sec. 15 of the Jaipur General Clauses Act which applies to the Act, unless there were otherwise expressly provided, power to appoint any person to fill the office of a member of a District Board could be exercised by the appointment either by name or by virtue of office. This power was exercised when some of the members were appointed by office. So far as the Chairman is concerned he too could be appointed ex-officio even if there were no express provision in the Act to that effect. But I find that this power is expressly conferred by sec. 16(2) of the Act which provides that the Chairman may be appointed ex-officio. Reliance was placed on sec. 11 of the Act in support of his contention by the counsel for the petitioners. That section, however, only provides that the names of all members finally elected to any Board as well as the names of the nominated members, if any appointed thereto, and the names of elected or appointed Chairman or vice-Chairman shall be published as soon as convenient in the Gazette. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that sec. That section, however, only provides that the names of all members finally elected to any Board as well as the names of the nominated members, if any appointed thereto, and the names of elected or appointed Chairman or vice-Chairman shall be published as soon as convenient in the Gazette. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that sec. 11 does not say that the nominated members shall be notified in the Gazette by their posts and it, therefore, shows that their appointment is to be made and the notification to that effect published in the Gazette by their personal names. This argument does not appeal to me. As regards Chairman, there is an express provision that he can be appointed ex-officio too. If a Chairman is appointed ex-officio it is only the name of the post which can be published in the Gazette and not his personal name. Sec. 11 uses the words "names of members........" and not the names of all the persons or individuals nominated as members etc. Members and Chairman as has been discussed above, can under the Act be appointed by their personal names or ex-officio. In case, therefore, the members or Chairman are appointed ex-officio reasonable interpretation which can be given to the words "names of members..." can only be that in case members or Chairman are appointed by their personal names shall be notified in the Gazette, but if they are appointed by the name of the office they hold, the publication shall be by the name of the office. In no other way can sec. 16(2) of the Act be reconciled with sec. 11. It is well known principle of law that an Act should be read as a harmonious whole and every attempt should be made to reconcile one part of it with the other. If the narrow interpretation to the words "names of members ........." is given (according to the suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioners sec. 16(2) will have not meaning and will be redundant. If the narrow interpretation to the words "names of members ........." is given (according to the suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioners sec. 16(2) will have not meaning and will be redundant. It is a well-known principle of interpretation that no words in a statute will be considered to be a surplusage unless an absurdity will follow from giving effect to them and that such sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence or word shall prove superfluous, void or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent (1) ((1) Craies on Statute Law, 1952 Edv., P. 99.). On the same page the learned author gives a question of Erle G.J. in R. vs. St. John, Westgate, Buird Board(2), ((2) (1862) 2-B and 5 703, 706.) which is as follows : — "To reject words as insensible is the ultima ratio when an absurdity would follow from giving effect to the words of an enactment as they stand." Again there is a quotation of Lord Holt in Harcourt vs. Fox (3), ((3) (1693). show, 506, 532.) which runs as follows: — "I think we should be very bold men, when we are entrusted with the interpretation of Acts of Parliament, to reject any words that are sensible in an Act." It cannot be said that the provision in sec. 16(2) is absurd or insensible. It cannot, therefore, be rejected as such. The presumption is against its being a surplusage. Every attempt should, therefore, be made to reconcile it with sec. 11. It would not be doing any violence to the language of sec. 11 if it is reconciled with sec. 16(2) by interpreting the words "names of members, Chairman etc." as including the names of the offices, the holders of which have been nominated as members or Chairman. The publication by the name of an office, therefore, was not in contravention of any provision of the Act and the Boards were not improperly constituted simply because those members and Chairman who were appointed ex-officio were notified in the Gazette by the names of their offices and not by their personal names. 18. The publication by the name of an office, therefore, was not in contravention of any provision of the Act and the Boards were not improperly constituted simply because those members and Chairman who were appointed ex-officio were notified in the Gazette by the names of their offices and not by their personal names. 18. Coming to the next argument on this point that Chairmen ought also to have been appointed members and without being appointed members their appointment as Chairman was invalid, the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that sec. 16 clearly provides that the Chairman whether he is elected or appointed must be a member of the Board. This is true but in the present case, I find that the Chairman were appointed members also. In the Jaipur Gazette (Extra-ordinary) dated the 16th October, 1948, a list of the members of the various District Boards has been published and in that list the Chairman is put at No. 1. There, of course, he is described as ex-officio Chairman. But that is because in addition to his being appointed a member he was also appointed a Chairman. This is clear from the opening part which says that the list of the members is given below. The argument, therefore, that the Chairmen were not appointed members falls to the ground. As regards the contention that all the members ought to have been appointed at one and the same time I do not find any warrant in the Act for it. I, therefore, hold that the District Boards in question were properly and validly constituted. 19. Point No. 2— Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that not only the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act, but also the Act itself is void as it is repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as, it gives District Boards, only a part of Rajasthan with the consequence of saddling the State grantees and cultivators of that part with the liability to pay cess. It was argued that the Jaipur District Board Act applies only to the territories comprised in the erstwhile Jaipur State and not to any other part of Rajasthan. Wherever this Act applies, the State Grantees and cultivators are liable to pay cess. The legislation is, therefore, discriminatory in character. It was argued that the Jaipur District Board Act applies only to the territories comprised in the erstwhile Jaipur State and not to any other part of Rajasthan. Wherever this Act applies, the State Grantees and cultivators are liable to pay cess. The legislation is, therefore, discriminatory in character. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that first of all this objection was not taken in the petitions and secondly, the legislation is not discriminatory. There is a reasonable basis for classification inasmuch as the inhabitants of the erstwhile Jaipur State had the privilege of enjoying the benefits of Local Self Government by virtue of the Act and consequently, they had the liability to pay cess for carrying on these institutions. District Boards had existed in the erstwhile Jaipur State even before the Rajasthan State came into being and there was no reason who those parts of Rajasthan which had enjoyed these self governing local institutions should be deprived of those institutions after the formation of Rajasthan State simply because other parts had not those advantages. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. The objection put forward in the arguments has not been taken in so many words in any of the 105 petitions. In petitions Nos. 187 and 388 of 1952 of Group B only objection has been taken that the Act is discriminating. Even there, it has not been said that the Act offends against the provisions of Art. 14, but we may not be so technical and it may be taken that in these two petitions only objection has been taken that the Act offends against the provisions of Art. 14. 20. The only argument put forward is that the Act applies only to those parts which formerly comprised Jaipur State and does not apply to any other part of Rajasthan. The Act creates the liability to pay cess upon the State grantees and cultivators of those parts only to which it applies. Thus there is a discrimination between the citizens of one part of Rajasthan State and those of other part because whereas particular classes of one part are liable to pay cess under the Act those very classes of other parts are not. Reliance was placed upon the case of R. S. Manoharsinghji vs. The State of Rajasthan (1) ((1) 1952 R.L.W. 81.). In that case three Ordinances Nos. Reliance was placed upon the case of R. S. Manoharsinghji vs. The State of Rajasthan (1) ((1) 1952 R.L.W. 81.). In that case three Ordinances Nos. 27 of 1948, of the former Rajasthan State were the subject matter of attack by the petitioners on the ground that under those Ordinances, the former State of Rajasthan assumed the management of the jagirs including the jagir of the petitioner R.S. Manohar Singhji. It was alleged that these three Ordinances were ultra vires of the Constitution as they discriminated between the Jagirdars of one part of Rajasthan and those of others, inasmuch as the jagirs of the Jagirdars in the territories comprised in the former State of Rajasthan were taken in State management while those of the other parts were not taken. It was held by a Division Bench consisting of the Honble the Chief Justice and Bapna J. on a review of a number of cases of the Supreme Court of the United States of America bearing upon the equal protection of the law clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United State of America which is in the same words as the equality before law clause of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India that there was no reasonable basis for discriminating between the jagirs of the former State of Rajasthan and those of other parts of the present State of Rajasthan. It was, however observed that:— "If there is some reasonable basis for a classification based on any reasonable differentiation, it is permissible for a State to have different laws in different parts of it. But the basis must be reasonable and the law must not discriminate purely arbitrarily. It is possible to have a classification based on geographical distribution but such distribution must be based on the particular needs of that geographical area which are, distinct and real as compared to needs to the remaining geographical area." It was further observed that: "If the Ordinances in question can be justified with regard to the welfare of all classes of a particular territory or jurisdiction that would give a reasonable basis for classification and the Ordinances would not be hit by Art.14 of the Constitution." The facts of that case are quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. There is a reasonable basis for classification in the present case, inasmuch as, the District Boards had been in existence in the erstwhile Jaipur State before the present Rajasthan came into being. The District Boards are local self governing institutions and the inhabitants of the area where District Boards are in existence have got the privilege of self Government in many matters. There must be some funds to carry on the self governing institutions and their purposes. For that the Act provided for the cess. The liability to pay cess arises from the privilege of self Government in matters provided for by the Act. It is a sign of advancement that local self governing institutions existed in certain parts. Among the directive principles the Constitution of India has provided under Art. 40 for the organisation of village panchayats and endowing them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. When the Constitution envisages the organisation of self governing institutions even in villages to abolish the District Boards which are self governing institutions for a whole District from those parts where they existed, simply because other parts, have not got them, would be a retrograde step and would be against the spirit of the Constitution. It is, therefore, but fair to continue those self governing institutions wherever they existed before the present State of Rajasthan came into being. There is thus a reasonable basis for maintaining District Boards in those parts where they had existed since before the State of Rajasthan came into being. 21. It was held in the case of Frank J. Bowman vs. Edward A Lewis (1) ((1) 101 United States Supreme Court Reports p. 22.) that: "A State may, if it pleases, establish one system of law in one portion of its territory, and another system in another; provided, that it does not encroach upon the proper jurisdiction of the United States, and does not abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of his rights without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws in the same district." In that case by the Constitution and laws of Missouri, a court called the St. Louis Court of appeal had exclusive jurisdiction, in certain cases, of all appeals from the circuit in St. Louis and some adjoining countries; the Supreme Court had jurisdiction of appeal in like cases from the circuit courts of the remaining countries of the State. It was held that: "This adjustment of appellate jurisdiction was not forbidden by anything contained in the 14th Amendment. As the State had full powers to make political Sub-Divisions of its territories for municipal purposes and to regulate their local Government including the Constitution of Courts and the extent of their jurisdiction." 22. In the case of S. H. Williams vs. Arther F. Eggleston (1), (1 170 United State Supreme Court Reports p. 304.) five towns of Hartford, East Windsor, Clastonobury, Manchester and South Windsor in the State of Connecticut were put into a class by themselves and organised in a single municipal corporation and separated from other towns in the State by being subjected to different controls in respect to high-ways. This placed these five towns under an obligation to assist in the construction of a new bridge. The Board of Commissioners of the District composed of all the above towns, having expended a certain sum in the ordinary support and maintenance of the bridge passed a resolution apportioning the amount between these five towns and drew a warrant for the sum of $ 15 on the town of Clastonbury, its portion of the sum expended. The treasurer of that town refused to pay the order, whereupon, the Board presented an application to the Superior Court of Hartford county for an alternative writ of mandamus against him. The treasurer pleaded inter alia that the proceedings of the Board denied the equal protection of the laws under the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America to the Town of Clastonbury. It was held that— "The regulation of municipal corporations is a matter peculiary within the domain of State control; that the State is not compelled by the Federal Constitution to grant to all its municipal corporations the same territorial extent, or the same duties and powers." It was further held that: "A municipal corporation is, so far as its purely municipal relations are concerned, simply an agency of the state for conducting the affair of Government, and as such it is subject to the control of the legislature. That body may place one part of the State under one municipal organisation and another part of the State under another organisation of an entirely different character." It was also held that: "Whether territory shall be governed for local purposes by a countries; a city, or a township organisation is one of the most usual and ordinary subjects of State legislation." 23. In the famous case of Charanjitlal Chowdhury vs. The Union of India (2) (2 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. p. 41.) decided by the Supreme Court, held that: "A law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. Any classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed." It was further held that: "The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of ah enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles." 24. In the present case, as has been said above there is a basis for reasonable classification inasmuch as the parts of the present State of Rajasthan comprised in the erstwhile Jaipur State were considered to be fit enough to have local self Governing institutions in the shape of District Boards under the Act. They had, therefore, the privilege of having self governing local institutions before the present State of Rajasthan come into being. It is therefore quite justifiable that the privilege they had from before may be continued even after the establishment of local self governing institutions. The Government of the State of Rajasthan is contemplating to extend such institutions to the entire State of Rajasthan. It, therefore, did not consider it droper to withdraw the privileges which had already been given to those parts which were formerly comprised in Jaipur State. It cannot be said that in doing so it made unreasonable discrimination between these parts and other parts of Rajasthan. The guarantee of equal protection does not prevent the State from applying different laws or different systems of judicature to different parts or local conditions, for the clause does not secure to all persons the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. The guarantee of equal protection does not prevent the State from applying different laws or different systems of judicature to different parts or local conditions, for the clause does not secure to all persons the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. If the petitioners were not liable to pay the cess under the Act, they would have no grudge against the Act which gave to the inhabitants of the erstwhile State of Jaipur the benefit of self governing institutions like the District Boards. Simply because for the privilege given by the Act, the petitioners have to contribute their mite to the up-keep of those institutions and for the carrying out of their purposes, it cannot be said that any unfair discrimination has been made between them and the inhabitants of other parts of Rajasthan. The burden of showing that the classification rests upon arbitrary and un-reasonable basis is upon the person who impeaches the law as being opposed to "equality before law clause." In the present case, the petitioners have failed to show that the classification made by the Act rests upon arbitrary and unreasonable basis. In fact all the petitioners excepting two, have not even alleged in. their petitions that unfair discrimination has been made between them and the residents of other parts of Rajasthan. It cannot be said that there was no occasion for taking such an objection at the time those petitions were filed because the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amending Act have been passed after they were filed. The objection of unfair discrimination as appears from the arguments is not against the amendments but against the Act itself, as it originally stood before the Amendment Act. If the petitioners thought that the Act made any unreasonable discrimination it was their duty to have taken this objection in the petitions themselves. Even in the petitions filed after the amendments, it is only in two petitions in which an objection on the ground of unreasonable discrimination has been taken. As a matter of fact, neither the Act or its amendments in question make any unreasonable discrimination between one part and another has been discussed above. The objection is, therefore, futile and must be rejected. 25. Point No. 3—Under sec. As a matter of fact, neither the Act or its amendments in question make any unreasonable discrimination between one part and another has been discussed above. The objection is, therefore, futile and must be rejected. 25. Point No. 3—Under sec. 32(b) of the Act all sums due from tenants in areas other than khalsa including the tenants of sub-grantees shall be recoverable from the grantees and remitted by them to the Government. Thus in the first instance, the cess has been made recoverable from the State grantees. Of course, it has been provided that the State-grantees shall be entitled to realise the cess from their tenants and the sub-grantees. It is however not necessary that the State grantees might be able to realise every pie of the cess from the tenants which they themselves might have to pay by virtue of sec. 32(b). Most of the tenants or at least some may not be financially able to recoup the loss to the State grantee which he might suffer on their account. Moreover, under sec. 34 the State grantee is liable to contribute an amount equal to the aggregate of the amount of cess payable to him by his tenant. Thus he has to pay an equal amount from his own pocket. It cannot therefore, be said that the State grantees have no interest to challenge the validity of the cess levied. 26. Point No. 4—It was argued by Mr. H. P. Gupta for the petitioners that the opening words of sec. 31 as it stood before the Amending Ordinance and the third Amendment Act were as follows: "With the previous sanction of the Government a Board shall levy by means of a resolution." 27. It was argued that it was clearly meant that the sanction of the Government should be obtained first and then by means of a resolution the cess should be levied. In none of the present cases sanction of the Government was obtained before the passing of the resolution. The case was just the reverse as the resolution was passed first and then the sanction of the Government was obtained. The resolution, therefore, had no force and cess could not be validly levied on its strength. In none of the present cases sanction of the Government was obtained before the passing of the resolution. The case was just the reverse as the resolution was passed first and then the sanction of the Government was obtained. The resolution, therefore, had no force and cess could not be validly levied on its strength. A number of rulings were cited on behalf of the petitioners to show that in cases where the words "previous sanction" were used it was held that sanction received afterwards would not validate the act which required previous sanction. Some of the rulings relate to sec. 197 Cr.P.C. where the words "previous sanction" have been used. It was argued that taxing legislation should be strictly construed and in cases of doubt advantage should be gived to the subject. I need not refer to the rulings in which it has been held that taxing legislation should be strictly construed and benefit of doubt should be given to the subject, because it is a well known principle of law. Likewise no help from any ruling is required in the interpretation of the opening part quoted above of sec. 31 as it is quite clear and unambiguous. The words used are "previous sanction" and they are followed by the words "a board shall levy by means of a resolution." It is therefore quite clear that the legislature meant that sanction of the Government should be obtained first and then a resolution should be passed levying cess. In the absence of strict compliance with this procedure the levying of the cess would not be valid. It is clear that the resolutions about the levying of the cess were passed by the District Boards of Sawai Madhopur and Jhunjhunu on the 6th November, 1948. The sanction of the Government was given later on and was published in the Jaipur Gazette dated the 29th November, 1948. The sanction, therefore, followed and not preceded the resolution for the levying of cess. In the same way resolution for the levy of cess was passed by the Jaipur District Board on the 27th February, 1949 and the Government sanction was given later on and published in the Gazette of 6th April, 1949. In the case of this District Board too the sanction followed and not preceded the resolution levying cess. In the same way resolution for the levy of cess was passed by the Jaipur District Board on the 27th February, 1949 and the Government sanction was given later on and published in the Gazette of 6th April, 1949. In the case of this District Board too the sanction followed and not preceded the resolution levying cess. The fact that a resolution was passed for the levy of cess and sanction of Government was also obtained would not make the levying of the cess valid if the procedure which was laid down in law was not followed. In terms of sec. 31 as it stood before the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act, a resolution ought to have been passed after the receipt of Government sanction. Taxing enactments have to be strictly construed and the benefit of doubt, if any, should be given to the subject and not to the taxing authority. I therefore find myself unable to agree with the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents that by receiving sanction after the passing of the resolution there was substantial compliance with the provisions of sec. 31. It was argued by Mr. D. M. Bhandari that a meeting was held under the Presidentship of the Education Minister, Jaipur, who also held the portfolio of Local Self Government on 19th October, 1948 and that the proceedings of that meeting showed that the Government had given its sanction and so the resolution of Jaipur District Board passed on 27th February, 1949 was perfectly valid as having been passed after the sanction. If any sanction of the Government can be gathered from the proceedings of the 19th October, 1948 it will only be the petitions of groups A-J, B-J and G-J, and the petitions of groups C-J, S-M and T in part which would be affected. The proceedings in the first instance do not show that any sanction was given for the levying of the cess. Secondly, only one of the Ministers of the Government participated in it and not the whole Cabinet. The proceedings in the first instance do not show that any sanction was given for the levying of the cess. Secondly, only one of the Ministers of the Government participated in it and not the whole Cabinet. The only proceedings of this meeting which are relied upon is resolution No. 10 which only says that wide publicity of the resolution regarding recovery of the cess may be given in the district, and that soon after it is passed by the Board in anticipation of the Government sanction circular to the Tehsildars, grantees, and sub-grantees may be issued to realise the District Board cess at the rate of one anna per rupee from the tenants along with the land revenue for the current siyalu. This resolution only gives direction what should be done after the passing of the resolution by the Board in anticipation of the Government sanction. This does not show that the resolution itself amounted to sanction of the Government. Moreover, as has been said above, only one of the Ministers of the Government had no authority to give Government sanction. It was argued that every Minister was given the powers of the Government so far as the Departments under him were concerned by the notification published in the Gazette of 3rd March, 1949. This was however after the passing of the resolution as also after the meeting of the 19th October, 1948. Any sanction invalidity given before the 3rd March, 1949 could not be valid by virtue of the fact, that afterwards the Minister was given the power of the whole Cabinet. It was argued that the proceedings of the meeting of 19th October, 1948 were signed by the Secretary, Local Self Government and therefore the resolution No. 10 ought to be considered sanction of the Government. This to, my mind has no force. The Secretary has only signed the proceedings of the meeting and he does not purport to issue any Government sanction. I am therefore unable to accept the argument that there is anything in the proceedings of the 19th October, 1948 from which valid Government sanction might be inferred. It was further argued that at least in the case of Madhopur, resolution about cess was passed by the Board on 23rd January, 1951. I am therefore unable to accept the argument that there is anything in the proceedings of the 19th October, 1948 from which valid Government sanction might be inferred. It was further argued that at least in the case of Madhopur, resolution about cess was passed by the Board on 23rd January, 1951. In the case of Sawai Madhopur, of course, resolution was passed on the 23rd January, 1951 after the sanction of the Government was received. This resolution is perfectly in order and as it was passed after the Government sanction was obtained it can be said to levy cess validly. However, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that this resolution was not given publicity as required by rule 4-A. The petitioners have taken an objection in their petitions that the subsequent resolution of 23rd January, 1951 was not published in the Gazette as required. Rule 4-A made under sec. 48 of the Act requires that the Board shall give publicity to the resolution inter alia by publication in the Jaipur Raj Patra and a local newspaper, if any. The respondents failed to show that this resolution was published the Gazette as required by the said rule. Therefore, no further proceedings can be taken on the strength of this resolution unless it is published in the Gazette as required in rule 4-A. Till then the proceedings for the realisation of cess which are in progress cannot be sustained, if sec. 31 is to stand as it was before the Amendment. 28. Point No. 5—After the hearing of the petitions of A group by this Bench judgment was reserved. Before judgment could be prepared the Raj-pramukh of the Rajasthan promulgated the Amending Ordinance and it was published in the Rajasthan Gazette (Extraordinary) dated the 4th October, 1952. By sec. 2 of this Ordinance an amendment was made in sec. 31 of the Act. By this amendment for the words "with the previous sanction of the Government, a Board shall levy by means of resolution, the following words were substituted:— "A Board shall levy, with the sanction of the Government." 29. The above Ordinance was followed by the Third Amendment Act which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette (Extra-Ordinary) dated the 17th November, 1952. This Amendment Act also made the same amendment in sec. 31 as was made by the Amending Ordinance. The above Ordinance was followed by the Third Amendment Act which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette (Extra-Ordinary) dated the 17th November, 1952. This Amendment Act also made the same amendment in sec. 31 as was made by the Amending Ordinance. After the passing of the Third Amendment Act the respondents moved this court to decide the cases in the light of the amendments made. It may be noted that before this motion was made to applications had been made in the cases relating to the District Boards of Jhunjhunu and Sikar that resolution had been passed by each of these two Boards on the 1st October, 1952 after the sanction of the Government for levying cess, and, therefore, the cases might be considered in the light of these two resolutions. This Bench considered it proper to give a hearing to the parties in the light of the two resolutions and the amendments made by the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act. As has been said earlier in this judgment at the hearing of the petitions of group A some other petitions could not be heard along with those petitions as they were not ripe for hearing. A number of petitions of group B had been made after the hearing of the petitions of group A but before the passing of the Amending Ordinance. Some petitions of group C were filed after the passing of the Amending Ordinance and the rest after the passing of the Third Amendment Act. These petitions of group B and C were also heard at the time of the further hearing of the petitions of group A on the 19th and 20th of March, 1953. 30. The first objection which was made by the counsel for the petitioners at this last hearing was that no notice should be taken of the resolutions and the amendments made during the pendency of the petitions of group A and that the petitions should be decided on the arguments made in September, 1952. This objection cannot in any case prevail so far as the petitions of group B and C are concerned, because they had not been heard before the passing of the resolutions is question or before the passing of the Amending Ordinance or the Third Amendment Act. This objection cannot in any case prevail so far as the petitions of group B and C are concerned, because they had not been heard before the passing of the resolutions is question or before the passing of the Amending Ordinance or the Third Amendment Act. As regards the petitions of group A which had been heard in September, 1952, too, I do not think we can shut out eyes to the change of law which had taken place before those cases could be decided because if that amendment makes the, cesses in question valid we would not be justified in holding them to be invalid in face of the clear provisions of law. 31. In the case of Jones vs. Rosenberg (1), (1. 1950 (1) A.E.R. p.296.) arguments were re heard on account of the change in law after the 1st hearing and before the judgment could be pronounced and it was held that the court was at liberty by hear further arguments before judgment. 32. Coming to the amendment it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitions that even after the amendment the position remained the same as before the amendment. It was argued that the words "a Board shall levy with the sanction of the Government" mean the same thing as the words "with the previous sanction of the Government Board shall levy." It was contended that by omitting the word "previous" before the word "sanction" the legislature has not been successful in making the levy of the cess legal without the previous sanction of the Government. Reliance was placed upon the ruling in the case of Manakchand vs. The Municipal Council of Jaipur (2) (2. A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 139.). On behalf of the respondent it was argued by Mr. D.M. Bhandari that the amendment has made a lot of difference. In omitting the word "previous" before the word "sanction the legislature had made it clear that it is not necessary to obtain previous sanction before passing the resolution levying cess. It was argued that it had been made still more clear by omitting the words "by means of a resolution" after the word "levy". The amendment now made makes it clear that for the levy of the cess the only thing which is necessary is that the sanction of the Government be obtained prior to passing of resolution levying cess or after it. The amendment now made makes it clear that for the levy of the cess the only thing which is necessary is that the sanction of the Government be obtained prior to passing of resolution levying cess or after it. As regards the ruling in the case of Manakchand vs. Municipal Council of Jaipur (1) ((1) A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 139.) cited by the counsel for the petitioners it was argued that provisions of secs. 77, 78 and 79 of the City Jaipur Municipal Act on the basis of which it was held that previous sanction of the Government was necessary before passing a resolution levying tax were quite different from the provisions of sec. 31 of the Act as now amended. 33. I have very carefully considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. The amendment in question was made after the hearing of the applications of Group A in September, 1952. It is quite clear that the amendment was made with a view to obviate any difficulty which might be created by the language of sec. 31 as it originally stood in the realisation of the cess in question. The preamble of the amending Ordinance recites "whereas circumstances exist which render in necessary further to amend the Jaipur District Boards Act, 1947, for the purposes hereinafter appearing ; and whereas the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly is not in session etc." The circumstances which are referred to were clearly the objections raised by the petitioners to the legality of the cess on the language of sec. 31. The legislature intended that before the judgment is delivered by this court, it should come out with an amendment, which might obviate the necessity of previous sanction before passing a resolution levying cess and as the Assembly was not in session an Ordinance was promulgated. It was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of D.R. Fraser and Co., Ltd. vs. The Minister of National Revenue(2) ( A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 120.). It was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of D.R. Fraser and Co., Ltd. vs. The Minister of National Revenue(2) ( A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 120.). "In tax legislation it is far from uncommon to find amendments introduced at the instance of the Revenue department to obviate judicial decisions which the department considers to be attended with undesirable results." Their Lordships further observed: "When an amending Act alters the language of principal statute; the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately." Their Lordships had to deal in that case with an amendment made by sec. 10 of 1940(c) 34 in sec. 5(1)(a) of the Dominion Income War Tax Act. Before the amendment the word "shall" was used in sec. 5(1)(a) but by the amendment the word "may" was substituted in place of the word "shall". It was argued on behalf of the assessee that notwithstanding the substitution of the word "may" in place of the word "shall", the Minister was still under an obligation to make exemptions and deductions in the tax, and that the substitution of word "may" in place of the word "shall" did not make it discretionary with the Minister to allow exemption and deduction on account of depreciation but he was bound to make some allowance. Their Lordships of course came to the conclusion on the language of the Act as amended that the substitution of the word "may" made it discretionary with the Minister to allow any exemption or deduction. Their Lordships however also took into account the fact that in the case of Pioneer Laundry and Dry Cleaners Ltd. vs. Minister of National Revenue (3) (1940 A.C. 127.), which related to a claim for depreciation, the Board had held that the assesses were entitled to a deduction for depreciation to such extent as the Minister might allow, and that the Minister had not properly exercised his discretion inasmuch as he had regard to inadmissible consideration and that it was after this decision that the statute was amended. 34. Coming to the language of the amendment made by the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act it is significant that the word "previous" has been omitted before the word "sanction" and that the words means of resolution" after the word "levy" have been omitted. It cannot, therefore, be said that sec. 34. Coming to the language of the amendment made by the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act it is significant that the word "previous" has been omitted before the word "sanction" and that the words means of resolution" after the word "levy" have been omitted. It cannot, therefore, be said that sec. 31 of the Act as amended makes it obligatory that the sanction of the Government must be obtained previously and then cess should be levied by means of a resolution. The only thing which has been made obligatory is to obtain the sanction of the Government. This sanction may be obtained before or after the passing of the resolution levying cess. If there is any ambiguity it is cleared by comparison of the language of sec. 31 as it stood prior to the amendment and the language substituted by the amendment, and also the circumstances under which the amendment was made. The amendment was deliberate and it was made with a view to obviate the difficulty created by the language of sec. 31 as it originally stood. It cannot be said that the language of the section after the amendment clearly admits of one interpretation and one interpretation only that the sanction should be obtained before the passing of resolution regarding levy of cess. When there is no qualification attached to the word "sanction", it may be obtained before or after passing the resolution regarding cess. If there is any ambiguity, assistance may be legitimately taken from the history of the legislation as well as the circumstances under which necessity arose of the amendment in question. I am clear in my mind that on the language of sec. 31 as amended, under the circumstances of the case, it cannot be held that it was obligatory on the Board to obtain sanction of the Government before passing a resolution regarding levying of cess. If the resolution is sanctioned by the Government without any modification it becomes effective as soon as the sanction of the Government is obtained and published. Only in case there is modification by the Government, it may be necessary for the Board to reconsider the resolution in the light of the modification made in the Government sanction. 35. If the resolution is sanctioned by the Government without any modification it becomes effective as soon as the sanction of the Government is obtained and published. Only in case there is modification by the Government, it may be necessary for the Board to reconsider the resolution in the light of the modification made in the Government sanction. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manakchand and others vs. The Municipal Council, Jaipur (1) (A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 139.). The facts of that case were, however, different. The city of Jaipur Municipal Act under which the tax was levied made a provision under sec. 78 for preliminary procedure before imposing the tax. The first step under the preliminary procedure was to pass a resolution at a general meeting selecting one or other of the taxes specified in sec. 77 and prepare rules for the purposes of clause (h) of sec. 62 prescribing the tax selected and certain things as for example classes of persons or property and amounts or rates etc. were to be specified in such resolution and in such rules. After the passing of the resolution, rules so prepared were to be published with a notice in a form prescribed. Within one month from the publication of the notice any inhabitant of the Municipality could object to the imposition of the tax or to the amount of rate proposed or to the classes of persons or property to be made liable thereto or to any exemption proposed. The Municipal Board was required to take such objections into consideration and unless it decided to abandon the proposed tax it was required to submit such objections with its opinion thereon and any modification proposed in accordance therewith, together with the notice and rules of Government. On receipt of the opinion of the Municipal Board, the Government had a discretion to either refuse to sanction the rules submitted or to return them to the Municipal Board for further consideration, or if no objection, which was in its opinion sufficient, was made to the proposed tax within one month from the publication of the notice, to sanction the rules either without modifications or conditions. After the action had been taken by the Government under sec. After the action had been taken by the Government under sec. 79, the Municipal Board was given powers to impose any of the taxes allowed by the Act. There was thus an elaborate procedure for the imposing of the tax and on a consideration of it the Division Bench which decided that case came to the conclusion that a, second resolution was necessary after the grant of Government sanction. In sec. 31 as amended by the present Act, no such elaborate procedure has been laid down as has been said above, the only condition laid down is that sanction of the Government must be received for validating the cess. This sanction may be obtained after the passing of the resolution levying tax. 36. I may also refer to another ruling cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is of a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Emperor vs. Shirinbai Sohrabji Nagpurwala (1) (A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 66.). In that case, however, in sec. 48 of the Bombay District Municipal Act it was clearly provided that bye-laws had to be made with the previous sanction of the Commissioner. The word "previous" is significant and the ruling has no application to the present case where the word "previous" has been deliberately omitted by the amendment made by the legislature. It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that even after the amendment, rule 4(a) of the rules made under the Act uses the words "when by a resolution passed with the previous sanction of the Government under sec. 31 of the Act a Board decides to levy a cess etc.," and these rules have the force of law. It should therefore be taken that the legislation did not mean to do away with the provision of obtaining previous sanction before passing the resolution levying cess. The rule was made before the amendment of sec. 31 by the Amending Ordinance and the third Amendment Act. On the language of sec. 31 the fact that the Government which has been authorised to frame rules has not amended this rule in accordance with the amendment made by the legislature will not affect the language of the amended sec. 31. Rules are made for carrying out the purpose of the Act and they cannot control the language of the Act. This objection to my mind has therefore no force. 37. 31. Rules are made for carrying out the purpose of the Act and they cannot control the language of the Act. This objection to my mind has therefore no force. 37. Point No. 6—It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that even if it be taken that the amendment made in sec. 31 by the Amendment Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act did away with the necessity of obtaining previous sanction of the Government and then passing a resolution levying cess, the amendment has no retrospective effect and did not consequently affect the invalidity of the cess in question. It was argued that every enactment is presumed to be prospective only unless there is any express provision making it retrospective or retrospectively can be inferred by necessary implication. It was argued that there is no express provision in the Amending Ordinance or the Third Amendment Act making the amendment in sec. 31 retrospective in its effect. The argument proceeded that the words used in sec. 2 of the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act by which the amendment is said to have retrospective effect are "shall be, and be deemed always to have been, substituted." These words, it was contended do not make the amendment retrospective by necessary implication. Reliance was placed upon the case of Manak Kanti Roy vs. Kripanath Jain and others (2) (A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 120.). In that case Bengal Tenancy Act 1885 was amended by Act I of 1925 during the pendency of the case and a new provision sec. 20 sub-sec. 1-A was introduced thereby. The new sub-section declared "A person shall be deemed........to have continually held land in village......." It was held that there were no words in the Act by which the sub-section was enacted, which may be construed as indicating an intention that the sub-section was to control the section as it stood even before the sub-section was introduced. The observations in the case of Lachhmeshwar Prasad Shukla and others vs. Keshwa Lal Chowdhry and others (1) made by Suleman J. were also relied upon. 38. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the words "and be deemed always to have been substituted" clearly show by necessary implication that the legislature intended to make the amendment retrospective in its effect. 38. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the words "and be deemed always to have been substituted" clearly show by necessary implication that the legislature intended to make the amendment retrospective in its effect. It was argued that whenever such words were used in an enactment it was held to be retrospective in its effect. The cases of West vs. Gwynne (2) (1911(2) Ch. D.P. T.); Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer Companies District 1 Calcutta (3) (A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 606); Tikasao and others vs. Harilal and others (4) (A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 385.); United Commercial Press Ltd. vs. Satya Narain Chamariya (5) (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 136.); D.R. Frazer & Co., Ltd. vs. The Minister of National Revenue (6) (A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 120) were referred to. 39. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that even if the amendment be taken to have retrospective effect it cannot affect pending proceedings. For this too reliance was placed upon the cases of Kanak Kanti Roy vs. Kripanath Jain and others (7) (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 321.) and observations of Suleman J. in the cases of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukla and others vs. Keshwalal Chowdhry and others (1) (A.I.R. 1941 F.C.P. 5) cited above. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the last mentioned case for showing that the present amendment could affect pending proceedings as well. 40. I have to see first whether the amendment has any retrospective effect at all. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative it has to be further seen whether the present proceedings are affected by it. The words used in sec. 2 of the Amending Ordinance as well as the Third Amendment Act which seeks to amend sec. 31 are "shall be, and be deemed always to have been substituted". So far as the words "shall be" are concerned, they do not indicate any intention to give retrospective effect to the amendment. Had they stood alone the amendment would have certainly been prospective. The question however is what is the effect of the addition of the words "and be deemed always to have been." Literally the expression means that it would be taken that the words put in by the amendment had always existed in sec.31 in place of the words which were deleted, or in other words these words had existed from the very time sec. 31 was enacted. 31 was enacted. This clearly means that we have to read sec.31 since the very beginning as if it had contained the words "a Board shall levy, with the sanction of the Government" and never contained the words "with the previous sanction of the Government a Board shall levy by means of resolution." Thus by necessary implication the expression "be deemed always to have been" gives a retrospective effect to the amendment. It cannot be denied that it is within the power of the legislature to give retrospective effect to any Act. In Craies on Statute Law, 1952 Edn., the learned author says "if it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation the courts will give it such an operation. Observations are given of Lord Hetherley in Pardo vs. Bingham (8) (1869 L. R. 4 Ch. App. 745, 740.) on the same page which are as follows: — "Baron Parke did not consider it an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed and said that the question in each case was whether the Legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what was that that the legislature contemplated." In the case of the United Commercial Press Ltd. vs. Satyanarain Chamaria (1), definition of tenant in the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1950 was amended by the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (temporary provisions) (Amendment) Act 1950 which came into force on November 30, 1950. The Amendment Act provided that the new definition was to be deemed always to have been substituted for the original definition in the 1950 Act. Before the passing of the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1950 and Amendment Act of 1950 a suit had been filed on 29th November, 1949 for the ejectment of the tenant under the Rent Control Act of 1948 which was substituted afterwards by the West Bengal Rent Control Act, 1950. By sec. 5 of the Amendment Act it was provided that in all applications made under sub-sec. (1) (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 136.) of sec. By sec. 5 of the Amendment Act it was provided that in all applications made under sub-sec. (1) (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 136.) of sec. 18 of the Act of 1950 which were pending at the commencement of Amendment Act and in all suits referred to in sub-sec. 5 which were pending at such commencement, the said Act as amended by the Amendment Act shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied. It was held that the expression "shall be deemed always to have applied" made it abundantly clear that the Act as passed on March 31, 1950. Similarly the words "shall be deemed always to have been substituted" were taken to have given retrospective effect to the amendment in the definition of the term "tenant". 41. When by Act No. 10 of 1927, the definition of the word "attested" in sec. 2 of the Transfer of Property Act was amended, the following words were used in the Amendment Act :— "and shall be deemed always to have meant." 42. This expression was taken to give retrospective effect to the definition of the word "attested" provided by the Amendment Act by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of P.L.M. Palaniappa Chettiar vs. Rajgopala Pandarathar and others (2) (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 773.). This view was confirmed by a Full Bench ruling of Madras High Court in the case of Veerappa Chettiar vs. Subrahmanya Ayyer and others (3) (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 1.). In the case of West vs. Gwynne (4) ((4) 1911(2) Ch. D.P. 1.) Buekley L.J. observed that "if an Act provides that at a past date the law shall be taken to have been that which it was not, that Act I understand to be retrospective." In the present case, the word "shall be deemed always to have been substituted; clearly show that the Act provides that sec. 31 of the Act shall be what it was not when it was enacted. The amendment is therefore clearly retrospective. 43. There is another amendment which has been made by the Amending Ordinance as well as the Third Amendment Act. This amendment has been made by sec. 3 which adds a new sec. 59. About this section also the words used are "and be deemed always to have been inserted". On the same ground on which the amendment of sec. 43. There is another amendment which has been made by the Amending Ordinance as well as the Third Amendment Act. This amendment has been made by sec. 3 which adds a new sec. 59. About this section also the words used are "and be deemed always to have been inserted". On the same ground on which the amendment of sec. 31 has been held to be retrospective in its effect, the newly added sec. 59 shall be taken to be retrospective in its effect and it will be assumed that it has been in the Act since the very beginning. The provisions of sec. 59 will be discussed in connection with point No. 7. 44. It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that in any case the amendments did not affect the present petitions, because neither the Amending Ordinance nor the Third Amendment Act lays down that the amendment shall affect pending proceedings. So far as petitions of group C are concerned this argument does not at all apply to them because they were filed after the Amending Ordinance which was confirmed by the Third Amendment Act. Therefore, in any case those petitions should be governed by the amendments in question. The question is only about the petitions of groups A and B. When it has been held that the amendments made by sec. 2 as well as sec. 3 of the Amending Ordinance and Third Amendment Act are to be considered to have existed in the Act since the very beginning, I do not understand why they should not affect the petitions of groups A and B as well. In the case of K.C. Mukerjee, Official Receiver vs. Mst. Ram Ratan Kaur and others (1) (AIR 1936 P.C. 49.) certain provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act were amended by the Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934, when the appeal was pending before His Majesty in Council in that case. By the amendment two new sub-secs. (N) and (O) were added to sec. 26. Sub-sec. Ram Ratan Kaur and others (1) (AIR 1936 P.C. 49.) certain provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act were amended by the Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934, when the appeal was pending before His Majesty in Council in that case. By the amendment two new sub-secs. (N) and (O) were added to sec. 26. Sub-sec. (N) ran as follows: — "Every person claiming an interest as landlord in any holding or portion thereof shall be deemed have given his consent to every transfer of such holding or portion by sale, exchange, gift or will made before first day of January, 1923, and in the case of the transfer of a portion of a holding, to have accept the distribution of the rent of the holding as stated in the instrument of transfer, or if there is no such instrument, as settled between the transferor and the transferee." 45. It provides that in the case of transfer made on or after the 1st of January, 1923, but before the date of the commencement of the Act, the trans-feree may pay to the landlord or deposit with the Collector, a transfer fee as therein particularised, and that upon his complying with this condition the consent of every person claiming an interest as landlord in the holding, or portion transferred shall be deemed to have been given to the transferee. This amendment was made after the case had been decided even by the High Court and when the appeal was pending before His Majesty in Council. It was held by their Lordships that unless some saving could be implied as regards occupancy holdings which as the date of the commencement of the Act were in question in a pending suit, sec. 26(N) must be applied to the case and the plaintiffs appeal must fail in limine. As their Lordships opinion no such saving could be implied the amendment was taken to apply to pending proceedings as well. Similarly, it was held that sec. 26(0) affected the case. In the present case amendment has been made not during any appeal but even before, the case could be decided by this court. As their Lordships opinion no such saving could be implied the amendment was taken to apply to pending proceedings as well. Similarly, it was held that sec. 26(0) affected the case. In the present case amendment has been made not during any appeal but even before, the case could be decided by this court. In my opinion, therefore, the amendments affected even the petitions of Groups A and B. In the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukla and other vs. Keshwalal Chaudhri and others (2) (AIR 1941 F.C.P. 5.) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, there is nothing to show that an Act with the provision "shall be deemed to have been substituted" could not apply to pending proceedings. On the other hand, in that case Bihar Money Lenders Act 1939 which was passed during the pendency of appeal in the Federal Court and after the decision of the High Court was held to apply to the case even at the stage of Federal Court appeal. In the case of Kanak Kanti Roy vs. Kripanath Gain and others (3) (AIR 1931 Cal. 321.) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners such expression as "shall be deemed always to have been substituted or inserted" was not under consideration. The only words used were "a person shall be deemed......to have continually held land is a village" and this expression was not held to make the new enactment retrospective to this extent as to apply to the pending cases. My view is that the amendment made by secs. 2 and 3 of the Amending Ordinance as well as the Third Amendment Act are retrospective in their effect and govern and the petitions whether they be of groups A, B, or C. 46. Point No. 7—It has already been held in connection with point No. 6 that the amendment made by sec. 3 of the Amending Ordinance as well as the Third Amendment Act is retrospective in its effect and governs all sec. 59 has been inserted and it provides that a newly constituted Board under sec. 4 or sec. 4-A in respect of any area under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 of the Amending Ordinance as well as the Third Amendment Act is retrospective in its effect and governs all sec. 59 has been inserted and it provides that a newly constituted Board under sec. 4 or sec. 4-A in respect of any area under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3-A, shall under the Act exercise all such powers, collect all such cesses, realise all such amounts and do all such acts as were being exercised, collected, realised and done in such area by the previously existing Board, if any, immediately before such constitution or vesting as aforesaid. Whatever may be the position before this amendment which will now be taken to have been inserted in the Act from the very beginning, the newly constituted Board of Tonk and Sikar which include the areas formerly within Malpura District Board shall have all such powers of collecting cesses levied by Malpura Board and are authorised to realise all such amounts and do all such acts as were being exercised, collected, realised and done in such areas by the previously existing Board of Malpura. After the amendment, therefore, the objection of the petitioners that the District Boards of Tonk and Sikar had no power to realise or collect cesses levied by Malpura District Board loses all its force. 47. Point Mo. 8—In view of my decision on points No. 2, 5 and 6 this point becomes only of academic importance because even if resolutions were not passed over again by the District Boards of Sikar and Jhunjhunu on 1st October, 1952 the previous resolutions after which sanction of the Government had been received are enough for the valid levying of the cess. If, however, there were no amendments which have been made by the Amending Ordinance and the Third Amendment Act I would not have considered the resolutions of 1st October, 1952 sufficient to make the proceedings about the realisations of cess which started before the passing of that resolution valid, because in my opinion those resolutions could not have retrospective effect. Of course the District Boards in question would have been perfectly entitled to take proceedings to enforce the levying of cess in pursuance of these resolutions after giving them due publicity as required by Rule 4-A of the Rules made under the Act. 48. Point Mo. Of course the District Boards in question would have been perfectly entitled to take proceedings to enforce the levying of cess in pursuance of these resolutions after giving them due publicity as required by Rule 4-A of the Rules made under the Act. 48. Point Mo. 9—In view of my decision on points No. 2, 5 and 6 the decision on this point becomes unnecessary. 49. Point No. 10—In view of my decision on points No. 2, 5, 6 and 7, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 50. All the petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances narrated in the opening part of this judgment I order parties to bear their own costs. WANCHOO, C.J.—I have read the judgment of my brother Sharma J. and agree with him that all the petitions should be dismissed and the parties should bear their own costs in the circumstances. 2. As I was a party to the judgment in R. S. Manohar Singhji vs. The State of Rajasthan (1) (1952 RLW, 81.), I should like to say a few words about it. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies on that case for the argument that the Jaipur District Boards Act is invalid under Art. 14 of the Constitution read with Art. 13 as district boards only exist in one part of the State of Rajasthan and not in other parts. As was pointed out in Manohar Singhjis case(l), it is permissible for a State to have different laws for different parts of it, provided there is some reasonable basis for the classification based on any reasonable differentiation. The present State of Rajasthan has been constituted by merging a number of territories which were formerly under Indian Princes and in various stages of development. One such State was Jaipur, and it had obviously reached a higher stage of development, and there were district boards in that State, though there were no such boards in many of the other States. When, therefore, the present State of Rajasthan came into existence, district boards existing in the former Jaipur State continued, and apparently a difference arose between people living in the former Jaipur State, and in other parts of Rajasthan. But this difference, which was continued, was, in my opinion, rightly continued. There was a reasonable basis for classification, and the facts of this case are different from the facts of Manoharsinghs case. But this difference, which was continued, was, in my opinion, rightly continued. There was a reasonable basis for classification, and the facts of this case are different from the facts of Manoharsinghs case. In that case, merely the right of collection of rents had been taken away, and there was no reasonable basis for making any classification as between the Jagirdars of one part of Rajasthan and those of others merely for the purpose of collection of rent. In this connection, I wish to emphasise that there can be justification for continuing different laws and procedure in one part of the State as against others provided a case can be made out for it. 3. In Frank J. Bowman Vs. Edward A Lewis (1) the following observations were made with regard to the hypothetical case of annexation of a part of the Mexican State by the United States. Merger being more or less similar to annexation, these observations are, therefore, pertinent to the case before us. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States were considering whether there was any justification for continuing different laws and procedure in one part of the State which might have been annexed as compared to other parts, and made the following observations :— "It (differentiation) would not be based on any respect of persons or classes but on municipal considerations alone and in regard to the welfare of all classes within the particular territory or jurisdiction." 4. As has been pointed out by my brother SharmaJ. constitution of district boards conferred powers of local self-government on residents of the areas comprising the former State of Jaipur, and it would be retrograde to deprive them of the benefits of local self-government on the ground that other areas, which were merged to form the present State of Rajasthan, did not have district boards, not have district boards, not having reached the same stage of development. The continuance, therefore, of district boards in the area, which was formerly in Jaipur State, is justified on the ground that it is for the welfare of all classes within a particular territory, and there is no inequality before the law, because the difference that arises is not based on any respect of persons or classes. The same could not be said for the particular provision of the law which was being considered in Manoharsinghjis case. The same could not be said for the particular provision of the law which was being considered in Manoharsinghjis case. That case, therefore, can be differentiated on facts, and has no application to the circumstances of the present case.