Rajamannar, C.J.- For a disposal of this appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., dismissing a Second Appeal, S.A.No.255 of 1946, it is sufficient to state the following facts: In execution of a decree in a suit on a mortgage executed by the father of the two appellants to the 3rd respondent, the mortgaged property was brought to sale and eventually on 7th December, 1936, purchased by the mortgagee-decree-holder, the 3rd respondent To the mortgage suit, the 1st defendant, the father (the executor) and one of his sons, the 2nd defendant in the present suit, were added as parties. The two plaintiffs, appellants in this Second Appeal, had not been born by that time. The 1st plaintiff was born on 1st September, 1932, long after the decree in the. suit. The 2nd plaintiff was born on 1st September, 1935, during execution proceedings. The plaintiffs were not brought on record in the execution proceedings, presumably because their father, the 1st defendant, sufficiently and adequately represented their interests. Though the sale took place on 7th December, 1936, the decree-holder purchaser did not deposit into Court the general stamp for a certificate under Order 21, rule 84, Civil Procedure Code or the amount required for such a stamp as provided in Order 21, rule 85 of the Code. Immediately after the sale, there was an application to set aside the sale filed by the two judgment-debtors. That application, however, was considered by a consent order, under which if the judgment-debtors did not pay by a particular time the sale would stand confirmed. In accordance with the compromise, the sale was confirmed on 31st July, 1937. On 7th August, 1937, the decree-holder purchaser filed an application, E.A. No.191 of 1937 to have the delay in paying the amount necessary for the sale certificate excused. This application was ordered and the delay was excused. Subsequently, there was an application by the two judgment-debtors to set aside the sale, inter alia on the ground that the provisions of Order 21, rule 85, had not been complied with. That application was dismissed and a Civil Revision Petition filed in this Court, C.R.P.No.1636 of 1937, against the order of dismissal was also dismissed on 28th January, 1938. More than three years after this, the appellants instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on 16th July, 1941. That application was dismissed and a Civil Revision Petition filed in this Court, C.R.P.No.1636 of 1937, against the order of dismissal was also dismissed on 28th January, 1938. More than three years after this, the appellants instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on 16th July, 1941. The suit was ostensibly for a partition of the family properties, but in effect a suit to get rid of the sale in favour of the third respondent. Both the Courts below dismissed the suit, and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., who heard the Second Appeal also dismissed it but granted leave to appeal. The only point raised by Mr. Umamaheswaram, learned counsel for the appellants before us, was that when the decree-holder-purchaser failed to deposit into Court the stamps or the amount required for the sale certificate under Order 21, rule 85, the sale in his favour must be deemed to have been automatically cancelled and the properties should have been re-sold under Order 21, rule 86. It must therefore be deemed that there was no sale in favour of the 3rd respondent, though the sale might have been confirmed and a sale certificate issued to him. He relied upon rulings of this Court and other courts, in support of the position that the requirements of Order 21, rule 85 of the Code are mandatory and failure on the part of the purchaser to comply with its provisions would have the result of automatically cancelling the sale in his favour. In Monni Aidruz v. Mira Mohideen1 it was held that under Order 21, rule 86 of the Code, if there was default in payment of the balance of the purchase money as required by Order 21, rule 85, it was obligatory on the Court to re-sell the property. In that case, there was a’ default by the purchaser and the Court directed a re-sale. It was this order that was the subject-matter of the appeal decided by a learned Judge of this Court in that case. It was held that the order directing re-sale was perfectly valid and in accordance with the plain language of Order 21, rule 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the Court did not excuse the delay in payment and did not accept the deposit made out of time. Nor did the Court ever confirm the sale. It was held that the order directing re-sale was perfectly valid and in accordance with the plain language of Order 21, rule 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the Court did not excuse the delay in payment and did not accept the deposit made out of time. Nor did the Court ever confirm the sale. In Annapurna Dasi v. Bazley Karim2, the question no doubt arose in a subsequent suit, but it does not appear from the report of the judgment in that case that the Court condoned the delay in making the deposit. It was held that on default of payment the purchaser forfeited all claim to the property. Much assistance cannot be derived from this case. In Inam-Ullah v. Muhammad Idris3, the matter came up in execution proceedings. The auction-purchaser there deposited the amount of the purchase money beyond time and the executing Court restored the sale in favour of the purchaser in spite of the protest by the judgment-debtor. Meanwhile, the judgment-debtor had deposited the whole of the decretal amount. It was held by Mulla, J., that on failure of the auction-purchaser to deposit the amount of the purchase money the sale in his favour was automatically cancelled and the Court had to hold another sale. As, however, the judgment-debtor had deposited the full amount due under the decree there was no necessity for holding a re-sale. The decision in Nawal Kishore v. Buttu Mal4, does not carry us any further. In that case, there was an appeal against an order of the executing court confirming a sale, although the balance of the purchase money had not been deposited within the time allowed. The auction-purchaser obtained the permission of the Court to deposit the amount after the prescribed time had elapsed. It was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. It may be admitted that all these decisions are authorities for the position that if the auction-purchaser does not comply with the provisions of Order 21, rule 85, he cannot insist on complying with it after the lapse of the prescribed time and demand that the sale in his favour should be confirmed. It may be admitted that all these decisions are authorities for the position that if the auction-purchaser does not comply with the provisions of Order 21, rule 85, he cannot insist on complying with it after the lapse of the prescribed time and demand that the sale in his favour should be confirmed. But actually what happened in this case was that the sale was confirmed in accordance with a compromise between the parties and subsequently the Court condoned the delay in depositing the amount required for stamps for the sale certificate. In these circumstances, the question is whether the sale should be declared void as contended by counsel for the appellants. On this point, we have the direct authority of the decision in Subramanyam Nambudri v. Vykunda Kammathi1. In that case, in execution of a decree there was a sale on 26th August, 1915. The decree-holder himself was the purchaser in execution and he had been allowed to set off the decree amount against the sale price and to pay the balance. He was unable to make the deposit of the balance within 15 days but the Court allowed him six days more. The balance was deposited a day after the six days. The sale was confirmed and a sale certificate was issued to the purchaser in September 1915. A petition was filed in December 1920 purporting to be under sections 47 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code praying that the sale may be declared to be a nullity. The learned Judges held that though a Court ought not to extend the time for deposit by the purchaser under Order 21, rule 85 of the Code or accept a deposit paid beyond time without consent of all the parties concerned, nevertheless if the Court did so extend the time or accept the deposit without such consent, then it is an irregularity and does not make the sale a nullity. The principle of this decision would apply to the facts of this case. The learned Judge who decided Monni Aidruz v. Mira Mohideen2, had evidently this decision also in mind when he observed as follows: “Mr. The principle of this decision would apply to the facts of this case. The learned Judge who decided Monni Aidruz v. Mira Mohideen2, had evidently this decision also in mind when he observed as follows: “Mr. Thiagaraja relied upon decisions of this Court and of other High Courts where it was held that even though the deposit as required by Order 21, rule 85, was not made within the time limited, with the consent of all parties the Court might confirm the sale, and if the Court confirmed the sale it was only an irregularity. But those decisions do not throw light on the question in dispute, namely, if the Court declines to confirm the sale but passes an order directing a re-sale, whether the Court was not justified in doing so.” In the present case, we have the further fact that an application was filed by the judgment-debtor to have the sale set aside on this very ground. Not only was that application dismissed but a Civil Revision Petition against the order of dismissal was also filed and failed. No doubt the present appellants were not eo nomine parties to that application or to the Civil Revision Petition, but it cannot be denied that the judgment-debtor therein, the father, amply represented the appellants and their interests. There was no question of any conflict between the interests of the father and the sons, the plaintiffs. In effect, the plaintiffs must be deemed to have been parties to all the proceedings at its several stages. The order passed on the application by the two judgment-debtors to have the sale set aside must be held to be binding on the plaintiffs also. In this suit, they cannot agitate once again the subject-matter of that application. On both the grounds, the appeal must be, and is, dismissed with costs. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.