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1953 DIGILAW 79 (MAD)

The Public Prosecutor v. C. Paramasivam

1953-03-02

BALAKRISHNA AYYAR, CHANDRA REDDI

body1953
Somasundaram, J.- The question that is raised in this petition is whether in view of Madras Act XXXII of 1951, which was introduced as an amendment to section 20 of the Opium Act (Central Act I of 1878), a confession made to a Prohibition officer is admissible or not. Section 20-A reads as follows: “The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, invest any officer of the Prohibition department, or every officer belonging to any specified class in that department, with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act.” This High Court has in a series of decisions held that an Excise Officer under the Madras Abkari Act is not a Police-officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. (Vide Mahalakshmayya v. Emperor1, Doraiswami Nadar v. Emperor2, Public Prosecutor v. Marimuthu Goundan3and Mayilvahanam, In re.4) But the Calcutta High Court by a Full Bench decision in Ameer Sheriff v. Emperor5, has held that an Excise-officer who in the conduct of an investigation of an offence against the Excise, exercises the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure upon an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of a cognizable offence is a Police-officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Similarly, the Bombay High Court in a Full Bench decision in Nanoo v. Emperor6, has held that an Abkari officer who in the conduct of investigation of an offence punishable under the Bombay Abkari Act exercises the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of a cognizable offence is a Police-officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, and any confession made to such an officer in the course of investigation is inadmissible in evidence. But the Patna High Court has held in Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor7, that an Excise-officer is not a Police-officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. But the Patna High Court has held in Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor7, that an Excise-officer is not a Police-officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. In the Patna High Court the learned Judges were considering the confession made to an Excise Inspector who under the Dangerous Drugs Act (II of 1930) not only has the power to arrest and search but has also been invested by the local Government with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for investigation of an offence under that particular Act. These decisions except the decision of the Patna High Court have been considered by Rajamannar, J. (as he then was) in Venkata Reddi v. Emperor8, wherein the learned Judge says, referring to the Calcutta and the Bombay decisions that an identical conclusion would be reached if there is a similar provision in any other enactment is evident from the decision in Someshwar Shelat, In re9, where a Bench of our High Court consisting of the late Chief Justice Sir Lionel Leach and Lakshmana Rao, J., have held that by reason of section 12(3) of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance inserted by Ordinance LIII of 1944, officers appointed to investigate offences under the Ordinance are Police-officers within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to statements recorded by them. The Madras amendment to the Opium Act confers on the Prohibition officer all the powers of a Police-officer in charge of a police station. This, in my opinion, alters the position of Prohibition officers and it is better that the question is settled by an authoritative decision by a Bench of this Court. I would, therefore, direct this case to be posted before a Bench. The case came on for hearing before a Bench in pursuance of the order of reference. The Public Prosecutor (V.T. Rangaswami Aiyangar) in person. S. Govind Swaminathan (State Prosecutor) and S. Rajaraman for Respondents. The Order of the Court was made by Balakrishna Ayyar, J.-On the 1st of January, 1952, a consignment of illicit opium was despatched by train from New Delhi to Madras and from Madras on to Chidambaram. Acting on some information that he had received Mr. Khadir Hussain, an Assistant Inspector of Excise, who was also a Deputy Prohibition Officer, shadowed the article to Chidambaram. Acting on some information that he had received Mr. Khadir Hussain, an Assistant Inspector of Excise, who was also a Deputy Prohibition Officer, shadowed the article to Chidambaram. On 5th January, 1952, one Paramasivam went to the railway parcel-office at Chidambaram tendered the way-bill to the general parcel-clerk and after signing in the delivery-book took delivery of the parcel. At that stage Mr. Khadir Hussain detained him and questioned him. He also seized the parcel which, on examination, was found to contain 33 seers of opium. On these allegations Paramasivam and three others were prosecuted before the Sub-Magistrate, Chidambaram. At the trial Mr. Khadir Hussain gave evidence for the prosecution. When he was in the box the Assistant Public Prosecutor asked him what Paramasivam had told him when questioned by the witness after his arrest. To that question the defence Counsel took exception on the ground that section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, prohibited such statements from being given in evidence for the prosecution. The learned Magistrate upheld the objection. On that, the prosecution came up in revision to this Court. Somasundaram, J., who first heard the matter considered that an authoritative decision was necessary on the point that had been raised and so referred the following question to a Bench: “The question that is raised in this petition is whether in view of Madras Act XXXII of 1951 which was introduced as an amendment to section 20 of the Opium Act (Central Act I of 1878), a confession made to a Prohibition officer is admissible or not.” Before attempting to answer this question it is as well to examine some of the provisions of the Opium Act (Central Act I of 1878). Section 4 prohibits the possession, transport, import, export or sale of opium except under certain circumstances referred to in that Act. Section 9 provides penalties for the contravention of section 4 and some other sections. Section 14, as it stood before it was amended in Madras, conferred on certain categories of officers belonging to the departments of Excise, Police, Customs, Salt, Opium and Revenue, power of entry, search, seizure and arrest when they had reason to believe that opium liable to confiscation under the Act was kept or concealed in any building, vessel, or enclosed space. These powers, however, could be exercised only between sunrise and sunset. These powers, however, could be exercised only between sunrise and sunset. Section 15 empowers every officer of the departments referred to in section 14 to seize opium in transit or in any open place. It also confers powers of detention, search and arrest. Section 20 requires that every person arrested and everything seized under section 14 or section 15 shall be forwarded without delay to the officer in charge of the nearest police station. Section 21 requires an officer making an arrest or seizure under the Act to send a report of the matter to his immediate official superior within 48 hours thereafter. It will be noticed that under the Act, as it stood before it was amended, though the officers of the Excise, Customs and other departments were given powers to enter, search, seize and arrest, they had no power to investigate. In 1951 the Madras Legislature amended the Central Opium Act in certain respects. Officers of the Prohibition department were included in the categories of officers referred to in section 14 who could enter, search, seize and arrest on reasonable suspicion of a contravention of the provisions of the Act. A new section, section 20-A, was added which runs as follows: “The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, invest any officer of the Prohibition department, or every officer belonging to any special class in that department, with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act.” The result of the amendment is to confer on officers of the Prohibition department in relation to offences under the Opium Act, practically all the powers of a Station House Officer. But, at the same time it will be noticed that the Amending Act does not call these officers Police-officers. There is no. exhaustive definition of the expression ‘Police-officer’ in any of our statutes. Act V of 1861 (Indian Police Act) merely says: “the word ‘Police’ shall include all persons who shall be enrolled under this Act.” Ex facie, this definition is not exhaustive, and it is of no help in answering the question that is now before us. There is no. exhaustive definition of the expression ‘Police-officer’ in any of our statutes. Act V of 1861 (Indian Police Act) merely says: “the word ‘Police’ shall include all persons who shall be enrolled under this Act.” Ex facie, this definition is not exhaustive, and it is of no help in answering the question that is now before us. In the absence of a statutory definition, and apart from all authority, one would be tempted to say that a Police-officer is a person whom any statute or other provision of law calls such, or, on whom it confers all or substantially all the powers and imposes the duties of an officer. If he is expressly called a Police-officer there is no difficulty whatsoever. If he is not so called then the next step is to ask: what does the law require him to do? What are the duties imposed on him? and what are the powers conferred on him? If they are substantially those of a Police-officer there need be no qualms in regarding him as one. If his powers and duties are confined to a particular extent of territory or to a particular subject-matter he will be a Police-officer only in respect of that territory or that subject-matter. The material thing to consider would be not the name given to him, nor the colour of the uniform he is required to wear but his functions, powers and duties. A Police-officer does not cease to be such merely because he is put into a white khaddar uniform instead of one in Khaki drill; a medicine will be just the same whether it is packaged in a glass-jar or a plastic Support for the view that regard must be had not to the name but to the powers duties and functions of the officer, is to be found in the decision reported in Someshwar H. Shelat, In re1. In that case the question for decision was whether a special officer of the Commercial Tax Department, who had been empowered, by the Provincial Government of Madras in exercise of the powers conferred on them by section 12(3) of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance was a Police-officer within the meaning and for the purpose of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The sub-section of the Ordinance ran as follows: “The Controller-General and such Inspectors or other officers as may be empowered by the Central or Provincial Government in this behalf shall, within the respective areas for which they are appointed, have power to investigate all offences punishable under this Ordinance and in conducting any such investigation shall, within the said areas, have all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities of an officer in charge of a police station under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, when investigating a cognizable offence within the limits of his station.” A Bench of this Court had no hesitation in holding that an officer empowered under this section was a Police-officer. Mr.V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, the learned Public Prosecutor, drew our attention to six decisions of this Court which have a bearing on the question before us In Mahalakshmayya v. Emperor2, Sundaram Chetty, J., ruled that a statement by an accused person to an Excise Inspector in answer to questions put by him is not a confession made to a Police-officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. In Doraiswami Nadar v. Emperor3, Bardswell, J., followed this case and ruled to the same effect. In Public Prosecutor v. Marimuthu Goundan1, Horwill, J., followed the two earlier decisions just now referred to. Before that learned Judge the decisions in Nanoo v. Emperor2 and Ameer Sheriff v. Emperor3were cited. But he distinguished them saying: "The Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court followed a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, whose decision naturally turned on the interpretation of the Bombay Excise Act which, in this respect, is similar to the Calcutta Act. Before that learned Judge the decisions in Nanoo v. Emperor2 and Ameer Sheriff v. Emperor3were cited. But he distinguished them saying: "The Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court followed a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, whose decision naturally turned on the interpretation of the Bombay Excise Act which, in this respect, is similar to the Calcutta Act. The Madras Act, however, does not give excise officers quite the same powers as the Bombay and Calcutta Excise Acts, and for that reason this Court has on three occasions held that for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act, an excise officer is not a police officer." No doubt he went on to add: "It appears to me that as section 25 refers only to a police officer, a Court should not extend it to other classes of officers merely on grounds of similarity of function, especially in view of the fact that the Evidence Act was introduced at a time when the methods of the police were much more open to attack then they are now." In Mayilvahanam, In re4, Yahya Ali, J., had to consider the position of an Assistant Inspector of Customs and he took the same view that had been taken in the earlier decisions of this Court. See also Venkata Reddi v. Emperor5 and Vadivel Gounder, In re.6 It seems to me that none of these decisions are in point because they belong to a time before the Central Opium Act was amended by the Madras Legislature in 1951. In Nanoo v. Emperor2, the following question was formulated for the decision of the Court: "Is an Abkari officer, who, in the conduct of investigation of an offence punishable under the Bombay Abkari Act, exercises the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, upon an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of a cognizable offence, a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act?‘ All the learned Judges, there were five of them were unanimously of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative. A different view was taken by a Full Bench of three Judges of the Patna High Court in Radha Krishun Marwari v. King-Emperor7. A different view was taken by a Full Bench of three Judges of the Patna High Court in Radha Krishun Marwari v. King-Emperor7. Mr.V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, the learned Public Prosecutor, placed special emphasis on this decision because the question that was decided in that case was whether a confession made before an Excise Inspector who, under the Dangerous Drugs Act (Central Act II of 1930) not only had the power to arrest and search but had also been invested by the local Government with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of an offence under that Act, is admissible evidence. Section 30 of Central Act II of 1930 runs as follows: "The Provincial Government may invest any officer of the Excise Department or any class of such officers, with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act." Mr. Rajaram pointed out that section 4 of Madras Act XXXII of 1951 which introduced section 20-A into Central Act I of 1878 is practically a reproduction of section 30 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. This circumstance no doubt makes the Patna case more apposite but it does not invert the reasoning in that case with any greater force. The Patna case was exhaustively considered by a Full Bench of five Judges in Calcutta. See Ameer Sheriff v. Emperor3, in which by a majority of 4 to 1 the learned Judges preferred the view of the Bombay High Court to that of the Patna High Court. The report of that decision occupies 56 pages of the book and every conceivable aspect of the matter has been exhaustively discussed. It is idle to discover much which can be profitably added to that discussion. On the view taken by the learned Judges in the Patna case and by Costello, J., in the Calcutta case, I would make these observations. It appears to me that they looked too narrowly to the appearance of things and declined to look at the substance behind the appearance. They focused attention on the label and would not look farther. I also consider that the learned Judges were being much too strict when they refused to consider why these rules of exclusion were embodied in section 162, Criminal Procedure Code and section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. They focused attention on the label and would not look farther. I also consider that the learned Judges were being much too strict when they refused to consider why these rules of exclusion were embodied in section 162, Criminal Procedure Code and section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is true that the grounds of exclusion are not indicated either in the Evidence Act or the Criminal Procedure Code. But that does not seem a sufficient reason for refusing to consider that aspect of the matter. It has some times been said that he does not know the law who does not know the reason for the law. Surely if you refuse to look at the reason for a particular rule of law how can any valid conclusion be reached? I prefer the view taken by the Full Bench in Bombay and in Calcutta, and would say that in relation to an offence under the Opium Act a Prohibition Officer on whom the State Government has conferred the powers of an officer in charge of a police station, is a police officer for purposes of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. It follows that the confession in this case is inadmissible in evidence. In the result the revision petition is dismissed. Chandra Reddy, J.-This matter has now come before us having been referred by our learned brother Somasundaram, J., to resolve the judicial conflict on the interpretation of section 20 of the Opium Act. The question to be answered by us is: “Is the excise officer who exercises the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure an officer in charge of police station in the conduct of an investigation of an offence against excise laws a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162, Criminal Procedure Code?” The facts relevant for the purpose of this enquiry are the following: It is alleged for the prosecution that on 1st January, 1952, a parcel was booked from New Delhi to Madras by train from where the same was sent on the morning of 5th January, 1952, to Chidambaram. At this place, the first accused took delivery of the parcel at the instance of accused 2 to 4. At this place, the first accused took delivery of the parcel at the instance of accused 2 to 4. When the 1st accused was taking it out of the parcel office, P.W.1, an Assistant Inspector of Excise, caught hold of him and on an examination it was found to contain 33 seers of opium. After investigation, a charge-sheet was laid against the first accused for possession of opium punishable under section 9(a) of the Opium Act and against accused 2 to 4 under section 9(b) of the said Act for transporting opium. In the course of examination of P.W.1, he wanted to prove a statement made by the first accused to him which was reduced to writing. An objection was taken on behalf of the accused to the admissibility of the statement on the ground that the officer to whom the statement was made was a police officer within the meaning of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code and section 25 of the Evidence Act. The objection was upheld by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Chidambaram, and the statement recorded by P.W.1 from the first accused was ruled out as being inadmissible. It is against this that the present revision petition has been filed by the State Government. In support of this petition, it is urged by the learned Public Prosecutor that an excise officer is not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and the prohibition enacted therein cannot be extended to excise officers. The question whether an excise officer Was a police officer and the confession made to him in the course of investigation was to be excluded by virtue of the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act came up for consideration in a number of cases in this Court. In Mahalakshmayya v. Emperor1, Sundaram Chetty, J., held that an admission made by an accused person to an excise inspector could not be ruled out as it could not be regarded as a confession made to a police officer coming under section 25 of the Evidence Act. To the same effect, is the ruling of Bardswell, J., in Doraiswami Nadar v. Emperor2. In Public Prosecutor v. Marimuthu Goundan3, Horwill, J., took the same view although there was no reference to the two earlier cases. To the same effect, is the ruling of Bardswell, J., in Doraiswami Nadar v. Emperor2. In Public Prosecutor v. Marimuthu Goundan3, Horwill, J., took the same view although there was no reference to the two earlier cases. Referring to a Calcutta case which will be alluded to presently and which expressed the opinion that an excise officer was a police officer within the ambit of section 25 of the Evidence Act, the learned Judge distinguished that case on the ground that it was based on special provisions of the Bengal Excise Act which made excise officers for purposes of excise offences police officers. The scope of a statement made to an assistant inspector of customs by an accused person in the course of an investigation fell to be considered by Yahya Ali, J., in Mayilvahanam, In re1. The learned Judge on a review of the earlier decisions of this Court held that the statement did not come within the prohibition of section 25 of the Evidence Act. In a more recent case, Rajamannar, J. (as he then was) in Venkata Reddi v. Emperor2, referred to the earlier decisions of this Court and expressed his concurrence with them. It must be noted that all these decisions were given on the interpretation of the Opium Act as it stood then. Section 20 of the Opium Act provided: “Every person arrested, and thing seized, under section 14 or section 15, shall be forwarded without delay to the officer in charge of the nearest police station, and every person arrested and thing seized under section 19 shall be forwarded without delay to the officer by whom the warrant was issued. * * * * * * *” Section 14 of the Act as amended in 1947 runs thus: “Any officer of any of the departments of Excise, Prohibition, Police, Customs, Salt, Opium or Revenue superior in rank to a peon,guard or constable, who may in right of his office be authorised by the State Government in this behalf, and who has reason to believe, from personal knowledge or from information given by any person and taken down in writing, that opium liable to confiscation under this Act is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .kept or concealed in any building, vessel or enclosed place, may, between sunrise and sunset, (a) enter into any such building, vessel, or place; (b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any other obstacle to such entry; (c) seize such opium.....and any other thing which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under section 11 or any other law for the time being in force relating to opium; and (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper,arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to be guilty of any offence relating to such opium under this or any other law for the time being in force.” Section 15 confers on an officer of the said departments powers to seize in any open place or in transit any opium and detain, search and arrest any person who is believed to be guilty of an offence against this or any other such law. It is thus seen that any of the officers mentioned in section 14 of the Opium Act has only power to seize the articles involved in a crime whether they are in an enclosed place or an open place and detain, search or arrest any person suspected of having committed any offence against the statute. He has no power to investigate into these crimes and he can only forward the person and the things seized without any delay to the officer in charge of the nearest police station. In 1951, the Legislature of the State of Madras amended section 20 of the Opium Act by inserting section 20-A by Madras Act XXXII of 1951 by which the officers mentioned in the sections already referred to were invested with certain powers of a police officer for investigation. In 1951, the Legislature of the State of Madras amended section 20 of the Opium Act by inserting section 20-A by Madras Act XXXII of 1951 by which the officers mentioned in the sections already referred to were invested with certain powers of a police officer for investigation. Section 20-A runs thus: “The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, invest any officer of the Prohibition Department, or every officer belonging to any specified class in that Department, with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of offences under this Act.” Now the question for consideration is whether this amendment has, in any way, altered the position in regard to the state of authority bearing on the subject. That it does bring about a change in respect of powers to be exercised by those officers in the detection of crimes is beyond question. Subsequent to this amendment the necessity to forward the articles seized and the person apprehended to the nearest police station is dispensed with and the officer concerned, himself is authorised to investigate into the matter. But the controversy is whether this has the effect of bringing such an officer within the purview of section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 25 of the Evidence Act says: "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." While section 162(1) Criminal Procedure Code, enacts: ‘‘No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation. under this chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made; ****** *" The word "police-officer" is not defined anywhere in the Evidence Act while we have only the definition of the "officer in charge of the police station" in the Criminal Procedure Code. From it we do not get any help. From it we do not get any help. Nor is the definition of a "police-officer" in the Identification of Prisoners Act, that is, Act XXXIII of 1920 of any assistance to us in the determination of the question before us. A similar question arose on the provisions of the Bombay Abkari Act before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Nanoo v. Emperor1. The section of the Act which the learned Judges of the Full Bench had to consider was section 41 which provided that "every Abkari officer not below such rank as Government may prescribe shall within the area for which he is appointed have power to investigate all offences punishable under this Act." The sub-section (2) provides that "such officer shall in the conduct of such investigation exercise the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, upon an officer in charge of a police-station for the investigation of a cognizable offence." It is seen that this is analogous to the provisions of section 20-A of the Opium Act as amended by Madras Act XXXII of 1951. In that case the learned Judges decided that an Abkari officer invested with powers of an officer in charge of the police station under section 41 of the Abkari Act was a police officer coming under the rule embodied in section 25 of the Evidence Act. The ground for the decision was that as the Legislature had deliberately conferred upon an Abkari officer substantially all the powers of a police officer, he had in effect become a police officer coming within the purview of section 25 of the Evidence Act. For this reason it was held there that any confession made to such an officer under the Abkari Act or the Criminal Procedure Code was inadmissible in evidence. The observations of Marten, C.J., at page 94 are apposite in this context: "In this connection, I should like to point out that it was open to the Legislature or to Government to do one of two or three things. It could detach ordinary Police officers to investigate excise offences. The observations of Marten, C.J., at page 94 are apposite in this context: "In this connection, I should like to point out that it was open to the Legislature or to Government to do one of two or three things. It could detach ordinary Police officers to investigate excise offences. Or, on the other hand, it could appoint other officers of Government or new officers to perform the duties of investigation and arrest and so on, which had previously been performed by ordinary police officers, whichever course was adopted, any alleged offence would, in effect, be investigated by persons in the position of policemen. In this very case it would appear that the effect of the above sections of the Abkari Act is that certain duties, which previously fell upon ordinary Police officers, and in fact now being carried out by the Abkari officers, who have been given these particular police powers." In support of his conclusion the learned Chief Justice relied on the dictum of Sir Richard Garth in Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose2, that the word "police-officer" was not used in section 25 of the Evidence Act in a technical sense but was used in a comprehensive and popular sense. Referring to earlier rulings of that Court and of the Calcutta High Court the learned Chief Justice distinguished them on the ground that they were based on the language of section 20 of the Opium Act and the provisions of the Bengal Abkari Act which were widely different from those of section 41 of the Bombay Abkari Act. Shah J., one of the learned Judges of the Full Bench in the course of his judgment stated that an officer contemplated by section 41, sub-section (1) was virtually in the same position as a police officer in the matter of investigation of the offences under that Act. All that was meant by the expression police-officer in section 25 of the Evidence Act was "an officer who exercises the powers of the police conferred on him by law" by whatever name he is called. The other three learned Judges also expressed their concurrence with the opinion mentioned above. All that was meant by the expression police-officer in section 25 of the Evidence Act was "an officer who exercises the powers of the police conferred on him by law" by whatever name he is called. The other three learned Judges also expressed their concurrence with the opinion mentioned above. The principle enunciated in that ruling is applicable to the case before us as the provisions of section 20-A of the Opium Act bear a close resemblance to those of section 41 of the Bombay Abkari Act, and I express my respectful accord with it. The Patna High Court reached an opposite conclusion in Radha Kishun Marwari v Kins-Emperor1. The point which the Full Bench of the Patna High Court considered was whether an Inspector of Excise acting in the course of his duties was a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and whether a confession made to him was admissible. The learned Judges answered the point in the negative In their view an excise officer could not be regarded as a police officer merely because he was exercising certain functions in the conduct of investigation of an excise offence. The learned Chief Justice (Courtney Terrell, C.J.) observes that he found himself "in complete disagreement with the arguments which found favour" in the Bombay case. According to him, there was a fallacy in the judgment of the Bombay Full Bench which was attributable to two causes. One was the misconception of the ruling in The Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose2, and the other the adoption of an erroneous cannon of construction of statutes, that is, the consideration of what is supposed to be the object of section 25 of the Evidence Act, by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court. In this view of the matter the learned Chief Justice thought that the opinion expressed in Nanoo v. Emperor3, was an erroneous one. In this view of the matter the learned Chief Justice thought that the opinion expressed in Nanoo v. Emperor3, was an erroneous one. Fazl Ali, J., who agreed with Courtney Terrell, C.J., observed that as laid down in Oueen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose2, it was well settled that the term "police-officer" should not be construed in a technical sense but in its more popular and comprehensive sense, while the other learned Judge Agarwala, J., was of the view that the word "police-officer" connotes nothing more or less than a member of the police force and he did not think that the observation of Garth, C.J., was intended to go beyond that It is clear that this dictum of Agarwala, J., is plainly opposed to that of Garth J in Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose2, in spite of the learned Judge’s attempt to reconcile the two dicta. It does not appear to me that the Judges of the Bombay High Court in any way misunderstood the scope of the dictum in Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose2. Reliance was placed by Marten, C.J., in the Bombay case on Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose2, only for the purpose of showing that the term "police-officer" was not used in a restricted sense but has a wider import Nor can I bring myself to agree with Courtney Terrell, C.J., that the Judges of the Bombay High Court adopted an erroneous cannon of construction. No doubt a statute has to be construed with reference to the language employed therein and it is not permissible to speculate as to the object or the intention of the Legislature. ‘ But when the meaning of an expression is not plain and it is not possible to ascertain the meaning of a term or to gather its import from the statute itself I think it is permissible to resort to extrinsic guides. In this context the remarks of Lord Atkin in Keats v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries4, are apposite: "In the construction of a statute it is, of course, at all times and under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the time the statute was passed, and to the evils, which as appears from its provisions, it was designed to remedy. It may be recalled that the term "police-officer" is not defined in the Evidence Act or in the Criminal Procedure Code. It may be recalled that the term "police-officer" is not defined in the Evidence Act or in the Criminal Procedure Code. So in trying to understand the signification of that expression, it is perfectly legitimate to have regard to the setting and the context in which section 25 of the Evidence Act was enacted. With great respect to the Judges who decided Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor1, I am unable to appreciate their criticism of Nanoo v. Emperor2. It looks to me that the Legislature must have used that expression in a larger sense than that attributed to it by the Patna High Court. Subsequent to the ruling of the Patna High Court an identical point arose for consideration before a Full Bench of five Judges of Calcutta High Court in Ameen Sheriff v. Emperor3. There the conviction of the accused persons under section 9 of the Opium Act was mainly based on a confession said to have been made by them to an Excise Inspector. The admissibility of this confession was raised in appeals preferred by the accused against their convictions. In view of the conflict of judicial opinion, the matter was placed before a Full Bench of five Judges. The answer given by the Full Bench (by a majority) was that the Legislature in using the term "police-officer" in section 25 of the Evidence Act did not intend to exclude from its meaning excise officers exercising powers of detection and investigation of crimes committed against excise laws. There is an exhaustive discussion of the topic and the opposing views expressed in Nanoo v. Emperor2 and Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor1are also considered. Four of the learned Judges approved of the rule of law stated in Nanoo v. Emperor2. The reasoning in Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor1was not acceptable to them. The leading judgment of Mukerji, J., is a very instructive one. The learned Judge reviewed the case-law bearing on the subject and also considered the reason of the rule enacted in section 25 of the Evidence Act. Discussing the connotation of the term ‘police-officer’ in the light of the relevant provisions of the Police Act V of 1861, he stated that police officers were officers whose duty was to prevent and detect crimes. Discussing the connotation of the term ‘police-officer’ in the light of the relevant provisions of the Police Act V of 1861, he stated that police officers were officers whose duty was to prevent and detect crimes. The learned Judge also referred to one of the meanings given to that expression in the Oxford Dictionary, viz.: "The civil force to which is entrusted the duty of maintaining public order, enforcing regulations for the prevention and punishment of the breaches of the law, and detecting crimes; construed as plural, the members of a ‘police force’; the constabulary of a locality, as throwing light on the import of that term." The position was summed up by the learned Judge at page 630 thus: "The powers and duties of excise officers investigating offences have been gradually brought more and more on a line with those of the officers of the police force, and they have been made police officers for the purposes of such investigations in all possible manner." Mallick, Jack and S.K. Ghose, JJ., agreed with the opinion expressed by Mukerji, J., while Costello, J., struck a note of dissent. Ghose, J., in the course of his judgment remarked that in an excise case an excise officer is the real police officer and the only "police-officer in the case." He also pointed out that in the earlier Calcutta cases in which the view was taken that an excise officer was not a police officer for purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act, the question of an excise officer exercising the powers of a police officer was not discussed and that except in one of them the attention of the learned Judges was not attracted to the material provisions of the Excise Act. In my judgment the view taken in Ameer Sheriff v. Emperor3, is a correct and a sound one and I am wholly in agreement with the reasoning adopted in that case. I will now refer to a ruling of a Bench of our High Court in Someshwar H. Shelat, In re4. The statutory provision which formed the subject-matter of inquiry before the Bench consisting of Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. and Lakshmana Rao, J., was subsection (3) of section 12 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance LIII of 1944. I will now refer to a ruling of a Bench of our High Court in Someshwar H. Shelat, In re4. The statutory provision which formed the subject-matter of inquiry before the Bench consisting of Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. and Lakshmana Rao, J., was subsection (3) of section 12 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance LIII of 1944. Sub-section (3) of section 12 reads as follows: "The Controller General and such inspectors or other officers as may be empowered by the Central or Provincial Government in this behalf shall within the respective areas for which they are appointed-have power to investigate all offences punishable under this Ordinance and in conducting any such investigation shall, within the said areas, have all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities of an officer in charge of a police station under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1898, when investigating a cognizable offence within the limits of his station." By virtue of this provision the Provincial Government gave certain officers of the Commercial Tax Department power to investigate offences within their respective jurisdictions. With reference to these provisions the following question was submitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under section 432, Criminal Procedure Code, for the opinion of this Court: "Whether a Special Officer of the Commercial Tax Department who has been empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government of Madras in exercise of the powers conferred on them by section 12(3) of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance introduced by the amending Ordinance No.LIII of 1944, is a police officer within the meaning and for the purpose of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 25 of the Evidence Act." On an interpretation of the relevant provisions the learned Judges gave the answer in the affirmative. In the course of the order it was remarked thus: "If an investigating officer is a police officer within and for the purpose of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this practice is obviously illegal. That he is a police officer within the meaning of the section we have no doubt whatever. In the course of the order it was remarked thus: "If an investigating officer is a police officer within and for the purpose of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this practice is obviously illegal. That he is a police officer within the meaning of the section we have no doubt whatever. Section 12(3) of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance expressly gives him all the powers, duties and privileges of an officer in charge of a police station under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, when investigating a cognizable offence within the limits of his station." "Therefore he has the full status of a police officer and his powers and duties must be limited to those of a police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which means that he has no right in an investigation under the Ordinance to require a person to sign a statement and where such a statement is reduced to writing it can only be used in accordance with the provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, or section 27 of the Evidence Act." The ruling in this case is applicable to the present case with equal force, as. the provisions of section 20-A of the Opium Act are pari materia with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance. I respectfully adopt the reasoning in this case. This decision was distinguished by Yahya Ali, J., in Mayilvahanam, In re1, already referred to on the ground that it was based exclusively on the phraseology employed in subsection (3) of section 12 of the said Ordinance which specifically mentioned that the officers concerned should have all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities of an officer-in-charge of a police station. It is clear from these observations that Yahya Ali, J., rested his conclusion in the case last mentioned on the absence of provision investing the excise officers in the detection of excise offences with the powers of a "police-officer" in charge of the police station. As already pointed out that was a case prior to Madras Act XXXII of 1951 which amended section 20 of the Opium Act. As already pointed out that was a case prior to Madras Act XXXII of 1951 which amended section 20 of the Opium Act. Rajamannar, J. (as he then was) in Venkata Reddi v. Emperor2, to which reference had already been made, in distinguishing the Calcutta and Bombay Full Bench decisions in Ameer Sheriff v. Emperor3 and Nanoo v. Emperor4, stated that an identical conclusion could be reached if there was a similar provision in any other enactment. This statement makes it abundantly clear that the learned Judge would have reached the conclusion that an excise officer was a police officer for purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, if provisions similar to section 20-A of the Opium Act were in force then. In the light of the above rulings and on a careful consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, I have reached the conclusion that the term "police-officer" is used in section 25 of the Evidence Act with reference to the functions exercised, by the officer and not as an officer of the police department. It only means an officer exercising certain powers and is not confined to an officer belonging to the police department. In my opinion it is the exercise of functions like the detection of crimes which involves the holding of investigation that marked out these officers. for special treatment in regard to the confessions made to them in the course of investigation. I may add, in recent times, the need to pass laws intended to regulate social and economic life of the people and to add to the revenues of the country as well, has indeed become very great. This had led to the Legislatures investing the officers appointed for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of these enactments, to check the evasion thereof and to prevent and detect crimes created under various enactments and to bring the offenders to justice, with powers of investigation. The insertion of section 20-A of the Opium Act is one of such instances. The insertion of section 20-A of the Opium Act is one of such instances. If these officers are invested with the same powers and are in the same position as the officers of the police department in relation to the detection of crimes by holding investigations, there does not seem to be any rational basis for distinction and for not extending the rule in section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, to them, especially when the functions exercised by both categories are essentially the same. In my opinion, it was not so much against an officer of a particular department that the prohibition under section 25 of the Evidence Act is enacted and the restrictions contained in section 162, Criminal Procedure Code are placed, as the desire to prevent the use of the statements made to officers engaged in the investigation of crime to the prejudice of the accused persons. It is also to be noted that it is Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure that deals with the investigations, and when the power of an officer in charge of the police station for the purpose of investigation is conferred upon an officer under section 20-A of the Opium Act, all the sections of that Chapter should be held applicable to such a case. Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, being one of the sections of that Chapter is equally applicable to a statement made to a prohibition or excise officer in the conduct of investigation. In these circumstances, the conclusion I have reached is that an excise officer invested with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for investigation of offences under section 20-A of the Opium Act is a “police-officer” coming within the purview of section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and any confession made to him. in the course of investigation is inadmissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act and the statements made to such an officer under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, can be used only in the manner enacted therein. In the result the revision petition is dismissed. R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.