JUDGMENT : Narasimham, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal against the reversing judgment of the Agency Subordinate Judge, Jeypore, dismissing his suit on the ground that it was no cognizable by the Civil Court. The material facts are as follows: The Plaintiff is a deity situated in village Karini within Gunupur taluk of Koraput district and was represented by its trustee Simhadri Sahu. The deity owns some lands in the village which were let out to the Defendant on condition that the paid an annual rent of Rs. 100/-. As the rent was not paid the suit was brought for the years 1943 and 1944 and the total claim including interest etc. was laid at Rs. 215/8/-. The suit was decreed, in the first instance, by the Principal Agency Munsif of Gunupur and was taken up on appeal before the Agency Subordinate Judge who on 2-9-48 remanded it for rehearing after framing the following two important issues: 1. Is Karini a whole inam village? 2. If so, has the Civil Court jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. After remand, both parties led evidence to prove the origin of the inam grant in respect of the village. Then the Principal Agency Munsif of Gunupur he living the evidence of the Plaintiff held that the village was not a whole inam village recognised by the British Government and that consequently the disputed lands were not included within the definition of 'estate' as given in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 as amended by Orissa Act XVII of 1947. On appeal, however, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the Plaintiff had totally failed to discharge his burden of proving that the disputed property was not an 'estate'. He, therefore, held in favour of the Defendant on this question and as a consequence of this finding be held that the suit was cognizable only in the Revenue Court and not in the Civil Court. But as regards the Plaintiff's claim, however, be gave a finding to the effect that the claim was valid and fully established. 3. He, therefore, held in favour of the Defendant on this question and as a consequence of this finding be held that the suit was cognizable only in the Revenue Court and not in the Civil Court. But as regards the Plaintiff's claim, however, be gave a finding to the effect that the claim was valid and fully established. 3. The original definition of the expression 'estate' as given in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 was amended by Orissa Act XVII of 1947 and the new definition is as follows: (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee of grantees. Explanation (1).-Where a grant as an inam is, expressed, to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of the name which have already been granted on service or other tenore or been, reserved for communal purposes. Explanation (2).-Where an inam village is, resumed by the Government, it shall cease to be an estate but, if any village a resumed is subsequently regranted by the Government as an inam, it shall, from the date of such regrant, be regarded as an estate. Explanation (3).-Where a portion of an inam village is resumed by the Government, such portion shall cease to be part of the estate, but the rest of the village shall be deemed to be an inam village for the purposes of this sub-clause. If the portion a resumed or any part thereof is subsequently re-granted by the Government as an inam, such portion or part shall, from the date of such re-grant, be regarded as forming part of the inam village for the purposes of this sub-clause; By Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land (Orissa Second Amendment) Act, 1946 a new section (Section 23) was inserted in the Madras Estates Land Act to the following effect: 23. Where in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary to determine whether an inam village or a separated part of an inam village was or was not an estate within: the meaning of this Act as it stood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Orissa Second Amendment) Act, 1946 it shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown that such village or part was an estate. The effect of this new Section 23 was to shift the burden on the person who alleged that a portion of the inam village was not an estate, to establish this fact thereby rendering the law as laid down by the Privy Council in 148 I.C. p. 827 inapplicable. His thus clear that it is the Plaintiff's primary duty to establish by evidence that the disputed property is not an 'estate' as defined in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended by Orissa Act XVII of 1947. 4. The Inam Commission did not make any investigation about the inam tenures in Koraput district and consequently there are no title deeds to prove the terms of the pre-settlement inams in Jeypore estate. The following extract from the Gazetteer of Koraput district (1945 edition) p. 140 may be read in this connection. By the terms of the permanent settlement the reversionary right in inam tenures then in existence was reserved to the Government, though the kattubadi on them was included in the assets of the estates and is payable to the zamindars and proprietors. In 1862 the inam Commission appointed by the Madras Government visited the Vizagapatam district and permitted holders of pre-settlement inams to enfranchise their grants from the risk of reversion to Government by the payment of an annual quit-rent which was fixed according to circumstances and did not vary thereafter. But no investigation was made into the status of the various inamdars in Jeypore and the hill tracts of Pachipenta, with the result that there is at present no practical distinction between pre-settlement and post-settlement grants in the district, the Government never having exercised their right to the reversion of the former either by resuming them or enfranchising them. Owing to the absence of reliable. Records until comparatively recent years it is now often impossible to ascertain the date of an original grant. 5. Owing to the absence of reliable. Records until comparatively recent years it is now often impossible to ascertain the date of an original grant. 5. The main question for decision in this appeal is whether Karini is a whole inam village. It was for a decision of this issue that the lower appellate Court specially remanded the case to the trial Court. It appears that both parties assumed the Karini was a pre-settlement inam village. If it had been a post-settlement inam village the question as to whether it was a whole inam or a minor inam would have been immaterial inasmuch as after the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1939 244 (Privy Council) all poet settlement inams have been held to be parts of an "estate". Hence the necessity for remanding the case to the trial Court for a decision of issue No. 1 would not have arisen. There is the unchallenged statement of the Plaintiff's witness No. 1 that Karini village was given as a grant about 150 years back. Doubtless, neither party has personal knowledge of the exact date when the inam grant was made by the then Maharaja of Jeypore. But the Plaintiff's witness No. 1 is a descendant of one of the original inamdars and his evidence about the approximate date of the grant is based on tradition. The Amin of Jeypore Samasthanam who was examined as a witness for the Defendant was a new comer to the estate and had no personal knowledge on the subject so as to contradict the evidence of the Plaintiff's witness No. 1. I would, therefore, hold that Karini village is a pre-settlement inam. 6. The next question is whether the grant was of the whole village or else of a portion of the village. The evidence led by the parties is divergent on this point. The Plaintiff's witnesses have stated that the village was granted in separate parcels to several Mahajans by separate pattas and that subsequently those Mahajans set apart the disputed lands for the deity of the village. In other words, the Plaintiff's case is that though the whole of village Karini was granted by the Maharaja of Jeypore before the coming into force of the Permanent Regulation the grant was of separate parcels of the village to different persons. In other words, the Plaintiff's case is that though the whole of village Karini was granted by the Maharaja of Jeypore before the coming into force of the Permanent Regulation the grant was of separate parcels of the village to different persons. The Defendant's evidence, however, was that the whole village formed one grant though the grant was made jointly in favour of several Mahajans. In the present case, however, it is unnecessary to decide whether there was one joint grant to several persons of the whole of village Karini or else whether there were separate grants of village Karini to different persons by the Maharaja of Jeypore. In any view of the case, in view of the unchallenged possession that it is a pre-settlement inam it will not become an 'estate' within the meaning of the definition given in Section 3(2)(d) unless it could be further shown that the grant was made, confirmed or recognized by the British Government. Admittedly, the grant was not made by the British Government but it was made by the Maharaja of Jeypore. It is also admitted that the grant was not confirmed by the British Government inasmuch as the Inam Commission never investigated the grants. The sale question, therefore, for consideration is whether the grant was 'recognised' by the British Government" The expression 'recognised' occurring in the said section has been construed in Sam v. Ramalinga AIR 1917 Mad 281 following Secy. of State v. Chinnapragada 17 I.C. 373 as implying something more than mere acquiescence. Srinivasa Aiyengar, J. observed in the above Madras case it means something done by the Government as for instance, by acceptance of service, jodi etc. In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the inam grant was recognised by the British Government. It is true that the Maharaja of Jeypore used to submit D.C.B. Statements to the Collector regularly showing the cess payable by the various inamdars and case used to be collected from him on the basis of those statements. But such collection of cess by the collector from the zamindar would not amount to recognition of the inams by the collector especially when the realisation of cess was made through the zamindar and not directly from the inamdars. But such collection of cess by the collector from the zamindar would not amount to recognition of the inams by the collector especially when the realisation of cess was made through the zamindar and not directly from the inamdars. Hence, one of the important ingredients of the definition of 'Estate' in Section 3(2)(d) has not been established in the present case and the disputed property cannot be said to be an 'estate' within the meaning of the definition. 7. It is true that the burden lies on the Plaintiff to establish that his property does not come within the definition given in Section 3(2)(d). The lower appellate Court was incorrect in stating that the Plaintiff led no evidence to discharge his burden. He did lead evidence to show that it was a pre-settlement inam. From the District Gazetteer which is an official publication and from the evidence of the estate Amin also it is clear that the inam was never confirmed by the British Government nor was it ever recognised. The filing of the D.C.B. statement (Ext. A) before the Collector will not amount to recognition within the meaning of the said definition. I would, therefore, hold that the Plaintiff has discharged the burden cast on him. The trial Court, therefore, rightly decided this point is favour of the Plaintiff. The disputed property is not an 'estate' and hence the suit is cognizable by the Civil Court. 8. As regards the claim, the appellate Court has confirmed the decision of the trial Court and its finding was not challenged before me. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower appellate Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial Court with costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed