JUDGMENT : 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal under S. 525 Gwalior Civil P.C. The plaintiff's suit for title and for possession of a house was dismissed by the trial Court and his appeal has been dismissed by the first appellate Court. He has, therefore, come in second appeal to this Court. The plaint had alleged that the house in question belonged to the plaintiff, that Pooran defendant 1 had been in occupation of this house and he and his son Ram Prasad (defendant 2), without plaintiff's authority, sold this house for a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to defendants 3 to 6. The house, it was alleged, was at the time of the institution of the suit, in possession of the defendants 3 to 6. 2. Now the first issue was whether the plaintiff was the owner of the house ? Oral evidence had been adduced by the parties and the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses did not believe the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff. Now it is very important in this case that plaintiff Gangaram did not appear as a (witness ?) and no reason is forthcoming what prevented him from coming to the Court. Mr. Himayatulla, on behalf of Gangaram plaintiff appellant, drew my attention to the statement of Khushali and Heera, two witnesses produced by the plaintiff and I do not find anything in their statements which may incline me to take a view different from that taken by the trial Court on the point. Taking the two testimonies as a whole one naturally comes to the conclusion that Gangaram plaintiff and Pooran defendant 1 come from the same family and formerly the house may have been a joint one or may have belonged to Gangaram; but nearly twenty-five years before the institution of the suit it appears that Gangaram had left the house and gone in service at Bhopal and Pooran had been in sole charge of the house and treated the house as it was his exclusive property. The plaintiff's witness Khushali clearly deposes to the effect that Gangaram plaintiff did not spend a single penny on the repairs of the mud house, that everything was done by Pooran and his aunt Keshar who looked after the house and who spent money over construction of the whole house. The plaintiff's witness Khushali clearly deposes to the effect that Gangaram plaintiff did not spend a single penny on the repairs of the mud house, that everything was done by Pooran and his aunt Keshar who looked after the house and who spent money over construction of the whole house. The statement is clearly to the effect that in fact the house was re-constructed by them. Clearly the evidence of Heera and Khushali does not at all help the plaintiff but helps the defendants. My attention was also drawn to the statement of Pooran and I do not find therein anything which may indicate that the house ever belonged to Gangaram. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that so far as the evidence about the ownership and of possession of the house in question is concerned the decision of the trial Court and that of the first appellate Court cannot be challenged in this second appeal. 3. Mr. Himayatulla then invited my attention to a document dated 23-2-47 executed by Pooran before a Panchayat. It appears that after the institution of this suit, in order to settle the family dispute between Pooran defendant 1 and Gangaram plaintiff a Panchayat assembled and it decided that the house was of Gangaram and then, according to the decision of the Panchayat, Pooran executed this deed stipulating that he would give to Gangaram before 15-3-47 some land either in Mohall Nakkasa or in Baraipur, which will adequately compensate Gangaram for the loss of this house. I agree with the trial Court that this document can in no way amount to an admission by Pooran that the property belonged to Gangaram. It is clearly written in accordance with the order of Panchas and I do not understand that this suit can be decreed on the basis of this document. I do not understand why the plaintiff Gangaram did not file a suit for specific performance of the contract entered into by Pooran, the evidence of which has been furnished by this document. 4. The only point worth consideration in this appeal is about the value to be attached to the statements of Behari P.W. 3, Kundan P.W. 4 and Mangal P.W. 5 who deposed that Pooran had admitted before the Panchas that the house had belonged to Ganga Ram plaintiff and that he had sold this house without authority to defendants 3 to 6. 5. 5. Mr. Patankar, counsel for the respondents, urged that the testimony of these Panch witnesses about a statement made by Pooran defendant 1 during the period of negotiations is not admissible and the learned counsel placed reliance on some observations of their Lordships (Harries and Rachhpal Singh, JJ.) of the Allahabad High Court in - 'Shibcharandas v. Firm Gulab Chand Chhotey Lal', AIR 1936 All 157 (A) to the effect that where negotiations are being conducted with a view to settlement it should be held that these negotiations are being conducted "without prejudice", and that it is not open for one of the parties to give evidence of an admission made by another. In my opinion, these observations were made without considering the provisions embodied in S. 23, Evidence Act and without referring to the case, closely followed the views of Phear, J. in the case of - 'Mohabeersingh v. Dhujoo Singh, 20 WR 172 (B) which was a case not governed by the provisions of the Evidence Act of 1872. With respect I may state that the correct view is certainly that of the Patna High Court (Coutts and Das, JJ.) in - 'Punjab Singh v. Ramautar Singh', AIR 1920 Pat 841 (C) that an admission before an arbitrator is admissible in evidence although it is for the Court dealing with the facts to attach whatever weight it thinks proper to attach to such an admission. I am clear in my mind that the rule enunciated in S. 23, Evidence Act does not apply to such admissions. I am fortified in this view also by rulings of the Calcutta High Court reported in - 'Kowsulliah Sundari Dasi v. Mukta Sundara Dasi', 11 Cal 588 (D) and - 'Meajam v. Alimuddin Mea', AIR 1917 :Cal 487 (E), where it had been held that, in the absence of an express or implied understanding between the parties that the evidence of the conversation during the period when negotiations for settlement of the claim are being carried on [is not to be tendered, such conversation cannot be held to be privileged and must be held to be admissible in evidence. In the present case there is no indication that the parties themselves regarded the conversation as being a privileged one. I hold accordingly that the evidence of these witnesses was rightly admitted by the trial Court. 6. In the present case there is no indication that the parties themselves regarded the conversation as being a privileged one. I hold accordingly that the evidence of these witnesses was rightly admitted by the trial Court. 6. Now the trial 'Court has taken view that the witnesses could not exactly give an account of what actually the words were which Pooran had used when he is alleged to have admitted the fact that Ganga Ram was the owner of the suit house. I have gone through these depositions carefully and I find that the trial Court and the first appellate Court are right in arriving at this conclusion and the statements cannot be taken to prove Pooran's admission about Gangaram's ownership of this house. It may also be added here that an admission of one co-defendant is not receivable against another merely by virtue of his position as a co-party in the litigation.' As Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J. at p. 974 of AIR 1913 Cal 971 - 'Ambar Ali v. Lutfe All (F)', remarked : "If the rule were otherwise, it would in practice permit a litigant to discredit an opponent's claim merely by joining any person as the opponent's co-party, and then employing that person's statements as admissions. Consequently, it is not by virtue of that person's relation to the litigation that the admission of one can be used against the other; it must be because of some priority of title or of obligation. The vital point for consideration, accordingly, is whether there is such priority of obligation or title between two persons as to justify the use of the admission of one against the other; and, plainly, this must be determined by reference to the relation between the parties at the time the admission is made. As a matter of probative value, the admission of a person (such as one joint-owner) having precisely the same interest at stake as another (his co-owner), will, in general, be likely to be equally worthy of consideration; there being an identity of legal liability, the two persons may be deemed one so far as affects the propriety of discrediting one by the statements of the other. This reason, however, ceases to be applicable where, as in the case before us, the admission was made at a time when the parties had no community of interest." 7. This reason, however, ceases to be applicable where, as in the case before us, the admission was made at a time when the parties had no community of interest." 7. So even if it had been held that Pooran's statement before Panchas amounted to his admission of Gangaram's ownership of the house in dispute even then it could not have been of any weight as against defendants 3 to 6 under S. 18, Evidence Act; for, Pooran had at that time ceased to have any interest in the house in question as the ownership of the house had been vested in defendants 3 to 6, and who were also at that time in its possession. It may also be added that Pooran or his son did not enter appearance in this case and proceedings against them were ex parte. The suit was contested only by defendants 3 to 6 and the law is well settled that statements made by persons from whom the parties to a suit have derived their interest in their subject-matter of the suit are admissible as admissions only when the admissions are of date prior to the date of transfer - 'J.C. Galstaun v. Abid Husain', AIR 1924 Oudh 19 (G) and that a purchaser is not bound by an admission made by his vendor subsequent to the purchase made by him : - 'Maung Aung v. Maung Shwe Lin', AIR 1623 Rang 51 (H). In these circumstances I find that there is no force in this appeal which must fail. I, therefore, dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.