ORDER : 1. This is a revision against the order dated 21-5-53, passed by the Munsiff, Bhopal in Objection Case No. 990 of 1952. 2. The non-applicant instituted a suit, against one Gogia Pasha, a magician, for money on 12-4-52 and on the same day obtained an order for an attachment before judgment and a prohibitory order against the applicant on the ground that Pasha held a claim for money against the applicant. After the decree was obtained on 27-5-52, an application for execution was filed against the judgment-debtor and a notice, calling upon the applicant to pay up the amount, was issued. The latter objected on the grounds that the prohibitory order was not served on him and that no attachment could be made of a mere share in profits not yet due. His objections were overruled by the above order which he now challenges. 3. His contentions are : (1) that neither was the defendant served nor any attempt made to serve him with a copy of the prohibitory order; that no such copy of the order was affixed to the Court house or was served on him and hence the prohibitory order was not served and there was no valid attachment and (2) that no attachment could be effected of a sum of money not yet due on the date of the order. The non-applicant contends that no revision could lie against the order which was passed on objection under O. 21, R. 58, Civil P.C. 4. The first question is whether the revision is tenable. It must be remembered that the provisions of O. 21, R. 58 of the Code would apply only when an attachment is effected. In the case on hand, the question is whether an attachment itself was effected. In - 'Muthiah Chetti v. Palaniappa Chetty', AIR 1928 PC 139 (A) it has been held that : "No property can be declared to be attached unless firstly order for attachment has been issued; and secondly, in execution of that order, the other things prescribed by the rules in the Code have been done." After an order of attachment had been issued a claim was put in and rejected. There was no attachment effected at any time and it was held that : "The order of rejection need not be set aside within one year, the order being a nullity." The garnishee, not being a party to the execution application, was a stranger as not liable under the decree and as such any question raised by him. did not fall within the purview of S. 47 of the Code. He has, therefore, a right to come up in revision if aggrieved by an order of a Court subordinate to this Court. The revision is, therefore, tenable. 5. The next question is whether an order for attachment of the particular property, as in this case, could, in law, be issued. The description of the alleged property is found in the copy of the notice issued to the defendant viz. : "his share for money realised by way of sale of tickets for his shows in the Bhopal Talkies today (12th) and tomorrow (13th) of April, 1952 to the extent of Rs. 400/-." The order itself is dated 12-4-1952. It is not disputed that the shows were given in the evening. It is thus clear that the sales of tickets even for that evening were yet to be effected and the sale proceeds were not in existence at the time the order was made. 6. Money, which may or may not become due, or the payment of which is dependent on the happening of an event or events which may not necessarily happen, could not be called a 'debt'. In - 'Mangtulal v. Dayashanker', AIR 1936 Pat 572 (B) it has been held that "a right to receive royalty depends upon the happening of circumstances which are entirely contingent and hence cannot be attached as a debt under S. 60." In - 'Bahadurmull Rampuria v. Tricumdas Callianji', AIR 1925 Cal 561 (C) it has been held that "the debt must be in existence and not merely contingent though it may not have been ascertained." In the case on hand the accrual, of a sum of Rs. 400/- or any part thereof was itself contingent on the sales of tickets for the shows which were yet even to commence and as such it could not fall within the purview of a 'debt'. 400/- or any part thereof was itself contingent on the sales of tickets for the shows which were yet even to commence and as such it could not fall within the purview of a 'debt'. No attachment could, therefore, be in law made of such Item of the alleged property and the order for such attachment was materially irregular. 7. The next question is whether the attachment was validly effected. The applicant-objector was admittedly a garnishee and thus provisions of O. 21, R. 46 of the Code were applicable to the case. The provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with. Under sub-rule (1) in the case of a debt (which it is alleged to be in the case), the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payments thereof. The creditor in this case was the defendant, who was said to be entitled to recover a certain amount of money not only not yet ascertained, but even not yet due and was prohibited from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payments thereof. In the case on hand, the record shows that an order was passed in writing, but was not served on the creditor, the defendant. Under sub-rule (2) "a copy of such order shall be affixed on some conspicuous part of the Court house." There is nothing on record to show that this was complied with. On behalf of the non-applicant it was said that this must be presumed, under S. 114, Evidence Act, to have been complied with. This argument could have had some force if there had been some order to the effect, but in the absence of such order, no such presumption can be made and the onus, therefore, lay on the non-applicant, to prove the compliance. There is no evidence to prove that this essential was complied with. In - 'Narendara Prasad v. Janki Kuer', AIR 1947 Pat 385 (D), it has been held that : "The provisions of O. 21, R. 46(2) being mandatory, the failure to comply with any one requirement thereof nullifies the whole proceeding and the defect is not curable under S. 99. To hold otherwise would be to use the section to cure the proceeding itself and not any mere error, defect or irregularity therein. To hold otherwise would be to use the section to cure the proceeding itself and not any mere error, defect or irregularity therein. Consequently, the failure to affix a copy of the prohibitory order on a conspicuous part of the Court house will render the attachment invalid." 8. Then again examining the record further, it must appear that even the garnishee does not appear to have been served with the prohibitory order. The maximum that was proved on record, as per the report of the Clerk who went to serve the order, is that "the manager of the Bhopal Talkies saw the Clerk and the plaintiff in the compound and then avoided meeting them." This cannot mean 'service', but only 'avoidance of service.' Service of a process is to be effected in the same manner as if it were a summons to the defendant. The mode of service, as laid down under O. 5, R. 10 of the Code, requires that "a copy of the process shall be delivered or tendered to the addressee." Under R. 16 of the said Order, "the person, to whom a copy of the process is delivered or tendered, shall be required to sign an acknowledgment of service endorsed on the original process." It is only then that the service is complete. In the circumstances, the Munsiff's view, that the garnishee was served with the order, is wholly incorrect. 9. The alleged property not being liable to be attached and all the essentials, under O. 21, R. 46 (2), for effecting a valid attachment, therefore, being not complied with, it is clear that there was no valid attachment of any kind of money in the hands of the garnishee and he cannot be called upon to pay anything towards the satisfaction of the decree. 10. It was said that the garnishee could not come up with such an application challenging the mode of service or the validity of the attachment and it is only the defendant or the judgment-debtor who could do so. 10. It was said that the garnishee could not come up with such an application challenging the mode of service or the validity of the attachment and it is only the defendant or the judgment-debtor who could do so. This contention must be repelled on the mere consideration that it is the garnishee who is affected the most not only by such an order, but also by the defective mode of the execution of the said order, and as such being aggrieved thereby, has a clear right to challenge not only the validity of the issue of the order, but also that of the mode of the execution or enforcement of the order. 11. The revision is, therefore, allowed with costs against the non-applicant who shall bear his own costs. The order of the Munsiff, together with the order for costs, is set aside. Counsel's fees will be Rs. 20/- only for each party, if certified. Revision allowed.