JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This is a Defendant's first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22-11-49 of Sri G.B. Misra, Agency Subordinate Judge of Jeypore, arising out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff for ejectment of the Defendant from the disputed house and for recovery of damages amounting to Rs. 93/-. The Plaintiff is the Maharaja of Jeypore. The Plaintiff's case is that on the main road of Jeypore and on the western row thereof there was a thatched ahead consisting of three rooms abutting the temple compound wan of Shri Chaitanya. The Plaintiff is the landlord of these rooms and the room described in the schedule attached to the plaint is one of them which was let out to one V. Seetaramswamy on a monthly tenancy with a rental of Rs. 2/10/8 on the hasis of lease executed in the year 1927 (Ext. 3). The said Seetaramswamy having fallen into arrears of rent made an application to the Plaintiff for accepting the present Defendant Suryanarayan as a tenant in his place and that the Defendant was ready to pay up the arrears also on a demand notice being served on him. The Defendant having agreed to abide by the terms of the lease of the year 1927 and having undertaken to pay the entire amount of arrears of rent on receipt of a notice of demand, the house, in question, was lab out to the Defendant since the year 1981 on the same terms, that is, on a monthly rental of Rs. 2/10/8. The Maharaja's name appeared in the House Tax Demand Register preserved by the Union Board in respect of these three rooms prior to the year 1935. After the year 1935, the other two rooms stood recorded in the Register in the name of the Plaintiff. Maharaja as occupier; but in respect of the house, in question, for the years 1935 to 1940, the name of the Defendant was so entered in place of the Plaintiff. The same entry in the name of the Defendant was renewed in the next House Tax Demand Register for the years 1940 to 1945 and 1945 to 1950 as well. In the year 1948, the Plaintiff made an application before the Union Board for correcting the entry and recording his name in the place of that of the Defendant. The same entry in the name of the Defendant was renewed in the next House Tax Demand Register for the years 1940 to 1945 and 1945 to 1950 as well. In the year 1948, the Plaintiff made an application before the Union Board for correcting the entry and recording his name in the place of that of the Defendant. Notice having been served on the Defendant and the Defendant having objected to in the Plaintiff's petition was rejected and the Defendant's name was allowed to continue. The Defendant asserted in those proceedings that he was the owner of the house and not the Maharaja. Thereafter the Plaintiff on 24-7-48 served a notice on the Defendant that the Defendant having dishonestly and maliciously asserted his title in respect of his (Plaintiff's) house adversely to that of the Plaintiff he was called upon to execute a rent-deed in favour of the Plaintiff or else a suit for ejectment was to be brought. In reply to this notice (Ext. 0) the Defendant completely repudiated the title of the Plaintiff in respect of the suit house and alleged that the Plaintiff's claim was absolutely frivolous. The Plaintiff, therefore, has brought the present suit on 5-7-49 hasing the plaint on the cause of action of the Defendant's repudiation of the title of the Plaintiff-landlord. 2. The defence is that the room which was in existence in the-year 1927 belonged to Seetaramswamy and in the year 1981 the Defendant had purchased the room from him. Thereafter he had reconstructed the house by spending a sum of Rs. 1500/- or more and is in possession of the house in his own right ever since the year 1931, and the Plaintiff has no right, title and interest whatsoever so far as the house is concerned. But the Plaintiff is only entitled to ground-rent of Rs. 2/10/8 and the rent is not payable in respect of the house which belongs to the Defendant. His further claim was that he being in adverse possession of the house for more than 12 years be had matured his title and, as such, was not liable to eviction, and his last plea is that in any event he is entitled to compensation to the extents of Rs. 500/- which he spent in reconstructing the house. 3. His further claim was that he being in adverse possession of the house for more than 12 years be had matured his title and, as such, was not liable to eviction, and his last plea is that in any event he is entitled to compensation to the extents of Rs. 500/- which he spent in reconstructing the house. 3. The learned trial Court completely disbelieved the story of the Defendant's purchase of the room from Seetaramaswamy as a myth. He found that in fact the Defendant was a tenant in respect of the house itself which was in occupation of Seetaramaswamy, his predecessor. The rental of Rs. 2/10/8 is the house-rent and not the ground-rent. He further found that the Defendant being a tenant and having continued as a tenant on payment of Rs. 2/10/8 p.m. as rental, the plea of adverse possession was not open to him. He found that the Defendant had spent nearly Rs. 1000/- by way of reconstructing the house and lastly relying upon a decision reported in Darbari Lal Mudi and Others Vs. Raneeganj Coal Association Ltd. he disallowed his claim for compensation, but nevertheless on passing a decree for ejectment allowed him sufficient time for removal of the structure. 4. Mr. M.S. Rao, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, argues his first point that the rental of Rs. 2/10/8 was really one in respect of the site on which the house stood and not house-rent. In our opinion, this contention is bound to fail in the face of some, of the documents which appear to be unimpeachable. Ext. 3 is that deed of lease between the Defendant's predecessor Seetaramaswamy and the Plaintiff on 20-4-27. The recital in paragraph 2 of the lease makes the point absolutely clear and runs thus: The lessee hereby covenants with the lessor (i) that from this 20th day of April, 1927, onwards for one year he shall be paying him a sum of Rupees (2/10/8) two, annas ten and pies eight monthly towards the rent for the room situated all the pial of the thatched house on the western side, opposite to the temple of the deity Sri Chaitanya in the town of Jeypore. This document has been proved by one of the attestors to the document and also by the lessee (Seetaramaswamy). The genuineness of the document appears to be beyond all possible doubts. Ext. This document has been proved by one of the attestors to the document and also by the lessee (Seetaramaswamy). The genuineness of the document appears to be beyond all possible doubts. Ext. 5 is the petition filed by Seetaramaswamy on 7-1-31 to the Killadar, Jeypore Samasthanam Fort, wherein he writes the rent in question relates to the small room on the pial of the house situate on the western side of the main road of this town opposite to the Chaitanya Muth which I have been using as a shop and the amount agreed to be paid monthly as such is Rs. 2-10-8. Further on he recites that the Defendant, agrees to pay the arrears of rent and will run business in the shop for himself in the place of Seetaramaswamy. It is important to mark that the present Defendant has made an endorsement on this application. (Ext. 5/a) under his own signature to the effect that he binds him self to abide by the aforesaid terms and undertakes to pay the entire amount of arrear rent on receipt of a notice of demand. Eventually the Defendant was accepted as a lessee in respect of the room by the Plaintiff. The learned Court below has accepted this petition and the endorsement made by the Defendant as sufficiently proved relying upon the evidence of P.W. 4 who is still working is a clerk in the estate's office. The position that what was paid by the Defendant was a house-rent and not merely a ground-rent seems to have been conclusively proved by the above two documents long with Ext. 1 series, that is, counterfoils of rent-receipts produced by the Plaintiff. Consistently we find in Ext. 1 series that in every receipt in every year the rent has been described as house rent. The position is further strengthened by the endorsement made by the Defendant himself Ext. 2) on the back of the counterfoil (Ext. 1a) and accepted the rental as house-rent. In our view, therefore, there is no doubt in our mind that the learned Court below found correctly that the Defendant had paid the above sums as boose-rent ana nab merely as ground-rent. 5. The next point taken up by Mr. Rao is that the Plaintiff has nab been able to establish the alleged cause of action of repudiation of landlord's title to succeed in this suit for ejectment. 5. The next point taken up by Mr. Rao is that the Plaintiff has nab been able to establish the alleged cause of action of repudiation of landlord's title to succeed in this suit for ejectment. He contends that the Defendant has all along bona fide and asserted that the house is his and not of the landlord. But nevertheless he alleges that he is so tenant in respect of the site and is always willing to pay the rental as ground rent. He relies upon the finding of the Court below that he had spent at least more, than Rs. 1000/-in reconstructing the house. As it transpires from the oral evidence adduced by the parties, the original room which was in occupation of Seetarawaswamy was only a thatched room with a mud floor. The Defendant had reconstructed the room by putting corrugated iron sheets in place of the thatch and by constructing brick walls and making the floor pucca. This only leads to the conclusion that the Defendant, while a lessee of the room, has made sufficient improvements thereto. But it can never be said that he was never a tenant of the house of the Plaintiff. We have got to examine the subsequent events on the hasis of the finding that the Defendant is a tenant of the house of the Plaintiff. In the year 1985 the Defendant took steps to get his name recorded in the House Tax Demand Register of the Union Board as the occupier of the house in place of Maharaja who had stood registered in respect of the room till that year. He was also able to get his name recorded in the Register for the years 1940 to 1945 and 1945 to 1950. But the more important feature is that in the year 1948 when the Plaintiff put in a petition for removing the name of the Defendant and changing the record in his favour by recording his name as the occupier, the Defendant successfully objected to this and the name of the Defendant was allowed to continue. To our mind, this incident of the year 1948, the Defendant having strongly resisted the Plaintiff's application for removal of the Defendant's name, is a definite repudiation of the landlord's title. 6. To our mind, this incident of the year 1948, the Defendant having strongly resisted the Plaintiff's application for removal of the Defendant's name, is a definite repudiation of the landlord's title. 6. We will now refer to the provisions of Section 111(g)(2) which runs as follows: in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a table in a third person or by claiming title in himself. The section enumerates all cases of termination of tenancy, one of them being in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. And the further provision is that and in any of those cases [that is enumerated in Clause (g)] the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. We are aware of the position of law that the cause of action is not matured and that the forfeiture is not complete unless and until the lessor gives notice that he has exercised his option to determine the lease as the lessee has repudiated his title. This provision necessitating a formal written notice under the provisions of Section 111(g) was introduced by the Amending Act of the year 1929. Before the Amending Act of the year 1929, it was only necessary for the lessor to do some act showing his intention to determine the lease. There was some discussion in the Bar whether the present case would be governed by the new provision demanding a formal notice to gait as provided for under the Amending Act of the year 1929 or by the position of law existing prior to that. As we find the original lease (Ext. 3) in favour of the Defendant's predecessor, Seetaramaswamy was of the year 1921 and on a careful examination of the subsequent proceedings by virtue of which the present Defendant was accepted as a tenant by the Plaintiff, it is clear to us that it is really a case of assignment of the previous leasehold held by Seetaramaswamy and not a creation of a new tenancy in the year 1931. As we have indicated above, on 7-1-31 Seetaramaswamy made an application to the Plaintiff's estate authorities that he was unable to pay up the arrears of rent and as the Defendant was willing to pay the arrears uptodate on behalf of Seetaramaswamy he might be accepted as a tenant in the place of Seetaramaswamy. On that petition the Defendant made an endorsement agreeing to the proposal and thereafter rent-receipts were granted to the Defendant. It is significant that no Dew lease was executed in the year 1931 as it was done in 1927. The Defendant does not assert that in fact a new tenancy was created in his favour. On the contrary, he says that he purchased the house from Seetaramaswamy by paying Rs. 75/-. In our view, therefore, the tenancy before us had its origin in the year 1927 even though the Defendant is a tenant since the year 1931 by virtue of an assignment of the previous tenant. We need not discuss the matter any further inasmuch as to our mind as it appears clear the notice Ext. C dated 24-7-48 served upon the Defendant is a substantial compliance of the provisions of Section 111(g), both new and old. The notice clearly recites that the Defendant with a malicious intention could succeeded in removing the name of the Moharaja and getting his:name recorded in the Union Board Register in respect of the house which belonged to the Maharaja and in respect of which the Defendant was only a tenant. The notice, therefore, demanded the Defendant to execute a rent-decree failing which a suit for ejectment would be proposed" and the Defendant would be liable for damages and costs. This notice sufficiently expresses the intention of the lessor to determine the lease by bringing a suit for ejectment on account of the reason that the Defendant had repudiated the title of the Plaintiff and set up his own. Indeed the notice itself has not been signed by the Plaintiff, but the reply given by the Defendant to the notice makes it sufficiently clear 'hat the notice was on behalf of the Plaintiff and by his agent. In our view, therefore, the Defendant has made himself liable for ejectment by repudiating the title of the Plaintiff (his landlord) and setting up his own title. 7. In our view, therefore, the Defendant has made himself liable for ejectment by repudiating the title of the Plaintiff (his landlord) and setting up his own title. 7. The next question that arises is his claim for compensation for having reconstructed the house by spending sum of Rs. 1000/- as found by the Court below. The clear provisions of law to cover such cases are contained in Section 108(h) which runs as follows: The lessee may even after the determination of the lease remove, at any time Whilst he is in possession of the property leased out but not afterwards all things which he has attached to the earth provided be leaves the property in the state in, which he received it. Mr. Rao however appeals to us on equitable ground to allow a relief of compensation in favour of the Appellant. The position been made clear in the decision reported in Darbari Lal Mudi and Others Vs. Raneeganj Coal Association Ltd., where exactly a similar case arose where the Defendant who of aimed permanent tenancy which was negatived by the Court had spent a substantial amount by putting considerable improvements to the property, and claimed compensation for ejectment. Their Lordships relying upon a judgment of the Privy Council reported in Lala Beni Ram v. Kudanlal observed that when there were clear provisions of law embodying the rights and liabilities between the parties, that is, the lessor and the lessee, u/s 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and the rights were conferred on the lessee, in such circumstances by the provisions under Clause (h) of Section 108, the question of equitable principle did not arise. In our view, this is the correct position of law and it is immaterial whether the Plaintiff knew all these improvements at the time or not. But we will else observe that there is no reliable evidence to show that the Plaintiff had the knowledge when the reconstructions were going on. The only evidence in this respect is that of a dismissed employee of the Plaintiff which is not acceptable to us. 8. In conclusion, therefore, we will confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. The Defendant is allowed a further period of two months from today to remove the structures. Narasimham, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Allowed