Judgment :- 1. The 3rd defendant is the appellant. As endorser of a cheque drawn by defendants 1 and 2 in his favour which was dishonoured by them the endorsee obtained a decree for the money in O.S. 49 of 1120 on the file of the Alleppey District Court against him as also against the drawers on 22.6.1121. There was an appeal against that decree by the 3rd defendant which also ended in favour of the plaintiff. The appellate decree was on 1.12.1949. E.P. 78 of 1951 was presented on 7.11.1951 for execution of the said decree against the 3rd defendant and his properties. The 3rd defendant objected by C.M.P. 352 of 1952. His objection was that his liability was that of a surety and was as such conditional on the amount not being found realisable from defendants 1 and 2 and that steps to recover the money from him could not be taken in the first instance. The objection was rightly overruled and execution of the decree allowed as applied for by order dated 18.3.1952. Against this order the 3rd defendant preferred an appeal to this court which also went against him. Meanwhile, pursuant to the order passed by the court below directing further steps, the decree-holder on 28.3.1952 produced the schedule of properties that had already been attached, for purposes of proclamation. On that date the court directed certain amendments to the schedule and production of a copy of the chitta of one survey number. Those directions were complied with and the court on 9.6.1952 ordered "R. 66 Notice" and fixed 8.7.1952 for its return. On 8.7.1952 notice was served upon the 3rd defendant but nothing happened in court that day, the records having been called up by the High Court in connection with the aforesaid appeal. On 13.3.1953 after receipt of the records back, the court passed the following order: "Proclamation of sale at spot on 15.6.1953 and in court on the 16th, 17th and 18th June 1953". On 27.3.1953 the 3rd defendant filed C.M.P. 2217/53 dated 26.3.1953 supported by his affidavit praying for a review of the aforesaid order dated 1.3.1953 and for directing reception of his objection to the proclamation which was presented along with it as C.M.P. 2218. Learned counsel for the decree-holder recorded on C.M.P. 2217 on 27.3.1953 as follows: "Copy of the petition and affidavit alone and not the objections received. Learned counsel for the decree-holder recorded on C.M.P. 2217 on 27.3.1953 as follows: "Copy of the petition and affidavit alone and not the objections received. I object to the petition at this stage. The object is only to drag on and delay the execution". Thereupon the learned judge passed the following order on the same day, i.e., on 27.3.1953:-"For objections and hearing to 6.6.1953" and on C.M.P. 2218 the judge passed an order as follows: "Report after the disposal of C.M.P. 2217/53". There was no sitting of the court on 6.6.1953 and the matter stood adjourned to 20.6.1953 wherefrom it was advanced to 13.6.1953. On that date the decree-holder filed C.M.P. 2582 by way of objections to C.M.P. 2217. CM.P. 2217 was heard that day and was posted for orders to 18.6.1953. On the day previous to the said date that is on 17.6.1953, the 3rd defendant filed C.M.P. 2701/53 producing a certified copy of the judgment of this court in A.S. 343/52 and contending that as per that decision the order for sale passed on 13.3.1953 was unsustainable and praying that the matter may be further heard and the above point considered before passing orders. Counsel for the decree-holder was served with a copy of the petition and he made the following endorsement thereon: "Copy of petition received, I object. There is no need to hear arguments over again. My client is no party to the judgment filed. The document is also inadmissible being copy of a copy. The facts in that case are also entirely different". The court ordered on C.M.P. 2701 that the whole matter be reposted to 20.6.1953. Accordingly on 20.6.1953 the court heard arguments afresh on all points and the order which is the subject-matter of this appeal was passed on C.M.Ps. 2217 and 2701 dated 26.6.1953. In the B diary, however, as on 22.6.1953 is recorded: This is wrong as regards C.M.P. 2218 which was not dismissed and is still pending as per the order dated 27.3.1953. 2. Mr. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holder, raised a preliminary objection as regards the competency of the appeal. The objection is that the order appealed against is one rejecting an application for review which is not appealable. The whole case as also arguments on the preliminary objection were heard. 3. 2. Mr. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holder, raised a preliminary objection as regards the competency of the appeal. The objection is that the order appealed against is one rejecting an application for review which is not appealable. The whole case as also arguments on the preliminary objection were heard. 3. It is clear that there was no drawing up of the proclamation of sale as required by sub-r. (2) of R. 66 of 0.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notice in Form No. 28 of the date fixed for settling the sale proclamation was issued to the 3rd defendant and the day fixed for that purpose was 8.7.1952. Nothing was done that day nor was the proposed settlement or drawing up of the proclamation done on any subsequent date. On 13.3.1953 what happened was the passing of the order which has already been read, which proceeds on the assumption of there having been a proclamation drawn up or settled, awaiting an order for sale. The provisions regarding the various steps that should precede sale of property are contained in Rr. 64 to 67 both inclusive, of 0. 21, which relate to and regulate sales by court and S. 68 provides for sales by the Collector to which as enacted by S. 69 the rules in the 3rd schedule apply. A decree-holder who has to realise money by sale of property is directed to make an application for an order for sale which should be accompanied by a statement as prescribed in R. 66(3) containing the matters required by R. 66(2) to be specified in the proclamation. In a case where properties are ordered to be sold by a decree in enforcement of a lien, charge or mortgage, no further order for sale is necessary in execution to start with. Such an order is contemplated only in other cases where attached properties are sold or where properties are sold without attachment. (See S. 51(b)). An order permitting or directing the applicant to take steps towards bringing the properties to sale may be sufficient. On receipt of the aforesaid application of the decree-holder, a notice in Form No. 28 of the day fixed for settling the sale proclamation should be issued to the judgment-debtor whose property is sought to be sold. (See S. 51(b)). An order permitting or directing the applicant to take steps towards bringing the properties to sale may be sufficient. On receipt of the aforesaid application of the decree-holder, a notice in Form No. 28 of the day fixed for settling the sale proclamation should be issued to the judgment-debtor whose property is sought to be sold. On the day so fixed, R. 66(2) of 0.21 enjoins upon the court the obligation of drawing up the proclamation and it is prescribed that the time and place of sale shall be stated therein. The modus operandi as regards the drawing up or settling the proclamation is not shown in the Code of Civil Procedure but R. 275 of the Travancore Civil Courts Guide which are the rules made under the rule-making power contained in the Travancore Civil P.C. and have the force of law, enacts that: "That proclamation of sale, when settled by the judge shall be signed by him, and an order for sale shall then be made; and the further hearing of the suit or matter shall be adjourned to a day which shall be ordinarily not more than 31 days from the day fixed by the court for the sale". These rules are in force even now as they have not been altered or superseded by rules of this court which have not been framed. In order to constitute the drawing up of the proclamation by the court, the proclamation of sale must be settled by the judge and in token of such settlement he should sign it. After the proclamation is thus drawn up, i.e., specifying the property to be sold under R. 66(2)(a) of 0. 21, and the particulars thereof mentioned in sub-cls. (b) to (c) are settled, the proclamation of the intended sale should be made in the language of the court, (See R. 66(1)), an order for sale under R.64 made, and the proclamation in Form No. 29 issued to give notice to the public. Though the Rule refers in terms to attached property, the provisions therein contained would apply to all sales of immovable property in public auction by court. 4. The settlement or drawing up to the proclamation is no doubt not a judicial act ordinarily. "The directions issued by the court under 0. Though the Rule refers in terms to attached property, the provisions therein contained would apply to all sales of immovable property in public auction by court. 4. The settlement or drawing up to the proclamation is no doubt not a judicial act ordinarily. "The directions issued by the court under 0. 21, R. 66, Civil P.C., as originally enacted requiring the specifications to be made in the proclamation of sale cannot be regarded as judicial adjudication of the rights of the decree-holder or of the judgment-debtor. They appear to possess the characteristics of an administrative order directing how the proclamation of sale should be drawn up before the auction sale is actually held, because it cannot be suggested that by those directions the court determines to exact value of the property so as to be finally binding on any party". (per Sulaiman, J. in A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 74 at 80). Exceptional cases coming under S. 47 have not been and cannot be ruled out. 5. The sequence of the two matters of drawing up the proclamation and making an order for sale is indicated by the use of the word 'then' in the aforesaid R. 275 of the Civil Courts Guide which says that: "The proclamation of sale, when settled by the judge, shall be signed by him, and an order for sale shall then be made" R. 67(1) of 0.21 of the Civil P.C. provides that: "(1) Every proclamation shall be made and published as nearly as may be, in the manner prescribed by R. 54, sub-r. (2)". Sub- rr. (2) and (3) of R. 67 provide for details of the manner of further publication, if any, according as the court directs or the nature of the property sold requires. R. 65 provides for the person to conduct the sale and that it shall be made by public auction in the manner prescribed. The aforesaid provisions of law make it clear that without the court drawing up and settling the proclamation for the sale of the property sought to be sold, there cannot be a legal sale. 6. Sale of property between parties on agreement for purposes of partition presents a different aspect to which other considerations apply. The aforesaid provisions of law make it clear that without the court drawing up and settling the proclamation for the sale of the property sought to be sold, there cannot be a legal sale. 6. Sale of property between parties on agreement for purposes of partition presents a different aspect to which other considerations apply. Even in cases of sales by court for purposes of partition under the Partition Act (Central Act, IV of 1893) which has been extended to Part B States by Central Act, II of 1951 as from 1.4.1951, the provisions of Rr. 64 to 67 of 0.21 would apply mutatis mutandis in the absence of special rules made under the Act (See S. 7(b) of the Partition Act.) 7. In I.L.R. 49 Madras 333 it was held that the proclamation must be settled by the court and that should it be not so settled, but is settled by a commissioner appointed by the court to whom the court delegates the power the sale would be invalid. The authority to settle the proclamation and the obligation to draw it up are upon the court. These cannot be delegated. Such a settlement of proclamation is a necessary condition to the validity of a sale by court. The circumstances that the judgment-debtor defaults to appear in response to an intimation of the date fixed for the settlement of the proclamation is not one that will enable the court to sell property without settling the proclamation for which purpose the date is fixed and intimation given. Whether the judgment-debtor appears and objects, or appears and does not object, or does not appear at all, the court has to do its duty intimation of the proposal to do which on a specified future date has been given to the judgment-debtor in the matter of settling the proclamation. That has not been done in this case. Learned counsel for the respondent relies upon what happened in 1952 when the decree-holder presented his application under R. 66(3) of 0.21 accompanied by a schedule. The direction to amend the schedule and produce a copy of chitta made by the court, which has been already read, would, it is contended, amount to a settlement or drawing up of the proclamation within the meaning of R. 66(2). This argument can hardly be accepted. The direction to amend the schedule and produce a copy of chitta made by the court, which has been already read, would, it is contended, amount to a settlement or drawing up of the proclamation within the meaning of R. 66(2). This argument can hardly be accepted. The notice in Form No. 28 fixing 8.7.1952 as the date for settling the proclamation was issued to the 3rd defendant on 9.6.1952. If, in the view of the court, the direction to amend the schedule and the file copy of the chitta amounted to the drawing up or settlement of the proclamation, that notice need not have been ordered. Further, the court is not competent to settle the proclamation without issuing notice to the judgment-debtor whose property is sought to be sold because, R. 66(2) provides that: "Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor The words 'after notice' did not occur in the corresponding S. 287, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. Says Woodroffe in his Civil Procedure Code, 2nd edition, 1916 at page 980, as regards the absence of the words 'after notice' in the earlier Code and their introduction in the later: "After-notice". The proclamation was in the Mofussil usually prepared without notice to the judgment-debtor and behind his back, and he was not therefore likely to receive any intimation of its contents until it was fixed up in the court house or collectorate or was published upon the property. The faultiness of this practice was held, therefore, to excuse objections by the judgment-debtor. The Code has therefore been altered to give effect to a practice followed in Calcutta with great advantage of drawing up the proclamation after notice to the parties, who are thus afforded an opportunity of settling the contents correctly, and in a great measure are restrained from subsequently raising obstructive and dilatory objections". Even if the court purported to settle the proclamation without notice to the judgment-debtor, that would not amount to a settlement or drawing up of the proclamation under law. In this case it is clear from the orders passed that the court never considered that what it did on 28.3.1952 was drawing up or settling the proclamation. Even if the court purported to settle the proclamation without notice to the judgment-debtor, that would not amount to a settlement or drawing up of the proclamation under law. In this case it is clear from the orders passed that the court never considered that what it did on 28.3.1952 was drawing up or settling the proclamation. It appears to us that the learned judge who passed the order on 13.3.1953 was under the mistaken impression that there had been a settlement of the proclamation, that is, there was a proclamation drawn up by it and what remained was only to make an order for sale. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the proclamation that was issued in Form No. 29 on 18.3.1953, Index No. 125, contains the judge's signature and all the particulars required under R. 66, 0. 21, and that therefore it may be considered as amounting to the settlement or drawing up of the proclamation within the meaning of R. 66(2). Here again, a reference to the provisions of R. 275 of the Civil Courts Guide will show that the sequence prescribed therein which is the one indicated by the aforesaid rules in the Code is against this contention. If what was done on 18.3.1953 was the drawing up of the proclamation, then there is no other order passed thereafter for sale of the property and should a sale ensue, it cannot stand being devoid of the support of an order which is necessary to sustain it. 8. The Judge who passed the orders inclusive of the aforesaid order dated 27.3.1953 ceased to be attached to that court by its reopening in May after the mid-summer recess which started early in April 1953, and was succeeded by another judge who passed the later orders. 9. Upon the application for review, the learned judge was not satisfied that there was any ground to allow it. The learned judge says that the omission to file an objection on 8.7.1952 could not be justified by the absence of the records in the court below and no objections having been filed on the due date, "the court on receipt of records from the High Court on 13.3.1953 posted the case for sale". The learned judge says that the omission to file an objection on 8.7.1952 could not be justified by the absence of the records in the court below and no objections having been filed on the due date, "the court on receipt of records from the High Court on 13.3.1953 posted the case for sale". In the view of the court below, if a judgment-debtor to whom notice in Form No. 28 is issued omits to appear and object, then there is no need for the court to do anything further, but can straight-away pass the order for sale. As we have already mentioned above, that view of the learned judge is altogether erroneous. In this view the learned judge found no scope for any objection by the 3rd defendant to the contents of the proclamation. 10. Having said so far on the merits of the application for review, the learned judge proceeded to dispose of the legal objection of the judgment-debtor based on this court's decision in A.S. 343/52. But before dealing with that aspect of the case, it is necessary to dispose of an argument raised by learned counsel for the respondent that besides the grounds mentioned by the judge, there was yet another which would have entailed a rejection of the application for review, viz., that the application for review was presented not before the judge who passed the order sought to be reviewed, but before his successor, and that therefore a review can be applied for only on the ground stated in R.2 of 0.47 that is, discovery of new and important matter or evidence and it is contended that there is none such. The facts of this case, however, render the objection groundless. C.M.P. 2217 which was the application for review was presented before and was first dealt with by the identical judge who passed the order sought to be reviewed on 13.3.1953. The decree-holder took notice of that application and the court, therefore, regarded the situation as one where notice was ordered, issued, and accepted, and posted the case for objections and hearing. The decree-holder took notice of that application and the court, therefore, regarded the situation as one where notice was ordered, issued, and accepted, and posted the case for objections and hearing. If an application for review is presented before the judge who made the order or passed the decree sought to be reviewed, and notice is issued by him, it is competent for his successor to deal with that application and it is unnecessary in such a case that the ground which should alone justify the presentation of an application to a succeeding judge should exist. Even if the application for review had been presented before a succeeding judge, he would have been competent to deal with it in the facts of the present case which reveal the existence of another ground which also sustains an application before a successor i.e., error apparent on the face of the decree or order, (0. 47, R. 2) i.e., on the face of the record (0. 47, R. 1). Non-advertence to a positive provision of law, in this case sub-r. (2) of R. 66 would be such and error. (See a Full Bench decision of this court, in Narayanan v. Raman, 1953 K.L.T. 216 (I.L.R.1953 T-C. 265). 11. In A.S. 343/52, a Division Bench of this court took the view that the drawing up of the proclamation by the court is a necessary preliminary to the taking of the next step in the execution of the decree by sale of property. The learned District Judge attempts to distinguish that decision on the ground that in that case the contention of the judgment-debtor was "that the notice of the proclamation had been falsely and fraudulently served and that as soon as he knew of the proceedings he had filed his objections". The learned judge also felt the "absence of any authenticated report of the case" as an obstacle for applying the rule of law as laid down in the said decision. As regards the attempted distinction, it has to be observed that it is devoid of foundation. The necessity for the drawing up of the proclamation by the court does not depend upon the question whether notice of the date proposed for the settlement has or has not been served upon the judgment-debtor. As regards the attempted distinction, it has to be observed that it is devoid of foundation. The necessity for the drawing up of the proclamation by the court does not depend upon the question whether notice of the date proposed for the settlement has or has not been served upon the judgment-debtor. It is clear that before such notice is served, no proclamation can be settled but in a case where there has been no settlement at all, the fact that notice was served will not cure the defect and the aforesaid decision of this court is clear authority for the position that the drawing up of the proclamation must be done and must precede an order for sale fixing its date, time and place. 12. The next thing which stood in the way of the learned District Judge following this court's decision is stated by him to be the absence of an authenticated report. To render a decision of the High Court binding upon the subordinate courts, it is unnecessary that it should have been reported. An unreported decision is not any-the-less authority. (See 92 I.C. 710). To enable a subordinate court to find the law as laid down by the High Court, the production of a certified copy of the judgment is enough. (See A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 44). The objection taken by learned counsel for the decree-holder which was endorsed upon C.M.P. 2701, already read, stated that being a copy of a copy, it could not be looked into. This objection does not appear to have been adverted to by the learned Judge. Assuming that that objection would stand in the way of the court below looking into it, there is the fact that A.S. 343/52 was an appeal against a decision of the Alleppey District Court, and as such, a copy of the judgment of the High Court had been sent to that court wherefrom the certified copy produced along with C.M.P. 2701 was obtained. The learned judge could have, therefore, easily availed himself of a reliable and admissible copy from the records of the court. 13. Another decision of this court reported in 1952 K.L.T. Short Notes page 15 was also brought to the notice of the learned Judge. As regards this he did not feel handicapped by the absence of a report. The learned judge could have, therefore, easily availed himself of a reliable and admissible copy from the records of the court. 13. Another decision of this court reported in 1952 K.L.T. Short Notes page 15 was also brought to the notice of the learned Judge. As regards this he did not feel handicapped by the absence of a report. That decision has also held that it is the duty of the court to settle the proclamation in conformity with the provisions of law, i.e., 0. 21, R. 66(1)(a) to (c) and that such settlement is not a mere matter of form. As regards this decision the learned District Judge says that it "is of no assistance to his party (i.e., 3rd defendant) as the proclamation when drawn up after notice to the parties has to be deemed to be a proclamation that has been duly settled in accordance with law". We find it difficult to follow the learned judge's meaning which is far from clear. The defect in this case is that the proclamation has never been drawn up by the court as required by law and the decision was cited as authority for the position that the drawing up of the proclamation is essential and it would be no answer to say that the proclamation when drawn up after notice to the parties has to be deemed to be a proclamation that has been duly settled in accordance with law because there has been no settlement. When a proclamation is settled by the court it is drawn up by it. The drawing up and settling of the proclamation mean the same thing. The expression used in R. 66(2) of 0.21 is 'drawing up' and Form No. 28 shows that it is a 'Notice of the day fixed for settling a sale proclamation'. Having got over the two decisions of the High Court in the aforesaid manner, the learned judge found himself free to dismiss not only C.M.P. 2217 but also C.M.P. 2701 which he did by the order which has led to this appeal. 14. Courts are bound implicitly to follow the decisions of the High Court to which they are subordinate. The rule and its genesis are referred to and dealt with by Stanley, C.J. and Birkitt, J. in Emperor v. Deni (I.L.R. 28 All. 14. Courts are bound implicitly to follow the decisions of the High Court to which they are subordinate. The rule and its genesis are referred to and dealt with by Stanley, C.J. and Birkitt, J. in Emperor v. Deni (I.L.R. 28 All. 62) where Their Lordships observed as follows at p. 71-72: "We should have thought that it did not require any authority for the proposition that subordinate courts must abide by and follow loyally the rulings of the High Court to which they are subordinate. We may quote the following passage bearing on this subject from a well-known work: 'It is then an established rule to abide by former precedents - stare decisis - where the same points come again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice steady and not liable to waiver with every new judge's opinion, as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared what before was uncertain and perhaps indifferent is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter according to his private sentiments, he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws of the land - not delegated to pronounce a new law but to maintain the old - jus dicere et non jus dare". (Broom's Legal Maxims, 7th Edn. p. 118). "This rule is accepted by every court of justice in England or Ireland and is loyally followed even by judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction. A fortiori is the rule binding upon subordinate courts. The judge of a subordinate court, however brilliant and well trained a lawyer he may be, is not entitled to assume the powers of an appellate court or refuse to follow the decisions of the High Court to which his court is subordinate. It is the duty of every subordinate judge loyally to accept the rulings of such High Court unless or until they have been overruled by a higher tribunal. We regret that the learned Sessions Judge should have seen fit in this case to deviate from a well recognised rule". We too regret, as Their Lordships did, that the learned District Judge thought fit to deviate from the rule. The same court had occasion to advert to the matter in A.I.R. 1946 All. 509. In a still later decision in A.I.R. 1950 All. We too regret, as Their Lordships did, that the learned District Judge thought fit to deviate from the rule. The same court had occasion to advert to the matter in A.I.R. 1946 All. 509. In a still later decision in A.I.R. 1950 All. 134 the learned judges say that "refusal to follow a decision of the High Court would amount to insubordination. Reference may also be made to I.L.R. 10 Cal. 82 and I.L.R. 15 Bom. 419. It is unnecessary to multiply authorities as the rule is well settled and unquestionable, as without it, administration of justice would be a mockery, if not an impossibility. It is very satisfactory to note that learned counsel for the respondent did not seek to support the order of the court below in so far as it omitted to regard the aforesaid decisions of this court as binding upon it. The attempt made was to distinguish those cases not for any ground better than those referred to by the learned Judge. It appears to us that the omission to draw up the proclamation is a fatal defect and would deprive the order for sale of any force. In fact, as already stated, it is the settlement of the proclamation that enables the court to pass an order for sale and if there is no settlement, there can be no order for sale. If the order for sale passed on 13.3.1953 is thus non-existent for want of the property to be sold (See R. 66(2) (a) of 0.21) it is not necessary to set it aside. When the fact of the defect attaching to the order was brought to the notice of the court, especially being a defect occasioned by its own fault, it was up to the court to rectify the error, vacate the order, and proceed afresh in the matter of settlement of the proclamation and proceed further by passing an order for sale of the property. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the order dated 13.3.1953 not having been appealed against became final and that against the order passed on 22.6.1953 no appeal will lie. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the order dated 13.3.1953 not having been appealed against became final and that against the order passed on 22.6.1953 no appeal will lie. It is also contended that this court cannot interfere in revision so far as the earlier order is concerned because it is an appealable order, nor could we interfere with the second order even in revision because it was one passed with jurisdiction and there is no illegality or irregularity in the matter of the exercise of that jurisdiction. When the court below entertained an objection to the validity of the order dated 13.3.1953 after notice to the decree-holder and the decree-holder did not object to that matter being considered by the court below, it appears to us it is competent for the court to entertain an objection relating to a defect arising on account of a default on the part of the court. The order passed on 22.6.1953 should, it appears to us, therefore, be regarded as a fresh order upon the question of the propriety of the passing of an order for sale without there being the drawing up of the proclamation by the court and if it be so regarded, an appeal is competent. Even if that order be not regarded as appealable, we are inclined to regard this as a revision and interfere because, in our judgment, the court below has, by a wrong view of the law, refused to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it of rectifying a mistake of the court by vacating an order illegally passed, i.e., passed in violation of the provisions of R. 66(2) of 0.21. If a court violates a mandatory provision of law in regard to the exercise of its jurisdiction, then it would amount to illegality within Cl. (c) of S. 115, Civil P.C. In this case the law peremptorily provides that the court shall, before ordering sale, draw up the proclamation of sale of that property. That provision has been violated and the order for sale passed. In any view of the matter it is competent for this court to interfere with the order passed by the court below and rectify the error into which that court has fallen. 15. The order dated 13.3.1953 will be regarded as not passed under the circumstances. That provision has been violated and the order for sale passed. In any view of the matter it is competent for this court to interfere with the order passed by the court below and rectify the error into which that court has fallen. 15. The order dated 13.3.1953 will be regarded as not passed under the circumstances. The court below should proceed in the matter of execution as prayed for by the decree-holder by accepting the objection tendered by the judgment-debtor in C.M.P. 2218 as it is competent to the judgment-debtor to intervene and to tender his objections so long as the court has not settled the proclamation pursuant to the notice issued to him in that behalf. In the case of a pending suit, where the defendant had been declared ex¬parte, it has been held by this court that he may come in at any time as of right and proceed with it from the stage at which it is when he comes in. (See 1951(6) D.L.R. T-C. 467 followed in 1952 K.L.T. 591). The court below will draw up the proclamation after considering the objections and then pass an order for sale. Thereafter the court below may proceed with the proclamation and sale as required by law. 16. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. In the special circumstances of this case we direct the parties to pay themselves their respective costs in this appeal. 17. Send the records back to the court below forthwith. Allowed.