Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This js an application on behalf of the defendant and arises out of an order rejecting his petition praying for an order that the suit has abated due to non-substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff within the time allowed by law. 2. One Bibi Sajda Khatoon filed Money Suit No. 129 of 1952 in the Court of the First Munsif, Patna, for recovery of Rs. 875/- besides interest on account of arrears of rent due in respect of certain house belonging to her, which was in occupation of the defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. The suit was instituted on 27-3-1952, with deficit court-fee. On the same day after filing of the suit she died. On 31-3-1952, Mohammad Anwar Karim, father of Bibi Sajda Khatoon, claiming to be her heir, made a gift of the disputed house to Umat Jamila. On 7-4-1952, this donee, Umat Jamila, filed a petition for substitution of her name in place of the deceased plaintiff, Bibi Sajda Khatoon, and paid the deficit court-fee. The Court without giving notice of this application to the defendant passed an order for substituting the name of Umat Jamila in place of the deceased plaintiff and admitted the plaint. On 16-6-1952, the summons in the suit was served on the defendant. He appeared on 27-6-1952. On 29-7-1952, he" filed an application praying for an order that the suit had abated as stated above. In his application the petitioner made a grievance that no notice of the substitution application was served on him as a result of which he could not contest the substitution matter and as the estate of Bibi Sajda Khatoon, the original plaintiff, since deceased, had not been fully represented by the substitution of Umat Jamila, the suit abated. The contention of the defendant was that no prayer for substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Sajda Khatoon having been made within the time allowed by law, the suit abated and the aforesaid Umat Jamila had no right to be substituted in her place. 3. The learned Munsif took the view that the substitution of Umat Jamila could be allowed under Sec.146, Civil P. C. He also held that, as the order for substitution was passed on 7-4-1952, and no appeal or review was preferred against the same in time, it had become" final. 3. The learned Munsif took the view that the substitution of Umat Jamila could be allowed under Sec.146, Civil P. C. He also held that, as the order for substitution was passed on 7-4-1952, and no appeal or review was preferred against the same in time, it had become" final. He, therefore, rejected the defendants petition. Against this order of the learned Munsif the defendant has come up to this Court in revision. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Umat Jamila could not be substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff under any provision of the law. In support of. his contention he has relied on the case of --Gobardhan Mukharji V/s. Saligram Marwari, AIR 1936 Pat 123 (A). In that case, under similar circumstances, it was held that an assignee from the heir of a deceased plaintiff, who was himself not brought on the record, could not be substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff either under Rule 3 of Order 22 or Rule 10 of that Order or Sec.146, Civil P. C. This is a Bench decision of this Court and is binding on me sitting singly. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in -- Anil Chandra V/s. Gopinath, AIR 1950 Cal. 376 (B), however, took a view that though a transferee from the legal representative of a deceased party could not be substituted either under Order 22, Rule 10 or Order 22, Rule 3, Civil P. C., yet he could be substituted under Sec.146 of the Code. This is quite in conflict with the above Division Bench decision, of this Court and we are bound to follow the decision of our own High Court. On the authority of that decision, therefore, Umat Jamila could not be substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff Bibi Sajda Khatoon either under Order 22, Rule 3 or Rule 10, or Sec.146, Civil P. C. 5. On the authority of that decision, therefore, Umat Jamila could not be substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff Bibi Sajda Khatoon either under Order 22, Rule 3 or Rule 10, or Sec.146, Civil P. C. 5. The learned Munsif, though he felt that the decision of our own High Court was binding on him, seemed to prefer the view taken by the Calcutta High Court which appears from his observation : "The Calcutta case does not seem to be without force and reason." Relying on this view of the Calcutta High Court, the learned Munsif held that in the present case Mohamad Anwar Karim having executed Hiba-bil-ewaz in favour of Bibi Jamila ceased to have any interest in the property in question and might be taken to have been civilly dead in respect of the property and it was not necessary for Bibi Jamila to ask for substitution of Mohammad Anwar Karim. It is regrettable that the learned Munsif should have preferred to take the view of the Calcutta High Court when it was directly in conflict with the view taken by a Bench of this Court as reported in -- AIR 1936 Pat 123 (A), referred to above. Whatever might be the view of the other High Courts, the view taken by this Court was binding on the learned Munsif. 6. The next question to be considered is whether in the circumstances of this case the transferee from the heir of the deceased plaintiff has any remedy in law or not. The decision of this Court referred to above does not say, however, that such a transferee has no other remedy available to him. It appears to me that the application of Umat Jamila can be dealt with under Sec.151, Civil P. C. Suppose A after having instituted a suit on the last day of limitation dies at 8 a. m. in the morning on a particular day and his heir B who has succeeded to his property transfers the same to C at 12 in the noon and thereafter dies at 2 in the afternoon. Obviously, B could have had no opportunity to apply for substitution of his name, he having been dead. Can it be said that C has no remedy in law? Obviously, B could have had no opportunity to apply for substitution of his name, he having been dead. Can it be said that C has no remedy in law? According to the decision of this Court referred to above, he cannot apply for substitution cither under Sec.146 or under Order 22, Rule 3 or under Order 22, Rule 10, Civil P. C. which are the provisions for substitution to be made in place of the parties on the record. No other provision has been shown to me which can apply to a case like this. In such an event I think the Court has got its inherent power to deal with the matter and can allow substitution under Sec.151, Civil P. C. Court is not powerless to do justice or redress a wrong, merely because there is no express provision of the Code to meet the requirements of a case. This point does not seem to have been considered in the case of this Court referred to above. Therefore, in my view, the learned Munsif was quite justified in ordering the substitution of Umat Jamila to be made in place of the deceased Bibi Sajda Khatoon under Sec.151, Civil P. C. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, submitted that Mohammad Anwar Karim was not the only heir of Bibi Sajda Khatoon and he alone could not transfer the entire interest in the house to Umat Jamila. His contention is that even after the substitution the estate of Bibi Sajda Khatoon was not fully represented. In his application before the Court below the petitioner averred that the estate of Sajda Khatoon was not fully represented. The petitioner might have meant from this that all the heirs of Bibi Sajda Khatoon have not been brought on the record. This is a matter which should have been agitated and decided by the Court at the time of substitution, but in this case notice of the substitution application was not issued or served on the petitioner and, therefore, he could not get any opportunity to make objections to the substitution. It is an elementary principle of jurisprudence that no orders should be passed behind the back of a person. Before making any order which may be binding on a person notice must be given to him so that he may contest the passing of that order if he be so advised. It is an elementary principle of jurisprudence that no orders should be passed behind the back of a person. Before making any order which may be binding on a person notice must be given to him so that he may contest the passing of that order if he be so advised. It was incumbent on the learned Munsif to have issued notice on the petitioner before passing final order for substitution. He not having done so, the order for substitution cannot be justified. 8. Mr. Anwar Ahmad appearing for the opposite party has raised two points, namely, (1) that the defendant not having preferred any appeal or review against the order of substitution within the time allowed by law, that order has become final and cannot be challenged now, and (2) that the learned Munsif Sri D. Ram could not recall the order of his predecessor dated 7-4-1952, by which the latter had allowed substitution. With respect to the first contention oE the learned counsel it may be observed that the order in question was passed without notice to the petitioner and when he appeared in the suit after service of summonses on him he filed the present application within thirty days of service of summonses, which amounts to be a petition for reconsideration of the matter, and, as the order in question was passed behind his back, the Court below should have recalled that order and reconsidered the matter after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to raise objections to the substitution if he had any. In support of his second contention, namely that the present Munsif could not have recalled the order of his predecessor, reliance has been placed on -- Hiro Singh V/s. Kazi Syed Ahmed Hussain. AIR 1922 Pat 204 (C) in which it was held that a successor has no power to recall the perfected order of his predecessor. In that case both the parties had opportunity to establish the contentions that they had raised and on consideration of their contentions the Court had passed the order. The party against whom the order was made did not move this Court against that order, which thus became final. In view of those facts it was held in that case that the successor could not recall the perfected order of his predecessor. The party against whom the order was made did not move this Court against that order, which thus became final. In view of those facts it was held in that case that the successor could not recall the perfected order of his predecessor. In the present case, however, no notice of the application for substitution was issued or served on the petitioner and no opportunity was given to him to contest the application. I think that this was a case in which the learned Munsif should have exercised the inherent power under Sec.151, Civil P. C. to recall that order. This power has been given to the Court to be exercised for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. In my opinion, such abuse has occurred by the Court passing an order against the defendant without giving him an opportunity to contest it. There has been miscarriage of justice and in the ends of justice the Court should have recalled the order of substitution. 9. It has next been contended that no application in revision has been filed against the order dated 7-4-1952, allowing the substitution and the present application in revision is against the order dated 26-8-1952, refusing to record abatement. It is, however, not necessary that an application in revision should be made by a party. Whenever an interference in any particular case is found necessary, the High Court may, of its own motion, call for the record and pass necessary orders. The whole matter is before me now and I do find that grave injustice has been done to the defendant by not giving him any opportunity to contest the substitution matter. It is not only a matter of great injustice done to a party, but a departure from the elementary principle of jurisprudence that before making any order to be binding on a party notice must be issued to him to contest the matter. In my view, the order dated 7-4-1952, cannot stand. The question whether the suit has abated or not will have to be determined along with the question whether the substitution as prayed for should be made or not. 10. In my view, the order dated 7-4-1952, cannot stand. The question whether the suit has abated or not will have to be determined along with the question whether the substitution as prayed for should be made or not. 10. In the result I would allow this application and under the revisional powers of this Court set aside the orders of the Court below dated 7-4-1952, and 26-8-1952, and remand the case to the Court below for rehearing the substitution matter after giving opportunity to the petitioner to raise objections, if any, to the substitution and to decide the question of abatement in the light of the objections that may be raised. Costs will abide the result. Hearing fee : One gold mohur.