Govinda Menon, J.- The property in dispute in this litigation formed part of the estate of one Pattakarathi Moopanar on whose death his widow Esakki Ammal succeeded to a widow’s estate. By a gift deed Ex. D-1 dated 12th December, 1936, she gifted away the suit and other properties in favour of her brother, the first defendant. Nearly ten years later, by Ex. P-5 dated 10th February, 1946, she surrendered her estate in favour of the nearest reversioner of her husband, the plaintiff. By Ex. D-6 dated 29th April, 1946, the father of defendants 4 to 7 purchased for consideration 32 cents of land which are in dispute in this suit from the first defendant, the donee under Ex. D-1. The suit out of which this second appeal arises was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the 32 cents of land on the strength of the surrender deed, Ex. P-5, executed in his favour by the widow Esakki Ammal. Both the lower Courts have upheld the contention put forward by the alienees that it is not open to a reversioner, to whom the widow has surrendered the estate after alienating a part of the property, to recover possession of the alienated property on the strength of the surrender deed until the death of the widow. In this case it is admitted that the widow Esakki Ammal is still alive and that if the contention of the alienees who claim under the first defendant is accepted,, then the suit has to be dismissed. By a long course of judicial decisions this Court has held that when a widow in possession of her husband’s estate, alienates part of that estate and then makes an unconditional surrender of the entire estate in favour of the nearest reversioner, it is not open to the reversioner-surrenderee to recover possession and dispossess an alienee from the widow until the widow dies. The earliest of these is in Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1, which is based upon a dictum in Sreeramulu v. Kristamma2, Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1, has been followed in this Court in quite a large number of subsequent cases. The earliest of these is in Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1, which is based upon a dictum in Sreeramulu v. Kristamma2, Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1, has been followed in this Court in quite a large number of subsequent cases. Though the judgment in Sreeramulu v. Kristamma2, on which the learned Judges based their judgment in Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1, had been overruled by the Full Bench in Vaidyanatha Sastri v. Savithri Ammal3, still the Full Bench itself has stated that so far as the surrender by the widow is concerned, an ante-surrender alienee cannot be dispossessed by the reversioner until the widow dies. We need only refer to the judgment of Kumaraswami Sastriar, J., at page 99 of the Full Bench judgment where the learned Judge observes as follows: “Reference has been made to cases where it has been held that a reversioner to whom the widow surrenders the estate (and thereby accelerates the succession) cannot sue to set aside the alienation made by her till she dies. These cases have in my opinion no bearing or application to cases of adoption by the widow. The whole doctrine of surrender and consequent acceleration of the estate, of the reversioner has no basis in Hindu Smritis but has been evolved by Courts of justice on general principles of jurisprudence. An anticipation of interest involved by the theory of relinquishment or the defeasance of an ulterior interest by the intermediate acts on the part of the widow are hardly contemplated by the Hindu law-givers. It is clear that the surrender By the widow and the acceptance of the estate by the reversioner are purely matters of contract.” Therefore it has to be taken that so far as the Full Bench is concerned, the learned Judges have not chosen to doubt the correctness of the decision in Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1. Subsequent course of judicial opinion in this Court is more or less on the same lines as is exemplified by Sri Raja Suryarao Rao Bahadur Garu v. Sri Rajah Suryanarayana Jagapathi Bahadur Garu4, Sundarasiva Rao v. Viyyamma5, Ramayya v. Narayya6, Sonai Karuppa Pillai v. Irulayee7, Ramayya v. Bapanamma8and Vijayaraghava Pillai v. Ponnammal9. A much more recent case of this Court is contained in the decision of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Tripurasundara Rao v. Kotayya10, where the learned Judge takes the view that the law has been settled so far as this Court is concerned. A much more recent case of this Court is contained in the decision of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Tripurasundara Rao v. Kotayya10, where the learned Judge takes the view that the law has been settled so far as this Court is concerned. In fact, in delivering the judgment of the Bench in Vijayaraghava Pillai v. Ponnammal9, Reilly and Ananthakrishna Aiyar, JJ., adverted to that fact and expressed the opinion that the law is well settled that a widow cannot alienate her interest in her husband’s estate and then defeat the alienation by surrendering her interest in that estate to the nearest reversioner. But Mr. K.V. Venkatasubramaniam for the appellant contends that the instant case is not one of alienation for consideration by the widow but is one where the widow has voluntarily made a gift of a portion of her husband’s estate in favour of a donee. Such being the case the learned counsel contends that the principle enunciated in the cases above-mentioned cannot be applied to this case. But we find that in Sonai Karuppa Pillai v. Irulayee7, Curgenven, J., had to consider a similar case and the learned Judge says that what is applicable to alienees for consideration must apply with equal force to gifts and donations. Mr. Venkatasubramaniam wants to question the very foundation of the decision in Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1 on the footing of the expressions of opinion by Mookerjee, J., in Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat11. followed and adumbrated in the judgment of D.N. Mitter, J. and B.N. Rao, J., in Ram Krishna v. Sm. Kousalya Mani12. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court were of opinion that the basic principle of the surrender by a Hindu widow of her husband’s estate is not founded on judicial decisions at all but can be traced to the Hindu Law-giver Katyayana and therefore when the Madras Judges held that the whole doctrine is based upon Judge-made law they have made a fundamental error in the approach to the question. But so far as our High Court is concerned, in view of this catena of cases, it is futile, at least for the purpose of this case, to explosure into the antiquities of texts and verses and try to find out whether all these cases have been based, upon a wrong doctrine. But so far as our High Court is concerned, in view of this catena of cases, it is futile, at least for the purpose of this case, to explosure into the antiquities of texts and verses and try to find out whether all these cases have been based, upon a wrong doctrine. In any event we do not think that at this late stage we should try to unsettle the settled law in this State which has been in force for such a long time. We are therefore of opinion that Subbamma v. Subrahmanyam1, followed as it is in a long series of subsequent decisions and by Curgenven, J., in Sonai Karuppa filial v. Irulayee2, is correct. The second appeal therefore fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.