JUDGEMENT : A.H. KHAN, J. This is an application by the Assistant Custodian, Evacuee Property, Indore, which contains a prayer that "in the events that have transpired and in view of the finding that 'Gumti' is completely an Evacuee Property, the direction that has been issued in Civil Miscellaneous Case No.7 of 1952, (a writ case) to restore the 'Gumti' be vacated." 2. The short facts are that in Civil Misc. Case No.7 of 1952, we held that in so far as the Custodian ignored the provisions of S.7 of Act No.31 of 1950, he acquired no jurisdiction to declare the 'Gumti' as evacuee property and setting aside his order, we directed the restoration of 'Gumti' to the petitioner. In this application it is stated that since the above order was passed by the High Court, the Custodian has followed the procedure, which he had omitted to do before, and, has declared the property to be evacuee property. In view of the subsequent proceedings in the matter by the Custodian, this application seeks that the order passed by the High Court in the writ case, be vacated. 3. This application is rather unusual. It is significant that it makes no mention of any law, under which it has been presented. The prayer in the application aims at the vacation of only a part of the order, passed on 20-11-1952. But the part, which is sought to be vacated is merely a corollary of the earlier proposition that the custodian acted without jurisdiction. Let us now consider the question whether an order passed in a writ case can be vacated. 4. The learned Advocate General has argued that the word 'vacated' has been wrongly used by the Custodian, and that what is really desired is a modification of the order. Whether the order is sought to be vacated or modified, we have first of all to consider the process that will bring about the change. 5. It is well known that High Prerogative Writs are issued under Art. 226 of the Constitution and there is no direction in the Article, which empowers the Court issuing it, to recall its order with a view to cancel it, modify it, alter it or vacate it. It being so, the only process known to law, by which orders are altered, modified or vacated is by way of review or appeal. 6. It being so, the only process known to law, by which orders are altered, modified or vacated is by way of review or appeal. 6. With regard to the reviewing of an order, their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed that the ground of review must be something which should exist at the date of the decree or order and, that the rule does not authorise the review of an order which was right when it was made but on the happening of some subsequent event it became bad: - 'Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Venkata Rama Rao', 27 IA 197 (A). In this case the review or what amounts to a review is sought on the ground of what happened subsequent to the passing of the order. Furthermore in - 'Drew v. Willis', (1891) 1 QB 450 (B) it is laid down that the right to review is not an inherent power. In - 'Prayag Lai v. Jai', 22 Cal 419 (C), the same view has been adopted. From - 'Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegade', AIR 1919 Mad 244 (D), it appears that when - 'Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nundkumar Singh', 34 Cal 677 (E), was taken before the Privy Council, Lord Atkinson declared in explicit terms that the power to review is not inherent in a Court. 7. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham), Volume IX, under the heading Crown Practice, which deals with the subject of High Prerogative Writs, there is not a single case, in which after issuing the writ, the Court ever altered, modified or vacated its order. The law relating to writs is believed to be in existence in England since 1215 A.D. and it is significant that not a single instance is to be found on the point. In India, although the law in its present form has been in vogue since the advent of Constitution in 1950, but even before it, in a qualified manner the High Courts of Judicature at Madras, Calcutta and Bombay could issue some writs under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. But no Indian authority is available to support the proposition that orders once passed can be reviewed and altered. In the circumstances, I hold that we cannot review an order passed in a writ case. 8. But no Indian authority is available to support the proposition that orders once passed can be reviewed and altered. In the circumstances, I hold that we cannot review an order passed in a writ case. 8. The law, of course, has provided the remedy of appeal and, it is open to the applicant to avail himself of it. 9. The learned Advocate General contends that apart from the process of review, an order passed in a writ case is capable of being modified. In support of his contention, he had referred to a text book known as "Extraordinary Legal remedies by Ferris". It is an American publication by Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis, M.O. and is a 1926 edition. Part IV of the book deals with Mandamus, its enforcement and contempt proceedings and on p.309, the following passage occurs: "The general rule is that it's the duty of respondent to obey the writ, but if acting in good faith he cannot, he will have full opportunity to make such answer in case a rule for contempt is issued returnable in the same cause. This inability may be brought to the notice of the Court by motion to modify, but it must be before the Court, which issued the Mandamus, the only Court having jurisdiction." The author has referred to - 'Littlefield v. Town of Adol', 108 SE (Ga) 56 (F) a case decided in America. As the American authority is not available, it would have been indeed difficult to follow its reasoning. But happily on p.310 of the same book, the learned author discloses the existence of statutes which provide for the review. He says: "Under the early common law, proceedings in Mandamus were not reviewable, but the modern practice and statutes generally in existence, the granting or refusing of the writ is subject to review". This shows that there is some statutory provision in American law for the review of High Prerogative Writs and the suggestion made in the book for a motion to modify is obviously based on it. This, not only discountenances the theory that an order passed in a writ case can be modified any how, but it also fortifies the proposition that unless the remedy of review is provided in law, orders in writ applications are not subject to review. This, not only discountenances the theory that an order passed in a writ case can be modified any how, but it also fortifies the proposition that unless the remedy of review is provided in law, orders in writ applications are not subject to review. As there is no provision for the review of such orders in Indian law, I am afraid, it cannot be availed of as a remedy. The American ruling, being distinguishable, is of no help in the present case. 10. For reasons stated above, I hold that the order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Case No.7 of 1952 can neither be vacated nor modified. The application is in consequence rejected. 11. MEHTA, J.: I agree. Application dismissed.