JUDGMENT : NEVASKAR, J. This judgment will dispose of two appeals viz.. Civil Second Appeal No.291 of 1951 and the other (what is styled as) Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.33 of 1950 as in both the aforesaid cases the same question of law is involved viz., whether it is competent for the Courts in Madhya. Bharat to execute decrees passed ex parte by Courts outside Madhya Bharat but within the territories of India. 2. On 30-11-1949, a decree was obtained by the respondent Purshottam Saran, resident of Muradabad in U.P., against the appellants who is a Firm owned by Mishrimal and his son Sohanlal of Ratlam (Madhya Bharat) in the Court of Munsiff Muradabad for Rs.2400/-. This was obtained ex parte. 3. On 18-12-1950 decree-holder applied for execution praying for transfer of decree for execution to the Civil Court of Ratlam. Thereupon, an order for transfer of decree for execution was passed and a transfer certificate dated 22-12-1950 was issued by Muradabad Court under O.21, R.6, Civil P.C. 4. On the basis of this transfer certificate, the decree-holder applied for execution on 8-2-1951 in the Court of Civil Judge Ratlam in Execution Case No.20 of 1951 and prayed for attachment and sale of the properties of the judgment-debtors. 5. A notice thereupon was served on the judgment-debtor under O.21, R.22, Civil P.C. The judgment-debtors thereupon on 24-3-1951 submitted various objections to the execution of the decree principal among them were as follows: I. Muradabad Court was a foreign Court when the decree was passed. This Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree as the judgment-debtors never submitted to its jurisdiction. The decree thus passed ex parte against a non-resident foreigner was nullity. II. The decree was not given on merits and was fraudulently obtained. 6. The Court of the Civil Judge, Ratlam, overruled these objections holding that the decree is executable and ordered the amount in execution to be deposited within a fortnight. Failing to make the deposit, it was further ordered that process for attachment be issued. 7. Judgment-debtor thereupon preferred an appeal to the District Judge Ratlam who relying upon a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in - 'Bhagwan Shankar v. Rajaram', AIR 1951 Bom 125 (A) dismissed the appeal. 8. The judgment-debtors have now preferred this second appeal. 9. 7. Judgment-debtor thereupon preferred an appeal to the District Judge Ratlam who relying upon a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in - 'Bhagwan Shankar v. Rajaram', AIR 1951 Bom 125 (A) dismissed the appeal. 8. The judgment-debtors have now preferred this second appeal. 9. In Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.33 of 1951 the facts are as follows: Kunwar Adityaveersinh obtained a decree in Civil Suit No.569 of 1949 on 30-11-1949 in the Court of Munsiff Bijnaur (U.P.) for Rs.4509/- against Choudhari Shivdansinh ex parte. 10. On 9-9-1949 the decree-holder obtained an order for the transfer of decree to the District Judge, Mandsaur on an application for execution. A transfer certificate under O.21, R.6, Civil P.C. was issued by the Court which passed the decree. On 29-4-1950, the decree-holder submitted the transfer certificate and other papers connected with it to the District Judge at Mandsaur and applied for appropriate order to be passed after hearing. No regular application for execution was submitted. The District Judge after hearing the parties passed an order on 2-5-1950 holding that "there is a serious doubt if the decree could be executed in a case like this by reason of the provisions of the Indian Constitution as contended on behalf of the decree-holder" and he therefore refused to execute the decree. 11. The decree-holder thereupon has preferred this appeal. 12. In both these appeals, therefore, one by the judgment-debtor and the other by the decree-holders the question is whether it is competent for the decree-holder, who obtained an ex parte decree against a resident of Madhya Bharat from a Court situated in a State outside Madhya Bharat before the promulgation of the Constitution of India, to execute the same through Courts in Madhya Bharat (i.e. Part B State) on the basis of transfer certificate issued by the former Court under O.21, R.6, Civil P.C. 13. On behalf of the decree-holder, it is contended that whatever may be the position prior to 26-1-1950 after the Constitution came into force on this date the judgment-debtors ceased to be foreigners and the Courts in the States (former British Indian Provinces, States or now Part A States) ceased to be foreign Courts and the judgments passed by the Courts in those States ceased to be foreign judgments. 14. 14. At any rate, it is contended, that when on 1-4-1951 Indian Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was made applicable to Part B States and the definition of foreign Court and foreign judgment was altered such judgments have become enforcible in what are now Part B States. 15. The status of the judgment-debtor altered from that of being a foreigner to that of a national of 'India' (which includes Part A, B and C States by the act of State). 16. This alteration of status brought with it as a necessary result that the protective shell afforded by the existence of two different States or political entities was removed and the enforcibility now merely rested on the question whether the judgment pronounced was by a Court competent to do so under the domestic law of the State in which the Court passing such judgment was situate. 17. The judgment pronounced by a Court in a foreign country against a non-resident foreigner, it is contended, is not an absolute nullity in the sense that it is nowhere good. It is good as regards the country of the forum in which it is pronounced and if by accidents of political changes its territorial limits got extended it cannot have a different effect as regards its executability or enforcibility in different parts of the same country. 18. Secondly it is contended that Art.261(3), of the Constitution, provides: "Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by Civil Courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law." 19. This gives constitutional sanction to the execution of decrees of any Court within the territorial limits of India (i.e., Part A, B and C States) anywhere in India. The words 'Civil Courts in any part of the territory of India' should be taken to mean Civil Courts within the geographical limits of what is now 'India', whether existing before or after the Constitution came into force. The words 'according to law' are intended to give effect to the legal provisions in some of the States which till the Indian Civil Procedure Code was applied to them continued to have a separate Code of Civil Procedure with a distinct definition of foreign Court' and 'foreign judgment'. 20. The words 'according to law' are intended to give effect to the legal provisions in some of the States which till the Indian Civil Procedure Code was applied to them continued to have a separate Code of Civil Procedure with a distinct definition of foreign Court' and 'foreign judgment'. 20. Reliance is placed on behalf of the decree-holders, for some of the aforesaid contentions mainly on cases reported in - 'Chunnilal Kasturchand, v. Dundappa Damappa', AIR 1951 Bom 190 (B) and ' AIR 1951 Bom 125 (FB)(A). 21. On behalf of the judgment-debtors, it is contended that Art.261(3) of the Constitution cannot be availed of for enforcement of decree passed before the commencement of the Constitution of India. The Courts then functioning will not be the Courts within the territory of India as defined in the Constitution. Before 26-1-1950 there was no territory of India in existence as defined in the Constitution, and therefore final judgments passed by such Civil Courts were not by Civil Courts within the territory of India and therefore not executable under this provision. Reliance for this view is placed on - 'Janardhan Reddy v. The State', AIR 1951 SC 124 (C). It was also urged that execution cannot be levied in Madhya Bharat regarding decree of Muradabad or Bijnaur (U.P.) because the decrees when passed were nullities by international law and this characteristic continued to attach to them when the question of execution arose. The appropriate time to consider the validity of the decree is the time when the decree was passed and not when the execution is sought to be levied and order therein is passed. 22. On behalf of the judgment-debtors reliance is placed upon the cases reported in - 'Subbaraya Setty and Sons v. Palani Chetty and Sons', AIR 1952 Mys 69 (D). The Mysore case dissents from the view expressed in ' AIR 1951 Bom 190 (B)' and ' AIR 1951 Bom 125 (FB) (A)' and takes the view favouring the judgment-debtor that the decree passed by Courts situate in the territory which now forms part of Part A State is not executable in Courts situated in what is now Part B State when an ex parte decree was passed before the Constitution and there was no submission to the jurisdiction. 23. 23. Before I proceed to consider these two opposing views I shall briefly state changes in the Civil Procedure Code at different stages both in Madhya Bharat and that part of territory of India which was formerly British India or 'the States' and which now form Part A States. I am omitting from consideration the changes in Civil Procedure Code in other Part B and Part C States as the same is not relevant for the purpose under consideration. 24. In territories which now form Part A States, the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 was in force before. According to this Code, by S.2(5) 'Foreign Court' was defined thus: 'Section 2(5)':- "Foreign Court means Court situated outside British India etc. (leaving out portion not material for the present purpose)." 25. Foreign judgment was defined as judgment of a foreign Court. 26. Later on, the words 'British India' were changed to Provinces of India and subsequently to 'States' and by the Adaptation of Laws Outer, 1950 for the word 'States' the words Part A and Part C States were substituted. 27. Thus it will be clear that even when India became politically one by the passing of the Constitution, for the purpose of Civil Procedure Code, Part B States' Courts continued to be foreign Courts by reason of statutory provision contained in Civil P.C. 28. It is only when the present amendment came into force on 1-4-1951 that S.20 of the Amending Act provides as follows: "If, immediately before the date on which the said Code comes into force in any Part B State, there is in force in that State any law corresponding to the said Code that law in that State shall stand repealed. Provided that the repeal shall not affect: (a) the previous operation of any law so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or (b) any 'right', 'privilege', obligation or liability 'acquired', accrued or incurred under any law so repealed or (c) any investigation, 'legal proceeding or remedy' in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability or penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid and 'any such' investigation, 'legal proceeding' or 'remedy' may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed 'as if this Act had not been passed'." Before this Amending Act was brought into force, there was in Madhya Bharat what is known as Madhya Bharat Indian Civil P.C., Angikaran Vidhan. This came into force from 22-1-1950. This provided that Indian Civil P.C. as it existed on the date when this Vidhan came into force is adopted with necessary changes 'Mutatis Mutandis' and with all the amendments as are indicated in Sch.'A' attached to this Act. It also provided that any subsequent amendment in Indian Civil P.C. will be deemed to be engrafted 'Mutatis Mutandis' in this Code. Before this there were different Civil Procedure Codes for different States which constituted Madhya Bharat, confined to the territories of the corresponding States and more or less akin to the Indian Civil Procedure Code. 29. The material question which will arise for consideration while considering the executability of the decrees passed by Courts of territories which now form part of Part A States in the territory of Madhya Bharat through Madhya Bharat Courts is which Civil Procedure Code will be applicable to these proceedings in execution. Whether the new Civil Procedure Code which came into force on 1-4-1951 by the Amending Act No.II of 1951 to the Indian Civil Procedure Code of 1908 or the Indian Civil Procedure Code, Angikaran Vidhan which came into force on 22-1-1950. 30. Civil Procedure Code deals with vested rights as well as rights which are of purely procedural character. Section 20 of amending Act provides that in so far as the vested rights are concerned they will not be affected by the repeal and the Courts have to regard as if the new Act has not been passed and therefore as if the old Act has not been repealed but continued to have its force. Section 20 of amending Act provides that in so far as the vested rights are concerned they will not be affected by the repeal and the Courts have to regard as if the new Act has not been passed and therefore as if the old Act has not been repealed but continued to have its force. But as regards rights which are purely procedural in character the new law will apply, as law relating to procedure is generally interpreted to have retrospective operation, and the question which we will have ultimately to consider is whether facts involved in the cases under consideration affect vested rights of the judgment-debtors. If not, the new Civil Procedure Code will apply and the decrees will be executable. However if vested rights are likely to be affected by reason of the change in the Civil Procedure Code then we will have to assume as if the new Act had not been passed and the decrees will remain un-executable. 31. Analysing these respective contentions of the two sides and legislative changes in the Civil Procedure Code which has a bearing on the subject of enforcement of final judgments the following points arise for consideration: Firstly - Are the decrees when passed being foreign decrees against non-resident foreigners absolute nullities? Secondly - Whether Art.261(3) of the Constitution affords constitutional sanction to the execution of decrees of any Court within the territorial limits of India anywhere in India even if the judgments had been pronounced prior to the coming into force of the Constitution of India. Thirdly - Whether apart from the provisions of Article 261(3) have the decrees in Courts situate in what are now Part 'A' States become executable in Courts in Part 'B' States by reason of change in the status of the judgment-debtor from that of foreigner to that of national of India. Thirdly - Whether apart from the provisions of Article 261(3) have the decrees in Courts situate in what are now Part 'A' States become executable in Courts in Part 'B' States by reason of change in the status of the judgment-debtor from that of foreigner to that of national of India. Fourthly - Assuming that the decrees will not become executable merely by reason of the coming into force of the Constitution and change in the status of the judgment-debtor by reason of the Legislative hindrance due to the existence of two different Civil Procedure Codes the two States, one in which the decree was passed (which has now become Part 'A' State) and one in which the decree is sought to be executed (which has now become Part 'B' State) will these decrees become executable by reason of the passing of the Amending Act No.II of 1951 on 1-4-1951. Will this Act have retrospective operation in the sense that this Act will apply to the execution applications in respect of decrees passed prior to the coming into force of the Constitution? 32. As regards the first question it is clear from the discussion of the question in - ' AIR 1951 Bom 125 (FB) (A)', with which I respectfully agree, that the judgments pronounced by foreign Courts against non-residents foreigners are not absolute nullities in the sense that they are void from their inception. They are valid and binding in the country of the forum which passed them and are executable there until they are satisfied or become barred by the operation of statute of limitation or otherwise become inoperative. In this Full Bench case his Lordship Chagla, C.J. has explained the phrase 'absolute nullity' used by their Lordships of the Privy Council in - 'Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkot, 21 Ind App 171 (PC) (E), thus: "Therefore the decree is not an absolute nullity. Something which is an absolute nullity can never be enforced in any part of the world under any circumstances. But the Privy Council itself contemplates that such a decree can be enforced in the forum by which it was passed provided special local legislation authorises that forum, and therefore in one sense the decree is a nullity in a limited sense. But the Privy Council itself contemplates that such a decree can be enforced in the forum by which it was passed provided special local legislation authorises that forum, and therefore in one sense the decree is a nullity in a limited sense. The other way of putting the same idea is that the decree is a valid decree, but it is not enforcible in Courts other than Courts where it was passed by reason of private international law. Therefore, once the position is made clear that the decree is not an absolute nullity, but merely there is an impediment in the way of its being executed, then no difficulty arises in coming to the conclusion to which, again with respect very rightly, Rajadhyaksha, J. and Shah, J. came." 33. I will now consider the second of the aforesaid questions. Article 261 of the Constitution of India lays down: "261 (1) Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the 'territory of India' to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the 'Union' and by every 'State'. (2) The manner in which and conditions under which the acts, records and proceedings referred to in Clause (1) shall be proved and effect thereof determined shall be as provided by law made by Parliament. (3) Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by Civil Courts in any part of the 'territory of India' shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law." 34. Now the word 'Union' in this is meant Union of State (India) of Bharat and the word 'State' means Part A, Part B or Part C State. 35. Before the Constitution of India came into force there was no such thing as 'Union' or Part A, B and C States. Therefore, when under Art.261(1) 'Full faith and credit' clause is introduced it has necessary reference to the period subsequent to the introduction of the Constitution and not to the earlier one. 36. You cannot conceive of public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union unless the union itself came into existence and so is the case of a 'State'. 37. Clause (3) again provides for execution of final judgments or orders of Civil Courts in any part of the territory of India and lays down that these will be capable of execution anywhere within the territory of India. 38. 37. Clause (3) again provides for execution of final judgments or orders of Civil Courts in any part of the territory of India and lays down that these will be capable of execution anywhere within the territory of India. 38. Now territory of India is defined thus: "Article 1(3) The territory of India shall comprise (a) the territories of the States (b) territories specified in Part D of First Schedule (c) Such other territories as may be acquired." 39. The term 'States' is defined as the States specified in Part A, B and C in the First Schedule. 40. Now Courts in any part of the territory of India will be Courts in existence after the coming into force of the Constitution. The Courts existing and functioning prior to that would be Courts of different political entities such as Madhya Bharat or Holkar State, Gwalior State, Bombay State or Province etc. They would be Courts of respective territories of those States within those territories but by no means within the territories of India because India as understood in this Clause was not in existence. 41. This view is fully supported by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in - ' AIR 1951 SC 124 (C). Question there was regarding the entertainability of application for special leave to appeal to Supreme Court against a decision given by Hyderabad High Court on 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949. 42. Before this, on 23-11-1949 Nizam of Hyderabad issued a 'firman' whereby he declared that the proposed Constitution of India was suitable for the Government of Hyderabad as one of the Part B States. 43. The Constitution of India became therefore applicable to Hyderabad on 26-1-1950 and it became one of the Part B States under the Constitution of India. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the judgment passed by Hyderabad High Court on 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949 was the judgment of a Court within the territory of India and it was held in the negative. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the judgment passed by Hyderabad High Court on 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949 was the judgment of a Court within the territory of India and it was held in the negative. The reason given was that the territory of Government of H. E. H. the Nizam was never the territory of India till 26-1-1950 and therefore the judgment passed by the Hyderabad High Court on 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949 cannot be considered as judgment of Court within the territory of India and on that ground special leave to appeal was refused as Art.136(1) of the Constitution of India was held inapplicable. 44. From this it is clear that Art.261(3) cannot be availed of for the purpose of pressing an application of execution in the territory now forming part of Part B States where the final judgments of which the execution is sought was given by a Court in the territory now forming part of Part A States prior to 26-1-1950. 45. This view has been taken in - 'AIR 1952 Mys 69 (D)'. 46. Taking the third question for consideration we now consider whether, by reason of change in the status of the judgment-debtor from that of a foreigner to that of a national of India, the decree against him became executable. This question will depend upon whether there are more than one obstacles in the matter of execution. When an ex parte decree is pronounced by a foreign Court competent to do so according to the domestic law of the country of the Court pronouncing it against a non-resident foreigner it is nullity by private international law and such a foreign judgment cannot be enforced even by a suit based on it although it is good in the country of the Court which passed it. When the two countries cease to be foreign there is no basis for applying private international law and the decrees would be executable if there is no legislative hindrance according to the laws in force. Some times this second obstacle exists as in the present cases. 47. When the two countries cease to be foreign there is no basis for applying private international law and the decrees would be executable if there is no legislative hindrance according to the laws in force. Some times this second obstacle exists as in the present cases. 47. In spite of the fact that after 26-1-1950 judgment-debtor ceased to be a foreigner in the international sense he continued to be a foreigner for the applicability of private international law by reason of definition of foreign Court and foreign judgment under the Civil Procedure Code applicable in the territory where the decree is sought to be executed. The Civil Procedure Code is accepted as good law, until changed, by the Constitution under Art.372 of the Constitution. The result is that as long as the two Civil Procedure Codes applicable in the two territories i.e. Part A and B States were different the ex parte decree of one could not be executed against the resident of another who had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court pronouncing it. This result follows not because we apply private international law because of the status of the judgment-debtor as a foreigner but by reason of legislative fiction by which he is reckoned to be so. 48. From what has been discussed above, it is clear that when this political merger of two countries took place at least one of the bars existing in execution of the decrees is removed, one existing by reason of the countries being different. But as long as the Civil Procedure Codes which cover the subject of execution of decrees continued to be different there remained an internal bar by the existence of a valid legislation binding upon all and the decrees could not be executed. 49. This aspect is accepted even in the earlier Bombay case reported in - ' AIR 1951 Bom 190 (B), wherein Shah, J. in Para.30 says as follows: "Now, it is true that prior to 28-7-1948 the Civil Procedure Code as passed by the Jamkhandi State was applicable to the State territory. That Civil Procedure Code was in terms the same as the Civil Procedure Code, Act V (5) of 1908, of British India as amended till 1914, with this alteration that the expression 'British India' whenever it occurred in the latter Code was substituted by the expression 'Jamkhandi State'. That Civil Procedure Code was in terms the same as the Civil Procedure Code, Act V (5) of 1908, of British India as amended till 1914, with this alteration that the expression 'British India' whenever it occurred in the latter Code was substituted by the expression 'Jamkhandi State'. However for all practical purposes there were two separate Codes of Civil Procedure of two different States." 50. In order to fully appreciate points underlying the present question it will be useful to deal with the aforesaid Bombay case in somewhat detail. 51. The facts of this case were that an ex parte decree was passed by Belgaum Court which was in the Province of Bombay forming part of British India against a person who was the subject of Jamakhindi State. When the decree was initially sought to be executed in 1940 it was a foreign Court and execution was sought on the strength of reciprocity arrangement (Section 44, Civil P.C.) between Government of Bombay and Jamakhindi State. This execution petition was dismissed by District Judge, Jamakhindi on 10-3-1948 on the ground that this was an ex parte decree against a non-resident foreigner who had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree viz., Belgaum Court and therefore a nullity by international law. 52. This case was then taken in appeal to the High Court of Bombay. There it was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Rajadhyaksha and Shah, JJ. both of whom decided upon its executability by the Jamakhindi Court. 53. The line of reasoning adopted by both the learned Judges was that: 1. The decree passed by Belgaum Court on 11-3-1938 was good and operative within the limits of British India as Belgaum Court by the Municipal laws of British India of which Belgaum formed part was authorised under S.20 of Indian Civil Procedure Code 1908 to pass a judgment against a non-resident foreigner. 2. It was invalid and unexecutable or 'absolute nullity' by private international law for the purpose of any place beyond British India and therefore so far as the territory of Jamakhindi State was concerned upto a certain date i.e., till the two States were separate, it was invalid. 3. 2. It was invalid and unexecutable or 'absolute nullity' by private international law for the purpose of any place beyond British India and therefore so far as the territory of Jamakhindi State was concerned upto a certain date i.e., till the two States were separate, it was invalid. 3. When Jamakhindi State acceded to India and Raja Sahib of Jamakhindi executed an agreement some time prior to 25-2-1948 transferring his sovereignty in favour of Central Government, Jamakhindi ceased to be a foreign territory and Court in Jamakhindi ceased to be a foreign Court. Therefore when on 10-3-1948 the Court of Jamakhindi passed order refusing execution it was not a foreign Court but a Court constituted or continued by the Government of India. Both the Belgaum Court and Jamakhindi Court were Courts of the same State (vide Shah J. page 202, Para.30); consequently Jamakhindi Court was bound to execute it. 4. Even assuming that before the application of Indian Civil Procedure Code to Jamakhindi territory on 28-7-48 by the Indian States Application of Laws Order 1948 for the first time, Jamakhindi Court was a foreign Court qua Belgaum Court till that date and' so on 10-3-1948 the Court can take into account subsequent events and grant relief accordingly if it is expedient to do so in the interest of justice and to shorten litigation. 54. It was conceded in this case that if fresh execution were levied the decree would be executable. 55. It appears from, the judgment of both the learned Judges that they were not unwilling to hold: "1. Till 28-7-1948 i.e., till the Indian States (Application of Laws) Order came into force Jamakhindi Court was a foreign Court vis-a-vis Belgaum Court. 2. The decree of Belgaum Court therefore could not be executed in Jamakhindi territory till that date and the order passed by the lower Court on 10-3-1948 might be said to be correct." But they held that on 28-7-1948 the Jamakhindi C.P.C. was repealed and Indian C.P.C. was applied. Clause (6) of the Order saved the jurisdiction of local Courts for the purpose of proceedings then pending before the Courts. 56. Now till 1-4-1951, Civil Procedure Code applicable to Madhya Bharat defined in S.2(5) foreign Court as a Court situate beyond the territory of Madhya Bharat and foreign judgment meant a judgment of a foreign Court thus defined. Clause (6) of the Order saved the jurisdiction of local Courts for the purpose of proceedings then pending before the Courts. 56. Now till 1-4-1951, Civil Procedure Code applicable to Madhya Bharat defined in S.2(5) foreign Court as a Court situate beyond the territory of Madhya Bharat and foreign judgment meant a judgment of a foreign Court thus defined. Therefore till that date the decrees of Bijnaur or Muradabad Courts were unexecutable in Madhya Bharat. 57. This sort of allocation of jurisdiction creating exclusiveness under the same sovereign, in the sense in which it is understood, where territories are different can be seen as in the case of British India, England and other countries under British Crown. 58. In - 21 Ind App 171 (PC) (E)', it is said at page 185: "As between different provinces under one sovereignty (e.g. under the Roman Empire) the legislation of the sovereign may distribute and regulate jurisdiction; but no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreign Court ought to recognise against foreigners who owe no allegiance or obedience to the Power which so legislates." 59. This brings us to the fourth question. What is the effect of passing of Act No.2 of 1951 by which Indian Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was extended to Part B States and the definitions of foreign Court and foreign judgment were modified? 60. Will the decrees now be executable by applying this newly applied Civil Procedure Code? This will depend upon the question whether this is likely to affect vested rights. In case it does, new Civil P.C. cannot be applied but if no vested rights are affected by the repeal of Indian Civil Procedure Code, Angikaran Vidhan (Madhya Bharat) and applying the new Act then the new law will apply. 61. According to Mysore case reported in-'AIR 1952 Mys 69 (D)', vested rights are affected by the repeal. This matter is very briefly touched in the Mysore case by stating that the Amending Act No.2 of 1951 cannot have retrospective operation. It seems there to have been assumed that the question as regards execution of duly obtained decree in a territory within which it was not executable before the Amending Act would necessarily affect vested rights. 62. This matter is very briefly touched in the Mysore case by stating that the Amending Act No.2 of 1951 cannot have retrospective operation. It seems there to have been assumed that the question as regards execution of duly obtained decree in a territory within which it was not executable before the Amending Act would necessarily affect vested rights. 62. In Bombay cases emphasis is laid on the fact that it is not by reason of the repeal of any law that the decrees became executable but by reason of change in the status. But the judgment clearly indicates that if the execution is held permissible that does not affect vested rights. 63. It was urged by Mr. Rege for the judgment-debtor in Civil Second Appeal No.291 of 1951 before us that a man has a vested right that a decree passed by a Court of another country shall not affect him until he goes there and that beyond those territorial limits he has got an immunity. It is difficult to agree with this. It is difficult to conceive of a vested right that a concluded and 'binding judgment will only be enforcible within certain geographical limits not capable of extension by any political events. In fact the existence of territorial limitations in the enforcement is attributable to the inability of the sovereign to enforce them beyond those limits and do not touch the rights of parties. 64. A converse case is reported in - 'Dominion of India v. Hiralal', AIR 1950 Cal 12 (F), where a decree of what was before the division of India and Pakistan a decree of a domestic Court now situated in Pakistan was after the division sought to be executed in India. It was held that the decree cannot be executed straightway. 65. Executability of a binding judgment within a certain territory is a matter not affecting vested right of a judgment-debtor because he cannot be said to have acquired a vested right not to have the decree executed beyond certain territorial limits. This is a matter that affects procedure in enforcement. For this reason, it is the Act No.2 of 1951 that should be made applicable and not the Madhya Bharat Act which it repeals. 66-67. This is a matter that affects procedure in enforcement. For this reason, it is the Act No.2 of 1951 that should be made applicable and not the Madhya Bharat Act which it repeals. 66-67. The Mysore case dissents from the Bombay view because as the learned Judge Vasudevamurthy, J. puts it: "The Bombay cases do not in my opinion recognise the cardinal principle by which ex parte decrees were not being allowed to be executed by the Courts of another." At another place, the same learned Judge says: "With great respect to learned Judges who decided the two Bombay cases I think the way in which this question has to be approached is to see whether such decrees, 'which when passed were according to international law nullities' in the foreign State where they were to be enforced, have by reason of any subsequent change in the status either of the native State or of its former subject becomes executable." The other learned Judge Venkataramayya, J. observes in Para.19 of the judgment as follows when dealing with the aforesaid Bombay cases: "This limitation with respect to execution 'is considered' to have been removed and decrees freed from being foreign 'by the Constitution' so as to render them executable as that of a Court in the 'territory of India'." In Para.20 the same Judge observes: "There is no reference in the decisions relied upon to Article 281 of the Constitution of India which expressly provides for execution of decrees passed in Courts within the Union." 68. I think with great respect to the Judges of Mysore High Court the view thus expressed by them regarding the Bombay decisions is difficult to appreciate. 69. On reading the Bombay decisions, it becomes clear that they do not fail "to recognise the cardinal principle by which such foreign ex parte decrees were not being allowed to be executed by Court of another." 70. Nor can the approach to question of execution under the circumstances of Bombay cases be considered erroneous. 71. The Bombay cases make no reference to Constitution nor do they assume that it is by reason of the Constitution of India that the decrees become executable. They nowhere hold that the phrase 'the territory of India' has to be construed to have retrospective operation. As the facts in those cases stood, it was unnecessary to make a reference to the Constitution or Art.261(3). They nowhere hold that the phrase 'the territory of India' has to be construed to have retrospective operation. As the facts in those cases stood, it was unnecessary to make a reference to the Constitution or Art.261(3). The Bombay decisions do not take their stand on Art.26(3) of the Constitution. 72. On the whole therefore I generally agree with the line of reasoning adopted in Bombay cases principle of which can now be extended to the present cases. 73. The decrees in these cases are not absolute nullities. They are good. They were not executable in Madhya Bharat till 1-4-1951 but after this they became excutable as no vested right is likely to be affected and although when the order was passed it may be good no useful purpose will be served by holding that the decrees are now executable without affording, relief on the changed circumstances. As the substantial points arising in these cases are covered by the Bombay and Mysore decisions referred to above it is unnecessary to refer to other cases which follow the one or the other of these lines of reasoning. 74. One more point deserves some reference and that is in case such executions are permitted it will lead to obvious prejudice. When a foreign Court is dealing with a cause a party who is non-resident foreigner is entitled to take no notice if he is sure that he has no earthly reason to go within the territorial limits of the country of that forum and if he does so and a judgment is passed 'in absentum' why should he not be afforded a chance to meet the case which he had no reason to meet before? This may be a good reason for the Legislature to make a positive law to relieve likely hardship if any and not for Courts to consider it. 75. The result is that Civil Second Appeal No.291 of 1951 is dismissed with costs and the execution application is ordered to proceed. 76. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.33 of 1951 is allowed with costs and the order of the lower Court dismissing the execution application is set aside and the execution is allowed to continue. 77. SHINDE, C.J.:- I am in entire agreement.