JUDGMENT : Narasimham, J. - This is Defendant's second appeal against the Appellant judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Sambalpur reversing the judgment of the Munsif of Bamra and decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession of the suit lands and for other consequential reliefs. 2. The suit lands extend over an area of 18.13 acres in village Purunapani and during the last settlement in Bamra State (1927) they were entered as bhogra lands appertaining to khata No. 77 of the village assessed to a rental of Rs. 22/2/11. The Plaintiff is the Gountia of the village. His case was that the bhogra lands were impartible and inalienable but that by virtue of the decisions of two Civil Courts in Civil Suit No. 1/101 of 1927-28 (Ext. 1) and Civil Suit No. 39/1939-40 (Ext. 2) the Defendant's mother Kamala was allowed to possess the same during her life time. She died on 5-10-45 and thereupon the Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to recover possession and then was compelled to bring the present suit. 3. The main defence taken by the Appellant was that he possessed the suit lands in his own right and title as raiyati lands on payment of rent to the Plaintiff Gountia for nearly 47 years and that consequently his title had been perfected by adverse possession. He did not claim the suit lands as the success-in-interest of his mother Kamala. It was, therefore, contended on his behalf that the judgments in the aforesaid suits recognising the life interest of Kamala would not bind him. 4. At this stage it will be useful to narrate certain admitted facts. The Plaintiff is the paternal grandson of one Raghunath whose uterine younger brother was one Dharam Singh. Dharam Singh's daughter was Kamala and the Defendant is her son. Sometime in 1900 or 1901 Raghunath who was the then Gountia of the village partitioned some of his bhogra lands and gave the suit lands to his brother Dharam Singh. This partition was approved by the then Ruler of Bamra State Sir Sudhal Deb. Sometime later Dharam Singh gifted away the property to his daughter Kamala in absolute right. During the settlement operations in Bamra State in 1927 dispute arose between the Plaintiff and Kamala regarding the suit lands; but with the consent of the Plaintiff the Asst. This partition was approved by the then Ruler of Bamra State Sir Sudhal Deb. Sometime later Dharam Singh gifted away the property to his daughter Kamala in absolute right. During the settlement operations in Bamra State in 1927 dispute arose between the Plaintiff and Kamala regarding the suit lands; but with the consent of the Plaintiff the Asst. Settlement Officer on 14-5-27 recorded the suit lands as bhogra lands of the Plaintiff with a note in the remarks column to the effect that Kamala was in possession of the same and that she would remain in possession during her life time. While the settlement operations were proceeding the Plaintiff brought a suit (C.S. No. 1/101 of 1927-28) against the Defendant his grandfather Dharam Singh and others claiming the suit lands as his absolute property. Strangely enough in that suit he did riot implead Kamala as one of the parties. The Defendant contested the Plaintiff's claim alloying that he was in possession of the suit lands as a raiyat. The judgment of the Civil Court (Ext. 1) was pronounced on 20-6-27 and the Court, being mainly influenced by the order of the A.S.O. dated 14-5-27 gave a declaration to the effect that the suit property would remain in possession of Kamala till her life time. The suit lands, however, continued to remain in possession of the Defendant who paid rent to the Plaintiff as fixed in the settlement proceedings. The Plaintiff granted rent receipts (Ext. A aeries) to him; but did not take special care to note in the rent receipts that the payment was made by the Defendant on behalf of Kamala. On the other hand, in the rent receipts the Defendant was mentioned as the 'praja' (tenant) and the name of Kamala was completely absent. In Borne of the rent receipts (Ext. A-8, A-25 & A-39) the land as described as 'bhogra' but in most of the rent receipts no description of the land was given. In 1939, the Plaintiff brought another suit against Kamala. (C.S. No. 39/1939.40) for her eviction from the suit lands. But the Civil Court dismissed that suit observing that in view of the decision in the previous suit (C.S. 1/101 of 1927-28) the Plaintiff had no cause of action during the life time in Kamala. 5. In 1939, the Plaintiff brought another suit against Kamala. (C.S. No. 39/1939.40) for her eviction from the suit lands. But the Civil Court dismissed that suit observing that in view of the decision in the previous suit (C.S. 1/101 of 1927-28) the Plaintiff had no cause of action during the life time in Kamala. 5. The suit lands are situated in Bamra State which before merger on 1.1.48 was an Indian State in which the Ruler of Bamra had limited sovereign powers. An up-to-date copy of the revenue laws in force in the State prior to merger is not available. But from some of the observations in the judgment of the learned Munsif of Bamra who had served in the State prior to merger it appears that prior to 1929 there were no systematic revenue rules in the State and the Ruler combined in himself both legislative and executive functions. The revenue laws were codifled only in 1929. This statement of fact in the Trial Courts judgment has not been challenged before me and I would therefore rely, on it and hold that when the disputed property was partitioned by Raghunath some time in 1900 there was no codified law to the effect that bhogra lands were impartible or inalienable. Everything was left to the sweet will and pleasure of the Ruler and in view of the admitted position that the then Ruler Sir Sudhal Deb gave his consent to such partition, it must be held that Dharam Singh obtained fall right to the property then. It is also an admitted fact that Dharam Singh made an absolute gift of his property to his daughter Kamala who thus became the fall owner of the same. It is true that in the settlement proceedings of 1927 Kamala was recorded as having life interest only. But the order of the A.S.O. is not on record and there is no evidence to show that Kamala was consenting party to the reduction of her status from that of a full owner to that of a limited owner in respect of the property. Whatever pre sumptive value may be attached to the settlement entry must be held to have been completely rebutted by the admitted position about partition between Raghunath and Dharam Singh, the securing of the consent of the then Ruler and the subsequent gift of Dharam, Singh to Kamala. Whatever pre sumptive value may be attached to the settlement entry must be held to have been completely rebutted by the admitted position about partition between Raghunath and Dharam Singh, the securing of the consent of the then Ruler and the subsequent gift of Dharam, Singh to Kamala. If the Plaintiff's case was that the settlement entry was based on compromise between the Plaintiff and Kamala as appears to have been thought, by the lower appellate Court clear issues should have been framed on this point and the admissions, made by Kamala before the settlement authorities should have been brought on record. Strangely enough, even the order of the A.S.O., has not been proved and the Court was left to gather its contents from some observations in the judgment of the Civil Court in 1927. I would not therefore, rely on the settlement entry so far as far as the rights of Kamala over the suit lands were concerned. 6. Coming to the judgment of the Civil Court in 1927, the main question is whether it will operate as res judicata against the Defendant. It is true that the Defendant is a party to that judgment and it appears that he claimed an independent raiyati right in the lands. Kamala however was not a party to that judgment though the Civil Court gave a decree to the effect that she had only life interest in the property. That judgment may operate as res judicata so far as the Defendant's claim of independent raiyati over the suit lands is concerned. But it cannot operate as res judicata in respect of any subsequent claim that be may pub forward for he suit lands as the heir of Kamala. Similarly, the judgment of the Civil Court in the 1939 suit (Ex. 2) would not operate as res judicata as that suit was disposed of on the preliminary point that it was not maintainable as the Plaintiff had accepted the position that Kamala was a life interest holder and he had no right to recover possession during her life time. There was no decision as to whether in fact Kamala's interest in the property was absolute or else was of a limited nature. There was no decision as to whether in fact Kamala's interest in the property was absolute or else was of a limited nature. Hence if the property became the absolute property of Kamala after the gift in her favour by her father Dharam Singh the settlement entry of 1927 of the Civil Suit of 1927 (Ext. 1) to which she was not a party would not in any way affect her right. Similarly, the dismissal of the Plaintiff's suit 1939 (Ext. 2) on a preliminary issue of non-maintainability also would not affect that right. After her death the Defendant as her son would be entitled to succeed. 7. It was urged that the plea of adverse possession raised by the Defendant could not stand in view of the fact that so long as Kamala was alive the Plaintiff had no right to sue for recovery of possession and that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for adverse possession the starting point would be the date of the death of Kamala in 1945. In support of this argument reliance was placed on a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kalipada Chakraborti and Another Vs. Palani Bala Devi and Others, where it was held that where a person claimed possession of a property adversely to that of a limited owner such as a Hindu widow the right of the reversioner of the widow to sue for recovery of possession commenced only from the date of the death of the widow and limitation would consequently run from that date. In the 1927 suit to which the Plaintiff and the Defendant were parties the Defendant's plea of independent raiyati right was negatived and it was declared that Kamala was entitled to possess the property during her life time. It is true that subsequent to that decision also the Defendant continued to remain in possession of the land asserting that it was his independent raiyati right and the Plaintiff also granted him receipt as if he was a raiyat in respect of the suit land. But so long as Kamala was alive the Plaintiff had no right to sue for recovery of possession and consequently as against him an adverse possession of the Defendant would run only from the date of the death of Kamala in view of the Supreme Court decision mentioned above. 8. But so long as Kamala was alive the Plaintiff had no right to sue for recovery of possession and consequently as against him an adverse possession of the Defendant would run only from the date of the death of Kamala in view of the Supreme Court decision mentioned above. 8. But this does not conclude the matter. This is a suit for ejectment and the Plaintiff must rely on his own title. He claimed title to the property on the ground that it was bhogra land. It has already been shown that the property became the absolute property of Dharam Singh by the partition effected between him and the Plaintiff's ancestor Raghunath in 1900 or 1901 with the approval of the then Ruler. Dharam Singh also made an absolute gift of the same to Kamala who thus become the sale owner of the property. Thus the Plaintiff had no title to the property then. It is true that in the settlement operations of 1927 the property was recorded in the Plaintiff's name with a note in the remarks column to the effect that Kamala would possess the property during her life time. But as is well known a settlement entry neither creates a right nor destroys a right and in view of the clear finding that Kamala was the absolute owner of the property the settlement entry ceases to have any special value. Doubtless, if the Plaintiff could establish that Kamala by way of compromise relinquished her absolute right in the property and agreed to remain in possession as a limited owner for her life time there may be some case for the Plaintiff. But no issue on this point was raised nor was any evidence led to show that Kamala consented to accept the position of a limited owner in respect of the suit property. Again in the suit of 1927-28 the Plaintiff did not make her a party. No specific issue was raised in that suit as to whether Kamala's right in the property was that of an absolute owner or that of a limited owner. Hence the decision in that suit to the effect that Kamala would possess the property during her life time ceases to have any value so far as Kamala or persons claiming title through her are concerned. Hence the decision in that suit to the effect that Kamala would possess the property during her life time ceases to have any value so far as Kamala or persons claiming title through her are concerned. I have already shown that the ejectment suit of 1930-40 also cannot operate as res judicata against Kamala as it was disposed of on a preliminary point. Thus the net result is that the absolute right which Kamala obtained when the property was gifted by her father Dharam Singh continued to remain with her till her death. The Plaintiff's predecessors lost all title to the property when by partition it wag given away to Dharam Singh and the Plaintiff has not acquired any fresh title to the same on the basis of surrender by Kamala. Hence, the suit for ejectment most fail on the simple question that he has not been able to establish his title to the property. It is immaterial as to whether the Defendant's claim of independent raiyati interest in the property has failed or not. 9. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the suit with costs throughout. Final Result : Dismissed