Judgment.- This Second Appeal raises a question relating to the interpretation of section 35 of Madras Act IX of 1949. A decree was obtained by the appellants against the respondent and some others in Small Cause Suit No.32 of 1937 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, South Kanara, for a sum of Rs.800 and odd. There was a personal decree against the respondent Rudramma who is a member of an Aliyasantana family. In execution of this decree, several applications were made by the appellants to attach her interest in the immoveable properties belonging to the family. They were all dismissed as there was no decree against the family or against the respondent as Ejamanthi of her branch. In 1949 the Legislature of Madras State enacted Madras Act IX of 1949 to define and amend in certain respects the law relating to marriage, maintenance, guardianship, intestate succession, family management and partition applicable to persons governed by the Aliyasantana Law of inheritance. After the passing of this Act the appellants sought to attach Rudramma’s interest in the properties of her kavaru, i.e., the branch on the ground that Rudramma could claim a partition of her share separately under section 35 of the said Act and consequently her share in the family properties was liable to be attached and sold for her personal debt. This application was opposed by the respondent on the contention that section 35 of the said Act did not enable her to claim a partition of her share in the properties of the branch. This objection found favour with the trial Court and the execution petition was dismissed. On appeal, the learned District Judge concurred in the view of the District Munsif and confirmed the order under appeal. The decree-holders who were aggrieved by this order have preferred the present second appeal. The point for determination in this appeal is whether the respondent could claim a partition of her share which could be obtained on a partition by her branch. The answer to this question depends upon the interpretation to be placed on section 35 of Act IX of 1949. The point for determination in this appeal is whether the respondent could claim a partition of her share which could be obtained on a partition by her branch. The answer to this question depends upon the interpretation to be placed on section 35 of Act IX of 1949. Section 35(1) provides: “Any kavaru represented by the majority of its major members may claim to take its share of the properties of kutumba over which the kutumba has power of disposal and separate from the kutumba: Provided that- (i) where a kavaru consists of only two persons, such a claim may be made by either of them; (ii) no kavaru shall make such a claim during the lifetime of any ancestress common to such kavaru and to any other kavaru or kavarus of the kutumba, who has not completed fifty years of age, unless- (a) she has signified her consent in writing or (b) two-thirds of the major members of the kavaru join in making the claim for partition; (iii) the common ancestress may on her own volition claim a partition.” Here in this enquiry, we are only concerned with clause (iii) of the proviso. It is not necessary for the present purpose to refer to the other sub-sections. The Explanation to section 35 is as follows:- “For the purposes of this chapter: (a) a male member of a kutumha, or a female member thereof who has no living descendant in the female line, shall be deemed to be a kavaru if he or she has no living female ascendant who is a member of the kutumba.” It is clear from the wording of the section that the partition here referred is that of a branch or kavaru. The proviso lays down the conditions under which certain persons could claim partition referred in the main section. Under clause (iii) it is open to a common ancestress to claim that partition on her own volition, while there are certain restrictions with regard to other members of the branch in that respect. It may be mentioned here that prior to the passing of this Act there could be a partition in an Aliyasantana kutumba or family only by the common consent of all the members of the family. A branch of the family could not claim partition of its share, even if all the members of that branch desired to have it. It may be mentioned here that prior to the passing of this Act there could be a partition in an Aliyasantana kutumba or family only by the common consent of all the members of the family. A branch of the family could not claim partition of its share, even if all the members of that branch desired to have it. Under section 35 of Act IX of 1949 a right was given to a branch to claim a partition provided certain requirements were fulfilled. That section deals only with the partition of the kutumba into different units or branches. It does not confer a right on the common ancestress to demand a separation of her individual share. The proviso is only an auxiliary to sub-section (1). That proviso only prescribes the procedure for claiming a division on behalf of the kavaru. A common ancestress could exercise the right confered on the kavaru under sub-section (1) without the concurrence of other members of the kavaru. But she is not invested with any special privilege to ask for a separate share for herself. In the whole of that chapter there is no reference to the partition of the family properties into individual shares. Under that chapter, the unit for purposes of partition is the kavaru. The marginal note of section 35 is ‘right of kavaru to claim partition’. Even section 36 makes it abundantly clear that what is contemplated in section 35 is only a partition on behalf of the kavaru or branch. What is urged by Mr. Vittal Rao is that under clause (iii) the common ancestress of the branch has a right on her own volition to claim a partition of not only of the branch of which she is the Ejamanthi but she could claim a partition of her own share in her branch. I do not think there is any force in this contention. As already remarked the demand for partition could be made only on behalf of a branch under section 35 of the Act and an individual member who does not constitute a kavaru within the meaning of the proviso cannot ask for partition. Mr. Vittal Rao maintained that this Act has not affected the rights of individual members to obtain their share in the kutumba properties when there is a partition. Mr. Vittal Rao maintained that this Act has not affected the rights of individual members to obtain their share in the kutumba properties when there is a partition. It is not claimed on the other side that the present Act has taken away the right of any individual member to get a share in the family properties as and when there is a partition. The only point here for consideration is whether a common ancestress who by herself does not constitute a kavaru can claim partition of her share in the properties of the family without the concurrence of the other members. So the present question does not in any way touch the rights of members of the family to get their due share when a partition is effected. So that argument has no substance at all. In my judgment the only right that is given by section 35 of the said Act to the common ancestress by virtue of her position is to ask for a partition on behalf of the branch and not to claim her individual share in the family properties. It was next urged by Mr. Vittal Rao that although the individual members of a branch or of the kutumba could not claim a partition in the family properties they have got a vested right which could be seized and sold in execution of a decree. As substantiating this proposition Mr. Vittal Rao relied on a ruling of a Bench of this Court in Subramanyam Tirumurupu v. Naraina Tirumurupu1. There, after the passing of the Marumakkathayam Act of 1933 the shares of two junior members of a tavazhi in tarwad property were attached in execution of decree passed against them for their personal debts. The question arose whether execution could be levied against the interest of those two members in the properties of the Marumakkathayam family. The basis of the application of the judgment-debtors was section 38 of the Marumakkathayam Act (Madras Act XXII of 1933) which is in the following words. The question arose whether execution could be levied against the interest of those two members in the properties of the Marumakkathayam family. The basis of the application of the judgment-debtors was section 38 of the Marumakkathayam Act (Madras Act XXII of 1933) which is in the following words. Section 38(1): "Any tavazhi represented by the majority of its major members may claim to take its share of all the properties of the tarwad over which it has power of disposal and separate from the tarwad: provided that no tavazhi shall claim to be divided from the tarwad during the lifetime of an ancestress common to such tavazhi and to any other tavazhi or tavazhis of the tarwad, except with the consent of such ancestress, if she is a member of the tarwad. Explanation:-For the purpose of this chapter, a male member of a tarwad or a female member thereof without any living child or descendant in the female line, shall be deemed to be a tavazhi if he or she has no living female ascendant who is a member of the tarwad." It is seen that this section is in pari materia with section 35 of Madras Act IX of 1949. The learned Judges held that the relief asked for in the execution petition, viz., the attachment of the shares of the petitioners in the property of the tarwad could be granted for the reason that by virtue of section 38 the right of partition was conceded to individual members who constituted a tavazhi and as the two judgment-debtors were entitled to claim their share in the property of the tarwad and separate therefrom by reason of their forming the tavazhi and consequently their shares could be attached in execution. Admittedly, these two were the only members of the tavazhi and therefore, they were entitled to claim partition and convert their share in the joint property as separate property. So, in that case the judgment-debtors were persons who were capable of asking for partition by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of the Marumakkathayam Act. According to that judgment, the foundation of the right of the creditors to seize the share of a member of the family is the right of that member to demand partition and convert his share in the joint property into separate property. According to that judgment, the foundation of the right of the creditors to seize the share of a member of the family is the right of that member to demand partition and convert his share in the joint property into separate property. In support of this view, the learned Judges relied on a number of rulings of the Judicial Committee. It may be apposite to refer to a passage in Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh1 which is extracted in the judgment in the last mentioned case: "Any one of several members of a joint family is entitled to require partition of ancestral property, and his demand to that effect, if it be not complied with, can be enforced by legal process. So long as his interest is indefinite, he is not in a position to dispose of it at his own hand, and for his own purposes, but as soon as partition is made, he becomes the sole owner of his share, and has same powers of disposal as if it had been his acquired proprety. Actual partition is not in all cases essential. An agreement by the members of an undivided family to hold the joint property individually in definite shares, or the attachment of a member’s undivided share in execution of a decree at the instance of his creditor, will be regarded as sufficient to support the alienation of a member’s interest in the estate or a sale under the execution." It is abundantly clear from this decision that in a case where a member has the right to claim partition, his share or interest could be seized and sold in execution of a decree. It follows that if such right does not vest in the judgment-debtor, the decree-holder cannot attach the interest of a member in the family. It is clear that this ruling does not in any way support the contention of the appellants. On the other hand, the remarks therein indicate that the arguments now put forward on behalf of the appellants are without much force. It was next argued by Mr. Vittal Rao that at any rate so far as the life estate of the respondent is concerned, that is capable of being proceeded against in execution. This proceeds on the assumption that the respondent has a life estate in the property. It was next argued by Mr. Vittal Rao that at any rate so far as the life estate of the respondent is concerned, that is capable of being proceeded against in execution. This proceeds on the assumption that the respondent has a life estate in the property. The only interest she has in the property is to be maintained out of the family income. She has no other interest in the property. The right to maintenance cannot be attached, as section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code is a bar to it. Under the circumstances, the orders of the Courts below are right and have to be affirmed. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. No leave. K.C. ------ Appeal dismissed.