Rajamannar C.J.- The question referred to the Full Bench is as follows: "Whether, in a suit filed to obtain a declaratory decree, where no consequential relief is prayed or in an appeal filed against a decree in that suit, the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be is able to pay court-fee on the ad valorem basis on the value of the subject-matter of the suit fixed under Rule a of the Rules for the valuation of certain classes of suits framed by the High Court." The question has been amply discussed first by the Master, then bv Subba Rao, J., on a reference to him under section 5 of the Court-fees Act and again by a Division Bench consisting Subba Rao and Ramaswami, JJ. It is not therefore necessary to state at great length the various arguments which could be put forward for either point of view. The proposed appeal arises out of a suit filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chittoor by two of the daughter’s sons of one Chenchiah Chetti for a declaration that the compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 10 of 1944 on the file of the same Court was not binding on them and for the appointment of a receiver to manage the properties of the late Chenchiah Chetti. The plaintiffs were not parties to the prior suit. That suit was brought by one of the daughters of Chenchiah Chetti against the other daughters and Vediah Chetty, the husband of the first daughter, for partition of the properties. In that suit the plaintiff therein claimed that certain properties belonged to the estate of Chenchiah Chetti and did not belong to Vediah Chetti who was claiming them as his own. It ended in a compromise decree under which Vediah Chetti and his children were given a large number of items. It is in respect of this compromise decree that the plaintiffs now seek for a declaration that it is not binding on them as reversioners to the estate of Chenchiah Chetti. Before us it is common ground that the relief of appointment of a receiver was not consequential on the declaration that the compromise decree was not bindine on the plaintiffs. Before us it is common ground that the relief of appointment of a receiver was not consequential on the declaration that the compromise decree was not bindine on the plaintiffs. It was also practically admitted by the learned Government pleader that the suit did not fall within section 7, clause (iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act as amended by the Madras Legislature. We must therefore take it that the suit was rightly framed as a suit for a mere declaration that the compromise was not binding on the plaintiffs. Prima facie such a suit would fall under Article 17-A(1) of Schedule II to the Court-Fees Act which runs thus: "Plaint or Memorandum of Appeal in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed." The proper fee leviable for such a suit under that Article depends upon firstly the Court to which the plaint is presented and secondly, when the plaint is presented to a District Court or a Sub-Court according to the value for purposes of jurisdiction It such value is less than Rs. 10,000 the fee is Rs. 100. If such value is Rs 10,000 or upwards the fee is Rs. 500. The question for consideration is, what is the effect of Rule 2 of the Rules framed by the High Court of Madras in exercise of the power conferred on it by section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. The rule runs as follows: "In suits for a declaration or for an injunction consequent on a declaration that a decree for money or any other property having a money value is not binding on the plaintiff who was not a party to the decree the subject-matter of the suit shall for purposes of jurisdiction and court-fee be valued at the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed; "Provided that if the value of the property or the interest which the plaintiff seeks to he declared not liable for the decree is less than the value of the decree the plaint shall be valued as if if were one for the possession of such property or interest." This rule came into operation on and from 1st November, 1943. There can be no doubt that the present suit does fall within the scope of this Rule. There can be no doubt that the present suit does fall within the scope of this Rule. This is a suit for a declaration that a decree in respect of property having a money value is not binding on the plaintiffs who were not parties to the decree. The value of the subject-matter must therefore be computed at the value of the property for which the decree was passed. Undoubtedly, this value will determine the Court which will be competent to entertain the suit. The rule provides that the value so computed will also be the value for purposes of court-fee payable. The answer to this question depends entirely on the provisions of the Court-fees Act. The actual amount or rate of court-fee leviable on a plaint is found in the Court Fees Act only in two schedules. Under Schedule I, the fee is calculated on an ad valorem basis. Schedule II provides for cases in which a fixed fee is leviable. In the body of the Act section 7 embodies the rules as to the computation of the amount of fee in certain classes of suits according to the value of the claim or relief sought. When the value of the claim or relief is ascertained according to these rules, for a calculation of the proper fee one has to turn to Article I of Schedule I. That Article provides inter alia for a plaint presented to any Civil Court not otherwise provided for in the Act. The words “not otherwsie provided for in this Act” should not be understood to refer to anything except a provision for the actual lee leviable. It does not refer to the provision for computation of values. If there is any other Article in either Schedule I or Schedule II which provides for a fee on any particular class of plaints, then that provision will govern and Article I of Schedule I will have no application. Otherwise, it will apply. To give an example, there is no provision otherwise in Schedule I or Schedule II for a plaint in a suit for possession of land. Therefore, for such suits Article I of Schedule I will apply so far as the rate of court-fee is concerned. The fee will have to be calculated at the proper rate on the amount as computed under section 7(v) of the Act. Therefore, for such suits Article I of Schedule I will apply so far as the rate of court-fee is concerned. The fee will have to be calculated at the proper rate on the amount as computed under section 7(v) of the Act. Likewise, a suit for relief under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is specifically provided for in Article 17 (iii) of Schedule I.I. The proper fee is a fixed fee of Rs. 50. To such’ a plaint Article I of Schedule I will not apply. Now as I have already mentioned above there is a specific provision for a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed in Article 17-A(1) of Schedule II. To a suit of that class Article I of Schedule I will have no application. It must follow on a plain reading of the material provisions of the Court-Fees Act including the Schedules that the fee cannot be calculated on an ad valorem basis. In my opinion it is not correct to so construe section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act as to confer a power on the High Court to provide for a separate class of suits not falling within any of the classes mentioned in the body of the Court Fees Act or in the Schedules. Nor can a rule framed under section 9 of that Act decide whether court-fee should be calculated on an ad valorem basis or on a fixed fee basis. The object of the Suits Valuation Act is to prescribe the method of valuing certain suits for the purposes of determining the jurisdiction of Courts with respect thereto. The Act contemplates suits in which the court-fee value may be different from the value for purposes of jurisdiction. A suit for possession of land must be valued for purposes of court-fee according to the rule laid down in section 7, paragraph (v) of the Court-fees Act. But the value of such a suit for purposes of jurisdiction may be different if the Provincial Government makes rules for determing the value of the land for purposes of jurisdiction on a different basis (section 3(1)). Under section 8, as regards certain classes of suits the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction are the same. Under section 8, as regards certain classes of suits the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction are the same. Section 9 deals with that class of suits which does not admit of being satisfactorily valued and provides that the High Court may provide for the valuation of such suits. The section then declares that the valuation so computed shall be the valuation both for the purposes of the Court-fees Act and for the purposes of the Suits Valuation Act. I do not therefore read rule 2 framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act as interfering in any manner with the scheme relating to the classification of suits provided in the body of the Court-Fees Act and its schedules. Take, for instance, a suit to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid. Such a suit in terms falls within paragraph (iii) of Article 17-A of Schedule II and a fixed fee is leviable thereon. It will not be open, by a rule made under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, to take such a suit out of Article 17-A(iii) of Schedule II and make it a suit for which court-fee is leviable ad valorem. If the rule were to be construed to have this effect, it would be in excess of the powers conferred by section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. This reference to a Full Bench really became necessary because of the observations contained in the decision of a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party in Narasamma v. Satyanarayana1. That was a suit in which the plaintiff prayed for the cancellation of the decree in a suit to which she was eo nomine a party. What she alleged was that she was impleaded in that suit as a major while she was still a minor. Actually she had engaged a pleader for her, and she gave evidence in the suit. It was contended that the suit fell within Article 17-A(1) of Schedule II because the decree must be deemed to be void; but it was held that the suit fell within section 7 (iv-A) of the Act. Actually she had engaged a pleader for her, and she gave evidence in the suit. It was contended that the suit fell within Article 17-A(1) of Schedule II because the decree must be deemed to be void; but it was held that the suit fell within section 7 (iv-A) of the Act. Viswanatha Sastri, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, observed thus: "The distinction between a decree to which the plaintiff was a party and a decree to which he was not a party and the distinction between void and voidable decrees, may be relevant in connection with other branches of the law, as for instance, in determining the period of limitation applicable to a suit to set aside the decree and the rights of innocent third parties who have acquired for value an interest in the subject-matter of the suit. But so far as the Court-Fees Act is concerned, a suit by a party to the decree, which is ex facie regular and within the jurisdiction of the Court, to have it declared void as against him is taken out of Article 17-A of Schedule II and section 7(iv)(c) and brought within section 7(iv-A) of the Act." I may point out that on behalf of the Government the only provision relied upon was section 7 (iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act and the arguments were confined to a discussion of that provision and Article 17-A(1) of Schedule II of the Act. But the learned Judge apparently thought that ad valorem court-fee would be payable on the value of the subject-matter of the suit under rule 2 of the rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act above mentioned. The learned Judge expressly mentioned the fact that the rule was not brought to the notice of the Bench by the learned counsel in the case. Strictly speaking, in view of the decision of the Bench that the suit would be governed by section 7(iv-A) of the Act, it was not necessary to deal with rule 2 framed under the Suits Valuation Act. Strictly speaking, in view of the decision of the Bench that the suit would be governed by section 7(iv-A) of the Act, it was not necessary to deal with rule 2 framed under the Suits Valuation Act. As the learned Judge said: "Whether the suit is governed by section 7(iv-A) of the Act or Rule 2 of the Court-Fees Rules ad valorem court-fees must be paid on the market value of the lands in Schedules A and B of the plaint which formed the subject-matter of the previous decree." In my opinion the decision in Narasamma v. Satyanarayana1, cannot be considered as an authority on the applicability of the rule now under consideration to a suit for a declaration that a decree in a suit to which the plaintiff was not a party is not binding on him. Having been a party to that decision I am free to say that the contentions now put forward before us as regards the scope of that rule were never before us in that case. I would answer the question referred to us as follows:- "In a suit filed to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed, which does not fall within the category of suits provided for by section 7 (iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act court-fee is not leviable on an ad valorem basis on the value of the subject-matter of the suit computed in accord-ance with Rule 2 of the rules framed by this Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act in 1943." Rajagopalan, J. - I agree. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. - I agree. R.M. ----- Reference answered accordingly.