JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. This is a petition for review of the judgment of this Court in Civil Second Appeal No.448 of 1949, whereby an appeal preferred by Ram Singh was accepted and the applicant-decree-holder's application for execution for the recovery of the amount of defaulted instalments payable under an agreement registered as required by S.14(2), Indore Debt Conciliation Act of 1939 was rejected. The only point for consideration in the appeal was whether after an agreement has been registered as provided in S.14, Debt Conciliation Act, a creditor could file an application for execution for the recovery of the defaulted amount without complying with the provisions of S.18 of the Act regarding the recovery of sums due under the agreement. My learned brother Mehta, J., took the view that an agreement under S.14 of the Act was not a decree but that it ripened into a decree upon the Subha certifying that the arrears could not be recovered and that the decree-holder should have pursued his remedy in the Revenue Court for the recovery of the defaulted amount and that it was only after the Subha had certified that the amount could not be recovered that the decree-holder could come to the Civil Court. In support of this construction of S.16, Debt Conciliation Act, my learned brother relied on the decisions of the Nagpur High Court reported in - 'Shridhar Krishnarao v. Narayan Namaji', AIR 1939 Nag 227 (A) and - 'Ratan Singh Kanhaisingh v. Raghuraj Singh Madho Singh', AIR 1946 Nag 30 (R), Kaul C.J., who was the other member of the Bench hearing the appeal agreed with the conclusion of my learned brother Mehta J., that the order of the lower Court holding that the execution taken out by the decree-holder was competent, should be set aside. 2. 2. The petitioner now seeks a review of the decision on the ground that the appeal was referred to for disposal by a Division Bench by an order of a reference made by Shinde, J., (as he then was) and that the learned Judge who disposed of the appeal did not notice the view recorded by Shinde J., in his order of reference and further that the Division Bench also did not take into consideration the decision of Sanghi, J., in - 'Hira Lal Kishanji v. Chhitar Amichand', AIR 1951 Madh-B 75 (C), on the construction of S.16, Debt Conciliation Act. Mr. Tambe learned counsel appearing for the applicant argued that the omission to consider the view stated in the order of reference and the decision of Sanghi J., in 'Hiralal Kishanji (C), was an error apparent on the face of the record and that the question of the construction of S.16 of the Act being of general importance, a review of the decision would be justified. I am unable to accede to the contention that the omission on the part of a Judge to notice an authority is an error apparent on the face of the record or constitutes "a sufficient reason" for a review of his judgment. Mr. Tambe referred us to a decision of the Madras High Court in - 'Morari Rao v. Balwant Dixit', AIR 1924 Mad 98 (D) and said that it laid down the proposition that the failure to take note of an authority is a ground for review. I do not think that case lays down any such proposition. In that case the District Judge had reviewed his decision because through some mistake he had omitted to apply to the facts found by him the law laid down by Madras High Court in - 'Kamalabai v. Bhagirathibai', AIR 1916 Mad 925 (E), that the agnates are to be referred to the sister's sons. When the matter went up before the Madras High Court it was held that the District Judge was justified in reviewing his decision on the ground that he did. It is clear that in that case the review was granted on the ground of failure to apply the law to the facts found by the Court and not because in deciding a question of law the Judge had omitted to consider an authority taking a possible view. Mr. It is clear that in that case the review was granted on the ground of failure to apply the law to the facts found by the Court and not because in deciding a question of law the Judge had omitted to consider an authority taking a possible view. Mr. Tambe also relied on - 'Natesa Naicker v. Sambanda Chattiar', AIR 1941 Mad 918 (F), to support his contention. This decision is of no assistance to the applicant. In that case the decision in AIR 1924 Mad 98 (D), was considered and, it was pointed out that the decision in AIR 1924 Mad 98 (D), was not an authority for the view that whenever a Judge has overlooked a ruling he has a power to review his decision; nor is it an. authority for the view that whenever, after a judgment has been pronounced, a subsequent ruling changes the accepted view of the law, that subsequent ruling can be a ground for review. To the same effect are the observations of Jackson J., in - 'Govindan Nayar v. Ithaletty', AIR 1926 Mad 764 (G). This case was cited by the learned counsel for the applicant to show that if the question decided is a question of general importance and if the effect of a wrong decision of the question is far-reaching, then a review of a judgment deciding the question would be justified. As I read the decision in AIR 1926 Mad 764 (G), I do not think it lays down any such general proposition. In that case the decision which was reviewed was one deciding the question of court-fees payable in a suit for redemption, where the mortgagor suing for redemption may have to pay some amount for improvements made to the property by the mortgagee. Jackson J., thought that this was a matter which transcended the interests of the actual parties and that having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, a review of his decision on the question would be justified. Jackson J., was careful to say that he was allowing the petition for review but "only be it understood with regard to the particular circumstances in this case". Here it cannot be maintained that the decision sought to be reviewed was not one which decided a question of rights between the two parties. 3. Jackson J., was careful to say that he was allowing the petition for review but "only be it understood with regard to the particular circumstances in this case". Here it cannot be maintained that the decision sought to be reviewed was not one which decided a question of rights between the two parties. 3. It was also said that the decision in AIR 1946 Nag 30 (B), which has been referred to in the decision of the Division Bench does not support the view taken by my learned brother Mehta, J. There is no force in this contention. If Mehta J., had based his decision solely relying on AIR 1946 Nag 30 (B), and if that decision had been in fact to the contrary, then possibly it could have been urged with some force that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. But it is clear from the decision of the Nagpur High Court in AIR 1946 Nag 30 (B), that it is really in accord with the view taken by the Division Bench. Again, the Division Bench's construction of S.16 of the Act is not based solely on AIR 1946 Nag 30 (B). 4. In the result as the petition for review does not come within the terms of O.47 R.1, it must be and is dismissed. As none appeared for the non-applicant, there will be no order as to costs. 5. MEHTA, J.: I agree. Petition dismissed.