Judgment :- 1. A Nair husband whose marriage was dissolved under the Travancore Nair Act II of 1100, is the appellant. The appellant's wife presented a petition in the District Munsiff's Court of Quilon on 28-3-1122, praying for dissolution of her marriage, on the ground of habitual cruelty and adultery of her husband. Their marriage took place on 10-10-1119. The wife who was petitioner in the court below alleged that she was taken by her husband to her family house in Kumbhom 1120 for her first confinement and that a child was born to her on 8-10-1120. It was alleged that since Kumbhom 1120 the husband was persistently neglecting to maintain her, that the husband did not even meet the expenses in connection with the birth of their child and that he had neglected to maintain the child also. The husband was alleged to be living in adultery with a Pulaya woman. The petitioner claimed a sum of Rs. 3000/- as compensation. 2. The appellant filed objections on 18-6-1122. He denied the charge of adultery; but admitted that he had not been maintaining or looking after his wife and child. He stated that he had sent a sum of Rs. 30/- to his wife and a silver zone and a small gold ring for the child. He further contended that the failure to maintain them was due to the refusal of the wife to live with him. The wife filed a rejoinder, reiterating the averments in her main petition, and denying receipt of the sum of Rs. 30/- and the jewels. The following issues arising from the pleadings were framed by the trial court on 13-10-1123: (1) Whether the grounds alleged in the petition for dissolution of marriage are true. (2) Whether they are sufficient for dissolution of marriage. (3) What is the amount of compensation awardable. 3. Delegates were empaneled on 18-1-52 and the enquiry proceeded. At the end of the trial, a verdict that the husband was guilty of adultery and habitual cruelty was given by the delegates. Accepting this verdict, the learned Munsiff ordered dissolution of marriage and directed the husband to pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- as compensation to his wife. This appeal has been filed by the husband against this decision. The wife has presented a memorandum of cross objections claiming Rs. 500/- more, as compensation. 4. Accepting this verdict, the learned Munsiff ordered dissolution of marriage and directed the husband to pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- as compensation to his wife. This appeal has been filed by the husband against this decision. The wife has presented a memorandum of cross objections claiming Rs. 500/- more, as compensation. 4. The powers of the High Court in appeal against decisions in matrimonial causes under the Nair Act are limited. Section 7 (4), Travancore Nair Act provides for an appeal to the High Court, by an aggrieved party from any decision of the District Munsiff relating to dissolution or award or both; but this right is subject to rules framed under the Act. The relevant rules are rules 46 and 47 which are given below: "Rule 46. If the verdict of the delegates or the majority of the delegates in any enquiry is contrary to law or any Rules having the force of law is vitiated by fraud or material defect or mistake or is unsupported by any evidence, the High Court may set aside their verdict and order a fresh trial. Rule 47. Except in cases mentioned in Rule 46, no verdict of the delegates or of a majority of the delegates in any enquiry shall be set aside for any irregularity, error or omission, in the course of the enquiry except when such irregularity, error or omission has in the opinion of the High Court, materially prejudiced the party or parties and occasioned a failure of justice." The conjoint effect of section 7 (4) and Rules 46 and 47 came up for consideration in Velayudhan Pillai v. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma reported in 24 Travancore Law Journal 451. In that case, a Bench of the Travancore High Court held that the powers of the High Court hearing appeals under the Nair Act were very limited and that it was not open for the High Court to go behind the verdict and see whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the same. We are in full agreement with the above view. 5. The main attack against the decision of the trial court was that there was no legal evidence to support the finding that the appellant was guilty of adultery. We are in full agreement with the above view. 5. The main attack against the decision of the trial court was that there was no legal evidence to support the finding that the appellant was guilty of adultery. In the view that we take on the question of habitual cruelty it is unnecessary to express an opinion as to whether appellant was guilty of adultery as alleged. The learned counsel for the respondent stated that there was evidence to support the finding of adultery. He was however prepared to rest his case on the finding that the husband was guilty of habitual cruelty. This expression, "Habitual cruelty" has been defined in the explanation to section 7 (3) to include persistent neglect on the part of the husband to maintain his wife. As already observed the appellant did not deny the allegation in the petition for dissolution, that he had not been maintaining his wife from the time she left his house in 1120. He sought to justify his conduct on the ground that she refused to go and stay with him without just cause. On this point, the court is bound to accept the verdict of the delegates. It is unnecessary to refer to the rulings under the Indian Divorce Act, which were cited at the Bar, as the provisions in the Travancore Nair Act differ from the Indian Divorce Act in several material respects. Under Section 7(8) of the Travancore Act "The decision on the facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution shall be the decision of the delegates" but in cases governed by the Indian Divorce Act appellate courts can go into questions of fact decided by the trial court. It was not disputed before us that the question whether the appellant was guilty of habitual cruelty was a question of fact. The trial court was bound to accept this finding returned by the delegates and it is not open to us, either, to examine the evidence on this point afresh. We therefore confirm the decision of the trial court allowing dissolution of the marriage. 6. The trial court was bound to accept this finding returned by the delegates and it is not open to us, either, to examine the evidence on this point afresh. We therefore confirm the decision of the trial court allowing dissolution of the marriage. 6. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Munsiff should have directed the delegates to give a verdict on 2 other questions also viz., (1) whether adultery if proved, had been condoned by the petitioner and (2) whether there was unnecessary or improper delay in presenting the petition. As the decision appealed against, can be maintained on the finding regarding habitual cruelty, we hold that the omission to refer to the question of condonation of adultery cannot affect the decision of this case. It is significant that the appellant had no plea, that even if the charge of adultery be true, the same had been condoned. Section 7 (6) states, that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the trial of a suit shall apply to all proceedings under the section, save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this section or the rules framed by Government, under section 7 (8). This must necessarily include rules of pleadings. The omission in the charge on the question of delay is also not substantial. There was no such plea taken by the appellant. On the pleadings and the evidence, it is not possible to hold that there has been unnecessary or improper delay in the presentation of the petition. As such we are not prepared to hold that the form and contents of the charge to the delegates has vitiated the trial or decision. 7. The last point urged by the appellant was regarding the question of compensation decreed. It was contended that the sum of Rs. 1000/- awarded by the court below was excessive. The learned Munsiff has adverted to reasons which weighed with him in fixing the amount of Rs. 1000/-. He chose to believe the evidence adduced by the respondent, regarding the position, means and circumstances of the parties, and we do not see any reason to differ from him. In this Court, the respondent has claimed enhancement of the compensation to Rs. 1500/-. We are not satisfied that grounds exist for interference in this matter either. 1000/-. He chose to believe the evidence adduced by the respondent, regarding the position, means and circumstances of the parties, and we do not see any reason to differ from him. In this Court, the respondent has claimed enhancement of the compensation to Rs. 1500/-. We are not satisfied that grounds exist for interference in this matter either. In the result we confirm the decision of the trial court dissolving the marriage and awarding Rs. 1000/- as compensation, and dismiss the appeal with costs. The memorandum of cross objections is also dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Dismissed.