Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal by the 1st defendant arises out of O.S. 187 of 1114 on the file of the Changanacherry Munsiff's Court which was a suit originally filed for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to and possession of the properties scheduled to the plaint which is a paramba having an extent of 16 cents and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession. The 1st defendant who is the father of defendants 2 to 6 (of whom the last two were minors) contested on his own behalf as also as guardian of the minors. The main plea was that the plaint property was orally assigned to him by his father-in-law in the year 1082 in lieu of Stridhanam as also of certain other amounts due to him and that he is in possession under that independent title. After this written statement, the plaint was amended by adding a prayer to the effect that should the defendants be found to be in possession, they may be directed to surrender the property to the plaintiff with mesne profits. 2. Plaintiff and the deceased wife of the 1st defendant are the daughters of one Pothen who was examined in the case as plaintiff's 1st witness, their brother being the 4th witness. The plaintiff and her husband were witnesses 2 and 3 on her side. 3. Plaintiff claimed title under an Udampadi executed by the father in the year 1105 (Ext.A). Under that Udampadi Pothen granted slices of immovable property to the plaintiff as also to her sister. Plaintiff got the plaint property and her sister the adjacent western property. Mutation was effected, the names of the donees were entered in the revenue registry, and land revenue was and is being paid by them accordingly. The case set up by the defence of an oral sale of the plaint property by Pothen to the 1st defendant was disbelieved by both the Courts below who concurred in the conclusion that the plaint property was conveyed to the plaintiff under Ext. A and that pursuant to it the plaintiff was the owner and was in legal possession. The plaintiff's case was that she permitted her sister and after her death the 1st defendant, to look after the property on her behalf. A and that pursuant to it the plaintiff was the owner and was in legal possession. The plaintiff's case was that she permitted her sister and after her death the 1st defendant, to look after the property on her behalf. This accounted for the contact that the sister and her husband the 1st defendant had with the plaint property which is spoken to by witnesses examined for the defence. The 1st defendant when examined stated that the property given to his wife by her father under the Udampadi lies to the west of the plaint property that he is residing in a house in the property given to him orally by Pothen in the year 1082 and that property also lies to the west of the plaint property. The inference is that the property that he says he got in the year 1082 after his marriage with Pothen's daughter in the year 1078 is the identical property which was formally made over to the 1st defendant's wife by Pothen under the Udampadi (Ext.A) in the year 1105. There is a house in it in which the 1st defendant was and is living with his family. Plaintiff was living away from the plaint property but was visiting it occasionally. Her version was accepted by the courts below and there is no reason shown why this court should interfere with the concurrent findings recorded on a question of fact. There is evidence to support it and I, therefore, confirm that conclusion and hold that the plaintiff was given the plaint property under the Udampadi (Ext. A), that she was put in possession pursuant to it and that her sister and the 1st defendant were, with the permission of the plaintiff, looking after the property with the result that their possession was merely permissive. The permissive character of possession can be inferred from the attendant circumstances even without direct evidence. If possession is found to be permissive at the inception, the possessor cannot prescribe or sustain title or any claim adversely to the grantor of the possession. Reference may be made to two Full Bench decisions of the Cochin High Court in XIV Cochin 264 and XXXVIII Cochin 96. If possession is found to be permissive at the inception, the possessor cannot prescribe or sustain title or any claim adversely to the grantor of the possession. Reference may be made to two Full Bench decisions of the Cochin High Court in XIV Cochin 264 and XXXVIII Cochin 96. In my judgment these decisions are applicable to the facts of the present case and applying them also, I find that whatever possession that the 1st defendant and his wife had, was permissive and as such for and on behalf of the plaintiff. The moment the plaintiff indicates her intention that the permissive possession should cease, the permissive possessor should desist from entering into the property and if he does not do so, his continuance would, thereafter, be wrongful and would render him liable to surrender possession with mesne profits. 4. The decree passed by the Courts below granting relief by way of a declaration of title and recovery of possession with mesne profits are, therefore, correct and are upheld and the second appeal dismissed, but without costs under the circumstances. 5. I cannot conclude this judgment without adverting to a point raised by Mr. Chacko, learned counsel for the appellants that the District Judge had not applied his mind to the case, that therefore his decree should be reversed for that sole reason, and the case remanded to him for fresh disposal. This argument was based upon the fact that the first three paragraphs of the judgment under "The plaint averments and contentions are as follows" have no relevance or relation at all to these proceedings but relate to some other litigation. They are long paragraphs containing a lot of details having nothing to do with this case. These paragraphs are unnumbered. Paragraph 2 onwards relate exclusively to the matters in question in this case and contain a consideration of the several points arising for decision, the decision thereon, and the discussion of the materials available. Learned counsel for the respondent had to admit that the aforesaid first portion had no relevancy to this case but he was not able to explain how that interloper happened to come into the judgment. Had there been no explanation available I would have had to accede to the request made by Mr. Chacko on behalf of the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent had to admit that the aforesaid first portion had no relevancy to this case but he was not able to explain how that interloper happened to come into the judgment. Had there been no explanation available I would have had to accede to the request made by Mr. Chacko on behalf of the appellant. I was, however, able to find a possible explanation from the original judgment written in the hand of the learned District Judge which was among the records sent up to this Court. In that judgment which is a manuscript of the judge, after the aforesaid sentence, i.e., The plaint averments and contentions are as follows", is seen written "Here enter paragraphs 1 to 3." The explanation that I was able to find under the aforesaid circumstances is that someone to whom the direction was given by the learned judge to enter paragraphs 1 to 3, entered paragraphs 1 to 3 not from the judgment of the Munsiff which led to the appeal but from the judgment in some other case by mistake. The judgment that was pronounced and signed is the said incomplete manuscript. The certified copy granted to the appellant and produced in this Court contains the first 3 paragraphs which are not in the original. Their source, had, therefore, to be traced. A typewritten copy containing them was also among the records. This copy also contains the signature of the judge and tallies with the certified copy granted to the appellant. The Judge would not have read this because had he read, he would have noticed the irrelevant paragraphs and deleted them. That has not been done. It is therefore clear that the copy in typescript was not read by the Judge. It follows that the complaint raised on behalf of the appellants that the judge had some other case also in mind when he decided this case has no foundation. The judge's consideration is clearly seen confined to this case. That has not been done. It is therefore clear that the copy in typescript was not read by the Judge. It follows that the complaint raised on behalf of the appellants that the judge had some other case also in mind when he decided this case has no foundation. The judge's consideration is clearly seen confined to this case. If an appellate judge does not apply his mind to the facts of the case before him, but merely records a finding confirming the conclusion reached by the Munsiff without himself bestowing any consideration thereon, it can surely be said that his is not a judgment and that notwithstanding the apparent concurrent findings which will ordinarily conclude the High Court in second appeal, it is competent for the High Court to consider the question afresh and dispose of the case as though there had been no judgment in appeal. (See Hemantha v. Jagadindra 16 MLJ 272 PC and 34 Cochin 39). This would be the position if the judge does not consider the case on hand but considers some other case or gets himself confused by considering along with the case on hand the facts of another case which are irrelevant. Mr. Chacko appeared to be satisfied with the aforesaid explanation after examining the various papers and did not thereafter press his point that the District Judge had not applied his mind to the case. 6. It was not proper for the learned judge to have given the direction to extract paragraphs 1 to 3 and to have left the matter there without satisfying himself that the direction has been correctly complied with. It is not clear to whom the direction was given or who complied with it and when. One can understand such a direction when a draft judgment is being prepared or a judgment is dictated to a shorthand writer. Extracts from statutes or from decisions or documents would have to be made and in such cases it may not be necessary or convenient that the whole of it should be written down then and there. When the draft is completed or the transcript made with the necessary extracts, the judgment full and complete must be scrutinized, revised if necessary, and subscribed to by the Judge. Such judgment shall not afterwards be altered save as provided by S. 152 or on receive. (Vide O. XX, R. 3, Civil P.C.). When the draft is completed or the transcript made with the necessary extracts, the judgment full and complete must be scrutinized, revised if necessary, and subscribed to by the Judge. Such judgment shall not afterwards be altered save as provided by S. 152 or on receive. (Vide O. XX, R. 3, Civil P.C.). It is clear in this case that after giving the direction as aforesaid, the learned judge did not care to look into the extracts made. It is to be regretted that the learned judge did his work in this unsatisfactory and unauthorised fashion. Had he done his duty properly, this second appeal is not likely to have been filed which occasioned this trouble and waste of time for counsel and court besides waste of money to the parties. This case demonstrates one of the various elements of usefulness in reading the entire judgment while pronouncing it though it may not be obligatory to do so under the law. 7. I must also say that it is neither necessary nor proper to send the judgment or decree in original to the superior court in transmitting records for purposes of appeal, revision or other proceedings, though in the present case the existence of the original judgment among the records transmitted, has helped discovery of an error of the judge which dispelled the appellants' apprehensions regarding the propriety of the disposal of the appeal. The originals ought to be in the Court of their origin unless called for by special order or by the nature of the proceedings. Dismissed.