SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : The only point which arises for consideration in this appeal is - whether the provisions of S. 77, Indian Railways Act (9 of 1890) have been com­plied with. Though simple by itself, in the cir­cumstances of this case, it has presented some difficult and interesting facets. (2) The plaintiff who has preferred this ap­peal is a registered firm. It instituted a suit for re­covery of compensation for non-delivery of certain goods and for damage caused to others in course of transit. On 8-5-1948, 100 bales of cotton piece goods were booked from Ahmedabad to Rangapara North Railway Station in the Darrang District. The consignors and consignees were the New Swadesh Wills who endorsed the Railway invoice in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's employee, suspect­ing damages, claimed and obtained open delivery of the consignment. One of the bales was not deli­vered at all and the other 27 bales were found badly damaged on account of water stains. The Railway concerned, now represented by the defendant, accordingly granted a certificate of damages and shortage (Ex. 1) at the time of the open delivery, which was on 2-9-1948. The certi­ficate is signed by the plaintiff's agent and also by the Railway Traffic Inspector. The officer assessed damage at a sum of Rs. 4,852/-, which the plaintiff claimed in his suit along with a sum of Rs. 303/- as compensation at 12 per cent, interest on the amount for a period of six months and seven days, making a total of Rs. 5,155/-. (3) In the written statement of the defendant, which appears to have been signed by the Deputy Traffic Superintendent (Claims), various objections were taken. The service of notices under S. 77, Indian Railways Act and S. 80, Civil P. C. was denied. In any case, it was claimed that the notices were illegal and ineffective. It was stated that the damage was due to natural percolation of rain water through the normal crevices of the wagon door for which the defendant could not be held responsible, and the loss, if any, occurred under circumstances over which the defendant had no control. It was asserted that there was no negligence or carelessness or misconduct on the part of the Railway or its servants. It was asserted that there was no negligence or carelessness or misconduct on the part of the Railway or its servants. It was further alleged, in my opinion somewhat recklessly, that the con­signor had executed a Risk Note in form 'B' which absolved the defendant from all liability. Subse­quently an additional written statement was filed, under which the defendant claimed protection also under S. 80, Indian Railways Act. (4) When the suit came to trial, the defendant did not adduce any evidence and the Court rightly held that there was nothing to show that any risk note 'B' had been executed at the time the con­signment in question was booked. The liability of the Railway Company was, therefore, the liability of an ordinary bailee and it had to account for the loss and damage caused to the consignment in course of transit. The trial Court held that the loss was due to the negligence and carelessness of the Railway and decreed damages to the plaintiff in respect of the one bale which was not delivered on the basis of the certificate (Ex. 1) granted by the Railway Officer. In respect of the other 27 bales which had been damaged by water stains, the Court held that the plaintiff could not recover any compensation without showing that the requirements of S. 77, Railways Act had been fulfilled. It found that the claim, as required by S. 77, had been preferred by the plaintiff beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, dismissed the claim to that extent. The plaintiff's suit having thus substantially failed, the present appeal was filed. There is no cross-appeal by the defendant against the amount decreed to the plaintiff for the value of the bale lost and not delivered. (5) The appeal was heard on an earlier occasion when this Court, by its judgment dated 4-6-1952, directed a remand, calling for certain findings from the- trial Court before finally dispos­ing of it. There is no cross-appeal by the defendant against the amount decreed to the plaintiff for the value of the bale lost and not delivered. (5) The appeal was heard on an earlier occasion when this Court, by its judgment dated 4-6-1952, directed a remand, calling for certain findings from the- trial Court before finally dispos­ing of it. The points on which findings were call­ed are: (i) Whether there is a rule or practice of the Assam Railway Administration by which claims for shortage and damage are made to the District Traffic Superintendent of the Assam Railway, Domohoni, and arc dealt with by him either in the first instance or finally, and (ii) whether, in this case, the Manager of the Assam Railway Administration had somehow knowledge of the plaintiff's claim made against the Railway Administration within six months of the delivery of the consignment. The parties were also permitted to lead such evidence as they thought fit to enable the Court to submit its findings on those points along with the evidence adduced. This time again the plaintiff alone examined one of his witnesses, but the defendant adduce no evidence at all. The learned Subordinate Judge, in submitting his findings, points out that at plaintiff's instance certain documents, alleged to be correspondence with the Deputy Traffic Superintendent and the Chief Commercial Manager of the Railway relat­ing to the consignment in question, were called for, but nothing was produced. While commenting on this attitude of the Railway authorities, the Court proceeded to give its findings on the evi­dence before it. It held that there was no adequate evidence to show that under any rule or practice of the Assam Railway Administration, the Deputy Traffic Superintendent could deal with claims for shortage and damages. The Court did not disbelieve the evidence of Nalini Chakravarty, plaintiff's wit­ness on the point, but held that his evidence stood uncorroborated and was too slender to be ade­quate. On the other question, the Court was of the opinion that there was correspondence between the parties regarding the consignment in suit. The letter from the Deputy Chief Commercial Manager, dated 13-12-1948 (Ex. 9) showed that the Railway Administration had knowledge of the plaintiff's claim within six months of the delivery of the consignment to the plaintiff by the Rail­way, open delivery having been given on 2-9-1948. The letter from the Deputy Chief Commercial Manager, dated 13-12-1948 (Ex. 9) showed that the Railway Administration had knowledge of the plaintiff's claim within six months of the delivery of the consignment to the plaintiff by the Rail­way, open delivery having been given on 2-9-1948. These findings have not been challenged on behalf of the defendant by formal objections in writing. The plaintiff alone has contested them. (6) It is apparent from Ex. 1 and Ex. 9 that there was correspondence going on between the plaintiff and the Railway authorities about this loss suffered by the plaintiff due to non-delivery and damage to the consignments. It would be ob­viously so in view of the fact that the Traffic Ins­pector of Amingao Railway Station had already ascertained the amount of damages when giving open delivery to plaintiff's agent on 2-9-1948. which was certainly well within six months from 8-5-1948 when the consignment was first handed over for carriage by the Railway. It was suggested in the cross-examination of plaintiff's witness, Nalini Chakravarti, that none but the Deputy Chief Commercial Manager was the man authorised to receive complaints. By 'complaints' was presumably meant 'claims'. The witness denied this and stated that the Deputy Traffic Superintendent was equally authorised to receive complaints in these matters. Ho further stated that after the open delivery he preferred a claim though he had no papers except those al­ready exhibited to show this. It appears that a son of the witness is a Rail­way Officer serving in the Railway Grain Shop. Presumably this may be his source of knowledge about the authority of the Deputy Commercial Manager and the Deputy Traffic Superintendent to entertain complaints. But be that as it may, there is nothing on behalf of the defendant to contro­vert the position. The Railway Administration could have easily placed the relevant materials before the Court to show that any particular officer was alone autho­rised to entertain such claims, and that there was no such authority vested in or delegated to any one else, but this the Railway Administration has failed to do. This practice of failing to furnish the Courts the best materials for their decision cannot be too strongly disapproved. This practice of failing to furnish the Courts the best materials for their decision cannot be too strongly disapproved. It would be profitable in this connection to refer to the very pertinent observations of the Judicial Committee in - 'Murugesam Pillai v. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Samiadhi', AIR 1917 PC 6 (A) where their Lordships pointed out: "A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents or information lying by, trusting to the abstract doc­trine of the onus of proof, and failing, accordingly to furnish to the Courts the best material for its decision. With regard to third parties, this may be right enough - - they have no responsibility for the conduct of the suit; but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, in their Lordships' opinion, an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition." The papers bearing on this point as also the cor­respondence relating to the preference of claim by the plaintiff were in possession of the Railway Administration represented by die defendant and it was clearly its duty to co-operate with the Court in placing those relevant materials. This was not done in the face of the order of the Court passed at the instance of the plain­tiff asking the Railway authorities to produce all the relevant papers and correspondence which passed between the plaintiff and the Railway in connection with the claim. The best assistance to the Court would have been provided by a scrutiny of these documents, and in their absence the Court was free to conclude that if those docu­ments supported the case of the defendant, the defendant would have brought them into Court. The presumption, therefore, under these cir­cumstances must be against the defendant, and it must be reasonably assumed, as stated by the plain­tiff's witness, that the claim for damages came to the knowledge of the defendant or the Railway Administration as soon as the extent of the damages had been ascertained by the Traffic Inspector of Amingao or at any rate shortly thereafter. (7) Section 77, Railways Act merely provides that a person shall not be entitled to compensa­tion for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods delivered to be carried by the Railway un­less his claim to compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the Railway Administration within six months from the date of the delivery of the goods for carriage by the Rail­way. I have my own doubts as to whether this period of six months should be calculated from the date on which the goods were delivered to the consignee or his representative or from the date on which the goods were originally consigned to (hi- Railway. The words "for carriage by railway" may lie read as qualifying the term "goods" only, and not the date of delivery of the goods. It seems to me [more reasonable to hold that the period of limita­tion should be counted from the day when the goods were to be delivered or delivered to the consignee or his representative, and not from the date when the goods were originally consigned. There are some decisions in support of this view-point. It was, for instance, held in - 'Bala Prasad v. B. N. W. Ry. Co.', AIR 1927 Oudh 478 (2) (B) by a Division Bench that in a suit for non­ delivery of goods, time begins to run when the goods ought to be delivered, i.e. when the con­signee is entitled to open delivery. If it is held on the contrary that the limitation period should run from the date when the goods were first consigned or delivered for car­riage to the Railway, we are then reduced to the: anomalous position that in certain cases the claim under S. 77 will have to be preferred even before the goods are delivered or even before the con­signee is aware whether any loss or damage has been caused. Cases are not unknown where goods are actually delivered long after six months from the date of consignment and it is only when deli­very is taken that the consignee is made aware of any shortage in or damage to the goods. I am conscious of the fact that there are several decisions of the Courts in India which pre­fer to adopt this latter view, in spite of the diffi­culties which, at any rate, are apparent to me. I am conscious of the fact that there are several decisions of the Courts in India which pre­fer to adopt this latter view, in spite of the diffi­culties which, at any rate, are apparent to me. The Legislature, in my opinion, should consider whe­ther S. 77, Railways Act should be appropriately recast. In any case, even if this latter view is adopted, it is obvious that the claim under S. 77, Railways Act will have to be in many cases a vague and speculative claim and must 'a fortiori' include, a claim for open delivery in case the goods are suspected to have been lost or damaged in transit. I am, therefore, for the present content to adopt the line of reasoning according to which the period of six months specified in S. 77 should be calculated from the date when the goods were consigned to the railway. It must be remembered, however, that S. 77, Railways Act does not lay down any particular form in which the claim is to be made. It is true that the claim should be preferred in writing to the railway administration. The word "railway ad­ministration", as defined in S. 3(6) of the Act, in the case of a railway administered by a Govern­ment or a State, means the Manager of the Rail­way and includes the Government or the State, and under S. 140, a notice or other document re­quired or authorised by the Act to be served on a railway administration may be served, in the case of a railway administered by the Government, on the Manager. But S. 140, as it has been repeatedly held, is merely an enabling section. The object of the notice on the Manager is simply to give an opportunity to the railway ad­ministration to enquire immediately into the com­plaint. The claim may be preferred to subordinate officers also who are authorised to entertain it. There is nothing to prevent the Manager from delegating such power to any subordinate officer. The object of the notice on the Manager is simply to give an opportunity to the railway ad­ministration to enquire immediately into the com­plaint. The claim may be preferred to subordinate officers also who are authorised to entertain it. There is nothing to prevent the Manager from delegating such power to any subordinate officer. This was the view expressed in a Full Bench decision of the Patna Hign Court in - 'Governor General in Council v. Gouri Shankar Mills Ltd.', AIR 1949 Pat 347 (C) where it was pointed out that the requirements of S. 77 read with S. 140 are satisfied by serving a notice within the pre­scribed period on the Chief Commercial Manager or any other subordinate officer of a Railway Com­pany provided it is established as a fact that the Railway Company had held out a particular offi­cial as competent to deal with such claims. , In this case, as I have said, the evidence off plaintiff's witness stands unrebutted, and in the! circumstances of the case, the reasonable inference is that the claim had been communicated within the period provided by the Statute to an officer authorised .to entertain it. (8) Mr. Medhi on behalf of the respondent has sought to rely upon a letter, dated 14-6-49, addressed by the plaintiff to the Chief Administrative Officer, Assam Railway, Pandu, which pur­ports to be a notice under S. 77, Indian Railways Act. He urges that in view of the fact that this notice was addressed to the Chief Administrative Officer of the Railway much beyond the requisite period, no other officer should be deemed to have •minority to receive such a notice of claim under S. 77. This notice is exactly in the same terms as the notice under S. 80, Civil P. C. There seems to be some misconception as to the real object and significance of the claim to be preferred under S. 77, Railways Act as distinguished from a notice under S. 80, Civil P. C. Sec­tion 77 merely requires that a demand for com­pensation should be made, but it nowhere pre­scribes that the money value of the claim should be stated or that the claimant should notify that I he intends to bring an action (see, for instance, - 'Durga Prasad v. G. I. P. Railway', AIR 1924 Pat 98 (D). The letter to which Mr. The letter to which Mr. Medhi refers is more in the nature of a notice under S. 80, Civil P. C. than that of a claim as contemplated by S. 77, Railways Act, and may have been sent by way of extra precaution. The mere fact that such a notice has been sent by the plaintiff to some officer does not necessarily indicate that no other officer was authorised to entertain a claim under S. 77 of the Act, and, does not contradict the statement of the plaintiff's witness. It is also not clear from any. material placed before us that the Chief Administrative Officer alone answered to the description of the term "manager" as used in S. 3(6), Railways Act. Sec­tion 140, Railways Act was undoubtedly enacted to help claimants, and not to assist the railway administration to put up a disingenuous defence. If the notice is served within its terms, the railway has no answer. It does not matter whether any individual officer knew about it or not. It is suffi­cient compliance with S. 77 if, in fact, notice has been given to the railway administration. There are various illustrative cases where notice on certain officers has been held, in their respective circumstances, to be sufficient com­pliance with the terms of S. 77 of the Act. For instance, in - 'B. and N. W. Rly. Co. v. Kameshwar Singh', AIR 1933 Pat 45 (E) letters writ­ten by the plaintiff's Manager to the District Traffic Superintendent in regard to the claim were considered to have fulfilled the requirements of S. 77. Similarly in - 'Sristhidhar Mandal v. Gov­ernor-General in Council', AIR 1945 Cal 412 (F), notice of claim for non-delivery of goods consign­ed served on the Chief Commercial Manager who was the officer responsible for investigating claims, instead of on the General Manager, was consider­ed to be good notice to the railway under S. 77 of the Act. It was observed in the latter case that even if the notice had been served on the Gene­ral Manager, he would have, in the usual course of business, merely forwarded it to the Chief Com­mercial Manager for appropriate action, and in the circumstances it was preposterous to suggest that information of the claim to the Chief Commercial Manager was insufficient compliance with the law. The Full Bench decision in - 'Devi Ditta Mai v. Secretary of State', AIR 1926 Lah 253 (FB) (G) illustrates the same view-point. There the notice under S. 77, Railways Act was served on the Traffic Manager (Claims) and it was held, in the circumstances, to be valid notice. The deci­sions in AIR 1926 Lah 253 (FB) (G) and - 'Mahadeva Ayyar v. South Indian Railway Co.", AIR 1922 Mad 362 (FB) (H) lead to the same con­clusion. I am inclined to agree with the principle un­derlying these decisions. To give any other strin­gent interpretation to S. 77 of the Act would IK to defeat the very wholesome purpose which it i-intended to serve and encourage dishonest plea' so as to throttle just claims on purely technical considerations. In - 'Shamsul Huq v. Secretary of State', AIR 1930 Cal 332 (I) Lort Williams J. pointed out that the object of S. 77 is to prevent stale and possibly dishonest claims for loss, when owing to delay it might be impossible to trace the transac­tion, and that it was intended as a weapon of de­fence against fraud, - not as a means to enable the Railway authorities to deprive their customers of their just dues. I, therefore, hold that the Railway Administra­tion concerned had notice of the claim within six months of the date of delivery of the consign­ment to the Railway and that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of S. 77, Rail­ways Act. (9) The genuineness of the certificate of damages and shortage, dated 2-9-48, (Ex. 1), is not disputed. The certificate is signed by the plaintiff as also the Traffic Inspector, Amingao, who assessed the money value of the damages caused to the plaintiff on account of non-delivery of one bale of piece-goods and the damage cause by water stains to the other 27 bales. This was in pursuance of the order (vide Ex. 2) passed by the District Traffic Superintendent on the letter of the plaintiff, dated 22-8-48, for grant of open deli­very. This letter, as I have said, could have been produced by the Railway authorities, as required by the Court, but was not produced. This was in pursuance of the order (vide Ex. 2) passed by the District Traffic Superintendent on the letter of the plaintiff, dated 22-8-48, for grant of open deli­very. This letter, as I have said, could have been produced by the Railway authorities, as required by the Court, but was not produced. I have already held that if the period of limitation is to be counted from the date when the consignment was delivered for carriage by the railway, then there is no reason why even a letter for open delivery of the goods based on suspicion of shortage damages cannot be regarded as preference of a claim within the meaning of S. 77. But Mr. Lahiri on behalf of the appellant has further urged that in view of the fact that the loss and shortage has been admitted, and not dis­puted, by the Railway authorities, it should be held that the requirements of S. 77 of the Act have been waived by the defendant. The principle is well settled that when certain duties or conditions are imposed by a statute, when those duties or conditions are not conditions! precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction, they are subject to the maxim 'lex non cogit ad impossibiliai aut inutilia'. They are understood as dispensing; with the performance of what is prescribed when performance of it is idle or impossible. As Maxwell puts it, "In such cases, the provision or condition is dispensed with when compliance is impossible in the nature of things. It would seem to be some­times equally so where compliance was, though not impossible in this sense, yet impracticable, without any default on the part of the person or whom the duty was thrown." It is rightly argued that the loss, and damage in the present case being admitted, it would not have served any practical purpose to have sent a fresh notice thereof to the Railway. In the present case, the Railway authorities had taken notice of the plaintiff's claim and sent an Inspector to investigate the claim and asses, the damages. It was, therefore, futile for the plain­tiff to send any further notice of the claim to the railway authorities who were estopped in consequence from pleading absence of notice as a bar to the plaintiff's suit. It was, therefore, futile for the plain­tiff to send any further notice of the claim to the railway authorities who were estopped in consequence from pleading absence of notice as a bar to the plaintiff's suit. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon several decisions, to some of which I may briefly refer. These decisions are -mostly by single Judges, but, in my opinion, the principles laid down therein, if I may say so with respect, appear to be well founded. I may refer at the outset to a decision of Bhide J. in - - 'Dhanpat Mai Lablia Mai v. Agent, H. B. and C. I. Rly. Co., Bombay', AIR 1928 Lah 43S (J). In that case, the plaintiff sued jointly two railway companies, one of them being the B. B. and C. I. Railway. The plaintiff had failed to prove that he gave any notice to this Railway, as required by S. 77, Railways Act. This fact was not disputed before Bhide J. It appears, however, that some notice was sent to the N. W. Railway which had been forwarded by them to the B. B. and C. I. Railway, and thereafter this railway made enquiries into the matter and sent a reply to the plaintiff's counsel admitting that the loss took place on their line, but repudiating their liability «n the basis of some risk-note. It was held in those circumstances that when the B. B. and C. I. Railway had taken notice of the plaintiff's claim and made enquiries and sent him a definite reply repudiating their liability, it would have been futile for the plaintiff to send any separate notice to them. For these reasons, the learned Judge thought that the railway was estopped from pleading absence of notice as a bar to the plaintiff's suit. The decision of Lort Williams J., in AIR 1930 Cal 332 (I), to which I have already referred, is to the same effect. There the learned Judge held, in view of certain letters which had passed be­tween the plaintiff and certain officials of the rail­way, that there was clear evidence that there was waiver of any such requirement as contemplated by S. 77, and that no further notice under that section was necessary. There the learned Judge held, in view of certain letters which had passed be­tween the plaintiff and certain officials of the rail­way, that there was clear evidence that there was waiver of any such requirement as contemplated by S. 77, and that no further notice under that section was necessary. It may be, however, urged that the above remarks by the learned Judge were to some ex­tent obiter, because, on facts, he also found that S. 77 had no application to the case as it was a case of unlawful detention or conversion of the goods; but otherwise the remarks are quite un­exceptionable. Niyogi J. in - 'Govindlal v. Governor-General in Council', AIR 1948 Nag 17 (K) also held that ,an admission itself of the loss of the property con­signed dispenses with an enquiry into the validity or invalidity of the notice of the claim made un­der S. 77, Railways Act since that section is main­ly intended to give an opportunity to the railway •company to make satisfactory investigation. If, therefore, it were necessary for me to •hold in the circumstances of the present case, that there was no further requirement of any notice raider S. 77 of the Act and that there was estoppel against the defendant, I would have been pre­pared to do so. But I have held already that on he evidence it can be reasonably concluded that the requirements of the law have been duly ful­filled. (10) For the reasons stated above, the appeal, in my opinion, should be allowed. The decree under appeal should be reversed and the plaintiff's suit decreed with costs throughout; but proportionate sum out of Rs. 303/-, the claim for interest by way of damages cannot be allowed (see - 'B. N. Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Haniji', AIR 1938 PC 57 (L)). We further direct under S. 82, C. P. C. that the amount of the decree should be paid within throe months of the date of the decree, failing which plaintiff will be entitled to interest at the usual rate of 6 per cent on the amount decreed with effect from that date. We further direct under S. 82, C. P. C. that the amount of the decree should be paid within throe months of the date of the decree, failing which plaintiff will be entitled to interest at the usual rate of 6 per cent on the amount decreed with effect from that date. (11) Before concluding, I find it necessary to observe that is a disservice to the Union of India to raise pleas in defence which cannot be sub­stantiated at all, and much of the unnecessary costs of litigation could be saved if in cases of this character the Railway authorities exercised a wise discretion in settling just claims. (12) RAM LABHAYA J. : I agree. Appeal allowed.