Judgment :- 1. This Revision petition is by the complainant in S.F.No.1101 of 1950 of the Court of the Honourary First Class Magistrate's Court, Quilon, against the acquittal of the accused by the judgment dated 27.1.1953. The complaint was filed on behalf of the Municipality of Quilon and related to the non-payment of profession tax by the Concordia Corporation Ltd., Quilon, in respect of the years 1122 and 1123. It was submitted at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he is now confining the case to the non-payment of tax in respect of the year 1122. 2. Ext. A is the notice issued by the Municipality regarding the profession tax for that year and Ext. Al is an endorsement by the accused acknowledging receipt of the notice on behalf of the Corporation. There was no response from the Corporation to the notice issued and Ext. C, the distraint warrant signed by the Municipal Commissioner, PW. 8 followed. PW. 3 was the Aminadar empowered to execute Ext. C, and Ext. D is his report of the effect that the distraint was impracticable. Thereafter PW. 8 authorised the Revenue Inspector of the Municipality by Ext. E to file a complaint under R. 31(2) of Schedule II to the Travancore District Municipalities Act, 1116 which provides that: "If for any reason the distraint or a sufficient distrant of the defaulter's property is impracticable, the executive authority may prosecute the defaulter before a Magistrate". and the prosecution was launched. 3. According to Mr. K.P. Abraham, learned counsel for the accused, who is the first counter petitioner before us, the Concordia Corporation Ltd., alone and not his client can be considered as the defaulter in respect of the profession tax claimed by the Municipality. His further position was that even if his client who was the Managing Director of the Corporation could be held liable for the tax under S. 93(1) of the Act. His further position was that even if his client who was the Managing Director of the Corporation could be held liable for the tax under S. 93(1) of the Act. "If a company or person employs a servant or agent to represent it or him for the purpose of transacting business in a Municipality, such company or person shall be deemed to transact business in the Municipality and such servant or agent shall be liable for the profession tax, in respect of the business of such company or person, whether or not such servant or agent had power to make binding contracts on behalf of such company or person". No prosecution can be launched against him until it is found that the distraint or a sufficient distraint of the first counter-petitioner's own property as distinct from that of the Corporation was found to be impracticable. 4. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether there is any liability on the part of the first counter-petitioner on the basis of S. 93(1) of the Act. Even on the assumption that he can be made liable under that sub-section there is nothing on record to show that any such attempt has been made or that it has been found that the distraint or a sufficient distraint of his own property was impracticable. 5. All proceedings till the filing of the complaint has been directed against the Corporation itself and not the first counter-petitioner. It is only on finding that the distraint or a sufficient distraint of the counter petitioner's own property was impracticable that R. 31(2) will entitle the executive authority to prosecute him before a Magistrate. No attempt to distrain any property of his has been made and there is no evidence to the effect that it has been found impracticable to distrain or sufficiently distrain his own property. On this ground by itself the acquittal of the accused is justified and this petition must fail. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged before us that even if we take the view that no prosecution against the first counter-petitioner is possible in the light of R. 31(2) which makes the impracticability of distraining his own property a condition precedent to the launching of a prosecution he can be prosecuted and found guilty as an abettor of the default of the Corporation. Neither the complaint nor the argument advanced in the Court below indicate that the Municipality had such a contention and in view of this we must decline to consider the question as to whether a conviction is possible on that basis. 7. The revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Dismissed.