Judgment :- 1. Mathai, the appellant before us was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Parur for committing the murder of his elder brother Varkki and sentenced to be transported for life. The prosecution alleged that on the evening of 18.5.1953, the appellant paid a visit to his elder brother, the deceased and that at about 8.30 P.M. while Varkki was sleeping in the southern room of his house the appellant, who was seated on the verandah, got into the room and caused 2 stab-wounds to Varkki on the abdominal region and that as a result thereof Varkki died immediately. To prove the commission of the crime by the appellant the prosecution relied upon: I. The direct evidence of the deceased's wife (P.W. 2) and of his 2 daughters (P.Ws.1 and 3), II. The extra judicial confessions the appellant is alleged to have made to P.Ws. 6, 7 and 8 who took him to a nearby police Out-post immediately after the commission of the crime and III. A confession which the accused made to P.W. 17, the First Class Magistrate of Moovattupuzha. The prosecution also led evidence to show that the appellant was under a strong belief that Varkki brought mis-fortune after mis-fortune upon the appellant and his family by witchcraft. The appellant and his brother were Pulayas who got themselves converted as Christians. It would appear that the appellant lost 7 children and that on the date of the occurrence his 8th child and his wife were seriously ill. On account of their illness, earlier that day, the appellant had sent them to the wife's elder sister's place. What the prosecution suggested was that on account of his belief that the deceased was responsible for all the ills of the family, the appellant went over to the deceased's house on the day of the occurrence, deliberately inflicted injuries on Varkki with a pen-knife and that as a result of that the latter died. 2. In his statement before the learned Sessions Judge and in the memorandum of appeal preferred before this Court the appellant did not deny that his brother Varkki died as a result of the injuries inflicted by him. 2. In his statement before the learned Sessions Judge and in the memorandum of appeal preferred before this Court the appellant did not deny that his brother Varkki died as a result of the injuries inflicted by him. His case however was that Varkki had invited him to his place and that after he went there an altercation took place between them as to whether the appellant had told some people that Varkki was practising witchcraft on the appellant's family and that that was responsible for all the calamities that had befallen to him. According to the appellant during that altercation Varkki gave him a kick as a result of which he fell down. Before he could get up Varkki caught hold of the appellant's private parts and pressed hard on his testacles. In his agony and with a view to get rid of Varkki's hold on the private parts he gave him a stab with a pen-knife. This, in brief, is the defence version of the occurrence. 3. That Varkki died as a result of the injuries sustained to his abdominal region admits of no doubt on the evidence in the case. The post-mortem certificate shows that he sustained 2 injuries in the abdominal region and that through both of them the intestines had come out. One injury was to the left of the umbilicus and the other, one inch above it. Medical evidence in the case is definite that Varkki died as a result of these injuries. 4. The eye-witnesses to the occurrence viz., P.Ws.1 to 3 have given evidence in terms of the prosecution case that the appellant inflicted the wounds after Varkki had gone to sleep. The witnesses were in the adjoining room when the appellant got into the southern room of the house and stabbed Varkki. There was no partition wall between the 2 rooms but only some wooden bars. There was a lamp burning there and the witnesses were then preparing their bed. They did not speak of any altercation or scuffle between the brothers. They raised loud cries that Varkki got wounded at the hands of the appellant and that attracted the attention of some neighbours of whom P.W. 4 was one. There was a lamp burning there and the witnesses were then preparing their bed. They did not speak of any altercation or scuffle between the brothers. They raised loud cries that Varkki got wounded at the hands of the appellant and that attracted the attention of some neighbours of whom P.W. 4 was one. That witness speaks only of the cries of the women-folk from the house and not of any cries from the appellant as the result of any violence caused to him by Varkki. 5. The evidence of P.Ws. 6, 7 and 8 shows that immediately after the occurrence the appellant went to P.W. 6, and told him of what had happened to Varkki. P.W.7 soon joined them and to him also the appellant admitted that he had stabbed Varkki. The three together proceeded to the Pothanikaud Police Out-post and on the way stepped into the house of P.W. 8 and made him also to accompany them to the out-post. That witness viz., P.W. 8 gave evidence that the accused admitted to him of having stabbed his elder brother. To none of them had he made any mention about the altercation or the scuffle or made any suggestion that he stabbed his brother in self-defence. 6. Equally silent is the judicial confession made to P.W. 17 about the defence case of Varkki being stabbed in the exercise of the right of private defence. The learned judge has chosen to place full reliance on the confession holding it to be both voluntary and true. In the light of the conduct of the appellant after the occurrence confessing his criminal act to P.Ws. 6, 7 and 8, his surrender at the Police Out-post and the production of the blood-stained knife before the police, we see no reason to take a different view of the truth and the voluntariness of the confession. Even without that the direct evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and the extra judicial confession to P.Ws. 6 to 8 are more than ample to bring home the guilt to the appellant. 7. We cannot therefore on the evidence and the circumstances of the case take a different view as to the accused's guilt than what the learned judge below has arrived at. It is unnecessary in the nature of the case to deal with the evidence at greater length. 7. We cannot therefore on the evidence and the circumstances of the case take a different view as to the accused's guilt than what the learned judge below has arrived at. It is unnecessary in the nature of the case to deal with the evidence at greater length. Even the evidence of the appellant's wife shows that the appellant was under the belief that the practice of witchcraft by Varkki was responsible for all their illness. 8. Counsel for the defence, however, invited our attention to the method of examination of the accused under S. 342, Criminal Procedure Code, adopted by the learned Sessions Judge and pointed out that it was inquisitorial intended to elicit incriminatory answers from the appellant. It is well settled that the object of the examination of an accused person under the said provision is to afford him a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. Reading the record of the appellant's examination by the learned judge, we are not prepared to say the learned judge did not afford the appellant the opportunity to explain the circumstances that appear against him in the evidence on record. His attention was invited to the direct evidence of the 3 eye-witnesses, to the evidence of P.Ws. 6 to 8 about the incriminatory statements made by him to them and to the confession before the Magistrate. We cannot, however, help agreeing with Counsel's criticism that the learned judge's examination went beyond all permissible limits. The examination followed the manner of cross-examination of an adverse witness by Counsel. Before inviting his attention to the evidence and circumstances appearing against him the learned judge started the examination by seeking to obtain confirmation or denial from the appellant of the crucial facts of the case. The power of the Court to examine the accused persons should be used to ascertain from him how he may explain the evidence appearing against him and not to drive him to make self-criminatory statements nor for the inquisitorial purpose of making him confess his guilt or assist the prosecution by admitting facts which may go to criminate him. Time and again courts have condemned such method of examination of an accused person as transgressing the provision in S. 342. Time and again courts have condemned such method of examination of an accused person as transgressing the provision in S. 342. It is no doubt not easy to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what questions should be put in any particular case, but if courts conduct the examination bearing in mind the object of the section that the examination contemplated by the section is not to fill up the gaps in the prosecution case and that questions are not to be put so as to embarrass an accused person as to compel him to admit or deny every fact proved against him, they, Le, the Courts will be well within the law. 9. We hold, therefore, that the criticism of the defence against the method of examination of the appellant by the learned judge below is well founded. We are, however, not persuaded to agree with counsel that such examination has caused any prejudice to the appellant. Though he must have had a really trying time he made no incriminating answer and after the inquisitorial questions were over he was given the opportunity to say what he had to say about the circumstances appearing on the evidence against him. Answers elicited by the searching questions put to him have not a single instance been used against him. In the circumstances we do not consider that we should direct a retrial after quashing the conviction and the sentence. The appeal fails on the merits and we dismiss it. Order accordingly. Dismissed.