JUDGMENT : P. Misra, J. - The Petitioner has been convicted u/s 100(91) of Orissa Act XXXIV of 1947 and sentenced to pay a fine of Re. 20/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one week. His appeal to the learned sessions Judge, Cuttack was dismissed summarily, and hence he has come up in revision to this Court. 2. The Petitioner was the owner of a Rice Mill at Bayree. He was prosecuted by the District Board for running the mill without taking a Licence in contravention of the notification published in the Orissa Gazette dated 10-9-1949. 3. The case of the District Board who are the complainant in this case is set out In the prosecution report. It is stated therein that after the passing of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self Government (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1947, the District Board adopted a resolution notifying the local limits to which the Act should be applicable, and notice were published in the Newspapers informing the public to take out necessary Licences from the Board for the purpose of carrying on the trade and business specified in Section 100-A(1) or the said Act, that although the accused had been carrying on the trade and business in rice milling, he had not taken out the necessary Licence, nor had he deposited the Licence fee of Rs. 500/- and accordingly he was liable to be prosecuted u/s 100-A(1) of the said Act. 4. The main defence of the accused was that as the District Board demanded a fee of Rs. 500/- per annum from the accused in contravention of Clause (2) of Article 276 of the Constitution of India, the accused was not bound to take out a licence from the District Board. 5. The learned Munsif-Magistrate adopted a peculiar reasoning. He held that to pay the fees and to take the Licence were two separate things. So it can be said that the accused was not bound to take the Licence from the authorities by paying such a high rate. It is difficult to understand this reasoning. The payment of the Licence Fee of Rs. 500/- was a condition precedent to the grant of the Licence and if the condition precedent was illegal and ultra vires it follows that the accused was justified in not taking out a license. 6. Mr. It is difficult to understand this reasoning. The payment of the Licence Fee of Rs. 500/- was a condition precedent to the grant of the Licence and if the condition precedent was illegal and ultra vires it follows that the accused was justified in not taking out a license. 6. Mr. S.K. Ray, learned Counsel for the District Board contends, as he contended in Criminal Revision No. 218 of 1953, in which we have just now delivered the judgment, that the Licence fee is not a tax on trade and as such is not hit by Article 276 of the Constitution. Mr. Ray?s contention is that the State Legislature has plenary powers to levy tax on trade, profession, calling or employment and that power cannot be curtailed by Article 276 or by the corresponding section of the earlier Government of India Act, 1935. He relies upon the opening words of Article 276 and argues that in order to attract the provisions of Article 276 the impugned tax must be a tax on income. With great respect, I have failed to follow this argument. The power to levy tax on trade, profession, calling or employment has been given to the State Legislatures, but the power to levy tax on income is a Union Subject. It is to avoid any argument that a tax on trade, profession, calling or employment may be treated as a tax on Income and so the power of the State Legislature may be questioned on that ground, that this section, in my opinion, was introduced into the Constitution. A tax on profession, trade, calling or employment may be a tax on income, but nevertheless to the extent of the limit permitted by Clause (2) of Article 276 the State Legislatures have been authorised to levy taxes on them. As I have pointed out in the Judgment in Criminal Revision No. 218 of 1953, the Licence Fee in such cases really amounts to a tax. The Constitution no doubt authorises every State Legislature to levy fee in respects of the subjects which are within its jurisdiction by virtue of list II, but these fees must be fees in the strict sense of the term. If in the garb of levying fees a tax is sought to be imposed such a tax must necessarily be subject to the limitations imposed by the Article 276 of the Constitution. 7. If in the garb of levying fees a tax is sought to be imposed such a tax must necessarily be subject to the limitations imposed by the Article 276 of the Constitution. 7. From the evidence of P.W. No. 1 it appears that in the present case the rates of Licence fees were notified by the District Board in the Orissa Gazette dated 9-9-1949. At that time the Government of India Act 1935 was in force. The Government of India Act, 1935 contained Section 142-A corresponding to Article 276 of the present Constitution and according to Clause (2) of that section the total amount payable as tax on professions, trades, calling and employment should not exceed Rs. 50/- per annum. Therefore, the demand for Rs. 500/- per annum as Licence fees from the Petitioner was illegal, and the Petitioner was justified in refusing to pay the said fee. 8. In the result, I would allow this revision petition, set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the Petitioner u/s 100-A(1) of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self Government (Orissa Amendment) Act 1947 and acquit him. The fine, if paid shall be refunded. Mohapatra, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Allowed