JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - This is an application in revision which was originally filed by the Chairman, District Board, Cuttack, against the order of Sri K.V.K. Rao, Magistrate, 1st Class, acquitting the accused-opposite party of an offence u/s 100-A(1) and (2) of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self Government (Orissa Amendment) Act 34 of 1947. 2. The employer of the accused, a firm known as Kesharichand Ghewarchand had a godown for storage and sale of jute at three places viz. Danpur) Kendupatna and Marshaghai in the subdivision of Kendrapara. The accused-opposite party Paramananda Rath was the manager of the firm. The firm had taken out a licence for the purposes of carrying on trades and business specified in Section 100-A(1) of the Act which expired on 31-3-51. Thereafter, it appears the firm did not take out any licence. 3. It may be noted that the Bihar and Orissa Local Self-Government (Orissa Amendment) Act 34 of 1947, introduced a new chapter headed as "Chapter I-A" to the original Act. The description of the chapter is "Powers of District Boards in respect of Industries and Factories". Section 100-A which was added to the original Act by Section 2 of the Amendment Act authorised the District Boards to notify that no place within such local limits as may be fixed by it shall be used without a licence granted by the Chairman of such Board and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such licence for anyone or more of the following purposes. In the instant case we are concerned with Clause (q) of Section 100-A(1) which runs as follows "selling timber or storing it for sale, storing or selling coal, storing hay, straw wood, thatching grass, jute or other dangerously inflammable materials." Sub-section (7) of Section 100-A of the said Act prescribes that- "A District Board may, subject to a maximum to be fixed by the Provincial Government, levy a fee in respect of any such licence and the renewal thereof and may impose such conditions and restrictions upon the grant of such licence as it may think necessary." It appears that there was a notification No. 36 - L.S.G. dated 5-1-49 issued by the Government of Orissa, fixing the maximum licence fees in respect of jute as follows Rs 5/- for 100 bales, Rs. 10/- for 500 bales, and Rs. 25/- over 500 bales, vide Ext. 8. 10/- for 500 bales, and Rs. 25/- over 500 bales, vide Ext. 8. Subsequently, it appears there was a notification No. 3135- L.S.G. dated 25-4-51 fixing the maximum licence fee for jute at one anna per maund. The District Board adopted this rate of licence fee at its meeting dated 28-7-51, and published a notice in the Samaj dated 8-8-51 to the effect that licence fee for jute would be realised at the said rate with effect from 1-4-51. The accused opposite-party did not agree to pay the licence fee at the new rate and did not take out a licence after the expiry of his previous licence on 31-3-51. In a letter, Ext-5 dated 10-9-52 the advocate for the firm Kesharichand and Ghewarchand said that his client was not liable to pay the licence fee at more than Rs. 250/- per year, as the demand for licence fee at the new rate was hit by Article 276 of the Constitution of India. He made it clear that the firm was prepared to take out a licence but the demand of the licence fee at one anna per maund of jute was illegal and contrary to the Constitution. Thereupon the Chairman of the District Board passed an order sanctioning the prosecution of the accused. 4. The learned Magistrate who tried the case came to the conclusion that the licence fee at the rate of one anna per maund of jute per annum was a tax, and was therefore hit by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. As the payment of the licence fee was a condition precedent to the grant of the licence, the learned Magistrate held that the accused was justified in not taking out a licence by agreeing to the payment of the illegal demand made on behalf of the District Board at a rate not sanctioned by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The Magistrate further pointed out that accused-firm was all along ready and willing to take out a licence on payment of the maximum fee of Rs. 250/-sanctioned by the Constitution under Article 276(2). In this view of the matter, the learned Magistrate held that the accused did not commit any offence by refusing to take the licence under the circumstances of the case and as such he acquitted the accused. 5. 250/-sanctioned by the Constitution under Article 276(2). In this view of the matter, the learned Magistrate held that the accused did not commit any offence by refusing to take the licence under the circumstances of the case and as such he acquitted the accused. 5. The present revision was filed on behalf of the District Board against the order of acquittal. Mr. S.K. Ray, learned Counsel for the District Board, has urged that the demand of an ann a per maund of jute per annum was a fee and not a tax, and therefore, the provisions of Article 276 were not attracted. He has further contended that the licence fee in the present case cannot be said to be a tax on any trade, calling or employment, as contemplated in Article 276, in as much as licence in the case of jute is issued only for storing and not for selling jute. According to his contention even a private individual who stores jute for his own private use is liable to take out a licence. That being so, his contention is that even if it be held that the licence fee in this case amounts to a tax, it is not a tax on any trade, profession, calling or employment, and as such it is not hit by Article 276 of the Constitution. He has cited a number of decisions in support of his contention, that the licence fee in the present case is a fee and not a tax. He has drawn our attention to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt., and Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another Vs. The State of Orissa and Another, in which the matter was discussed at great length and the distinction between a 'tax' and a 'fee' was pointed out. 6. In my opinion, it is not necessary to go into the subtle questions of law raised by Mr. S.K. Ray in this case. Although Mr. The State of Orissa and Another, in which the matter was discussed at great length and the distinction between a 'tax' and a 'fee' was pointed out. 6. In my opinion, it is not necessary to go into the subtle questions of law raised by Mr. S.K. Ray in this case. Although Mr. Ray has tried to make out a point at the hearing of this revision that the licence fee in the present case was a fee for storing jute only and not for selling it, and as such Article 276 is not infringed, the matter has to be looked into from the point of view as to how the prosecution was originally started. Mr. Mohapatra for the opposite party has pressed before us that the prosecution report on the basis of which cognizance was taken in this case states as follows That after the passing of the Local Self Government (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1947, (Orissa Act 34 of 1947), the District Board of Cuttack, adopted a resolution notifying the local limits to which the act shall be applicable. That accordingly notices were published in the news papers informing the people to take out necessary licence from the Board for the purpose of carrying on trades and business specified in Section 100-A(1) of the said Act. That although the accused named above has been carrying on the trades and business as specified in the subjoined schedule within the aforesaid local limits, he has not yet taken out the licence nor has he deposited the licence fees fixed by the Board in spite of repeated notices and demands from the Board for the years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53." In the schedule as against the heading the name of the trade and business, it is stated 'storing and selling of jute'. In the notice which was published for information of the general public, it was stated that "the District Board will realise with effect from 1st April, 1951, licence fee at the following maximum rates as sanctioned by the Government of Orissa in Notification No. 3135 L.S.G. dated 25-4-51, for places of storage or selling explosive and combustible materials such as jute, hemp and cotton. 7. P.W. 1 who was the clerk of the District Board said that the accused was the General Manager of Kesharichand Ghewarchand, and that they store jute and sell it. 7. P.W. 1 who was the clerk of the District Board said that the accused was the General Manager of Kesharichand Ghewarchand, and that they store jute and sell it. From all these documents and the deposition of P.W. 1 it is clear that it was the case of the District Board that the accused as the Manager of the Firm Kesharichand Ghewarchand was carrying on the trade or business of selling jute without a licence and without depositing the licence fee. Therefore, the learned Magistrate rightly held in my opinion that the District Board prosecuted the accused for carrying the trade in jute without taking out a licence and without payment of the licence fee. Section 100-A(1)(q) of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self Government (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1947, does not authorise the District Board to demand that a trader in jute should take out a licence on payment of licence fee. It simply authorises the District Board to grant licence for storing jute. As I have pointed out, in the present case the District Board demanded licence fee for carrying on trade in Jute. That is made further clear by the fact that from time to time they demanded purchase statements from the dealers in jute. One such statement has been filed in the present case by the prosecution which is Ext. 9. That shows the quantity of jute in which they were carrying on the trade in different quarters of the year. Apparently it is on the basis of such statements that the District Board fixes the licence fee payable by the dealers in jute. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case the demand of the licence fee was a demand for taking out a licence for carrying on the trade in jute, which, as I have held the District Board was not authorised to do, and as such the prosecution was not competent. 8. If we were called upon to decide the question whether the licence fee at one anna per maund of jute per annum was a fee or a tax, we would hold, following the decision of the Supreme Court in S.C.R. (1954) 1005 and 1046, that the licence fee in the present case amounts to a tax. 8. If we were called upon to decide the question whether the licence fee at one anna per maund of jute per annum was a fee or a tax, we would hold, following the decision of the Supreme Court in S.C.R. (1954) 1005 and 1046, that the licence fee in the present case amounts to a tax. It is admitted in the present case that the licence fee goes to the general District Fund which is meant to benefit the subjects of the District in general and is not meant only for benefiting those persons from whom the revenue of the District is realised. As pointed out by his Lordship Mukherjea, J in the above case "a fee may generaly be defined as a charge for a special service rendered to individual by some governmental agency". The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases such expenses are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay." It is clear that the licence fee derived from the issue of licences to persons storing jute is not utilised for the benefit of such persons only. As I have said, the entire fee goes to the District Fund which is meant for the benefit of the entire community of the District. In that view of the matter, if it be a tax, it would be hit by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. 9. This is a revision against an order of acquittal. I see no cogent and compelling reasons to interfere with the order. On the other hand, as I have pointed out, the prosecution was rather incompetent, for, the District Board had no authority under the Act to demand a licence for carrying on trade in view of Section 100-A(1)(q) of Act 34 of 1947. I would, therefore, dismiss this revision petition and uphold the order of acquittal. Mohapatra, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed