Judgment :- 1. The decree-holder in O.S. No. 71 of 1123 on the file of the Anjikaimal District Court is the appellant. The decree allows him to recover the plaint items from the defendants on payment to them of the amount fixed as the value of the improvements effected on the properties. Past and future mesne profits have also been decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The decree was confirmed by this Court in A.S. No. 852 of 1951 subject to the modification that the amount decreed as past mesne profits was limited to such mesne profits due for a period of 3 years prior to the date of the suit. When the decree holder applied for being put in possession of the properties as per the terms of the decree, the first defendant objected by contending that the value of all the items of improvements now found on the properties should be ascertained and fixed and that only on payment of the entire amount due to him on that account he can be deprived of the possession of the properties. He put in a separate petition for the issue of a commission to fix the value of the improvements specified by him. The lower court accepted the contentions of the 1st defendant and ordered the issue of a commission as prayed for by him. The present appeal is directed against that order. 2. The points urged on behalf of the appellant are: (1) that the decree in the case was passed on the basis that the defendants are persons in wrongful possession of properties belonging to the plaintiff and that as such defendants cannot be deemed to be tenants entitled to the benefits conferred by the Cochin Tenancy Act, Act XV of 1113, (2) that even if the Tenancy Act is held applicable to this case, the 1st defendant's claim to have a fresh assessment of the value of improvements effected in the properties prior to the date of the decree of the trial court cannot be entertained; at best he could only claim a revaluation of such improvements on the ground that there has been substantial change in the conditions of such improvements. He could also claim the value of the improvements effected subsequent to the date of the decree, and (3) that the investigation into the claims put forward by the 1st defendant cannot be a bar to the delivery of properties to the decree-holder. 3. Before proceeding to consider the points urged on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to state the circumstances under which the 1st defendant obtained possession of the plaint items. The properties originally belonged to a tarwad known by the name of Pavampayil. From this tarwad the 1st defendant and others had obtained these properties on lease. In such a situation the Pavampayil tarwad mortgaged these items to the V.T.K. Estate in the year 1095. The 1st defendant and others who were already lessees of the properties attorned to the mortgagee Estate and entered into a fresh lease arrangement with the Estate in the year 1116. Three years later, the present plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption of the properties from the Pavampayil tarwad and redeemed the mortgage in favour of the V.T.K. Estate. All the same the plaintiff could not obtain possession of the properties from the lessees. Hence it was that he instituted the present suit on the strength of his title to the properties and on the basis that the lease granted by the mortgagee was determined with the redemption of the mortgage. Even though the defendants resisted the suit, their contentions were repelled except in the respect of the claim for value of improvements effected in the plaint properties, and a decree for eviction was passed against them. 4. The first point urged on behalf of the appellant, viz., that the defendants are not entitled to claim the benefits of the Cochin Tenancy Act, has to be examined the light of the facts already stated. Since the lease in favour of the 1st defendant and others was determined with the redemption of the mortgage in favour of the lessor, it is contended that these lessees had ceased to be tenants as early as in the year 1119 and that the properties in their possession could not thereafter be deemed to be a holding as defined in the Tenancy Act. The comprehensive nature of the word "tenant" as given in Cl. (o) of S. 2 of the Tenancy Act is sufficient in itself to show that there is little substance in these contentions. The comprehensive nature of the word "tenant" as given in Cl. (o) of S. 2 of the Tenancy Act is sufficient in itself to show that there is little substance in these contentions. The definition is as follows: " "Tenant', with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes a person who, as kanam-tenant, lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be kanam-tenant, lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee of land is in possession thereof or who, with the bonafide intention of attorning and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste land, but without the permission of such person brings such land under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator." The 1st defendant's possession of the properties originated as a lessee under the jenmi of the properties and later on he became a lessee under the mortgagee, and even after the redemption of the mortgage he continued to be in possession of the properties. Even if it be taken that such continuance of possession was without the permission of the plaintiff, in whom the ownership of the properties had become vested, it has to be held that the 1st defendant was continuing in possession of the properties with the bona fide intention of attorning to the plaintiff and paying the rent due to him. The determination of the lease will not ipso facto deprive the lessee of the benefits conferred by the Tenancy Act on lessees and other tenants in possession of properties. This position is made clear by S. 4 of the Tenancy Act which states that every tenant to whom compensation is due for improvements effected by him shall, notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy, be entitled to remain in possession until eviction in execution of a decree or order of Court. The only consequence of the determination of the tenancy is that the tenant thereby becomes liable to be evicted on payment of compensation due to him for the improvements effected on the properties. In view of the express provision contained in S. 4 of the Tenancy Act, it is futile to contend that the 1st defendant and others who were lessees under the mortgagee V.T.K. Estate, ceased to be tenants with the determination of their lease and that they are not entitled to the rights available under the Tenancy Act. 5. In view of the express provision contained in S. 4 of the Tenancy Act, it is futile to contend that the 1st defendant and others who were lessees under the mortgagee V.T.K. Estate, ceased to be tenants with the determination of their lease and that they are not entitled to the rights available under the Tenancy Act. 5. The second point may now be considered. The question is whether the tenant is entitled to ask for the value of any items of improvements alleged to have been effected prior to the date of the decree on the ground that those items have not been taken into account in fixing the value of improvements under the decree. When the decree directs that the tenant should surrender possession of the holding on receipt of a certain amount by way of value of improvements, the normal presumption is that all the different items of improvements then in existence have been taken into account in filing the amount of compensation. The defendant agitating that matter at the trial stage of the suit is bound to raise all points in support of the claim sought to be adjudicated by the decree. He will be deemed to have done so and the decree will conclude him in respect of all matters which might and ought to have been raised at the trial of the suit. He will not be entitled to agitate such matters at any subsequent stage. There is no provision in the Tenancy Act justifying a deviation from this general rule. On the other hand, the provisions contained in Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act are only in support of this rule. S. 4 says that every tenant shall on eviction be entitled to compensation for improvements which were made by him and his predecessors-in-interest. S. 5 states that in a suit for eviction instituted against a tenant, the Court shall ascertain the amount of compensation due to the tenant and shall pass a decree declaring the amount so due in case the plaintiff succeeds in the suit. There is nothing in these sections to indicate that some of the items of improvements may be left out for valuation at any later stage. Cl. 3 of S. 5 specifies the extent to which the claim for improvements could be agitated when the decree for eviction is sought to be enforced. There is nothing in these sections to indicate that some of the items of improvements may be left out for valuation at any later stage. Cl. 3 of S. 5 specifies the extent to which the claim for improvements could be agitated when the decree for eviction is sought to be enforced. That clause confers the jurisdiction on the execution court to determine the amount of compensation for improvements made consequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements was adjudged in the decree and also to re-value the items of improvements for which compensation was so adjudged when and in so far as such revaluation may be necessary with reference to the condition of such improvements at the time of eviction. It is significant to note that in respect of the improvements already adjudged in the decree, a re-valuation alone is permitted when justified by the conditions of such improvements, while all the items of improvements effected after the date of the decree are directed to be taken into account in fixing the additional amount of compensation to be awarded. Thus the special provision made under the Tenancy Act in respect of the items of improvements which existed at the time of the passing of the decree and the claims in respect of which are deemed to have been adjudicated under the decree, is only for a re-valuation of such items. It follows, therefore, that the 1st defendant's claim in execution has to be confined to such a re-valuation so far as the claim for compensation in respect of the items of improvements which were in existence on the date of the decree is concerned. But in respect of the improvements effected subsequent to 25.8.1951, the date on which the decree in the case was passed, the 1st defendant's claim for original valuation is proper and legitimate and has to be allowed. It may be mentioned here that the learned Advocate for the respondent 1st defendant stated that the claim for original valuation is confined to fresh items of improvements effected after 25.8.1951 and that in respect of the other items of improvements for which compensation has been fixed under the decree, a re-valuation alone is claimed by the 1st defendant. The scope of the lower court's order is thus clarified. 6. The scope of the lower court's order is thus clarified. 6. The third and the most important point raised by the appellant is that the execution Court cannot postpone delivery of the properties in favour of the decree-holder until the tenant's claim for value of improvements is finally settled. It is argued that there is no express provision in the Tenancy Act justifying a virtual stay of the execution of the decree in such a situation. No doubt there is no such express provision in the Act. All the same, it is clear that the effect of the provision contained in Cl. 3 of S. 5 read with C1.1 of S. 4, is to postpone the execution of the decree for delivery of properties until the defendant's claim for value of improvements is finally settled. S. 4 states that every tenant shall on eviction be entitled to compensation for his improvements effected on the property and that he is entitled to remain in possession until eviction in execution of a decree or order of Court. The compensation to be paid to him on eviction is not only the compensation adjudged by the decree but will also include the additional amount of compensation that may be fixed by order of the execution court under Cl. 3 of S. 5. It is also stated in that clause that when an order is passed by the executing court determining the defendant's claim for additional compensation, the decree in the case shall be varied in accordance with that order. Thus the purport of an application presented to the execution court for fixing the additional amount of compensation due to the defendant-tenant, is for a variation of the original decree in accordance with the tenor of the ultimate order that may be passed on such an application. The inevitable consequence following from such an application is a virtual stay of the execution of the decree in the case because until the exact form of the decree as varied in accordance with the order that may be passed on that application is known, the executing court will not be in a position to know the actual amount of compensation to be paid to the tenant as a condition precedent to his eviction from the property. Thus Cl. 1 of S. 4 read with Cl. Thus Cl. 1 of S. 4 read with Cl. 3 of the S. 5 of the Tenancy Act operates by implication as a statutory stay of eviction of the tenant from the holding pending adjudication by the execution court of the claim put forward by him for additional compensation as contemplated by Cl. 3 of the S. 5. The decree holder's prayer for delivery of possession of the properties even before the determination of the defendant's claim for additional compensation cannot therefore be allowed. The lower court's conclusion to that effect is right and does not call for any interference. 7. The decree-holder has claimed an alternative relief by way of appointment of a receiver to be in possession of the decree-schedule properties pending final decision of the questions raised by the defendants. Such is the relief claimed in C.M.P. 548 of 1954. The main grounds urged by the decree-holder are that the 1st defendant is committing several acts of waste in the properties and is deliberately permitting the properties to deteriorate in value and to go into ruins and that he is adopting all sorts of obstructive tactics to defeat and delay the decree-holder's right to get possession of the properties. It is further alleged that the building constructed on item 1 is unsuitable to the holding and cannot be deemed to be an improvement and that the defendant should be directed to remove the same without causing injury to the property. No doubt S. 6 of the Tenancy Act empowers the court to direct the defendant to remove the building which cannot be deemed to be an improvement for which compensation can be claimed. But any such direction can be issued only after an investigation into the nature of the improvement and after a decision whether it is suitable to the holding so that compensation can be claimed. Similarly the allegations of waste also require to be investigated. But there appears to be considerable force in the decree-holder's complaint that the defendant is adopting obstructive and delaying tactics. At the time of the passing of the decree on 25.8.1951 there was no building in the property. The basement of the building was alone in existence and compensation for the same has been awarded under the decree. But there appears to be considerable force in the decree-holder's complaint that the defendant is adopting obstructive and delaying tactics. At the time of the passing of the decree on 25.8.1951 there was no building in the property. The basement of the building was alone in existence and compensation for the same has been awarded under the decree. The defendant appears to have put up the super structure only after the decree for eviction was confirmed by this Court on 30.12.1953 as per the decision in A.S. No. 852 of 1951. When the decree-holder applied for delivery of possession of the properties, the application was opposed mainly on the ground that the defendant is entitled to get an additional amount of Rs. 20,000/- also the value of this building. Cl. 3 of S. 5 of the Tenancy Act enables the tenant to put forward claims of this kind. In fact that clause is capable of potential mischief of great magnitude. Even after a decree for eviction is passed against the tenant, it is open to him to defeat the decree-holder's attempts to get delivery of possession of the properties. The tenant has only to put forward claims for additional compensation at successive stages of execution. Such claims should be supported by allegations that he has effected additional items of improvements and that the items for which compensation has already been fixed require to be re-valued. The execution court cannot refuse to investigate into these claims. Such claims and investigations may go on indefinitely because the Tenancy Act gives no indication as to the stage at which such claims and investigations should stop so as to give effect to the decree for eviction passed in favour of the land-lord. If the defendant-tenant is mischievously inclined and is particular of retaining possession of the property, he can achieve that object by invoking the aid of CD of S. 5. The Tenancy Act purports to protect the rights of both the tenant and the land-lord, but the protection granted to the land-lord is bound to illusory in many instances in view of Cl. 3 of S. 5. The Tenancy Act purports to protect the rights of both the tenant and the land-lord, but the protection granted to the land-lord is bound to illusory in many instances in view of Cl. 3 of S. 5. If the intention of the Legislature is that the land-lord in whose favour a decree for eviction is passed should really be in a position to get the benefit of that decree by being able to recover possession of the property from the tenant within a reasonable time, Cl. 3 of S. 5 has to be suitably amended by fixing a stage in the course of the execution proceedings at which claims for additional compensation for fresh improvements effected after the decree and also for a re-valuation of the improvements already provided for in the decree should stop. If, on the other hand, the intention of the Legislature is to permit the tenant to go on effecting additional improvements even after the date of the decree for any length of time, the proper course would be to straightway confer right of permanent occupancy in favour of the tenant instead of the existing situation under which the land-lord and the tenant are both obliged to continue their litigation indefinitely. The execution proceedings in eviction decrees may never come to an end in view of the provision as it now exists in Cl. 3 of S. 5 of the Tenancy Act. If the statute is suitably amended so as to give a definiteness and certainty regarding the rights of the land-lord and the tenant, much of the fruitless fight in execution can be avoided. This is a matter for the consideration of the Legislature. As the provision stands at present, the only way in which Courts could give some sort of finality to the disputes in execution of eviction decrees, would be by taking custody of the properties and entrusting the same to a receiver. By adopting such a course the possibility of the tenant putting forward claims for new items of improvements could be obviated. After that is done, the total amount of compensation due to the tenant may be ascertained and finally fixed and on payment of the same to the tenant, the land-lord can be put in possession of the property. By adopting such a course the possibility of the tenant putting forward claims for new items of improvements could be obviated. After that is done, the total amount of compensation due to the tenant may be ascertained and finally fixed and on payment of the same to the tenant, the land-lord can be put in possession of the property. The desirability of adopting such a course will be considered by the lower court in case it is found that the present dispute is being unduly dragged on. If within a period of three months from this date, it is not made possible to finally settle the defendant's claim so as to give effect to the decree for eviction, the lower court will proceed to adopt the course indicated above. Somebody other than the contesting parties should alone be thought of for receivership. 8. Subject to the observations and directions made above, the order of the lower court is confirmed and this appeal as also C.M.P. 548/54 are dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to the costs of this appeal. Dismissed.