JUDGMENT : Panigrahi, C.J. - The Plaintiff-Appellant is the Thikadar-Lambardar of Mouza Badamula, within the Khariar Zamindari of Sambalpur District. Respondent No. 1 (Defendant No. 1) is the son of one Ramachandra Singh who was the protected Thikadar of the village till the 26th August 1937, when his protected status was forfeited by the Revenue Commissioner, Orissa. There was no reservation of occupancy rights in the Sir lands of the village, in favour of the ex- Thikadar, and the father of Respondent No. 2 (Defendant No. 2) was put in possession of the village along with all the Sir and Khudkast lands. On the 1st June 1947, Defendant No. 2, who is the present proprietor leased out the village to the Plaintiff and appointed her as the Thikadar for a period of ten years from the 1st June 1947 to the 31st June 1957, by a registered patta (Ext. 8). The Plaintiff was mutated as the Thikadar Lambardar of the village owning sixteen annas interest. Defendant No. 1 who continued to be in possession of the Sir lands did not quit possession even after he had been served with a registered notice, and hence the present suit for a ejectment of Defendant No. 1 from the Sir lands. The first Defendant raised a number of contentions, but all of them have been negatived. The only ground on which the Courts below have directed the dismissal of the Plaintiff's suit was that the registered patta (Ext. 8), relied on by her, contravened the provisions of Section 49 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1 of 1920 and that it conferred no title upon her. The Plaintiff filed a petition praying for transposing Defendant No. 2 as an additional Plaintiff and for granting a joint decree in favour of both. The Courts below held that Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC did not apply to the facts of the case and rejected her application. 2. In second appeal two points have been urged on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant. They .are firstly, whether the registered patta in favour of the Plaintiff is void and confers no title on her and secondly, whether the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 cannot, in the alternative, be granted a joint decree. 3. 2. In second appeal two points have been urged on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant. They .are firstly, whether the registered patta in favour of the Plaintiff is void and confers no title on her and secondly, whether the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 cannot, in the alternative, be granted a joint decree. 3. The Central Provinces Tenancy Act, XI of 1898 was amended in 1920 by Act 1 of 1920 by the Central Provinces Legislature when Khariar Zamindari was a part of that Province. The case is, therefore, governed by the provisions of Section 49 of Central Provinces Act I of 1920. Section 49 of this Act, which corresponds to Section 45 of the old Act, is as follows 49(1) Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, and save where sanction has been given in accordance with the provisions of this Act, a proprietor who temporarily or permanently loses, whether under a decree or order of a Civil Court or transfer or otherwise, his right to occupy any portion of his Sir lands as a proprietor, shall, at the date of such loss become an occupancy tenant of such Sir lands and any tenancy right granted by him in such Sir lands for a period exceeding five years without the sanction of the Revenue officer, shall thereupon lapse. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act 1908, no officer empowered to register documents thereunder shall admit to registration any document which purports to transfer the rights of a proprietor in his Sir land without reservation of the right of occupancy specified in Sub-section (1), or to grant tenancy rights in Sir land for a period exceeding five years or to be an agreement for such transfer or grant, unless sanction to such transfer or grant has been endorsed on the document in such manner and by such authority as may be prescribed by rules made u/s 109. (3) Nothing in this Section shall affect rights under any document duly registered before the 21st of October 1898, and on any transfer being made, decreed, or ordered in pursuance of such document, the rights of transferee to occupy and cultivate such Sir land shall accrue. (4) Nothing in this Section shall apply to land in the Sambalpur territory regarded as Bhogra in the record of rights of the Current Settlement. (4) Nothing in this Section shall apply to land in the Sambalpur territory regarded as Bhogra in the record of rights of the Current Settlement. (5) Nothing in this Section shall apply to a lease for a term not exceeding the term of settlement of a village, of any estate to which the Commissioner may declare this Sub-section applicable. (6) Nothing in this Section shall affect any loss of possession of any Sir land in the course of a partition. It will be seen that the transfer of the proprietary right of a proprietor in his Sir lands is not prohibited by this Section. Sub-section (1) merely declares that a proprietor who loses, by transfer or otherwise, his right to occupy any portion of the Sir land as proprietor shall become an occupancy tenant of such Sir land and any tenancy right granted by him without the sanction of the Revenue Officer for a period exceeding five years shall have no effect. It must particularly be noticed that the transfer affects the right to occupy the Sir lands as proprietor. Throughout, the Act makes a distinction between the right of the proprietor to occupy and the right of occupancy. The two component rights of Sir lands are (1) the proprietary right and (2) the right of occupancy. The proprietor can transfer both the rights with the sanction of the Revenue officer, in which case the transferee gets all the right formerly owned by the proprietor, but if such sanction is not obtained the transferee acquires only the proprietary right in the Sir lands. The transferor retains an occupancy right in the Sir lands by the operation of the law and the Sir plot loses that character and becomes tenancy land. The right of occupancy and the right to occupy may be vested in the same person or in different persons. Where an occupancy tenant leases out his land, his tenant gets the right to occupy, though not the right of occupancy. So it is with the proprietor who retains the proprietary right to occupy the Sir lands and lets out the right to occupy to a tenant. The Explanation in the definition Section of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act of 1917 says that "Proprietor" includes the transferee of the proprietary rights in possession and a Thikadar with protected status. So it is with the proprietor who retains the proprietary right to occupy the Sir lands and lets out the right to occupy to a tenant. The Explanation in the definition Section of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act of 1917 says that "Proprietor" includes the transferee of the proprietary rights in possession and a Thikadar with protected status. Similarly, Explanation 2 to the definition of Khudkast says that 'proprietor' includes a transferee of the proprietary rights in possession and thikadar With protected status. "Proprietary right in possession" is distinct from transfer of Sir lauds as proprietor referred to in Section 49(1). 4. Section 49 also prohibits registration of documents transferring Sir lands without the sanction of the Revenue officer. Sub-section (2) lays down that no officer empowered 'to register documents under the Indian Registration Act shall admit to registration any document which purports to transfer the right of a proprietor in his Sir land, without reservation of the right of occupancy specified in Sub-section (1). Both the Courts below have held that if there is a violation of this provision, the transaction becomes void and the transferee acquires no title or right under the deed of transfer." Here again they have failed to notice the distinction between what the law absolutely prohibits and what is imposed as a restriction on a particular officer. All that Sub-section (2) of Section 49 lays down is that the registering officer shall examine the document presented to him so that the consequences of the transfer may be brought to the notice of the parties, and that he shall not register a document which brings about a transfer in contravention of the provisions of Sub-section (1). If, however, the Registering officer bonafide believes that there is nothing in the document which transgresses the restriction imposed by Sub-section (1) and registers it, the document takes effect according to its tenor. Section 87 of the Indian Registration Act of 1908 expressly provides for a contingency of this kind and says Nothing done in good faith pursuant to this Act, or any Act, hereby, repealed by any registering officer shall be deemed invalid merely by reason of any defect in his appointment or procedure. The case of Parsaram v. Asharam ILR 1936 Nag. The case of Parsaram v. Asharam ILR 1936 Nag. 104 (P.C.) arose u/s 46(5) of the old Central Provinces Tenancy Act of 1908, which contained a similar provision relating to the transfer of the right of an occupancy tenant. There the question was whether the registration of a document which included the transfer of a right of occupancy, should be declared void and Their Lordships of the judicial Committee made the following observations But the deed in question has been registered and the point for determination is whether it should be treated as an unregistered document and excluded from consideration. The language of Sub-section (5) shows that the Registering officer i forbidden to register a document which purports to transfer the right of occupancy tenant in his holding or in any portion thereof. Does the document which includes only trees and expressly excludes the land on which the trees stand purport to transfer a right of occupancy? The Registering officer evidently thought that ex facie the instrument did not transgress the law and he did not therefore refuse to admit it to registration. He was not required to enter upon an enquiry as to whether a certain property sought to be transferred would or would not amount to an occupancy right. Such enquiry would obviously be beyond his province. His function was to peruse the instrument and to see whether it purported to make a prohibited transfer, and if he thought that it did not embody any such transfer, he was bound to admit it to registration. It is to be observed that Sub-section (5) does not determine the question of the validity or otherwise of the transaction itself. Having regard to the above observations of the Privy Council it appears to me that both the Courts below have taken an erroneous view of the patta (Ext. 8) executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of the Plaintiff. 5. We have also gone through the document and we see no recital in it to justify the finding that the proprietary right of Defendant No. 2 has been transferred, without reservation of the occupancy right in the Sir lands. The document purports to be an ordinary Thikadari patta embodying a right to collect rent. 5. We have also gone through the document and we see no recital in it to justify the finding that the proprietary right of Defendant No. 2 has been transferred, without reservation of the occupancy right in the Sir lands. The document purports to be an ordinary Thikadari patta embodying a right to collect rent. Condition 5 of the terms of the patta expressly says that the lessee shall not in any manner dispose of the Sir and Khudkast land of the village. The restraint of the power of the lessee to deal with the Sir land is couched in negative language and this has possibly misled the Courts below into thinking that there was no express reservation of the occupancy right of the proprietor. It appears to us, however, that no formal words are necessary in order that the occupancy right of the proprietor may be retained. The language of the document is wide enough to import such reservation. We are therefore of the view that the provisions of Section 49(1) have not been infringed by the patta and that the proprietor still retains the right to occupy the Sir lands as a proprietor. The position of the transferee under the deed is nothing more than that of a tenant under the proprietor of the Sir lands and this tenancy terminates on the expiry of the Tika period. But it is perhaps unnecessary to determine the status of the Plaintiff's tenancy qua status. If she is a tenant-of whatever description, and if Defendant No. 1 is a trespasser she can eject him in this suit. The first Defendant does not claim to have been put in possession by the proprietor and his possession is only that of a trespasser. The Plaintiff admittedly has been appointed Lambardar of the village and for the purpose of the Tenancy Act she is deemed to he the landlord. It is however unnecessary to define her exact status in view of the fact that the proprietor has been made a party to the suit. 6. To get over this difficulty the Plaintiff filed a petition under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and prayed for a joint decree in favour of herself and Defendant No. 2, after transposing the latter as an additional Plaintiff. 6. To get over this difficulty the Plaintiff filed a petition under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and prayed for a joint decree in favour of herself and Defendant No. 2, after transposing the latter as an additional Plaintiff. As we have pointed out already, the Courts below held that such a course was not permissible as, in their opinion the nature of the suit would be altered if Defendant No. 2 were transposed as a Plaintiff. I am unable to appreciate the reasoning of the Courts below. All the evidence necessary to be adduced for proving the forfeiture of the protected status of Defendant No. 1 has been let in. The findings of fact recorded by the Courts are in favour of the Plaintiff. They have both concurrently held that Defendant No. 1 is as mere trespasser. The only question, therefore, is whether the Plaintiff or the second Defendant is entitled to evict him. The necessary parties in whose presence such an issue could be tried are all before the Court. The second Defendant has no objection to his being transposed as a Plaintiff and a joint decree being passed in favour of both, as against Defendant No. 1. If the parties are driven to file a fresh suit the same questions of fact will have to be re-tried. It is to meet such contingencies, and to avoid multiplicity of litigations, that Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC is designed. The Privy Council has held, in similar circumstances, in Bhupendra Naryan v. Rajeswar Prasad that such a course should always be adopted in cases where it is necessary, for a complete adjudication upon the questions involved in the suit, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. See also Kishori Jena v. Rupa Jena. The rule to be adopted in such Cases is laid down in Cocherwll v. Dickens thus The rule is that if the bill contains charges putting facts in issue that are material, the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief which those facts will sustain under the general prayer. But he cannot desert the specific relief prayed and under the general prayer ask specific relief of another descriptions' unless the facts and circumstances charged by the bill will, consistently with the rules of the Court, maintain that relief. But he cannot desert the specific relief prayed and under the general prayer ask specific relief of another descriptions' unless the facts and circumstances charged by the bill will, consistently with the rules of the Court, maintain that relief. Following this rule, Jenkins, C.J. observed in Hemendra Nath v. Upendra Narayan that on occasions it may be necessary, out of a wreckage of procedure, to construct the material for a just decision. The extent to which Courts have gone in applying this rule will be seen from the decision in Surajman v. Sadanand where the suit by a person who alleged to be the real owner of a hand note was held to be maintainable as the holder of the note was a party and transposition of the holder' was allowed as the debtor was not prejudiced thereby. See also Bongi Narayan v. Bangari Gurrama. We therefore intimated to counsel, at the close of arguments, that Defendant No. 2 would be transposed as Plaintiff No. 2 in the suit and Appellant No. 2 in this Court. In view of the discussions above both the Plaintiff are entitled to a joint decree for ejectment against Defendant No. 1. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside. We directed that a decree be passed in favour of the Appellant-Plaintiff, declaring their title to the suit lands and putting No. 1 (Respondent No. 1) therefrom. In the circumstance each party will bear his own costs throughout. Narasimham, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Allowed