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1954 DIGILAW 111 (PAT)

State Of Bihar v. Sheikh Salamat

1954-09-22

SINHA, SYED NAQUI IMAM

body1954
Judgment Naqui Imam, J. 1. This is a Government appeal against the order of the learned Magistrate, Mr. J. N. Singh, acquitting the respondent, Sheikh Salamat. The respondent was charged under Section 7/8, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1940, for carrying one maund twenty seers of rice on 23-7-1952 from Ranchi district to Palainau district, in contravention of Notification No. Proc. 54/52--P. C. 14121 dated 18-6-1952, having been issued under Clause 11, Bihar Foodgrain Control Order, 1950. 2. The case of the prosecution was that, on 23-7-1952, the respondent, Sheikh Salamat, was carrying one maund twenty seers of rice, which act was in contravention of the said notification. The respondent admitted, in his statement under Sec.342, Criminal P. C., that he was carrying the rice outside the district of Ranchi, but that he did so as he did not know, that the law prohibited it. The learned Magistrate has considered the respondents case, and it appears that certain rulings were placed before him and, upon a consideration of those rulings, he was satisfied that the charge against the respondent had not been established, and thus acquitted him. The first point raised in the court below in favour of the respondent was that where there is no "mens rea there could be no criminal offence unless the statute expressly provides that want of mens rea would be no excuse. Before the learned Magistrate, the view of Orissa High Court in -- Narsingho Chaudhury v. State, AIR 1952 Orissa 214 (A) was placed. The ruling of the Orissa High Court was concerning a case under the Orissa Drugs (Control) Act, 1950. Before the learned Magistrate, the view of Orissa High Court in -- Narsingho Chaudhury v. State, AIR 1952 Orissa 214 (A) was placed. The ruling of the Orissa High Court was concerning a case under the Orissa Drugs (Control) Act, 1950. His Lordship, Panigrahi, J. observed as follows; "As has been held by the Privy Council in --Srinivas Mall V/s. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 135 (B), unless a statute expressly rules out mens rea as a necessary ingredient of the offence it must be held that a person can be deemed guilty only it it can be shown that he had the necessary criminal intention." I have the Privy Council ruling also before me, and there it was observed as follows: It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that the Court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind." 3. There is absolutely no material on the record to show that, in spite of the fact that there was no mens rea, the notification provided that the accused should be found guilty. The further point to be considered in this case is, when was the said notification published? It is true that the notification is dated 18-6-1952, but that would not necessarily be the date of its publication. Mr. Shahi, appearing for the State, could not inform us, as it is not on the record, when the notification was actually published. This question as to when the notification was published or proclaimed is of utmost importance because, if the notification was published or proclaimed after the occurrence, there could be no offence committed so far as this notification is concerned. If, however, the notification was published before the occurrence took place, then a further question would arise, how long before the occurrence? If it was published six or seven months before, then it may be reasonably argued that there was sufficient time for the accused to be aware of the provisions of the notification. If, however, the notification was published before the occurrence took place, then a further question would arise, how long before the occurrence? If it was published six or seven months before, then it may be reasonably argued that there was sufficient time for the accused to be aware of the provisions of the notification. If, however, the notification was published only just a few days before then it would be difficult to hold, unless there is definite evidence to that effect, that the accused would be aware of the provisions of the notification, and hence he would have no mens rea if he committed the act in contravention of the provisions of the notification. 4. In this connection, I would refer to a ruling of the Supreme Court in -- Harla V/s. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467 (C). It has been observed in this case as follows: "In the absence of any special law or custom, we are of opinion that it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of a state to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or, at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence........ Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential." Their Lordships, further observed: "The difference is obvious.. Acts of the British Parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the Acts are passed by the accredited representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide "publicity in papers and, now, over the wireless. Not so Royal Proclamation and Orders of a Food Controller and so forth. There must therefore be promulgation and publication in their cases. The mode of publication can vary; what is a good method in the country may not necessarily be the best in another. They also receive wide "publicity in papers and, now, over the wireless. Not so Royal Proclamation and Orders of a Food Controller and so forth. There must therefore be promulgation and publication in their cases. The mode of publication can vary; what is a good method in the country may not necessarily be the best in another. But reasonable publication of some sort there must be." So far as the evidence on the point of publication and promulgation of the notification is concerned, it is to the effect that none of the witnesses, not even those in authority, had personal knowledge about the publication of the notification. In other words there is absolutely no evidence of the fact that the said notification was ever published. Having regard to what I have said above, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the charge against the respondent has not been proved at all and that the learned Magistrate was perfectly justified in acquitting the respondent namely the accused before him. 5 In the result, this Government appeal is dismissed. The respondent will be discharged from his bail bond. Sinha, J. 6 I agree.