JUDGMENT Malik, C.J. - This appeal has been filed on behalf of the Defendants. 2. A short pedigree will help in understanding the facts of this case. Drigbijai Singh = Gajraj Kuer_______|______________________________________Mst. Ram | |Piari Saraswati Shanker Bakhsh Devi Singh | = Mahipal Singh Natha Singh | | Jagdamba Baksh Singh =Mst. Jagrani Anrudh Singh 3. Drigbijai Singh on the 13th May, 1934, executed a will as regards the property described in list A attached to the plaint. Under this will, Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh, daughter's son of Drigbijai Singh was to be the legatee. On the 22nd December, 1932, Drigbijai Singh made a gift of the property in list B to the same Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh. After the execution of the deed gift, Natha Singh filed a suit No. 11 of 1936 in the court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, on the allegation that Drigbijai Singh had been wrongly claiming the entire property detailed in the plaint as his self acquired property. That the property was in fact joint ancestral property of the joint family consisting of Drigbija Singh, Shanker Bakhsh Singh and Natha Singh, who were all coparceners, that Drigbijai Singh had without any right made a gift of the properties in list B to Defendant No. 3, Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh on the 22nd of December, 1952, and that Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh had, therefore, no right to retain possession of those properties. The relief claimed in the plaint were that it be declared that the entire property detailed in the plaint in list A was joint ancestral property of the Plaintiff Natha Singh and of Drigbijai Singh and Shankar Bakhsh Singh and that the Defendant No. 3 be dispossessed of the property given to him under the deed of gift and the possession of the property be restored to the Joint family. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The Plaintiff filed a First Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1937 in the Chief Court. During the pendency of the First Appeal Drigbijai Singh died on the 6th of May, 1939. On the 26th of July, 1939, the parties entered into a compromise. The compromise was to the effect that Thakur Drigbijai Singh, Respondent No. 1 had died on the 6th of May, 1939, leaving the Plaintiff-Appellant, Natha Singh and Respondent No. 2, Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh as his heirs. On the 26th of July, 1939, the parties entered into a compromise. The compromise was to the effect that Thakur Drigbijai Singh, Respondent No. 1 had died on the 6th of May, 1939, leaving the Plaintiff-Appellant, Natha Singh and Respondent No. 2, Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh as his heirs. That Respondent No. 3, Thakur Jagdamba Singh was claiming that the properties mentioned in lists A, B, & C. of the compromise had been alienated by Thakur Drigbijai Singh in his lifetime under certain transfers mentioned in the compromise. It was then set out that the Plaintiff's case was that the entire property was joint family property and the alienations were all void and that "to save the parties from expense in protracted litigation, the parties have settled the dispute and entered into the following arrangements". 4. The arrangement briefly was that Thakur Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh was given the property mentioned in list A of the compromise. We are told that this is the property that was included in the deed of gift dated the 22nd of December, 1932. Jagrani, wife of Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh, was made the absolute owner of the property in list B of the compromise and their son Thakur Anrudh Singh was given the property in list C of the compromise. Paragraph B of the compromise then provided that the Plaintiff Appellant, that is Natha Singh, and the Respondent No. 2, Shanker Bakhsh Singh "shall own and possess the rest of the property in suit." Thakur Natha Singh and Shanker Bakhsh Singh were made responsible for the debts of Drigbijai Singh and the parties were made liable for their own costs in both the courts. 5. This was the entire compromise and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed by the Chief Court on 28th July, 1939. 6. The parties entered into possession of the properties in accordance with the terms of this compromise but on the 8th of September, 1945, Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh went back on this compromise and claimed possession of the properties which under the compromise and the compromise decree were given to Natha Singh and Shanker Bakhsh Singh. 7. The lower appellate court has gone into an elaborate discussion as to whether this compromise operates as res judicata and has held that the compromise decree cannot be placed on a high her footing than the compromise on which it was based. 7. The lower appellate court has gone into an elaborate discussion as to whether this compromise operates as res judicata and has held that the compromise decree cannot be placed on a high her footing than the compromise on which it was based. The lower appellate court has failed to see that the Plaintiff was bound by the compromise and, unless he could make out a case entitling him to go back on the agreement which he had solemnly entered into in order to avoid further litigation, his suit could not succeed. The members of the family were all closely related to each other and rather than prolong the litigation they agreed that they would divide the property in a certain way and got a decree passed in terms of that compromise. That compromise must, therefore, be deemed to be binding as a family arrangement. Learned Counsel for the Respondent is not able to suggest any ground on which this family settlement can be brushed aside as invalid. The compromise stands in the Plaintiff's way and, unless he can say that he was not bound by it, he cannot get a decree. The learned Judge of the lower Court took a peculiar view of the case. He laid stress on the first paragraph of this compromise which provided that Natha Singh and Shanker Bakhsh Singh will never claim nor have any interest in the property mentioned in lists A, B and C of the compromise and points out that these words are absent in the second clause which reads as follows: That the Plaintiff-Appellant and Respondent No. 2 shall own and possess the rest of the property in suit. 8. To conclude from the absence of these words that Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh had reserved to himself the right to claim this property by a second suit is to our minds, with respect to the learned Judge, absured. Natha Singh and Shankar Bakhsh Singh had taken upon themselves all the liabilities of Drigbijai Singh in lieu of their getting the rest of the property which had remained undisposed of. Natha Singh and Shankar Bakhsh Singh had taken upon themselves all the liabilities of Drigbijai Singh in lieu of their getting the rest of the property which had remained undisposed of. It cannot be said that while their liability to pay the debts was absolute, their right to this property given under this compromise depended on the sweet will of Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh and they could claim to be owners only so long as Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh did not claim possession of the properties under the will. The other reason given by the learned Judge, with great respect to him, appears to us also to be absured. He has said the rights of the parties must be determined with (sic) be position on the date when the suit was filed in 1936. At that time Drigbijai Singh was no doubt alive and the learned Judge was right that the question of the validity of the will and the rights of the legatees under that will had not arisen. But the fact remains that the Plaintiff claimed that the entire property was joint family property and that Drigbijai Singh had no right to claim that it was his separate property and if that declaration had been granted, the necessary consequence would have been that the will would have been deemed to be invalid and inoperative, on the date, however, when the compromise was entered into. Drigbijai Singh had already died and the question had arisen as to who was to get possession of the property and if the parties who were all majors, decided to divide the property rather then take the risk of further litigation, there is no reason for holding that this compromise was not binding merely because on the date when the suit was filed, Drigbijai Singh was alive. 9. Even the properties which were given to Jagdamba Bakhsh Singh, Jagrani and Anrudh Singh were included in the will and if this compromise is to be interpreted to exclude the consideration of the validity of the will then it becomes meaningless as all the terms of the compromise become open to challenge. In any view of the case, the Plaintiff cannot be said to have had any right to file a suit. The compromise and the compromise decree were binding on him. The Plaintiff's suit must, therefore, fail and be dismissed. 10. In any view of the case, the Plaintiff cannot be said to have had any right to file a suit. The compromise and the compromise decree were binding on him. The Plaintiff's suit must, therefore, fail and be dismissed. 10. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored. The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal but the Defendants will be entitled to their costs of the lower courts. 11. As the appeal has been decided, the stay order and injunction order are discharged.