ORDER This is an assessee's application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of order of re-assessment passed against him in respect of the period 1st June, 1947, to 21st October, 1949, in the following circumstances. 2. The applicant is a registered dealer under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act (XXI of 1947). The applicant was assessed in the respect of sales tax on the 10th March 1950 for the period 1st June 1947 to 12th November 1947, on the 30th October 1950 in respect of the period 13th November 1947 to 1st November 1948, and on the 29th June 1951 in respect of the period 2nd November 1948 to 21st October 1949 by the then Sales Tax Officer. These assessments were made in due course after looking into the applicant's books of account and other evidence, after due enquiry. A new Sales Tax Officer named Shri Deosthale succeeded to the officer. He had reasons to suspect that the applicant had not been properly assessed to sales tax in respect of the periods aforesaid, and he moved respondent No. 3 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh) to revise the aforesaid assessments and for permission to assess the applicant afresh. Three Revision Cases, 8-R, 9-R and 10-R, all of 1953, were thus registered and came for disposal before respondent No. 2, the deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh. On the 25th July, 1953, a notice in Form XXV was issued to the applicant by respondent No. 2. The gist the proposed order in that notice is as under :- "After you were assessed by the Sales Tax Officer, Akola, for the periods 1st June, 1947 to 12th November, 1947, 13th November, 1947, to 1st November, 1948, and 2nd November, 1948, to 21st October, 1949, it was discovered that your accounts for the periods under assessments are not acceptable for the purpose of the assessment as required by section 14 of the Sales Tax Act. The said orders of Sales Tax Officer are proposed to be revised to assess you on correct turnover." 3. The applicant averred further that the Sales Tax Department had never before served on the applicant any notice under section 14 of the Sales Tax Act requiring him to maintain accounts in any particular manner. The said orders of Sales Tax Officer are proposed to be revised to assess you on correct turnover." 3. The applicant averred further that the Sales Tax Department had never before served on the applicant any notice under section 14 of the Sales Tax Act requiring him to maintain accounts in any particular manner. After hearing the applicant the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, by his consolidated orders dated the 18th September, 1953, set aside the aforesaid three assessments and directed respondent No. 1, the Sales Tax Officer, Akola, to assess the applicant afresh. Notice under sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 11 was accordingly served upon the applicant to appear before the Sales Tax Officer on the 28th November, 1953. The material portion of the notice is as follows :- ".............. show cause as to why you should not be assessed to tax is respect of the said period and produce your books of accounts and other documents and such evidence as you wish. "In the event of your failure to comply with notice I shall proceed to assess under section 11(4) and (5) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 to the best of my judgment without further reference to you." It is these proceedings which have been challenged by the applicant as illegal and without jurisdiction or the ground that they infringe his right of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution and are not in accordance with the taxing statute, that is to say, the relevant sections of Sales Tax Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 4. The facts stated above have not been denied by the respondents in the return filed on behalf of the department, particularly the statement in paragraph 4 of the petition that it was Shri Deosthale who moved the Commissioner of Sales Tax to revise the aforesaid three assessments and for permission to assess the applicant afresh an the statement in paragraph 5 of the petition that the department had never before served any notice on the applicant under section 14 of the Act. The learned Additional Government Pleader who appeared on behalf of the department also raised a preliminary objection that this application should not be entertained as the applicant has his remedy under the law. As will presently appear, the applicant had been assessed by the department for the period in question. The learned Additional Government Pleader who appeared on behalf of the department also raised a preliminary objection that this application should not be entertained as the applicant has his remedy under the law. As will presently appear, the applicant had been assessed by the department for the period in question. What he objects to is the reopening of the whole matter and starting the assessment proceedings afresh, which naturally must cause a great deal of harassment to the assessee. The contention is that these proceedings have been without jurisdiction and without the section of the taxing statute. If the contention is well founded, then we see no reason not to interfere at the preliminary stage instead of allowing the applicant to go through all the stages of the assessment and the necessity of making deposits under the rules before going up to the higher authorities or the Tribunal. In this connexion the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Central Potteries v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 15 at p. 16) may be referred to. Reliance was also placed by the applicant on the ruling of the Supreme Court in H. Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1954] 5 S.T.C. 155). But that was a case of an infringement of a fundamental right. It was on that account that the applicant has attempted to bring his case within Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. Coming to the merits of case, it appears that the provisions of sub-sections (1) to (3) of section 11 had been satisfied in this case as the taxing authority after taking such evidence as the assessee could adduce in support of his return and after making such further enquiry as the department thought necessary the assessment had been made and closed. It does not appear that the matter went beyond the first stage, when the original order of assessment had been made. Sub-section (4) of section 11 would not in terms apply to the assessment in this case, because there was no failure to furnish returns or to comply with the terms of any notice or to maintain accounts regularly. It is only in those three circumstances as contemplated by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 11(4) that the Commissioner has the power to assess the dealer "to the best of his judgment". It is only in those three circumstances as contemplated by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 11(4) that the Commissioner has the power to assess the dealer "to the best of his judgment". Sub-section (5) of section 11 is also out of the way of the applicant because he is a registered dealer and therefore cannot be said to have "wilfully failed to apply for registration". That sub-section authorizes the Commissioner, at any time within 12 months from the expire of the period in respect of which the Commissioner may find the unregistered dealer to be liable to assessment, to assess him to the best of his judgment and to subject him to penalty in additional to the tax determined by him. It will thus appear that sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 11 of the Act authorize the Commissioner to assess the dealer to best of his judgment only in such cases where the conditions laid down in those sub-sections are fulfilled. The applicant is not one of those defaulters whose case could originally be brought within the purview of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 11. 6. What the Department has proposed to do in the instant case is to try to assess the dealer in respect of his turnover which either has escaped assessment or has been assessed at a lower rate than justified under the law or has been under-assessed as contemplated by the newly added section 11-A. This section was added by section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Act XX of 1953, which came into effect on the 14th November, 1953. But the newly added section was given retrospective operation by section 24 of the Amending Act and should be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of June, 1947, that is to to say when the original Act itself came into operation. Section 11-A is therefore out of the way of the applicant both because it had not been enacted on the date on which the order impugned in this case had been passed and because the period of assessment in question in this case was beyond three calendar years at all material dates. Section 11-A is therefore out of the way of the applicant both because it had not been enacted on the date on which the order impugned in this case had been passed and because the period of assessment in question in this case was beyond three calendar years at all material dates. Section 11-A has removed the lacuna found in the original Act, in so far as it had not provided for reopening the assessment already made, if the Commissioner was satisfied that the revenue had suffered because of under-assessment or because any turnover of the dealer had escaped assessment or because of any similar circumstances. It is clear therefore that the assessment could not have been reopened in terms of section 11-A of Act. 7. The question then arises whether the Commissioner or his delegate, the second respondent, could have done so under the unamended Act, In our opinion, there is no such power contemplated by the unamended Act once the assessment has been made and the proceeding closed. The learned Additional Government Pleader, who appeared on behalf of the Department, contended that under the revisional jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner under section 22(5) of the Act he could have done so. Sub-section (5) of section 22 contemplates revisions of orders passed by officers subordinate to the Commissioner of Sales Tax during the pendency of the proceedings. But in the instant case the proceedings had closed in respect of the first two periods more than three years before the orders had been passed and in the case of last period more than two years from the date of the closing of the proceedings. Rule 57 framed under section 28 of the Act bears on the question of the revisional powers of the Commissioner or of the Tribunal. The rule contemplates an application for revision within 30 days of the order impugned and ordinarily would lie on a substantial question of law. But those are requirements of "an application for revision". Such an application ordinarily would be by the assessee. But there may be cases when even the Department may figure as the applicant for revision. In this case the applicant, as already indicated, alleged that it was Shri Deosthale who moved the Commissioner for revising the orders passed by his predecessors and for reopening the assessments. Such an application ordinarily would be by the assessee. But there may be cases when even the Department may figure as the applicant for revision. In this case the applicant, as already indicated, alleged that it was Shri Deosthale who moved the Commissioner for revising the orders passed by his predecessors and for reopening the assessments. This statement has been not denied, though it is stated in the return that the Commissioner passed the order of revision suo motu. In paragraph 7 of the return, as it originally stood and signed by the Additional Government Pleader the relevant sentence stood thus :- "The revision was suo motu by the Commissioner as he was moved by the Sales Tax Department and not by the dealer." Someone has made corrections in that sentence by striking out the words "as he was moved by the Sales Tax Department", and the word "by" was replaced by the words "at the instance of". There is no affidavit in support of this statement. We must therefore take it that the statement made on affidavit by the applicant is correct. If the Commissioner had to be moved by some other authority or by a party for interference in revision, such an application should have been made within 30 days of the order impugned. 8. It would thus appear that recourse to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 11 of the Act was not justified in the circumstances of the case, and the manner of it is also not in accordance with the rules framed under the Act. We would therefore quash the orders impugned in this case and direct the respondents not to proceed with the fresh assessment as proposed by them. The applicant is entitled to has costs in this Court. Hearing fee Rs. 100. The amount of security deposited by the applicant shall also be refunded to him. Application allowed.