Judgment Sinha, J. 1. The respondents before us, namely, Magni Lal and S. K. Pramanik, had been prosecuted for an offence under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (24 of 1946). They were, however, acquitted by Mr. J. N. Singh, Magistrate First Class, Ranchi on grounds of law. 2. The prosecution case was that, on 7-5-1952, these two respondents earned 62 maunds and odd of maida and 19 maunds and odd of Suji (wheat products) into Ranchi district from outside the district on a truck, which was driven by one Neeka Singh. These two respondents, along with, the driver, were charged under Section 7 of the Act aforesaid for contravention of Government Notification No. Proc. 93/51-P.C.-3267G, dated 11-12-1951, as amended by Notification No. Proc. 54/52-P.C. 13020 dated 5-5-1952, issued under Clause 11 of the Bihar Foodgrains Control Order 1950. 3. The defence was that the respondents and the other accused were not guilty. The driver said that he was bringing the truck from Patna, but the other two persons, the respondents before us, made, no statement. 4. Several persons were examined as prosecution witnesses to support the prosecution case, and, placing reliance, on those witnesses, the Court below held that it was proved beyond all doubt that, on 7-5-1952, "the accused persons carried the maida and Suji into Ranchi district from outside". The Court, however, felt that, as the noti-fication aforesaid, for contravention of which these persons had been prosecuted, was not in force at the time when the conviction was to be recorded, it acquitted the accused persons. The State Government had filed this appeal against the acquit^ tal of the respondents but not of the driver. 5. Mr. Government pleader has submitted that the view taken by the Court below is not sustain-able in law, that the authorities, on which reliance was placed by the Court below, had no application to the facts of the present case, and further that this case was concluded by the authority of this Court in -- Madho Singh V/s. Emperor, AIR 1944 Pat 217 (A). 6. Under Sec.3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, the Central Government was authorised to provide, by notified order, for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities or for securing their equitable distribution and avaliability at fair prices. 6. Under Sec.3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, the Central Government was authorised to provide, by notified order, for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities or for securing their equitable distribution and avaliability at fair prices. Under Section 4 of that Act, the powers of the Central Government could be delegated to any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or to such Provincial Government or such officer or authority subordinate to the, Provincial Government as may be specified in the direction; and Section 7 of the Act makes penal any breach of the orders passed by the Central Government or by the Provincial Government or by the authority or officer of the Provincial Government. The State of Bihar passed the Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1950 , under the provisions of the Act, and under Clause 11 of the Bihar Foodgrains Control Order, 1950, the aforesaid notification was issued. The said notification provided that "no person shall export, carry or cause to be exported or carried.,.. (ii) any quantity of wheat, wheat-products (namely, atta, maida & suji but excluding self raising flour & semolina imported from overseas), Maize, barley, jowar and milo.. (b) by motor trucks or any other kind of motor vehicles--from any place within a district to any other place outside that district;.. except with the written permission of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies Bihar or the Deputy Commissioner or the Additional Deputy Commis-sioner or the District Magistrate or the District Supply Officer of the exporting areas concerned. ." This notification was substituted by another noti fication on 18-6-1952, which did not continue the ban on the movement of wheat or wheat-products, in other words the ban was lifted. The point taken before the learned Magistrate was that, as on the date when the final order in the proceedings was to be passed, namely, on 27-11-1952, there was no- ban on the movement of wheat or wheat-products, there ought to be no conviction and it was sub mitted that in regard to breach of penal provi sions of temporary enactments, the entire pro ceeding, including the order of conviction should be terminated during the time the temporary Act was in force. Two authorities of this Court in -- Rampal Singh V/s. Emperor, AIR 194S Pat 229 (B), and the other of Allahabad High Court in -- Bansgopal V/s. Emperor, AIR, 1933 All 669 (FB) (C), were relied upon and the Court below upon the authority of those two cases acquitted the respondents. The facts of these two cases were, however, entirely different. In the Patna case, the conviction had been recorded under the Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder. The point taken was that as the Act and the Rules thereunder had ceased to exist, the conviction though recorded before the expiry of the Act and the Orders made thereunder, was illegal as the Act and the orders had expired. The contention was negatived. It will thus be seen that the facts of that case were entirely different and the decision in that case can afford no guidance. 7. In the Allahabad case also the facts were different. The petitioner in that case was prosecuted for contravention of Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 and other breaches of other law. Before the charge under Ordinance No. 2 could be framed against the petitioners, the Ordinance had expirr ed on 3-7-1932. 8. The contention was that no charge under Ordinance No. 2 could be framed after the said Ordinance had expired. It is not necessary to refer to the other points urged in that case. It was held that an offence committed against a temporary Act must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expired and that as soon as the Act expired any proceeding taken or continued under that Act would ipso facto terminate. In both the aforesaid cases the Act (Defence of India Act) and Orders as in the Patna case and the (Ordinance No. 2 of 11)32 in the Allahabad case) which had imposed the penalty and under which prosecution had been started, had come to an end by lapse of time. The difference between these cases and the present case is that here the penalty is imposed not by the notifications which expired but by a different Act, namely, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946 and that the Act was very much alive on the date when the final order in the proceeding had to be passed. The difference between these cases and the present case is that here the penalty is imposed not by the notifications which expired but by a different Act, namely, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946 and that the Act was very much alive on the date when the final order in the proceeding had to be passed. If that Act had expired or had been repealed, different considerations would arise, but so long as that Act existed, it cannot be said that the powers of the Courts to punish for an offence committed on a date when the notification was in force, had ceased to exist. The notification banned the movement of wheat-products from one district to another and on the date of the occurrence, namely, on 7-5-1952, that notification was in force and a breach of that notification was made punishable under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. 9. The offence had been committed and proceedings for prosecution had been started, and the proceedings were conducted under that Act. The mere fact that the ban was not continued on movement of wheat-products in the notification dated 18-6-1952, did not affect the power of the Court to punish the offender for offences committed when the notification of 11-12-1951, was in force. A similar view was taken by this Court in AIR 1944 Pat 217 (A). In that case, certain notification had been made under Rule 81 (2) of the Defence of India Rules, and Rule 81(4) made punishable any contravention of the order made under Rule 81(2). Neither the notification nor the order by itself had imposed any punishment, and a prosecution for the offence committed for breach of the order passed under Rule 81(2) had been started before the order under Rule 81(2) had ceased to exist, although the conviction was recorded after the expiry of the order, and it was held that the conviction was a good conviction in law because the subsequent events, namely, the prosecution and conviction of the accused, were the effect not of the notification and the order in question but of Rule 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules which were in force. 10. Mr. Ghoshal appearing for the respondents also concedes the position of law. 10. Mr. Ghoshal appearing for the respondents also concedes the position of law. It must, therefore, be held that the Court below was entirely in error in taking the view that, because the sub-sequent notification of 18-6-1952, did not continue the ban on movement of wheat products the respondents were entitled to acquittal on 27-11-1952, after the making of the notification of 18-6-1952. 11. Mr. Ghoshal has, however, submitted that the respondents were entitled to be acquitted because the notification of 11-12-1951, did not ban the movement of wheat or wheat-products into the district according to his view of the notification; it only banned export from the district. 12. The notification, was placed before us, and there can be no doubt, upon the language used that the notification banned the export, carrying or causing to be exported or carried any quantity of wheat or wheat-products by motor trucks on any other kind of motor vehicle from any place within a district to any other place outside the district. The charge in this case also makes quite clear that the respondents carried without permit, certain quantity of rnaida and suji from outside Ranchi district into Ranchi district. There can be no manner of doubt that, under the notification wheat or wheat-product or any other kind of foodgrain mentioned in the notification could not have been brought into Ranchi District from any other place outside Ranchi District. In my opinion, therefore, the respondents must be held guilty of having contravened the notification dated 11-12-1951 as amended by the notification dated 5-6-1952, as already mentioned, and they were punishable under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. 13. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporarily Powers) Act, 1946, prescribes that if any person contravenes any order under Sec.3 relating to foodstuffs, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine, unless for reasons to be recorded, the Court is of opinion that a sentence of fine only will meet the ends of justice. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 runs as follows : "(b) any property in respect of which the order has been contravened or such part thereof as to the court may seem fit shall be forfeited to the Government, unless for reasons to be re corded the Court is of opinion that it is no necessary to direct forfeiture in respect of the whole, or as the case may be, any part of the property." 14. The entire quantity of maida and suji found in the truck, are therefore, forfeited to the Government. 15. In my judgment, in this case the ends of justice will be met by sentencing the respondents to pay a fine of Rs. 500.00 each and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. I am not disposed to impose any term of imprison-ment because the entire quantity of the food-grains found in the truck has been forfeited and also because there is no ban on the movement of wheat or wheat-product since 18-6-1952. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Magistrate acquitting the respondents is set aside. Imam, J. 17 I agree.