Umamaheswaram, J.- This appeal is brought by the tenants as against the judgment of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., refusing to issue a writ of certiorari and quash the Order of the Revenue Court in Case No. 1 of 1952. The second respondent herein filed a petition under section 10(2) of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal (Protection) Ordinance (IV of 1952), for the eviction of the appellants. The order for eviction was passed under section 10(1)(f) of the Ordinance on the ground that the past conduct of the tenants was such that they ought not to be continued as tenants in the interests of cultivation itself. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., confirmed the order of the Revenue Court on the ground that the conduct of the tenants after the 1st December, 1951 and before the date of the Ordinance could properly be taken into account for determining whether the tenants are or are not guilty of conduct falling within the scope of section 10(1) of the Ordinance which has been replaced by section 10(1) of Madras Act (XIV of 1952). The short question that arises for determination of the appeal is as to the proper interpretation of section 10(1) of Madras Act (XIV of 1952). The relevant terms of the section are as follows: “No cultivating tenant shall be evicted except as provided in section 6, or unless- (f) his conduct or behaviour has been such as to render his continuance as a tenant on the land undesirable in the interests of good cultivation. Owing to the disputes that existed between the landlords and the tenants in Tanjore District, the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal (Protection) Ordinance (IV of 1952) was promulgated to come into force on 23rd August, 1952. The Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal (Protection) Act (XIV of 1952) received the assent of the President on 21st December, 1952. Under section 1(2) the Act shall be deemed to have come into force in the whole of the district of Tanjore on the 23rd August, 1952. The Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal (Protection) Act (XIV of 1952) received the assent of the President on 21st December, 1952. Under section 1(2) the Act shall be deemed to have come into force in the whole of the district of Tanjore on the 23rd August, 1952. The preamble to the Ordinance and the Act is in similar terms and is as follows:- "Whereas in the district of Tanjore the relations between land owners and their agents on the one hand and tenarts and farm labourers on the other had become strained, resulting in the displacement of tenants and the dismissal of farm labourers and in agrarian crimes and disturbances;" And whereas the situation there at end to cause deterioration in agricultural production; The Act was therefore passed to provide for the improvement of agrarian conditions in the district of Tanjore. The validity of this Act, which was challenged, was considered by a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party and the observations made in that case of Santhana Krishna Udayar v. Vaithilingam1, may be referred to for the purpose of understanding the scope and effect of the several provisions of the Act. They are as follows: “The Tenants and Pannaiyals had, it is true, most regrettably taken the law into their own hands and engaged in acts of violence and crime. But it should be said in mitigation of their conduct that there was justice in their demands for revision of the terms of the tenancy and of the rates of wages .... Therefore while the Tenants and Pannaiyal were very much in the wrong in taking to the creed of violence and disorder, the fault, however was not wholly on their side. This then was the conflict which the Government and the Legislature were called upon to reconcile; and Ordinance (IV of 1952) and Act (XIV of 1952) present their solution to it”. With this background we shall proceed to consider the contentions advanced by both the parties as to the interpretation of section 10(1)(f). This then was the conflict which the Government and the Legislature were called upon to reconcile; and Ordinance (IV of 1952) and Act (XIV of 1952) present their solution to it”. With this background we shall proceed to consider the contentions advanced by both the parties as to the interpretation of section 10(1)(f). The learned advocate for the appellants contended that under section 10(1)(f), the tenant is liable to be evicted only if his conduct or behaviour after the passing of the Act was such as to render his continuance as a tenant on the land undesirable in the interests of good cultivation and not his conduct or behaviour prior to the passing of the Act. The learned advocate for the respondents, on the other hand, put forward an extreme contention, namely, that the misbehaviour or misconduct of the tenant at any time prior to the passsing of the Act may be pressed into service for evicting the tenant. He relied upon the use of the words “has been” as supporting his contention. A reading of the several clauses in section 10(1) clearly shows that the grounds for eviction should be the grounds which have come into existence after the passing of the Act. Clause (a) refers to the failure of the tenant not to divide the produce as laid down in section 8(1), or the failure to make over to the land owner the quantity of the produce to which he is entitled under section 8(3). Clause (b) refers to the non-payment of the rent accruing after the commencement of the Act within two months of the date stipulated in the lease deed, or in the absence of a lease deed, within one month of the due date according to the usage of the locality or village. Clause (c) refers to the act of the tenant, which is destructive of, or injurious to, the land or any crop thereon and clause (d) refers to the user of the land for any purpose contrary to that for which the land was let. Clause (e) refers to the sub-letting of the land and clause (g) to the non-observance of any condition imposed by the Conciliation Officer or the Revenue Court in pursuance of section 6. Clause (e) refers to the sub-letting of the land and clause (g) to the non-observance of any condition imposed by the Conciliation Officer or the Revenue Court in pursuance of section 6. So, the language of the several clauses in the section is in no way inconsistent with the policy or object of the Act, namely, to let the dead past bury the dead and to open a fresh chapter for regulating the relations between the landlord and the tenant and not to rip open or press into service the past acts or misdeeds. The rights of the tenants, who were in possession of the land on the 1st December, 1951, to continue in possession for a period of five years as per the provisions of section 6 ought not to be permitted to be circumvented by construing the language of section (10)(1) as conferring a right on the landholder to urge that prior to the Act the tenant sub-let the land or used it for a purpose contrary to that for which the land was let, or did any act which is destructive of or injurious to the land or any crop thereon, or his conduct or behaviour has been such as to render his continuance undesirable in the interests of good cultivation. It is impossible to hold that if the tenant had sub-let the land a year or two before the passing of the Act, the past sub-letting should constitute a ground for eviction under section 10(1)(e). Similarly, if the tenant had done any act or had been guilty of neglect which is destructive or injurious to the land, or had used the land for purposes contrary to that for which the land was let some years prior to the passing of the Act, those acts do not entitle the landlord to apply for the eviction of the tenant. As pointed out in Alagappa Chettiar v. Nachiappa Chettiar1: “No rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right. That is the general rule. As pointed out in Alagappa Chettiar v. Nachiappa Chettiar1: “No rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right. That is the general rule. But no one can deny the competency of the Legislature to pass clearly, or by necessary and distinct intendment, to have retrospective operation; there is nothing inherently illegal on that account.” Therefore the question is whether the terms of section 10(1) are intended to have retrospective operation so as to clothe the landlord with a right to evict for the acts done prior to the passing of the Act. The words employed in the several clauses excepting clause (f) are “has failed” or “has done” or “has used” or “has sub-let”, and all of them indicate clearly that the act constituting a ground for eviction should be after the passing of the Act. Though the expression “has been” in clause (f) may include past conduct also, the proper construction of the clause read along with the other clauses and in the context would be to confine it only to the conduct or behaviour of the tenant subsequent to the passing of the Act. The learned advocate for the respondents laid some stress upon the words “after the commencement of this Act” in clause (b) and the omission of those words in the other clauses. What the Legislature intended to indicate by clause (b) was that the tenant was liable to be evicted only if he failed to pay any rent accruing due after the commencement of the Act and not in respect of rent accruing due before the Act and in respect of which he would certainly be liable even after the passing of the Act. Default to pay the arrears of rent which accrued due before the passing of the Act does not entitle the landlord to apply for the eviction of the tenant. So, the addition of those words in clause (b) does not in any way compel us to accept the contention of the respondents’ advocate. Default to pay the arrears of rent which accrued due before the passing of the Act does not entitle the landlord to apply for the eviction of the tenant. So, the addition of those words in clause (b) does not in any way compel us to accept the contention of the respondents’ advocate. All the clauses have to be construed in the same manner and no distinction can be drawn on the ground that the act complained of in the present case was unlawful, when done while the act of sub-letting referred to in clause (e) might have been lawful prior to the passing of the Act. The next contention that was urged by the learned advocate for the respondents was that the acts done by the tenants subsequent to 1st December, 1951, would at least constitute grounds for eviction. For this purpose reliance was placed on the terms of section 6 which provides: "(1) Every cultivating tenant who was in possession of any land on the 1st day of December, 1951, shall be entitled to be in possession thereof as such tenant, subject to the provisions of this Act, until the expiry of a period of five years from the commencement of the agricultural years 1952-53; ............" The object of enacting this section was to protect the tenants, who were evicted by the landlords as a result of the publication of the Subramanyam Committee Report. The Act therefore provided that if the tenants were in possession on 1st December, 1951, their possession should be sustained and if they have lost it subsequently, they should be reinstated and the tenants who were in possession in 1950-51 should also have similar rights except as against cultivating tenants who had been put in possession before 1st December, 1951 and had actually raised crops. The mere fact that certain rights are conferred upon them as from 1st December, 1951, does not lead us to the conclusion that the acts of those tenants subsequent to that date and prior to the passing of the Ordinance or the Act should afford grounds for eviction. As already stated, it is only the acts done by the tenants subsequent to the Act that entitle the landlord to invoke the terms of section 10. As already stated, it is only the acts done by the tenants subsequent to the Act that entitle the landlord to invoke the terms of section 10. We therefore do not agree with the learned Judge that the conduct of the tenants after the 1st December, 1951, could properly be taken into account for determining whether the tenant is or is not guilty of conduct falling within the scope of section 10(1) of Madras Act (XIV of 1952). The construction placed by the learned Judge would have the effect of taking away by the left hand, the benefit conferred by the right hand. That certainly is not the object of the Legislature and the terms of section 10 read with section 6 do not warrant the construction placed by the learned Judge. In support of the argument that the Act applies to acts prior to the passing of the Act, reference was made to two English decisions. The decision in Lane v. Lane1, has really no bearing on the construction of the Act in question. The question that arose for consideration in that case was as to whether the persistent cruelty of the husband, which would have entitled a married woman to a juducial separation before the passing of Summary Jurisdiction Married Women Act of 1895 ought not to be taken into account under section 4 of the Act and it was held that as the Act was intended only to give a speedier and cheaper remedy to enable the wife to obtain an order from a Court of summary jurisdiction, and no statutory indemnity was intended to be given to all husbands who had previously been guilty of persistent cruelty to their wives and who had not been reached under previous statutes, the expression "shall have been" should be understood as including the cruelty prior to the Act. The decision in the Queen v. Vine2is also easily distinguishable. Under section 14 of Wine and Beer Amendment Act of 1870 (33 and 34 Victoria, Chapter 29) it was provided that every person convicted of felony shall for ever be disqualified from selling spirits by retail and no license shall be granted to any person who shall have been so convicted. The question that arose was whether a person who had been convicted of felony before the Act passed became disqualified on the passing of the Act or not. The question that arose was whether a person who had been convicted of felony before the Act passed became disqualified on the passing of the Act or not. It was rightly held in that case that the object of the enactment being to protect the public against public houses in which spirits are retailed being kept by persons of doubtful character, " it matters not for this purpose whether a person was convicted before or after the Act is passed, one is equally bad as the other and ought not to be interested with a license." The learned advocate for the respondents next referred us to the decision in Lakshmi Ammal v. Narayanaswami Naicker3. The Act that had to be construed in that case was Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (XIX of 1946). The object and the terms of that statute are very different from the terms of Madras Act (XIV of 1952). It is therefore unnecessary to refer to the interpretation which was placed on sub-section 4 of section 2 “if he marries again”, which has been the subject of conflicting authorities (vide Sidda Setty v. Muniamma1, and the unreported decision in Musunuru Nagendramma v. Musunuru Ramakotiah2. In the result we hold that both the Revenue Court and the learned Judge were wrong in taking into account the conduct of the tenants prior to the passing of the Act as constituting a ground for eviction under section 10(1)(f) of Madras Act (XIV of 1952). We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Judge and quash the order of the Revenue Court, Mannargudi, in Case No. 1 of 1952 on its file. The application under section 10(2) filed therein will stand dismissed. The appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal and the writ petition before the learned Judge from the landlady, the second respondent herein. The advocate’s fee is fixed at Rs. 100 in the appeal and Rs. 100 in the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs in the petition before the Revenue Court. K.C. ----- Appeal allowed.