JUDGMENT : Rao, J. - The Plaintiff is the Appellant. The appeal is filed against the reversing judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack. 2. The disputed land comprising an area of 12 acre of homestead land belonged originally to one Bhubani Sahu and Dadhi Sahu who sold the same to the Plaintiff and she had been in possession of the same by constructing a house on it. The original Defendant No. 2 was wrongly recorded with respect to this land in the last survey record of rights and for rectification of the same the Plaintiff filed a suit against Fakir Parida the original Defendant No. 2 in O.S. No. 31 of 1934 in the Court of the Second Munsif, Cuttack in which her title to the land was recognised. The Plaintiff's case is that Defendant No. 1 in collusion with the amlas of Defendant No. 3 the landlord, obtained a decree for arrears of rent against Fakir Parida by suppression of summons and in execution of the decree he purchased the property on 19-4-41 in court sale, and that as Defendant No. 1 on the strength of that sale is threatening the Plaintiff with dispossession, the Plaintiff files the present suit. 3. Defendants 1 and 3 filed a written statement contending that the suit property really belonged to Fakir that he mortgaged the same to the Defendants father Bholanath Kar that the decree in O.S. No. 31 of 1934 obtained by the Plaintiff was collusive and fraudulent that the rent decree and the sale were perfectly valid and legal and that the Defendant No. 1 had acquired good title and also obtained possession through court. 4. The trial Court found that the disputed property is the identical property purchased by Defendant No. 1 in rent sale under Ext. C and that Defendant No. 1 had acquired no title on the strength of the court sale as it was not a rent decree but a mere money decree, and consequently decreed the Plaintiff's suit. 5. On appeal, the only point advanced before the appellate court by the Appellant was as to whether the execution sale in which the Defendant purchased the suit property was in execution of a money decree or a rent decree. The learned subordinate Judge held that the sale was in execution of a rent decree and not of a money decree. 6. Mr. The learned subordinate Judge held that the sale was in execution of a rent decree and not of a money decree. 6. Mr. R.K. Das, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant contends that the appellate court wrongly decided that the decree in question was a rent decree. He referred me to the definition of a holding which defined in Section 3, Clause (8) of the Orissa Tenancy Act as "holding means a parcel or parcels of land held by a raiyat and forming the subject of a separate tenancy", and contended that as Section 212 contemplates a sale of a tenure of holding in order that the holding might pass, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is wrong inasmuch as there is no division of the holding in dispute in the present case. 7. The entire holding No. 610 which is the disputed land comprised an area of .46 acre of land. The rent decree Ext. 5 is for rent of a part of that holding that is .22 acre as mentioned in the body of the decree but there is an endorsement of mutation. Ext A (1) on the basis of which .24 acre of land out of the disputed holding was purchased by Defendant No. 1 under Ext. A, There are also rent receipts Exts. B series under which the landlord was granting receipts for proportionate amount of rent on this 24 acre of land of Khata No. 610. The contention of the Appellant is that as no separate Khata was made in the landlord's Sherista for the disputed .22 acres of land, there is no division of tenancy. Mr, Das contends that Section 99 of the Orissa Tenancy Act does not apply to the facts of the present case and it cannot be held that there is a division of tenancy by virtue of that section. 8. Mr, Das contends that Section 99 of the Orissa Tenancy Act does not apply to the facts of the present case and it cannot be held that there is a division of tenancy by virtue of that section. 8. Section 99 enacts, Save as provided in Sections 18, 31, and 31-A and otherwise provided in the next two succeeding Sub-sections a division of tenure or holding or distribution of rent payable in respect thereof, shall not be binding on the landlord unless it is made with his express consent in writing or with that of his agent duly authorised in that behalf Provided that if it is proved that in any landlord's rent roll there is an entry showing that any tenure or holding has been divided, or that the rent payable in respect thereof has been distributed, such landlord may be presumed to have given his express consent in writing to such division or distribution. Mr. R.K. Das contends that there is no evidence in this case that in the rent roll there is any division of the holding No. 610 and as such Section 99 cannot support the contention of the Defendant. 9. I am not inclined to accept this contention, The explanation to Section 99 says, "For the purposes of this section, a tenure or holding shall be deemed to be divided by metes and bounds if there is separate possession of portion of such tenure or holding by tenant". In this case there is evidence that the Defendant was in separate possession of the land purchased by him previously, that is, .24 acre of land, Further Section 212 follows Section 99 and it is but natural that Section 212 contemplates a holding which is one as per the provisions of Section 99. 10. In the case of Pyari Mohun Mukhopadhya v. Gopal Paik ILR Cal. 10. In the case of Pyari Mohun Mukhopadhya v. Gopal Paik ILR Cal. 531 (F.B.) it was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court u/s 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act which is the corresponding Section 99 of the Orissa Tenancy Act, A receipt for rent granted by a landlord or his agent containing a recital that a tenant's name is registered in the landlord's sheristha as a tenant of a portion of the original holding at a rent which is a portion of the original rent, does amount to a consent in writing by the landlord to a sub-division of the holding and a distribution of the rent payable in respect thereof within the meaning of Section 88 of he Bengal Tenancy Act. The principle laid down in this Case was also followed by the Patna High Court in the case of Srikrishna Prasad Panjiar v. Mt. Jeohari Kuer. It was held in that case that express consent in writing may be given by a rent receipt. In the case under consideration rent receipts Exts. B, B(1) and B (2) clearly show that the rent has been received by the landlord for .24 acre of land out of the disputed holding at Rs. 1-2-9. The rent payable for the entire holding is Rs. 2-4-0. The entire holding No. 610 comprises .46 acre. It can thus be clearly seen that there was a distribution of rent as per the proviso to Section 99. This Clearly shows that the landlord has consented to the sub-division of the holding and comes directly under the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court. It clearly appears on the fact of the receipts that the rent is paid in respect of a particular portion of the holding. 11. In my opinion, therefore, Ext. 5 is a rent decree and the sale under the Same is a sale of the entire holding as there was already a sub-division of the holding. I, therefore, hold that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct, and the appeal fails. It is therefore ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed