JUDGMENT R. Singh, J. - These two appeals which have been heard together, arise out of two suits-one for the possession of 41 plots of land having an aggregate area of 1 bigha 15 biswas and 10 biswanasis and the other for recovery of arrears of rent of these plots. The Defendants were said to be in possession of these plots in the capacity of tenants. They contested both the suits. In the suit for ejectment they pleaded that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the plots except plots Nos. 198 and 199 and that the Defendants were the owners of the plots. In the other suit for recovery of rent, the Defendants contended that the Plaintiff was entitled to a decree for rent at the rate of Rs. 35/ -per year only which represented the rent for the two plots Nos. 198 and 199 which only belonged to the Plaintiff. As an issue of title was raised, the Revenue Court referred the issue of title to the Civil Court for a finding. The Civil Court found that the Plaintiff-was the owner of all the plots and decreed the claim. The Defendants then went up in appeal to the District Judge of Lucknow. In a brief judgment the learned District Judge agreed with the view taken by the trial Court with regard to the ownership of the plots, but he disagreed with the view of the trial Court on the question of rent. He held that the Plaintiff was entitled to rent at the rate of Rs. 35/ - per year which represented the rent of the entire land claimed by the Plaintiff and held by the Defendants. He therefore modified the decree passed by the trial Court to the extent mentioned above. The rest of the decree was confirmed. The Defendants have now come up in second appeal. 2. The first point which is the only important point in these two appeals, is whether the Plaintiff was the owner of the plots in dispute. It was alleged on behalf of the Plaintiff that the entire area, which was known as Rajjabganj and which includes the plots in dispute belonged to one Rajjab Ali. Hamid Ali was the son and heir of Rajjab Ali. He executed a sale deed in respect of the plots in dispute on 19th January, 1867, vide Ex. 4, in favour of one Putani Begam. Hamid Ali was the son and heir of Rajjab Ali. He executed a sale deed in respect of the plots in dispute on 19th January, 1867, vide Ex. 4, in favour of one Putani Begam. The heirs of Putani Begam then sold the property by means of a sale deed dated the 6th July, 1898, vide Ex. 8 to one Mohd. Hussain. On the 30th July, 1915, the widow of Mohd. Hussain gifted this property by means of a deed dated the 30th July, 1915, to Zaibunnisa and Zaibunnisa in her turn executed a sale deed on the 15th November, 1940, in favour of Din Dayal. There was yet another sale deed and Din Dayal transferred the property to the Plaintiff on the 25th November, 1942. 3. The Defendants have also tried to trace their title to a gift deed executed on the 23rd August, 1906. It is however not necessary to go into the question of the Defendants' title. It is the duty of the Plaintiff to establish his own title and if he fails in establishing his own title, it would not be necessary to examine whether the Defendants were or were not rightly in possession of the plots. 4. It has been argued on behalf of the Plaintiff that the proprietary rights in the soil of Oudh were confiscated by a proclamation of Lord Canning dated the 15th Much, 1858. After the confiscation of the proprietary rights in the soil of the province by this proclamation some rights in this property were regranted by the Crown to the owners of the houses. It appears that a letter dated the 6th July, 1853, was sent by the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner to the Officiating Commissioner which has been referred to at Page 1276 in the ruling reported in Rahas Behari Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal 1940 A.W.R.(C.C.) 245. Reliance was placed on this letter to show that the confiscation of the proprietary rights made by the proclamation of 1858 was annulled by this letter. The effect of this letter was, however, considered in the reported case mentioned above and it was held that the letter dated the 6th July 1863 was applicable to the property which was comprised in that suit and had no general application on the other properties which were situated in Lucknow. The effect of this letter was, however, considered in the reported case mentioned above and it was held that the letter dated the 6th July 1863 was applicable to the property which was comprised in that suit and had no general application on the other properties which were situated in Lucknow. After the letter of the 6th July, 1863, another letter No. 5107 dated the 7th August, 1868, was sent by the Financial Commissioner which has, in some cases, been held to have had the effect of a fresh grant. It is not necessary to discuss the effect of this letter in detail as the effect of this letter has been thoroughly considered by the Full Bench in 1940 A.W.R. (C.C.) 245. It was held that the proprietary rights in the soil of the whole of the Province of Oudh were confiscated by the Government by the proclamation of the 15th March, 1858, and that the effect of the letter of the Financial Commissioner was that the sites of houses which were occupied were granted to the persons who were owners of the houses in occupation. Lands which were unoccupied were taken over by the Government and burial grounds etc., were entered as nazul property. It would thus appear that nobody who was the owner of land in Oudh before 15th March, 1858 could base his title to that land after the proclamation, on his original title which he had before the date of the proclamation so far as the lands in the City of Lucknow were concerned. In the present case it is not disputed that the entire area, which is the subject of dispute in these two appeals, was situated in the City of Lucknow. A khasra was prepared in the first regular settlement which began in the year 1862 and continued for some years. Directions were issued by the Financial Commissioner by means of a letter dated the 7th August, 1868, to the settlement staff to enter the names of the owners of the houses in occupation against the sites of those houses without making any inquiry about the title which a particular person had before the date of confiscation. This khasra, therefore became a document of title and all those persons who were in occupation of houses became the owners of the sites of those houses. 5. This khasra, therefore became a document of title and all those persons who were in occupation of houses became the owners of the sites of those houses. 5. The parties have filed copies of khasras of the file regular settlement and they are Exs.-A-3 and A-4. In these khasras Plaintiff No. 81, 90, 91, 219, 220, 214 and 2l5 are entered in the name of Putani Begam in the column of owner as occupier while the names of other persons are entered as owners in occupation against the remaining plots. It lay therefore upon the Plaintiff to establish that even after the confiscation his predecessors had acquired title to the plots which were not in possession of Putani Begam or her predecessors at the time of the first regular settlement. The Plaintiff has not been able to establish that any of his predecessors had been in occupation of the lands and the plots claimed by the Plaintiff except the seven plots mentioned above. The learned District Judge did not examine the effect of the confiscation in the erroneous belief that the property was agricultural land and the letter of the Financial Commissioner did not apply to such lands. The khasras Exs. 3 and A- 4 clearly show that almost all the plots in dispute had either houses or dilapidated houses standing on them. Even if some of the plots were uftada or nazul, the Plaintiff could lay no claim to a proprietary right of these lands. He could only succeed if he proved that his predecessors were in actual occupation of the sites of the houses at the time of the first regular settlement which he has failed to do. A perusal of the khasra shows that the view taken by the learned District Judge that the land was agricultural land was not correct. The nature of the land at the time of the confiscation or grant has to be seen and not the nature of the land as it exists today. If the entire area was situate in the City of Lucknow and was not agricultural land, it was governed by the grant made by the letter dated the 7th August, 1868, of the Financial Commissioner. If the entire area was situate in the City of Lucknow and was not agricultural land, it was governed by the grant made by the letter dated the 7th August, 1868, of the Financial Commissioner. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on a ruling reported in Sohm Lal v. Sheikh Mohammad Hussain AIR 1930 Oud, 374, in which a similar question arose before a single Judge of the erstwhile Oudh Chief Court. The facts of that reported case were, however different. In that case a grant had been made by the Crown in favour of Nawab Umrao Mahal on the 7th July, 1858, i.e. a few months after the confiscation and the rights of the parties were therefore to be governed by that grant and not by the letter of the Financial Commissioner. The authority cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent does not therefore assist the Plaintiff. In view therefore of the Plaintiff's failure to establish his title to the plots in dispute except the seven plots mentioned above, the Plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for possession of all the plots. 6. As regards the appeal arising out of the suit for rent the Defendants admitted that they were liable to pay Rs. 35/ - as rent to the Plaintiff for the area owned by the Plaintiff and held by the Defendants. 7. The decree for arrears of rent passed by the learned District Judge in appeal cannot therefore be reversed but this rent would be deemed to be due only in respect of the seven plots found to belong to the Plaintiff. 8. As a result appeal No. 5 of 1947 is allowed to this extent that the Plaintiff's suit for possession stands decreed in respect of plots Nos. 81, 90, 91, 219, 220, 214 and 215. The claim for possession of the rest of the plots is dismissed. The Appellants shall get three-fourths of their costs in all the Courts and the Plaintiff Respondent will get one-fourth of his costs in all the Courts. Appeal No. 4 of 1947 is dismissed, but the parties shall bear their own costs in all three Courts.