Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of the amount due under an instrument purporting to be a promissory note executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant on 15.1.1122 and endorsed by the latter to the plaintiff. Ext. B is the document in question. The 1st defendant admitted having executed Ext. B but he contended that it was not supported by consideration and that the suit was barred by limitation. After trial, the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation. After trial, the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation. Findings were not entered on the other issues as the learned Munsiff considered it unnecessary to do so, in view of his finding on the question of limitation. The plaintiff has preferred this appeal from the decree dismissing the suit. 2. The learned Munsiff held that Ext. B was not a promissory note but only a simple bond for which the period of limitation was only three years. He based his conclusion on the ground that an unconditional undertaking to pay a specified amount on demand was absent in Ext. B and that the latter portion of the instrument amounted to an indemnity clause which could not be brought within the definition of a promissory note. He also held that the plaintiff was estopped from contending that the instrument sued on was a promissory note as he had submitted to an order to pay additional stamp duty and penalty on Ext. B which was found to be an insufficiently stamped document at an earlier stage of the suit. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent rightly conceded that he did not support the decree on the ground of estoppel or that the instrument sued on was a bond. 3. The document on which the plaintiff founded his claim may be translated thus: "Promissory note executed on the 15th day of Avani 1122 by Maharaja Pillai, son of Muthuperumal Pillai of Kesavan Puthoor, Azhakiapandipuram Pakuthy in favour of Sivan Pillai, son of Ramaswamy Pillai of Thuckalay Kizhakketheruvu. Thuckalay Pakuthy, Kalkulam Taluk. I have received from you a sum of Fs. 7500/- for payment of consideration under the sale deed of Thovala Sub Registrar's Office which I have taken this day, I promise to pay you or order the said sum of Rs. Thuckalay Pakuthy, Kalkulam Taluk. I have received from you a sum of Fs. 7500/- for payment of consideration under the sale deed of Thovala Sub Registrar's Office which I have taken this day, I promise to pay you or order the said sum of Rs. 7500/- with interest at 3/4 per cent per mensem and to get back the note. If I fail to pay as stated above, myself and my properties shall be liable for the principal, interest and all damages consequent on such default." The contention of the 1st respondent before us was that the last sentence in the document amounted to an agreement and that the instrument ceased to be negotiable on account of that and that it could not therefore be deemed to be a promissory note. It may be mentioned here that the 1st defendant did not contend in his written statement that the document was not a promissory note. When he was examined in the case, he referred to the document as a promissory note even in his chief examination. It is admitted that the first part of Ext. B amounts to a promissory note. The controversy has thus become narrowed down to the question whether the last sentence in Ext. B which contains words to the effect that in case of default the 1st defendant and his properties would be liable for the consequent loss, takes it out of the definition of a promissory note. The argument was that this clause contained an agreement which made the instrument not negotiable and that the undertaking to pay the loss, made the amount payable under the instrument uncertain. 4. Under the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100 the period of limitation for a promissory note payable on demand was six years from the date of the note while the period for a suit on a simple bond was only three years. As this suit was instituted more than three years after the date of execution of Ext. B the suit would be barred by limitation if Ext. B is not a promissory note. The definition of a promissory note under the Travancore Limitation Act is as follows:- Promissory note means any instrument whereby the maker engages absolutely to pay a specified sum of money to another at a time therein limited or on demand or at sight". B the suit would be barred by limitation if Ext. B is not a promissory note. The definition of a promissory note under the Travancore Limitation Act is as follows:- Promissory note means any instrument whereby the maker engages absolutely to pay a specified sum of money to another at a time therein limited or on demand or at sight". The absence of the words "on demand" in Ext. B does not affect the application of Art. 105 of the Travancore Limitation Act, as a promissory note in which no time for payment is specified is one payable on demand under S.18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. "Promissory note" has been defined by the Travancore Negotiable Instruments Act II of 1075 as "an instrument in writing 'not being a Bank note or a currency note) made on a specified date containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of, a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument." This definition is substantially the same as in the Indian Negotiable Instruments Act XXVI of 1881, the only difference being that that the words "made on a specified date" are absent in the Indian Act. The decisions under the Indian Act are therefore helpful in deciding this question. 6. Reliance was placed by the 1st respondent on the decision of the Privy Council in Md. Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh (1936 PC 171). The instrument in the case before the Privy Council was held to be a receipt and not a promissory note. Lord Atkin stated: "Their Lordships prefer to decide this point on the broad ground that such a document as this is and could not be intended to be brought within the definition relating to documents which are to be negotiable instruments. Such documents must come into existence for the purpose only of recording an agreement to pay money and nothing more, though of course they may state the consideration. Receipts and agreements generally are not intended to be negotiable, and serious embarrassment would be caused in commerce if the negotiable net were cast too wide. This document plainly is a receipt for money containing the terms on which it is to be repaid. Receipts and agreements generally are not intended to be negotiable, and serious embarrassment would be caused in commerce if the negotiable net were cast too wide. This document plainly is a receipt for money containing the terms on which it is to be repaid. It is not without significance that the defendants who drew it, and who were experienced money lenders, did not draw it on paper with an impressed stamp as they would have had to if the document were a promissory note, and that they affixed a stamp which is sufficient if the document is a simple receipt. Being preliminary a receipt even if coupled with a promise to pay it is not a promissory note". It was held that what the parties intended to create was only a receipt containing the terms on which the amount received was to be repaid and not a promissory note. Another decision of the Privy Council is Lala Karam Chand & Ann v. Firm Main Mir Ahamad Azis Ahmad & Ann (AIR 1938 PC 121). Two documents relied on by the plaintiffs in that case were held by the Judicial Commissioners in India to be promissory notes and therefore inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamp. Following the earlier decision of the Privy Council referred to above, Sir George Rankin who delivered the judgment of the Board held that the documents were clearly never intended to be negotiable instruments at all and were not promissory notes. The two documents in the case were mere receipts coupled with the agreement "the principal amount will be paid with interest at the rate of Rs. 11-4-0 p.c." and "the amount to be paid back with interest at the rate of Rs. 11-4-0 p.c. after 10 months". These decisions cannot help the respondent as Ext. B clearly satisfies all the requirements of a promissory note. However, it is seen that the Privy Council laid stress on the question of intention of the parties as appearing from the words used, stamp affixed, etc. Reliance was also placed by the respondent's learned counsel on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ambalal Purushotam Das & Co. v. Jawaharlal Purushotam Deve & Ors. (AIR 1953 Cal. 758) and of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer in Bherulal v. Ram Rikh (AIR 1951 Ajmeer 71). Reliance was also placed by the respondent's learned counsel on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ambalal Purushotam Das & Co. v. Jawaharlal Purushotam Deve & Ors. (AIR 1953 Cal. 758) and of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer in Bherulal v. Ram Rikh (AIR 1951 Ajmeer 71). In the former case, leave was granted to a defendant to appear and defend an action on a promissory note on the ground that the payee was uncertain. In the latter case it was held that the intention underlying the document was that after certain credit and debit entries had been made and taken into consideration certain amounts would be due, which the defendant undertook to pay. It was found that it could not be held that if credit for Rs. 373-3-9 had not been given, the defendant would still have agreed to pay the amount specified in the document. In these circumstances it was held by the Judicial Commissioner that the intention was to execute an agreement and not a promissory note and that the document could not be said to be negotiable immediately. This is clearly a case of an agreement which rendered the promise to be conditional and the instrument could not in the circumstances be held to be a promissory note. These directions are not of any use in deciding this case. 7. There are decisions which support the view that we take in this case. Kirkwood v. Carroll (1903) 1 KB 531) was a case which arose under the Bills of Exchange Act (45 and 46 Victoria c. 61). The instrument sued on was in the following terms: "We jointly and severally promise to pay Mr. John Kirkwood (carrying on business in the name or style of the Provincial Union Bank) or order the sum of 1251 for value received by instalments in manner following, that is to say, the sum of 51 on Thursday, the 31st day of January inst., and the sum of 51 on Thursday in every succeeding week until the whole of the said 1251 shall be fully paid, and in case default is made in payment of any one of the said instalments the whole amount remaining unpaid shall become due and payable forthwith. No time given to, or security taken from, or composition or arrangement entered into with, either party hereto shall prejudice the rights of the holder to proceed against any other party." The defendants contended that the instrument was not duly stamped and could not be given in evidence or be available for any purpose whatever and submitted that owing to the last clause contained in it, it was not a promissory note and could not be sued on as such. Wright, J. held that the document was not a promissory note within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 which defined a promissory note as follows: "S. 23(1). A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of a specified person or the bearer." The judgment of the Court of Appeal allowing the plaintiff's appeal was delivered by the Earl of Halsbury L.C. who observed: "The addition to the promissory note does not qualify it, and I doubt whether the addition is in any proper sense operative. The document contains a promise to pay a certain sum of money by certain instalments and it seems to me impossible to suggest that it is anything else but a promissory note within the meaning of Bills of Exchange Act 1882". Jury v. Barker (1858) 27 LJ QB 255 was also a case under the Bills of Exchange Act. The document sued on was in these terms: "I promise to pay to Mr. J.C. Saunders or his order at three months after date, the sum of 100 pounds as per memorandum of agreement." Henry John Barker "Payable at 105, Upper Thames Street, London". Lord Campbel, C.J. held: "The note here is an absolute and unconditional promise, as to the payer, the payee, the amount and the date. If the addition of the words in question makes the promise conditional it is on the defendant to show that; and he has not done so". Reference may be made to a few decisions of Indian High Courts on this point. If the addition of the words in question makes the promise conditional it is on the defendant to show that; and he has not done so". Reference may be made to a few decisions of Indian High Courts on this point. In Mathu v. Viswanatha Pandara Sannadhi (AIR 1914 M 657) the document in question called a varthamanam or letter was in these terms: "Amount of cash borrowed of you by me is Rs. 350. I shall in two weeks' time returning this sum of three hundred and fifty rupees with interest thereon at the rate of 1 rupee per cent per month get back the letter". Sadasiva Iyer, J. with whom Spencer, J. concurred held that the document was a promissory note as it contained an unconditional undertaking on the face of the document, to repay borrowed money. In Sushil Chandar v. Wali Ullah (AIR 1941 All. 162) it was held that the main question in each case was to consider, not whether the instrument sued on was negotiable or not, though ordinarily negotiability of an instrument is a good test to determine whether a document is a promissory note or not; but to consider whether in substance and in primary intention of the parties the document was or was not a promissory note and whether it contained necessary recitals or whether it was intended to record a different kind of transaction altogether. 8. Judged in the light of these decisions, it is impossible to hold that Ext. B is not a promissory note. The later clause does not amount to an agreement making the liability of the promisor conditional. It merely shows what the consequence of non-payment on demand would be and does not qualify the operation of the note. The intention of the parties was to make a promissory note and not a bond or agreement. The instrument was described as a promissory note and it was also stamped as such. As observed earlier, the defendant in his pleadings and evidence referred to the instrument as a promissory note. In these circumstances we are unable to uphold the findings of the trial court. We hold that Ext. B is a promissory note and that the suit instituted within six years of the date of Ext. B is not barred by limitation. 9. In these circumstances we are unable to uphold the findings of the trial court. We hold that Ext. B is a promissory note and that the suit instituted within six years of the date of Ext. B is not barred by limitation. 9. Though evidence on the other issues had been adduced by both sides, the trial court did not enter findings on such issues. We are therefore obliged to remand the suit to the owner suit. We therefore set aside the decree, allow the appeal and remand the suit to the Lower Court for fresh disposal according to law and in the light of our findings regarding the nature of Ext. B. The plaintiff-appellant will get refund of the institution fees paid here and the rest of the costs will abide the final result. The first defendant will bear his costs. The suit will be disposed of on the evidence already recorded. Allowed.