Rupa Gauntiani v. Sriyabati — 1954 DIGILAW 14 (ORI)

Judgement P. V. B. RAO, J.:- This Second Appeal is by the defendants against the reversing judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Balangir decreeing the plaintiffs suit for maintenance. 2. Plaintiff is the widow of one late Manglu Gountia who predeceased his father Chaudhury Gountia. Defendant No.1 is the widow of the said Chaudhury Gountia and defendant No.2 is his son. It was alleged in the plaint that defendant No.2 was born to a concubine of Choudhury Gountia but point was not pressed in the lower appellate court. Defendant No.1 died during the pendency of the Second Appeal and defendant No.2 the sole appellant now is the only person entitled to all the properties of late Chaudhury Gountia. 3. It is alleged in the plaint that Choudhury Gountia died about one year prior to the suit and that he left considerable properties which were inherited by defendants. It is not stated in the plaint nor is there anything in evidence to show that these properties were ancestral properties in the hands of Chaudhury Gountia. Both parties proceeded on the common ground that they were the self-acquired properties of Choudhury Gountia. 4. Plaintiff claimed arrears of maintenance for 3 years prior to the filing of the suit and maintenance at the rate of Rs.37/8/- per month on ground that the defendants who are in possession of all the properties of her late father-in-law having inherited to the same are bound to give her the maintenance claimed. 5. The defendants contended inter alia that she took a sum of Rs.1400/- from Chaudhury Gountia her father-in-law in lieu of maintenance and executed a document in that connection, by which she gave up her right of maintenance in lieu of a lump sum of money; that the suit is not maintainable and that it is barred by res judicata and limitation. 6. The learned Munsif dismissed the plaintiffs suit but in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the same. 7. Mr. R.N. Misra, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the plaintiff having received Rs.1400/- as a lump sum from her father-in-law in lieu of maintenance is not entitled to any further maintenance; that the suit is barred by res judicata and limitation; and that at any rate the plaintiff is not entitled to the arrears of maintenance. 8. R.N. Misra, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the plaintiff having received Rs.1400/- as a lump sum from her father-in-law in lieu of maintenance is not entitled to any further maintenance; that the suit is barred by res judicata and limitation; and that at any rate the plaintiff is not entitled to the arrears of maintenance. 8. With regard to the first contention, the defendants failed completely to prove that plaintiff was paid Rs.1400/- in lieu of maintenance. In the written statement there is no mention of the year or date in which the plaintiff is alleged to have executed a document in favour of her father-in-law on receipt of Rs.1400/- and it was not stated that, that document was lost. The defendants have examined some witnesses to prove the alleged agreement. Even on the assumption that secondary evidence is admissible I agree with the learned Sub-Judge that the evidence of the witnesses could not be accepted for the very cogent reasons stated by him in his judgment. The reasons given by the learned Subordinate Judge for setting aside the finding of the learned Munsif on this point are very sound and in my opinion the defendants have not proved the prior agreement alleged in the written statement. 9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit is barred by res judicata. The plaintiff has stated in her cross-examination that about 10 years back she filed a suit for maintenance against her father-in-law. It is difficult to hold that the suit is barred by res judicata on this solitary statement of an illiterate woman elicited in cross-examination. The defendants did not file the pleadings of that case, nor the judgment. In the absence of the proof of the pleadings and the judgment, the plea of res judicata cannot be accepted. 10. The plea of limitation also cannot be accepted as there is absolutely no reliable evidence about the demand and the refusal. The same witnesses who spoke about the existence of a prior agreement also speak about this. I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that their evidence cannot be accepted. 11. But the important contention to be considered in this appeal is the last contention raised by the appellants that the plaintiff is not entitled to arrears of maintenance. The same witnesses who spoke about the existence of a prior agreement also speak about this. I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that their evidence cannot be accepted. 11. But the important contention to be considered in this appeal is the last contention raised by the appellants that the plaintiff is not entitled to arrears of maintenance. This point was not raised in the Courts below, but it being a question of law, we allowed the appellants to raise it. It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiffs father-in-law died about one year prior to the filing of the suit. In the absence of any reliable evidence to the contrary that allegation must be accepted. So she is undoubtedly entitled to one years arrear maintenance and this position is not seriously contested by the appellants learned counsel. With regard to the arrears of the other two years, the learned counsel for the appellants raised an interesting question of law and it is whether arrears of maintenance arising during the life-time of the father-in-law can be recovered from the heir who succeeds to his self-acquired property even if he is liable to pay maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law as a consequence of the self-acquired properties devolving on him by inheritance. 12. The learned counsel contends that though the son who gets the self-acquired properties of the father by inheritance is liable to pay maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law that liability cannot extend to cover the arrears which arose during the life-time of the father. Apparently the contention appears to be plausible inasmuch as there can be no arrears of maintenance when the liability of the father-in-law was only a moral obligation to pay maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law. Apparently the contention appears to be plausible inasmuch as there can be no arrears of maintenance when the liability of the father-in-law was only a moral obligation to pay maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law. But on careful consideration of the principles of Hindu Law and the observations made in the various decisions of the several High Courts and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, I find that there can be no distinction between the liability of the son or the person who takes the property by inheritance to pay maintenance to the widowed daughter-in-law and the liability to pay the arrears arising during the life-time of the father-in-law, as both the claims arise out of the same principle of the law that the moral obligation of the father-in-law to maintain the daughter-in-law is converted into a legal obligation against the person taking the property of the father-in-law by inheritance or gift. 13. There is now no dispute, as can be seen from the decisions to be presently referred to, that the son or donee or legatee taking the self-acquired property of a person is bound to pay maintenance to his widowed daughter-in-law. The decisions have laid down that the father-in-law is under a moral obligation to maintain the wife of a deceased son and that after his death that moral obligation is converted into and transmitted to the person who takes his properties. 14. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel referred to a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of - Janki v. Nanda Ram, 11 All 194 (A). But in my opinion this decision does not support the present contention raised by him. On the other hand, as I will show presently, the observations in this decision support the view that the plaintiff is entitled to the two years arrear maintenance. But in my opinion this decision does not support the present contention raised by him. On the other hand, as I will show presently, the observations in this decision support the view that the plaintiff is entitled to the two years arrear maintenance. In this case it was held that the father-in-law was under a moral, though not a legal, obligation not only to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law during his lifetime, but also to make provision out of his self-acquired property for her maintenance after his death; and that such moral obligation in the father became, by reason of his self-acquired property having come by inheritance into the hands of his surviving son, a legal obligation enforceable by suit against that son (who took the estate not for his own benefit but for the spiritual benefit of the last proprietor) and against the property in question. In course of the judgment, their Lordships, Chief Justice Edge and Justice Tyrrel observed: "The case under consideration appears to us to be analogous to that in which a son who has inherited property from his father is bound to carry out what his father has promised for religious purposes and to the liability of a brother who has assets from his father, in his hands to provide for the marriage expense of his sister." His Lordship Justice Mahmood, in a separate judgment, after a long discussion of the subject, summarises his conclusion as follows: "1. A Hindu father is under a moral, if not a legal, obligation to give his daughter in marriage. 2. By marriage a Hindu woman ceases to belong to her parental family and becomes a member of her husbands family. 3. The head of a Hindu family is bound morally, if not legally, to provide for the maintenance of all the members of the family according to the various rules applicable to the claims of each class of members. 4. Although a father-in-law in possession only of self-acquired property is not legally compellable to maintain his sons widow, yet the Hindu law imposes a moral obligation on him to provide for her maintenance. 5. An essential element of the sons right of inheritance from his father is the spiritual benefit which in the contemplation of the Hindu law the son confers upon the soul of his deceased father. 6. 5. An essential element of the sons right of inheritance from his father is the spiritual benefit which in the contemplation of the Hindu law the son confers upon the soul of his deceased father. 6. Therefore the son inheriting the self-acquired property of his father takes that property subject to such moral obligation as are conducive to the spiritual benefit of his father, and thus such moral obligations become legal obligations as against the son who holds his fathers property by inheritance." After quoting a text of Sancha "To the childless wives of brothers and of sons, strictly observing the conduct prescribed, their spiritual parent must allot mere food and old garments which are not tattered", the learned Judge observes : "The ratio decidendi of all rulings of the various High Courts which I have already cited, whilst negativing the legal right of a widowed daughter-in-law, to claim maintenance from her father-in-law who is in possession only of self-acquired property, recognize and proceed upon affirming the proposition that her maintenance though falling short of a legal right, is a moral obligation resting on the father-in-law." After quoting a text of Manu "By a son, a man obtains victory over all people; by a sons son he enjoys immortality; and afterwards, by the son of that grandson, he reaches the solar abode. Since the son delivers his father from the hell named put he was, therefore, called puttra by Brahma himself", the learned Judge observed,- "That a son has the right of inheriting his fathers property, because the son is the means of conferring spiritual benefits upon the deceased father by delivering his fathers soul from the hell named "put". In view of Hindu lawyers, a debt is not merely an obligation but a sin, the consequences of which follow the debtor into the next world. In view of Hindu lawyers, a debt is not merely an obligation but a sin, the consequences of which follow the debtor into the next world. In the original texts of Hindu law, the word debt is to be understood in a broad sense as to include all classes of obligations, such as moral obligations in respect of maintaining widowed daughter-in-law and expenses of the marriage of unmarried daughters and the decisions have clearly laid it down and emphasized the principle that it is a pious duty on the part of the son to pay his fathers debts, and even ancestral property in which the son, as son, acquires an interest by birth, under the Mitakshara law, is liable to the fathers debts unless they have been contracted for immoral purposes. This principle has been extended to the liability of a son to pay the marriage expenses of an unmarried sister out of the estate which he has inherited from his father, even if such estate was the self-acquired property of the father. The learned Judge also observes that,- "Under the Hindu law purely moral obligations imposed by religious precepts upon the father ripen into legally enforceable obligations as against the son who inherits his fathers property." 15. The principle laid down in this decision has been followed in - Devi Persad v. Gunwanti Koer, 22 Cal 410 (B); - Yamunabai v. Manubai, 23 Bom 608 (C); - Siddessury Dassee v. Janardan Sarkar, 29 Cal 557 (D); - Rangammal v. Echammal, 22 Mad 305 (E) and various other decisions. All these decisions clearly lay down in unanimous terms that the father-in-law is under a moral obligation to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law that such a moral obligation ripens into a legal obligation on the part of a person who takes, by inheritance, the property of the father-in-law but unfortunately no decision is placed before us in which, on this principle, a suit for a claim for arrear maintenance accruing during the life-time of the father-in-law against the heir who takes the father-in-laws property was granted. We are not also able to get a direct authority on the question in this appeal. We are not also able to get a direct authority on the question in this appeal. But on the principle that the moral obligation rests in the father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law even though there were no ancestral properties in his hands but only self-acquired properties, it follows that the father-in-law is under a moral obligation to provide for a maintenance of the widowed daughter-in-law during his life-time and that the decisions cited above clearly establish that such a moral obligation becomes a legal obligation in the hands of the heir. Those propositions were laid down in the case of claims for maintenance against the heir. I think, the principle enunciated in those decisions clearly includes a claim for arrears of maintenance before the filing of the suit and arising during the life-time of the father-in-law. The father-in-law is morally bound to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law, that is, the widowed daughter-in-law has a moral claim for maintenance during the life-time of the father-in-law and this moral liability of the father-in-law becomes a legal liability against the person who takes the properties of the father-in-law after his death. I am supported in taking this view by the undermentioned authorities. 16. In the 11th Edition of Maynes Hindu Law, Chapter IX, Paragraph 312 at page 394, it is stated,- "The Law of Debts illustrates a principle which constantly recur in Hindu Law, viz., that moral obligations take precedence of legal rights; or, to put the same idea in different words, that legal rights are taken subject to the discharge of moral obligations." At page 397, the learned Author says,- "The liability to pay the fathers debt arises from the moral and religious obligation to rescue him from the penalties arising from the non-payment of his debts, and this obligation equally compels the son to carry out what the ancestor has promised for religious purposes." At page 406, it is observed by the same learned Author,- "It follows from the texts bearing on the subject that the obligation of the son to pay the debt is hot found on any assumed benefit to himself or to the estate, arising from the origin of the debt; still less is that obligation affected by the nature of the estate which is descended to the son, as being ancestral, or self-acquired. Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was not the duty of the son to pay it, the discharge of it, even though affected ancestral estate, would still be an act of pious duty in the son. By the Hindu law, the freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the fathers debt has respect to the nature of the debt, and not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt." 17. The above citations from the Maynes Hindu Law clearly show the nature of the debts which the son is bound to discharge and the basis of his liability. It follows that the moral liability of the father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law can, under the principles of Hindu law, be treated as a debt which the son is bound to discharge under the doctrine of the pious obligation. 18. In the case of - Rajani Kanta Pal v. Sajani Sundari Dassaya, AIR 1934 PC 29 (F), it was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the liability of the father-in-law towards the widow of his son was no doubt, on the authorities, a moral liability, but that liability when transmitted to his sons, on his death, became in their persons, a legal liability, the measure of which however was restricted to the amount of the estate to which they succeeded from their father. This decision clearly indicates that a moral liability against the father-in-law is transmitted to his sons and becomes a legal liability. 19. The appellants learned counsel also cited the case of - Ethirajamma v. K. Subbarayudu, AIR 1939 Mad 150 (G). That is a case where a widowed daughter-in-law filed a suit against the father-in-law for maintenance. During the pendency of the appeal, the father-in-law died and his widow had been impleaded as his legal representative. It was contended by the appellants counsel therein that on the principle of the decided cases that the moral liability against the father-in-law is converted into the legal liability on the part of the heir, the appeal could proceed and the suit ought to be decreed against the widow of the deceased father-in-law. It was contended by the appellants counsel therein that on the principle of the decided cases that the moral liability against the father-in-law is converted into the legal liability on the part of the heir, the appeal could proceed and the suit ought to be decreed against the widow of the deceased father-in-law. But the learned Judge observed that- "Even if the plaintiffs right to claim maintenance has been enlarged by the death of the defendant, that enlarged claim could not be established in that suit which has been framed simply as a suit against the father-in-law" and observed,- "I say nothing therefore which will either help or hinder the plaintiff from bringing a fresh suit, if so advised, against the heir of the deceased father-in-law." This decision, therefore, does not in any way help the appellants contention. It is now settled law that in order to recover arrears of maintenance, it is not necessary to prove a demand and refusal. 20. To sum up, the claim of the plaintiff to the arrears of maintenance for 3 years is made up of one years maintenance after the death of the father-in-law and two years arrears during the life-time of the father-in-law. These two years maintenance is a moral obligation on the father-in-law. The decisions cited above establish that the moral obligation of the father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law becomes a legal obligation on the part of the person taking the self-acquired properties of the father-in-law after his death. This moral obligation of the father-in-law to pay his widowed daughter-in-law maintenance is, according to the construction of Hindu law, a debt which the son is under a pious obligation to discharge. It is a right attached to the property and he takes the property subject to the moral liability of the father-in-law and his son is under the pious obligation to discharge the same. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the arrears claimed. The appeal fails and is dismissed without costs. 21. NARASIMHAM, J.: I agree. 22. As pointed out by my learned brother, there is no authority on the question as to the stage at which the moral obligation of a Hindu father to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law out of his self-acquired property ripens into a legal obligation when that property is inherited by his son. 21. NARASIMHAM, J.: I agree. 22. As pointed out by my learned brother, there is no authority on the question as to the stage at which the moral obligation of a Hindu father to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law out of his self-acquired property ripens into a legal obligation when that property is inherited by his son. Does that legal obligation arise for the first time after the death of the father or else does it relate back during the life-time of the father also subject, of course, to the law of limitation? The paucity of cases on the subject is perhaps due to the fact that it is seldom that a father-in-law fails to discharge his moral obligation and disputes arise only after his death between the widowed daughter-in-law and his son. 23. On the general principles of Hindu Law on which the doctrine of pious obligation is based there seems no special reason for holding that the legal obligation arises only after the death of the father. In Maynes Hindu Law, 11th Edition, at page 397 it is pointed out that the sons liability to pay his fathers debts arises from the moral and religious obligation to rescue from the penalties arising from non-payment of debts and that this obligation compels the son to carry out what the ancestor has promised for religious purposes. The moral obligation of the father to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law even out of his self-acquired property is based, partly at any rate, on the doctrine of spiritual benefit and the son is under pious obligation to rescue his father from the consequences arising out of the failure of the father to fulfil even his moral obligations. Doubtless, I am conscious of the danger of extending this principle too far. But in this case we are concerned only with a limited class of moral obligations, namely, the obligation to maintain a widowed daughter-in-law. The maintenance of dependent females and the dire consequences to the family if the females are left unprovided for, have been so strongly emphasised in all the scriptural texts that it seems no undue strain to stretch the principles of pious obligation to cases of maintenance of females. I may quote the following text from Manusmriti, Chapter 3, Verses 57 and 58. "57. Sochanti jamavo vatra vinasvayasu tatkulam, Na sochanti tu yatraiya vardhate taddhi sarvada". I may quote the following text from Manusmriti, Chapter 3, Verses 57 and 58. "57. Sochanti jamavo vatra vinasvayasu tatkulam, Na sochanti tu yatraiya vardhate taddhi sarvada". (That family in which the female dependents (including daughters-in-law) are aggrieved will speedily go to ruin. But where they are not aggrieved that family will become prosperous). "58. Jamayo yani gehani sapantyapratipujit Tani krutyahataniva vinasyanti samantatah". (Those houses which are cursed by the female dependents due to their not being properly honoured, will perish as if by magic)." 24. Some support for the above view may be gathered from the language used by the Privy Council in AIR 1934 PC 29 (F) where it was observed that the moral liability of a Hindu father to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law when transmitted to his sons on his death, became in their persons a legal liability. The use of the verb transmitted supports the view that it is not a new liability that arises on the death of the father but it is a previous liability which the sons inherit along with their fathers estate. Appeal dismissed.