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1954 DIGILAW 142 (KER)

Nanu Divakaran v. Velumpi Nani

1954-08-24

KOSHI, KUMARA PILLAI, SUBRAMONIA.IYER

body1954
Judgment :- 1. The questions which arise for decision in this second appeal relate to succession to the self-acquired and separate properties of an Ezhava female under S.18 of the Travancore Ezhava Act III of 1100. Plaint schedule items 1 and 2 are admittedly self-acquired properties of one Karambi who was the mother of the 1st defendant. Karambi died after the Travancore Ezhava Act III of 1100 came into force, leaving a son and a daughter. The daughter is the 1st defendant, and the son was one Nanu who died in 1116. Plaintiff is the eldest son of the 1st defendant. Besides the plaintiff the 1st defendant has five more children. In 1115 the 1st defendant and Nanu mortgaged plaint schedule item No.1 to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 50, and while the 2nd defendant was in possession of the properties the 1st defendant executed in favour of the 3rd defendant a puisne mortgage, Ext. A, in 1119, after Nanu's death. Both plaint items 1 and 2 were included in Ext. A. Possession of item No. 2 was given to the 3rd defendant on the date of the execution of that document, and she was directed to redeem the mortgage of 1115 and get possession of item I. Accordingly she was also obtained a decree for redemption of the mortgage of 1115 and recovery of possession of item 1. The plaintiff's case is that on the death of Karambi the plaint properties devolved on her thavazhee consisting of Nanu and the 1st defendant and the 1st defendant's children, that the plaint properties were therefore the sub-tarwad properties of the said thavazhee, that Nanu was in possession of the properties till his death in 1116 as karnavan of the thavazhee or sub-tarwad, that at the time of the execution of Ext. A plaintiff was the karnavan of the sub-tarwad and the 1st defendant was therefore incompetent to execute the puisne mortgage, that Ext. A is also not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity binding on his sub-tarwad, and that it should therefore be set aside and he should be allowed to recover possession of item 2 with past and future mesne profits. A is also not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity binding on his sub-tarwad, and that it should therefore be set aside and he should be allowed to recover possession of item 2 with past and future mesne profits. As plaint item 1 is outstanding on the mortgage of 1115 which is accepted by the plaintiff as a transaction supported by consideration and necessity and binding on his sub-tarwad, recovery of possession of that item was not sought for in the plaint. The 3rd defendant contested the suit. She contended inter alia that the plaint properties were not the sub-tarwad of properties of the plaintiff and that the suit was not maintainable in its present form. The trial court repelled this contention and decreed the suit practically in terms of the plaint. In the appeal which the 3rd defendant filed against the trial court's decree it was urged on her behalf, that under S.18 of the Travancore Ezhava Act III of 1100, on the death of an intestate Ezhava female her self-acquired and separate properties would devolve on the entire group of all her descendants both in female line and the male line, that the children of her sons and the children of her daughters must of necessity belong to different tarwads, that these descendants would not, therefore, take her properties as persons belonging to any Marumakkathayam thavazhee or sub-tarwad but only as tenants-in-common, that the plaint properties were not, therefore, the sub-tarwad properties of the plaintiff, and that he was only entitled to a fractional share in them. It was urged that as the suit was brought on the footing that the plaint properties belong to the plaintiff's sub-tarwad and not on the basis of his individual right in respect of them as one of the co-heirs of Karambi, it was not maintainable and should be dismissed. These contentions found favour with the learned District Judge. Accordingly he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff, therefore, brought this second appeal, and it has been referred by one of us for decision by a Full Bench. 2. The questions of law which arise for decision in the case have been formulated as follows in the order of reference. Accordingly he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff, therefore, brought this second appeal, and it has been referred by one of us for decision by a Full Bench. 2. The questions of law which arise for decision in the case have been formulated as follows in the order of reference. "The question that arises is firstly whether Explanation 2 to S.19 of the Act will take in the children of male members of the thavazhee among the group of persons on whom the property devolves, and secondly assuming they also will come in, what exactly is the tenure under which the group of persons take the property, whether as tenants-in-common as held by the District Judge, or as joint tenants as is contended for on behalf of the plaintiff". 3. Intestate succession is dealt with in Part IV of the Travancore Ezhava Act III of 1100. That part bears the title "Intestate Succession". There are five sections in the part, viz., Ss. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. Ss. 15, 16 and 17 deal with Intestate Succession to an Ezhava male, and Ss. 18 and 19 deal with Intestate Succession to an Ezhava female. S.18 enacts: "On the death of an Ezhava female, the whole of her self-acquired or separate property left undisposed of by her at her death shall devolve on her own thavazhee. If she dies leaving her surviving no members of her thavazhee but her husband and members of her mother's thavazhee, one-half of such property shall devolve on her husband and the other half on her mother's thavazhee. In the absence of the husband the mother's thavazhee shall take the whole, and in the absence of the mother's thavazhee the husband shall take the whole." Relying on the ordinary connotation of the term "thavazhee" in Marumakkathayam Law the appellant's learned counsel contends that the thavazhee on which the properties devolve under S.18 is the intestate female's thavazhee consisting of her sons and daughters and her daughter's descendants in the female line, and that the children of her sons and other descendants in the male line would not be included in that "thavazhee". In support of this contention he also relies on the definition of the term "thavazhee of a female" in S. 4(3) of the Ezhava Act III of 1100. In support of this contention he also relies on the definition of the term "thavazhee of a female" in S. 4(3) of the Ezhava Act III of 1100. S. 4(3) reads: "Thavazhee of a female" means a group of persons consisting of that female and her issue how-low¬so-ever in the female line, or such of that group as are alive". It is true that under the ordinary Marumakkathayam Law a thavazhee would consist only of the descendants in the female line of a common ancestress and the common ancestress, if she is alive, and the descendants of her sons and the descendants of her daughter's sons would not belong to it. Such a thavazhee in Marumakkathayam Law holds the properties belonging to it or taken by it as a sub-tarwad with all the incidents of tarwad property such as joint ownership, right of survivorship, possession and management by the karnavan, and requirements of considerations and tarwad necessity and consent of all adult members to make alienations of its properties valid and binding on the thavazhee. The appellant's contention is that the "thavazhee" which succeeds on the death of an Ezhava female to her self-acquired and separate properties under S.18 of the Act is a thavazhee as understood in the above sense. 4. If S.18 had stood by itself this contention would have been unanswerable. But S.18 does not stand alone, and has to be read in the light of Explanation II of S.19. Explanation II of S.19 provides: "The expression "children" in the case of an intestate male and the expression "thavazhee" in the case of an intestate female shall, for the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate male or female how-low-so-ever". It is clear from this explanation that the term "thavazhee" has not been used in Part IV of the Ezhava Act in the sense that term is understood in ordinary Marumakkathayam Law and has been defined in S. 4(3), but in an entirely different sense. According to Explanation II, the expression "thavazhee" has to be understood for the purpose of Part IV of the Act, that is to say for purposes of intestate succession, as meaning only the issue of how-low-so-ever of the intestate female. According to Explanation II, the expression "thavazhee" has to be understood for the purpose of Part IV of the Act, that is to say for purposes of intestate succession, as meaning only the issue of how-low-so-ever of the intestate female. The term "thavazhee" used in S.18 would include all the issue of the intestate female how-low-so-ever, including both the descendants of her daughters and the descendants of her sons. Explanation II of S.19 makes it clear that the descendants of both sons and daughters are included in the term "thavazhee" as used in S. 18, and that the term as used in that Section is not meant to include only her issue in the female line. It was contended by the appellant's counsel that the omission in Explanation II to limit the connotation of the term "thavazhee" to issue in the female line alone was due to an oversight or inadvertence and that, from the use of the term "thavazhee", which has got a very special meaning in Marumakkathayam Law, in S.18 and Explanation II of S. 19, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended the intestate female's issue in the female line alone to succeed to her self-acquired and separate properties. If the Legislature had intended to use the term "thavazhee" only in its ordinary connotation in Part IV of the Act, there was no necessity to add Explanation II to S. 19. The term had already been defined in S. 4(3) and the definition given in S. 4(3) was the same as its ordinary connotation in Marumakkathayam Law. It was only because the Legislature intended to depart from the ordinary connotation of the expression and the definition given in S. 4(3) that it expressly added in Part IV, Explanation II to S. 19. The term "thavazhee" has been used in Part IV only as a compendious expression connoting all the descendants of the intestate female including both the issue of her sons and the issue of her daughters. 5. The erstwhile Travancore High Court also had occasion to consider this question in the case of Kaliyani v. Gopalan reported in 1945 TLR 122. A Division Bench of that High Court held that the word "thavazhee" used in S.18 and Explanation II of S.19 would include all the descendants of the intestate female in either line - male or female. 6. A Division Bench of that High Court held that the word "thavazhee" used in S.18 and Explanation II of S.19 would include all the descendants of the intestate female in either line - male or female. 6. The answer to the first question contained in the order of reference is, therefore, that Explanation II to S.19 of the Travancore Ezhava Act would take in all the issue of the intestate female including both the descendants of her daughters and the descendants of her sons, and not merely the members of her thavazhee as that term is understood in ordinary Marumakkathayam Law among the group of persons on whom, under S. 18, her self-acquired and separate properties would devolve on her death. 7. It was contended by the appellant's learned counsel that, even if the children of the intestate's sons are entitled to succeed to her self-acquired and separate properties, the effect of S.18 would be to make the whole group of her heirs, including the children of the sons and the children of the daughters, take the properties as joint tenants. According to him since the term "thavazhee" has been used in S.18 for denoting the whole group of heirs, it has to be presumed that in enacting that section the Legislature intended that all of them should take together the properties as a thavazhee, with all the incidents of thavazhee or sub-tarwad property under the Marumakkathayam Law. The children of the sons and the children of the daughters of an intestate female must of necessity belong to more than one Marumakkathayam tarwad. The sons and daughters of the intestate and the children of the daughters will, of course, belong to the same tarwad, but the intestate female's son and son's children will naturally belong to two different tarwads since marriage between a male and a female of the same tarwad is forbidden. In the intestate female had left more than one son and if some of her daughters also had sons, and these sons too had children at the time of her death, the group of heirs entitled to succeed under S.18 would in many cases belong to several tarwads. A thavazhee under the Marumakkathayam Law is composed of the members of the same tarwad. It is opposed to all notions of Marumakkathayam Law to conceive of a thavazhee composed of members of different tarwads. A thavazhee under the Marumakkathayam Law is composed of the members of the same tarwad. It is opposed to all notions of Marumakkathayam Law to conceive of a thavazhee composed of members of different tarwads. From Explanation II to S. 19, it is clear that the Legislature only intended to make use of the word "thavazhee" in Part IV of the Act as a compendious expression for referring to all the issue how-low-so-ever, both in the male line and the female line, of the intestate female. Having regard to Explanation II of S. 19, in the absence of an express provision in the Statute itself, it is not permissible to infer from the mere use of the expression "thavazhee" in S.18 that the Legislature had intended by that section that the "thavazhee" mentioned therein should have all the incidents of a marumakkathayam thavazhee. Since the "thavazhee" mentioned in S.18 will be composed of members of different tarwads, in the absence of any express provision in the Statute, the persons referred to by that expression can take the properties devolving on them only as tenants-in¬common, and not as joint tenants. 8. Reliance was placed by the appellant's counsel to a passage in the judgment in Kalyani v. Gopalan, 1945 TLR 122, referred to above, in support of his contention that the heirs take as joint tenants and not as tenants-in-common. The passage relied upon by him reads as follows: "The general rule seems quite applicable to the present case. The parties themselves would appear to have proceeded on the footing of their having taken as a group. The Seshakars admittedly took their share as a tarwad and the Makkathayam heirs also would take their share as a sub-tarwad to that extent following the rules of the Marumakkathayam usage. This contention of Mr. V.T. Thomas must therefore be rejected." Though this passage might appear in the first blush to support the appellant's contention, on close scrutiny it can be seen that the question of succession under S.18 of the Ezhava Act of 1100 was not the subject matter of consideration in that passage. In that case the suit was one for partition of the properties left by an Ezhava female, by name Narayani who died in 1110. There were several defendants in that suit, and they had different contentions. In that case the suit was one for partition of the properties left by an Ezhava female, by name Narayani who died in 1110. There were several defendants in that suit, and they had different contentions. Some of the defendants raised the contention that the children of Narayani's son also were entitled to the properties left by her, and the High Court upheld their contention. Certain other defendants had a contention that some of the properties sought to be divided belonged to the father of the 1st plaintiff who had died in 1083, before the enactment of the Ezhava Act III of 1100. In respect of these properties, they contended that one-half of them was taken by the Seshakars and the other half by his children or Makkathayam heirs. The question was also raised whether his heirs took the properties as joint tenants or as tenants-in-common. The High Court held that his Seshakars took one-half of his properties as joint tenants, and that his Makkathayam heirs also took the other half as joint tenants. That is to say, there were two groups of joint tenants - each group having nothing to do with the other. The passage from the judgment in 1945 TLR 122 extracted above deals with the case of succession to an intestate of Ezhava male who had died before the enactment of the Travancore Ezhava Act III of 1100. The case was governed by the customary law then in force and not by the Statute of 1100. Under the customary law only the children of the intestate male were his Makkathayam heirs, and since the intestate male in that case had only one wife there was no difficulty in their taking the property as a sub¬tarwad, ie., as joint tenants. That decision is no authority for holding that in the case of succession under S.18 of the Act of 1100 the heirs take as joint tenants. 9. The answer to the second question formulated in the order of reference is that the heirs under S.18 take the properties devolving on them as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. 10. That decision is no authority for holding that in the case of succession under S.18 of the Act of 1100 the heirs take as joint tenants. 9. The answer to the second question formulated in the order of reference is that the heirs under S.18 take the properties devolving on them as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. 10. Since it is admitted by both sides that the plaint properties were the self-acquired and separate properties of Karambi, it follows from what has been said above that on her death the properties devolved on all her surviving issue who took them as tenants-in-common and that they are not the sub¬tarwad properties of the plaintiff. The plaintiff can therefore ask for cancellation of the puisne mortgage only in so far as it affects his share in the properties and is not entitled to seek for the cancellation of the whole mortgage. It is admitted that he has not joined in its execution. He has also not received any part of the consideration for it. Since there is a dispute between the parties as to whether Nanu had any children at the time of Karambi's death and there is no evidence on that point, it is not now possible to ascertain the extent of the share which the plaintiff has in the plaint properties. In view of these circumstances and having regard also to the fact that the present suit is based on the alleged right of the plaintiff's sub-tarwad and not on his individual right, the only relief that can be allowed in this suit to the plaintiff is to give him a declaration that the puisne mortgage of 1119, Ext. A is not binding on him and his share in the plaint properties and leave him free to bring a fresh suit for recovery of possession of his share of the plaint properties. The extent of his share must be left open to be ascertained in the fresh suit after taking evidence as to the number of heirs Karambi had under S.18 of the Act of 1100. Subject to the above declaration and the right given to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit as mentioned above, the decree of the lower appellate court is confirmed, and this second appeal is dismissed. Parties will bear their costs in this court. Dismissed.