Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the decree dismissing his suit. He sued for a declaration that the decree and execution proceedings in O.S. Nos. 1655 and 1657 of 1100 of the Padmanabhapuram Munsiff's Court were fraudulently and collusively obtained and that the sale and delivery proceedings in execution of the two decrees were not binding on the plaint properties which were alleged to belong to a private family trust and also for recovery of possession of the properties from the defendants with mesne profits. His case was that these properties had been declared to be trust properties by the decree in O.S. No. 67 of the Nagercoil District Court which was confirmed by the High Court in A.S. No. 132 of 1086, that four persons including defendants 1 and 2 had been appointed as trustees by the said decree, that defendants 1 and 2 were the surviving trustees and that defendants 1 and 2 were doing various fraudulent acts to appropriate the properties themselves. It was further alleged that according to Jenmikarom decisions these properties were not liable to Jenmikarom. However, one of the trustees had executed a deed admitting liability for Michavarom and the two decrees were obtained on the basis of such an invalid deed. The plaintiff claimed that the decrees could not bind the plaint properties. The grounds on which the declaration regarding the decrees and execution proceedings were sought were that the two decrees were obtained on a false claim that the properties belonged to a Trust and that the decrees were fraudulently and collusively obtained. Defendants 3 and 4 contested. The 3rd defendant's contentions were that the properties were the Jenmom properties of her family, that the same were demised on Kanom to the ancestors of the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 and that the decrees were validly obtained for recovery of Michavarom justly due. She denied the allegations of fraud and collusion as well as the averment in the plaint that the properties belonged to a trust. The 4th defendant who claimed under the 3rd defendant raised similar contentions. The suit was dismissed mainly on the basis of certain admissions and concessions said to have been made by counsel at the final hearing. She denied the allegations of fraud and collusion as well as the averment in the plaint that the properties belonged to a trust. The 4th defendant who claimed under the 3rd defendant raised similar contentions. The suit was dismissed mainly on the basis of certain admissions and concessions said to have been made by counsel at the final hearing. An affidavit was filed before us by the Counsel who appeared for the plaintiff in the lower court denying the alleged admissions and concessions and in view of this we permitted the appellant's counsel to address arguments on all the points. 2. The main point urged by Mr. Krishnamurthi Iyer, the learned counsel for the appellant was that the properties belonged to a trust and that the decrees and execution proceedings were invalid in view of the fact that the so-called trustees were not impleaded in that capacity in the two suits. Though the plaintiff had a case in the plaint that the properties belonged to a private trust, failure to describe defendants 1 and 2 as trustees in the two suits was not relied on as a ground for setting aside the decrees. However this question is not of any importance in this case because the view that we take on the main question whether the properties belonged to a trust as alleged by the plaintiff. 3. The foundation on which the plaintiff's case rests is his assertion that there is a valid wakf and that the properties belonged to that wakf. The plaintiffs sought to prove this fact by producing Exts. B and C copy of the judgment in O.S. No. 67 of 1083 of the Nagercoil District Court and the decree in A.S. No. 132 of 1086 of the High Court. Ext. B was the judgment in a suit for removal of the trustees or Mutawallis including defendants 1 and 2 and for setting aside certain alienations. The 3rd defendant was not a party to that suit. The judgment Ext. B though not interpartes is admissible in evidence under S.13 of the Evidence Act. However, the judgment can neither be considered conclusive nor can the findings contained therein be used as evidence in this case. It is not the correctness of the previous decision but the fact that there has been a prior decision that is established by the judgment. B though not interpartes is admissible in evidence under S.13 of the Evidence Act. However, the judgment can neither be considered conclusive nor can the findings contained therein be used as evidence in this case. It is not the correctness of the previous decision but the fact that there has been a prior decision that is established by the judgment. The limited use to which such judgments may be put has been explained by the Privy Council in Dinomoni v. Brij Mohini (29 Indian Appeals 24). It was held that an order under S. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was admissible to show that such an order was made, who the parties to the dispute were, what the land in dispute was and who was declared entitled to retain such possession and that the order was admissible for this purpose and to this extent for and against every one when the fact of possession on the date of the order has to be ascertained. Mookerjee, J. has explained the position in the passage extracted below from his judgment in Kashinath Pal v. Jagatkeshore (20 C.W.N. 643 at p. 644). "It is well settled that although a judgment not interpartes may be used in evidence in certain circumstances, as a fact in issue, or as relevant fact or possibly as a transaction Rama Rajan v. Ram Narain (I.L.R. 22 Cal. 533), Bhitto v. Kesho Pershad (L.R. 24 I.A.10), Dinomani v. Brojomohini (L.R. 29 I.A. 24), Tepu Katu Rajani (I.L.R. 25 Ca. 52), Malcomson v. O'Dea (10 H.L.C. 593) and Bristoro v. Cormican (3 App. Ca. 641), the recitals in the judgment cannot be used as evidence in a litigation between the parties. The principle is that all judgments are conclusive of their existence, as distinguished from their truth, judgments, as public transactions of a solemn nature, are presumed to be faithfully recorded. Every judgment is, therefore, conclusive evidence, for and against all persons whether parties, privies or strangers, of its own existence, date and legal effect as distinguished from the accuracy of the decision rendered; in other words the law attributes unerring verity to the substantive as opposed to the judicial portions of the record". 4. This decision was followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Seethapati Rao Dora v. Venkanna Dora (I.L.R. 45 Mad. 332). 4. This decision was followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Seethapati Rao Dora v. Venkanna Dora (I.L.R. 45 Mad. 332). Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on Sunni Central Board of Waqf V.P. v. Sirajul Haq Khan and others (A.I.R. 1954 All. 88) a decision of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The dictum in the case was: "A suit under S. 92, (formerly S. 539) Civil Procedure Code could be maintained only in respect of a public Trust of a permanent character and the judgment in such a suit would be a judgment in rem and not a judgment in personam". 5. This decision cannot be of any assistance, as it is asserted in the plaint that the Trust was a private Trust. Thus Exts. B and C cannot by themselves substantially help the plaintiff to prove the foundation of his claim and apart from Exts. B and C there is no evidence to show that there was a valid wakf or that these properties belonged to the wakf. It is not contended that if the properties are not proved to belong to a wakf, the decrees obtained against defendants 1 and 2 and the execution proceedings in the decrees would not be valid. 6. If the decrees were thus validly obtained with proper persons on the party array, it is not open to the plaintiff to contend that the claims adjudicated in the two suits were not true. There is no evidence of fraud or collusion. The plaintiff admitted that the properties were held on Kanom. Even if the Jenmikarom officer decided that the properties were not liable for Jenmikarom, it is open for the Jenmi to question the same in the Civil Court. 7. An interesting point was raised by Mr. Kukilliya, learned counsel for respondents, that a wakf could not be validly created in respect of properties held on Kanom which is in its nature a usufructuary mortgage which has been made irredeemable by statute law. The argument was that such mortgages would be an evasion of Mohammadan Law against usury. He relied on the decision in Rahaman v. Baquridian (A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 213). In the view that we take on the main question, we do not consider it necessary to expression an opinion on this question, in this case. 8. The argument was that such mortgages would be an evasion of Mohammadan Law against usury. He relied on the decision in Rahaman v. Baquridian (A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 213). In the view that we take on the main question, we do not consider it necessary to expression an opinion on this question, in this case. 8. In the result we confirm the decree of the lower court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Dismissed.