Judgment :- 1. Gnanamoni Nadar Gnansikhamony Nadar, who was accused No. 6 in Sessions Case No. 13 of 1953 on the file of the Nagercoil Sessions Court, has preferred this appeal against the conviction for commission of offence punishable under S. 489B of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years besides a fine of Rs. 600/- imposed upon him in respect therefor. Seven other persons were jointly tried along with the appellant for the commission of similar offences, but they have all been acquitted except accused No. 4. The appeal preferred by accused No. 4 is criminal appeal No. 41. That appeal and the present appeal were heard together. Apart from the contention that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of either appellant, Sri. T.K. Narayana Pillai (N) learned counsel appearing for the appellants also contended that the trial was bad for misjoinder of charges and persons and that the convictions and sentences had to be set aside on that sole ground. At the conclusion of the hearing we expressed the view that we were inclined to accept the argument with regard to the mis joinder and to set aside the convictions and sentences. 2. We have dealt with the question of mis joinder in our judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 41, just pronounced and upholding the defence contention in respect thereof have quashed the convictions and the sentences against accused No. 4 and directed him to be tried afresh. So far as the present appellant is concerned, on a careful examination of the records of the case we are inclined to think that the learned Sessions Judge has based the conviction made on inadmissible evidence than on legal evidence. On a retrial, when the inadmissible portion of the evidence is eschewed, the chances of the appellant being convicted, would appear to us to be remote. The legal evidence on record is for the most part either incredible or tainted and it would be unsafe to found a conviction upon it without independent corroboration. We, therefore, propose to dispose of this appeal on the merits. 3. S. 489B relates to "using the genuine, forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes". The learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for attempting to pass off as genuine one counterfeit currency note of the one hundred rupees' denomination. We, therefore, propose to dispose of this appeal on the merits. 3. S. 489B relates to "using the genuine, forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes". The learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for attempting to pass off as genuine one counterfeit currency note of the one hundred rupees' denomination. The case against the appellant was that in May 1951 he purchased one counterfeit note from accused 3 for Rs. 10, that in September of that year he purchased six like notes from accused 2 for Rs. 70 and that out of the seven notes he thus came by, he gave one (M.O. III) to PW. 18 in November 1951 to get it changed into genuine notes of smaller denominations. Though the purchases from accused 2 and accused 3 were held not to have been proved, accepting the evidence of PWs. 17, 18, 19, 37 and 38 the learned Sessions Judge found the offence under S. 489B brought home to the appellant. 4. PW. 18 is the principal witness and his evidence is to the following effect. In Karthigai 1127 the appellant entrusted M.O. III to him for being cashed and suspecting its genuineness he declined to give change and wanted the appellant to take it back. The appellant while agreeing to do so did not take it back for over three months. In Masi the Police went over to his place in the company of the appellant and recovered the note from him as per the mahazar, Ext. M. The discussion of the evidence of the witness by the learned judge shows that she was of the view, that having retained the note with him for months together knowing the same to be not genuine, the testimony of the witness was not worthy to be acted upon unless corroborated by independent evidence. The prosecution case is that it was information supplied by the appellant himself that led to the recovery of M.O. III from the possession of PW. 18 and the learned judge has stated that but for corroboration evidence available in the case the explanation of the witness as to the retention of the note would not have been entitled to any weight, it (the explanation) being a mere self serving one. It was the witness whom the Police found in possession of the incriminating material, the counterfeit currency note and not the appellant. It was the witness whom the Police found in possession of the incriminating material, the counterfeit currency note and not the appellant. The learned judge however found corroboration for the evidence of PW. 18 in the testimony of two police officers examined in the case, (PW. 37 and PW. 38) and in the evidence of PW. 19, an attesting witness to the mahazar for the recovery. The Police officers are respectively the Sub-Inspector and the Circle Inspector who were in charge of the investigation. After adverting to the defence criticism that PW. 18's evidence was tainted evidence the learned judge remarked "PW. 38 the Circle Inspector and PW. 37 the Sub-Inspector swear that the 6th accused on being arrested admitted that he had entrusted one note with PW. 18 for being changed and it was on that information they proceeded to the house of the witness and recovered the note from him. There is on reason why their evidence on this point should not be accepted". 5. We are afraid that the learned judge has used the evidence of PW. 37 and PW. 38 in a manner not warranted by law. That M.O. III was recovered from the possession of PW. 18 in consequence of information received from the appellant to the Police is admissible, but to admit in evidence and act upon the further statement of the appellant to the Police that a counterfeit note was handed over by him to PW. 18, to get change for the same, is to fall foul with the rule in Kottaya's case AIR 1947 PC 67. 6. Time and again courts in India have quoted from the judgment in that case and pointed out that statements of accused persons to the Police admitting the commission of the crime charged against them cannot be allowed to go in evidence under the guise of admissible evidence falling within the scope of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Yet, looking into the depositions PW. 19, PW. 37 and PW. 38 gave at the trial we find such evidence has been allowed to go in without protest even from the court. The court has also used that inadmissible evidence and found in it the needed corroboration to act upon the evidence of PW. 18. Both PW. 37 and PW. Yet, looking into the depositions PW. 19, PW. 37 and PW. 38 gave at the trial we find such evidence has been allowed to go in without protest even from the court. The court has also used that inadmissible evidence and found in it the needed corroboration to act upon the evidence of PW. 18. Both PW. 37 and PW. 38 gave evidence that the appellant admitted to them that he gave a counterfeit currency note to PW. 18 to get change for it. PW. 19 also spoke in the same strain regarding the statement of the appellant to the Police. That statement was equally inadmissible as it was one he heard the appellant make to PW. 37 and PW.38, while he was in their custody. Barring the evidence with regard to the appellant's statement to the Police, PW. 19 only proves the recovery. 7. Except that M.O. III happened to be recovered from the possession of PW. 18 pursuant to the information obtained from the appellant, the evidence of PWs. 19,37 and 38 that the appellant told the Police that he gave a false note to PW. 18 to get change for the same was clearly inadmissible. Such evidence ought not have been allowed to be let in, much less used by the learned judge to found upon it the conviction of the appellant. Another extract from the judgment would show that it was this inadmissible evidence given by these three witnesses that turned the scales of justice against the appellant. The learned judge has said:- "The evidence of PWs. 37 and 38 taken along with that of PWs. 18 and 19 clearly establish the fact that M.O. III forged note was recovered from the possession of PW. 18 on the information given by A.6. The possession of the forged note by A.6 and his pressing it on PW. 18 for being utilised as a genuine one is proved by the above evidence." 8. It is clear from the two extracts we have taken from the judgment that on the testimony of PW. 18 alone the appellant would not have been convicted. There is no independent evidence in the case to establish that the appellant handed over M.O. III to PW. 18 and that such handing over was for getting cash for it. According to PW. 18 alone the appellant would not have been convicted. There is no independent evidence in the case to establish that the appellant handed over M.O. III to PW. 18 and that such handing over was for getting cash for it. According to PW. 18, he had kept M.O. III with him for over three months knowing the same to be a counterfeit one. To save his own skin he had to give an explanation. As pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge herself it is mare self serving statement and cannot be used against the appellant unless corroborated by independent evidence. PWs. 19, 37 and 38 alone gave corroborative evidence, but their evidence about the matter was inadmissible. 9. PW. 17, the only other witness believed by the learned judge as against the appellant, gave no useful evidence regarding the specific charge of which the appellant has been found guilty. That witness only stated that some months prior to the arrest of the appellant, the latter gave him a false hundred rupees note together with some genuine notes of smaller denominations towards the price of coconuts purchased by him. The witness would have it that suspecting the genuineness of the hundred rupees' note he returned the same to the appellant. That note is not before the Court. In the learned judge's own word this evidence only established that the appellant attempted to pass off a one hundred rupees' note similar to M.O. III to the witness and that it had to be returned on suspicion that it was not a good one. Though the judge refers to M.O. III it was really M.O. I the learned Special Public Prosecutor showed to the witness during his examination and the statement made by the witness was that the appellant gave him a note which was similar to M.O. I. The learned judge took it for granted that M.O. III was shown to the witness while as a matter of fact the deposition shows that M.O.I. It was that was shown. Whatever that be, we fail to see how the evidence is useful to prove the specific charge of uttering or attempting to pass off as genuine M.O. III. Whatever that be, we fail to see how the evidence is useful to prove the specific charge of uttering or attempting to pass off as genuine M.O. III. Had the identity of M.O. III with the counterfeit note given to the witness been established that would no doubt have shown that the subsequent dealings with it was with guilty intent, but the nature of the evidence given by the witness gives no scope for any such inference. Further, a reading of his deposition does not impress us that PW. 17 is a truthful witness. At the Sessions trial the learned Special Public Prosecutor had to treat him as having turned hostile to the prosecution and cross-examine him during the course of the re-examination. While the prosecution case was that the appellant handed over the false note to the witness, in cross-examination what the witness said was that it was the appellant's father who did that. Any how his evidence, even if believed in its entirety, does not advance the case of the prosecution. 10. In these circumstances we fell loath to consider that interests of justice demand that the appellant should be made to stand a retrial. His appeal is allowed and the conviction and the sentence passed against him by the learned Sessions Judge are set aside. We acquit the appellant. His bail bond will stand cancelled. Order accordingly. Allowed.