Judgment :- 1. This is an application by the Standard Motor Union Ltd., Ettumanoor, represented by its Managing Director, C.L. Varkey against two respondents, the State of Travancore-Cochin and the Swaraj Motors Ltd., Kottayam, respectively asking the court to issue an order in the nature of certiorari or other directions and quash the order passed by the Government in review on 7.4.1953 in L.Dis. 3762/52/PWC. The 2nd respondent applied for a stage carriage permit on 1.1.52. That application was rejected by the Transport Authority before whom it was made on 9.2.52. The applicant aggrieved by the order appealed to the Government on 8.4.52 and the Government by order dated 23.1.1953 dismissed the appeal. An application for review was made by the second respondent which was allowed by the Government by order dated 7.4.1953. The order passed in appeal is marked as Ext. A and that passed in review is marked as Ext. B. The petitioner company who were also operators of Transport buses in the locality and who objected to the issue of permit to the second respondent on the aforesaid application seek to have the order of Government passed on 7.4.1953 on review quashed as one passed without jurisdiction. There are certain other grounds also taken in the petition but the only ground argued at the hearing is the want of jurisdiction in Government to review their order. There appears to have been other proceedings also started by an application made by the petitioner for stage carriage permit against the order of the Transport Authority allowing their application which was objected to by the 2nd respondent and an appeal was presented before Government which was allowed and the matter remanded to the Transport Authority for further consideration and disposal by order dated 20.9.1952 in which liberty is reserved to the second respondent to intervene and seek their reliefs. The 2nd respondent had also applied for a permit in the same route for which the permit is applied for by the petitioner. To the objection that the order of review was without jurisdiction the answer given in the counter-affidavit presented on behalf of the first respondent is contained in paragraph 4 to the effect that although there is no provision to accept a review the first respondent has inherent powers to rectify mistakes in review and in the next paragraph it is stated "good grounds were given for review". In the counter-affidavit presented by the second respondent the objection to the order passed on review on the ground of want of jurisdiction is answered in paragraph 6 wherein they say: "The power to review its own order is inherent in the Government and in the absence of any provisions to the contrary, Government have every right to do so. The Government have not, in any way, exceeded their powers in passing the order of 7.4.1953. Even assuming that there is an error in the exercise of their jurisdiction, that will be no ground for interference by this Hon'ble Court by the issue of a writ." It is significant that it is not stated that the jurisdiction that the Government purported to exercise is not in review. The order impeached dated 7.4.1953 insists that the jurisdiction invoked and exercised is in review. In fact the competency to interfere in review was canvassed and the answer was that they had considered the question then and on previous occasions and reached the conclusion that the Government had jurisdiction to review their order. It was so stated in the order. No doubt, the order mentions certain mistakes committed by the Government in the matter of the disposal of the second respondent's appeal. It is because mistakes are committed which are to be rectified that reviews are applied for. The circumstance that a mistake is committed in an order passed by an authority by itself does not mean that that authority is responsible for that mistake. The second respondent was always represented before the Government in the matter of appeal and does not complain that they got no opportunity to urge all that they had to in support of the appeal which they presented. If the party interested did not place all facts before the authority and because of the inadvertence to facts which the party could have but omitted to place before the authority the order passed happens to be erroneous it cannot be said that that is a mistake committed by the authority. It is true that the authority having jurisdiction to decide a matter has jurisdiction to rectify any mistake that creeps into the order for which the authority alone is responsible and that jurisdiction is inherent in any authority having jurisdiction to decide any matter. In my judgment in A.I.R. 1953 Tr. It is true that the authority having jurisdiction to decide a matter has jurisdiction to rectify any mistake that creeps into the order for which the authority alone is responsible and that jurisdiction is inherent in any authority having jurisdiction to decide any matter. In my judgment in A.I.R. 1953 Tr. C. 439 while discussing the question of jurisdiction to review I have adverted to this aspect of the matter. I am not satisfied that in passing the order impugned dated 7.4.1953 the Government were rectifying any mistake committed by them. They were exercising the power of review at the instance and for the benefit of a party who invoked the Government's jurisdiction in review. That jurisdiction is not expressly granted by the statute. A power of review is not inherent in any authority. The moment a right to decide is exercised the authority becomes functus officio except for the matter of correction of clerical errors or mistakes committed by the authority for which, as already stated, the authority is responsible. The view that I have taken is also taken by the Madras High Court in Fernandez v. Ranganayakulu 1953 Madras 236. In my judgment the order dated 7.4.1953 passed by Government on review is void for want of jurisdiction and must be and is hereby quashed as such. The Original Petition is, therefore, allowed with costs, advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. 2. Mr. Govindan Nair represents before me that there a likelihood of it being taken that the application of the second respondent dated 1.1.1952 against the dismissal of which the appeal was preferred which was dismissed and which order was sought to be reviewed, was an application presented pursuant to the liberty reserved to the 2nd respondent by the order of remand made by the Government on 20.9.1953. It is clear that it could not be so because the order of remand was dated 20.9.1952 and the proceedings ending in the order of review dated 7.4.1953 was about eight months earlier. Allowed.