Judgment.- This is a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise the order of the District Judge of South Arcot passed on an application presented to him by a councillor of the Tindivanam Municipality under section 51 of the District Municipalities Act, 1920, praying that it may be adjudged after inquiry whether or not the respondent to his application was disqualified under section 50 of the said Act. The petitioner in the Court below who will be referred to as “the petitioner” in this C.R.P. was elected as a councillor for one of the wards in the Tindivanam Municipality in 1952. The respondent to the said petition who will be referred to as “the respondent” was also elected similarly for another ward and subsequently elected Chairman of the Municipality. The petitioner alleged that the respondent had ceased to hold his office by reason of section 50(1)(A) of the Act in that he became a leper. The learned District Judge held that the respondent was therefore disqualified and hence has ceased to hold his office as Municipal Councillor. It is against this order of the District Judge that the present revision petition has been filed. Under section 50(1)(b) of the Act, a councillor shall cease to hold his office if he becomes of unsound mind, a deaf, mute, or a leper. Section 51 of the Act provides inter alia that whenever it is alleged that any person who has been elected as a councillor is disqualified under section 50 and such person does not admit the allegation, any councillor may apply to the District Judge of the District in which the Municipality is situate, and the said District Judge, after making such inquiry as he deems necessary shall determine whether or not such person is disqualified under that section. Clause (3) of the section provides that pending such decision the councillor shall be entitled to act as if he were not disqualified. The learned Judge, held, accepting the report from the Superintendent, Government Lady Willingdon Leprosy Sanatorium, Tirumani Chingleput, that the respondent was afflicted with leprosy. In view of this, he held that the respondent had ceased to hold office. Several contentions were urged before him by the respondent who is the petitioner before me. It was first contended, relying on a certificate given by one Dr. In view of this, he held that the respondent had ceased to hold office. Several contentions were urged before him by the respondent who is the petitioner before me. It was first contended, relying on a certificate given by one Dr. Rajah on 16th February 1954 that the respondent was not a leper on the date of the inquiry, he could not be held to have ceased to hold his office under section 50(1)(A). Learned Counsel for the respondent argued that the material date for ascertaining whether or not a particular councillor had ceased to hold office on account of a disqualification was the date of the inquiry. In my opinion, this contention is opposed to the plain language of section 50. That section enacts that if a councillor becomes subject to one or other of the dis-qualifications enumerated therein, he shall cease to hold his office No doubt, in case of dispute, section 51 provides for recourse to the District Judge. But it is not as a result of the order of the District Judge that a councillor ceases to hold his office. The councillor ceases to hold office because of the supervening disqualification. It may be that no application has been filed under section 51 It may be that an application is filed late. It does not mean, however, that merely because an application has not been filed or had not been filed within certain time that the councillor, though disqualified under any one of the provisions (a) to (i), nevertheless does not cease to hold his office till determination by the District Judge This point is, I think covered by the observations of Wallace, J., in Subbaroya Goundan v. Muthu Kumaraswami Goundan1. In that case, the learned Judge was dealing with the analogous provision, section 57 of the Madras Local Boards Act of 1920. The learned Judge repelling an argument similar to one addressed to me, said:- “There is no limitation for an application under section 57 and one might never be put in at all. This does not mean, for example, that a person of unsound mind, deaf, mute a leper a convict, an insolvent etc reman members until some one takes out an application under section 57 to the District Judge. This does not mean, for example, that a person of unsound mind, deaf, mute a leper a convict, an insolvent etc reman members until some one takes out an application under section 57 to the District Judge. These persons cease ipso facto to be members, as section 56 states and the proviso to section 56 subject to the provisions of section 57 can only mean that in cases where an application under section 57 is put in, the operation of section 56 is not final, but is subject to the decision of the District Judge under section 57”. The learned Judge also pointed out that if an application is put in under section 57 of the Local Boards Act (corresponding to section 51 of the District Municipalities Act) and the District Judge decides that he had ceased to be a member, then he ceased to be a member from the date fixed in section 56 though for the purpose of saving the validity of proceedings in which he might have taken part after he had ceated to be a member he is deemed to be duly qualified. With respect, I am in entire agreement with the above observations of Wallace, J., and following them, I hold that a councillor ceases automatically to hold office if he becomes, disqualified in one or other of the ways mentioned in clauses (a) to (i) of section 50 (1) of the Act. In this case, I take the District Judge’s finding to mean that the respondent was suffering from leprosy in any event from 19th December 1053 and earlier. He, therefore, became a leper and ceased to hold office. It was next contended that though the respondent might be suffering from leprosy on 19th December, 1953, when he was examined by the Superintendent of the Leprosy Sanatorium, it was not proved that the respondent had not been suffering from that disease prior to his election and he had contracted it only thereafter. The attitude taken up by the respondent in defence before the learned District Judge was one of complete denial of having ever suffered from leprosy It was not suggested on his behalf that he had been a leper even prior to the date of his election, and that therefore section 50 which dealt with a supervening disqualification would not have any application at all. The learned Judge considered and rightly, that he was not called upon to decide the question whether the respondent was a leper even before his election. I do not, therefore, think that it is necessary to have a definite finding by the learned District Judge that the respondent contracted leprosy before or after his election. Learned counsel for the respondent adverted to what according to him is the policy of the Act underlying provisions like section 50 of the Madras District Municipalities Act and section 56 of the old Local Boards Act, and contended that as the real criterion was, whether the concerned councillor could satisfactorily carry out his duties as a councillor, the material time would be the time of the inquiry. I. see nothing in the language of the statute to support this contention. I agree with the learned District Judge that the respondent ceased to hold office because of the supervening disqualification, namely, that he had become a leper. In this view, it is not necessary to deal with the contention raised on behalf of the respondent’s counsel that the Civil Revision Petition itself is not maintainable, because section 115, Civil Procedure Code, will have no application, and Article 227 of the Constitution would not apply, because the District Judge dealing with an. application under section 51 of the Act would be a presona designata and not a Court or tribunal. As I said, it is not necessary to decide that question, though I may indicate my opinion that the contention is not well founded. The District Judge acting under section 51 of the Act might be, as Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam described him, a persona designata, that is to say, he was different from the District Court over which he was presiding. But I do not agree with him that he therefore was not a tribunal within the meaning of that term in Article 227 of the Constitution. Vide the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath1. In the result the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. K.S. ----- Petition dismissed.