Judgement ORDER : - This is a petition for an appropriate writ, direction or order preventing the State of Bombay from enforcing a requisition order dated 31-10-1953. 2. The petitioner alleges that since the year 1941 he has been the tenant of flat No.8 on the third floor of Neelam Mansion, Tribhowan Road, Bombay. In October 1950 one A.G. Pandit, a close friend of the petitioners father, died in the said flat. Thereafter on 18-4-1952, Government issued a notice to show cause why the property should not be requisitioned under S.5 or S.6(4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. The petitioner showed cause against the notice and the Mehtaji of the landlord also submitted before the Accommodation Officer that the petitioner was his tenant. Nonetheless by the requisition order dated 31-10-1953, Government made a declaration that the premises had become vacant in the month of October 1950 and proceeded to requisition the premises. 3. Now, the only ground on which this petition has been argued before me is that the requisition order infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. The argument as I see it is that the petitioner, being the tenant, was as such tenant entitled to "hold" the property in the sense of enjoying it. That is a right conferred under Art.19 (1)(f). By the order of requisition his right of holding the property restricted and the restrictions imposed must be under Art.19(5) "reasonable restrictions." In considering whether the restrictions are or are not reasonable, it is now well settled that the procedure prescribed for imposing such restrictions may also be taken into account and the procedure must also be reasonable. What is urged by the petitioner is that the Bombay Land Requisition Act, S.6(4), confers the power of requisition in cases in which the premises have become vacant. The proviso to that section which enacts that the declaration made by Government that the premises were vacant or had become vacant is conclusive evidence enables Government to make a declaration irrespective of whether the premises are in fact vacant or not and is therefore unreasonable and thus the restriction itself on the right of the tenant to enjoy the property is unreasonable. 4. Now, whatever may be the merits of this contention, there appears to me to be a very short answer to the petitioners plea. 4. Now, whatever may be the merits of this contention, there appears to me to be a very short answer to the petitioners plea. The Supreme Court had occasion more than once to deal with the correlation between Art.19(1)(f) and Art.31 of the Constitution; and in their judgment in - Dwarkadas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd, AIR 1954 SC 119 (A) Mahajan J. dealing with this question observed as follows (p.126): "The true approach to this question is that these two articles really deal with two different subjects and one has no direct relation with the other, namely, Art.31 deals with the field of eminent domain and the whole boundary of that field is demarcated by this article." Therefore, where we have a case of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, Art.31 applies and the requirements thereof have to be satisfied, and in my opinion Art.19(1)(f) does not apply to such a case. Article 19(1)(f) applies to cases where the person entitled to a right to property is in enjoyment of that right and restrictions are sought to be placed on such enjoyment. It is beyond dispute after the decision of the Supreme Court to which I have just referred that requisition is included within the term "acquisition" in Art.31(2) of the Constitution; and the power that is exercised under the Bombay Land Requisition Act is under the sphere of eminent domain. It is not alleged that the Act provides for the exercise of this power without fulfilling the conditions of Art.31(2), viz. that there should be a public purpose and that the law should provide for compensation, and therefore the requirements of Art.31 are fully satisfied. No question, therefore, in my opinion arises of considering whether any restrictions placed on the enjoyment of property are reasonable restrictions as Art.19(5) does not come into play and Art.19(1)(f) does not apply to the facts of the case. 5. The result, therefore, is that whether or not the petitioner was in fact a tenant, Government being clothed with authority to declare that there was a vacancy, and having so declared, the declaration is conclusive evidence of that fact and no Court can go behind it. The petition must, therefore, fail and the petition is dismissed and the rule discharged with costs. Costs fixed at Rs.650. Rule discharged.