ORDER : This revision arises out of proceedings before the Rent Controller and it is filed under S.115, Civil P.C. as well as under Article 227 of the Constitution. So far as the filing of this application under S.115, Civil P.C. is concerned, I think it cannot be considered, because a Division Bench of this High Court, - 'Shri Krishna v. Badrilal', Madh. B. LR 1953 Civ. 144 (A), has held that application of this nature under S.115, Civil P.C. is incompetent. 2. In considering the matter under Article 227 of the Constitution, I must briefly refer to the facts of the case. 3. The opponent, on 15-3-1948, filed a suit for the reduction of rent in the Court of Civil Judge, Morar. The suit continued there for some time, but on the coming into force of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act No.15 of 1950), the Court returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Thereupon the opponent filed an application under S.7 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan before the Rent Controller, Gwalior, and along with it also filed the plaint that was returned to him. The application under S.7 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan was for the reduction of the rent. The applicant (Landlord) objected to the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to entertain the application. But overruling this objection the Rent Controller entertained it and fixed the rent at Rs.483/- per year. On appeal, the District Judge, Gwalior, confirmed the decision of the trial Court. Aggrieved by this order, the landlord has filed this petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. 4. The main points urged by Mr. Ram Roop Tiwari, counsel for the applicant, are that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain this suit and that the rent fixed by him is too inadequate. 5. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the opponent, Mr. Anand, that the matter cannot be considered under Art.227 of the Constitution and to support his contention, he has cited the following cases: - 'Veerappa v. Raman and Raman Ltd,' AIR 1952 SC 192 (B); - 'D.N. Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee', AIR 1953 SC 58 (C); - 'Ramnivas v. Ramgopal', Madh BLJ 1952 HCR 589 (D) and - 'Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachiram Ratanmal', AIR 1953 Madh-B 197 (E). In reply the learned counsel for the applicant Mr. In reply the learned counsel for the applicant Mr. Tiwari has also cited an equal number of cases given below: - 'Kailash Nath v. Harish Chandra', AIR 1953 Madh-B 13 (F); - 'Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya', AIR 1952 Madh-B 51 (G); - 'Gundappa v. Collector of Gulbarga', AIR 1953 Hyd. 135 (H) and 'Abdur Rahim v. Josheph A. Pinto, AIR 1951 Hyd. 11 (FB) (I). 6. I must at the very outset make it clear that it is not at all easy to define the scope and ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution. But it will certainly be helpful to remember that in all civilised countries of the world, every High Court is vested with visitatorial jurisdiction, which is peculiar to itself. In order to appreciate the full implications of the power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court by Art.227 of the Constitution of India, a backward view of the law on the point may be found to be of some assistance. 7. By S.107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, powers of superintendence were conferred on the High Court and it was considered to include judicial as well as administrative superintendence, and, the High Court intervened by revision in appropriate cases. The power which the High Courts thus enjoyed was not liked by those in authority and in the next constitutional stride, which India took, by enacting S.224, sub-s.(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, this power of superintendence was limited to what has been described by Harries, C.J. purely non-judicial matters - 'Abdur Rahim v. Abdul Jabbar', AIR 1950 Cal 379 (J). After the attainment of Independence, the Constitution of India made a special provision for the power of superintendence, which is not hedged in by any conditions whatsoever. The Constitution itself has not defined it and the wisdom of it is not far to seek. The primary object of law is to do justice and it being not possible to provide for all eventualities, it is necessary that Courts of superior jurisdiction (High Courts) should be given wide discretionary powers, and the power of superintendence belongs to that species. In the circumstances, where the Constitution in its wisdom has left the power of superintendence undefined, it would not be proper to prescribe any rule which would limit it. In the circumstances, where the Constitution in its wisdom has left the power of superintendence undefined, it would not be proper to prescribe any rule which would limit it. That power I suggest may be left undefined because it is impossible to forsee all human exigencies, which may require protection of rights or redress of wrongs. In order to achieve its end, the power of superintendence under Art.227 of the Constitution must remain fluid. I venture to suggest that the real object of superintendence is that the power may be exercised with reference to the circumstances of each particular case in such a way as to secure the furtherance of justice. 8. Of the two Supreme Court cases cited before me, - ' AIR 1952 SC 192 (B)', contains observations of their Lordships about Art.226 of the Constitution only. In the other case, - ' AIR 1953 SC 58 (C)' their Lordships were pleased to hold that "unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere". In other words, grave miscarriage of justice and flagrant violation of law are the two paramount considerations by which a petition under Art.227 is to be determined. In - 'AIR 1952 Madh B 51 (G)', a Division Bench of this Court has taken a similar view. It is unnecessary to consider other cases which express synonymous views. 9. In the circumstances, what is to be considered is whether in the present case there has been any miscarriage of justice, or, any flagrant violation of law which calls for an intervention. The chief contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to try the case, and, if this contention prevails, I have no doubt that the absence of jurisdiction is a matter which renders the entire proceeding a nullity and the decision amounts to a flagrant violation of law, which calls for intervention. 10. The learned counsel for the applicant Mr. Tiwari challenges the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller on two grounds and I propose to examine each separately. 11. 10. The learned counsel for the applicant Mr. Tiwari challenges the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller on two grounds and I propose to examine each separately. 11. His first contention is that according to S.7 (2) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act No.15 of 1950) before moving the Rent Controller in the matter of reduction of rent, one has to give notice to the other party. The relevant portion of S.7(2) reads as follows: 12. This makes it clear that before launching proceedings for the reduction of rent, a notice to the landlord is incumbent. In the present case, no notice as contemplated by S.7(2) of the Vidhan was given by the non-applicant before filing the suit and we have to determine what the effect of such an action is. The language of the section being imperative a notice has to be given before a suit can be instituted. If notice is not given as required by law, the notice being a condition precedent, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in - 'Ragunath Das v. Sundar Das', AIR 1914 PC 129 (L) have made some observations, which are equally applicable to this case. It has been said that where the law requires that a notice should be given, it is necessary to do so in order that the court should obtain jurisdiction. In other words, the notice is the foundation of jurisdiction. By way of analogy, I may refer to S.80, Civil P.C, which requires a notice of two months prior to the institution of a suit against the Government. It has been held in a number of cases that the section debars a Court from entertaining a suit instituted without compliance with the provision of notice. 13. The learned counsel for the opposite party, Mr. Anand, has put forth two-fold arguments. His first submission is that a notice in fact has been given and secondly, he has urged that no notice was at all necessary and in advancing this argument he mainly relies upon - 'Gordhandas v. Phoolchand', AIR 1953 Madh B 253 (M). 14. 13. The learned counsel for the opposite party, Mr. Anand, has put forth two-fold arguments. His first submission is that a notice in fact has been given and secondly, he has urged that no notice was at all necessary and in advancing this argument he mainly relies upon - 'Gordhandas v. Phoolchand', AIR 1953 Madh B 253 (M). 14. With regard to the first contention, it appears that the opponent had given a notice to the father of the applicant on 28-9-1948, and, it is urged that notice served as a foundation for this application which is filed on 28-4-1950 under S.7(2) of the Vidhan. But how can a notice given in 1948 be regarded as one in compliance with the provisions of the Vidhan that came in force in the year 1950? As a matter of fact the notice of 1948 was not for filing an application under S.7(2) of the Act No.15 of 1950, but it was as a prelude to the filing of a suit in the Morar Court in 1948, which suit was actually filed by the opponent. 15. The other argument of the learned counsel for the opponent is that it was not necessary to give any notice at all and that a suit could be brought without giving the notice and in support of this, he has cited - 'AIR 1953 Madh-B 253 (L)'. But the concluding paragraph of the judgment referred to above says: "For these reasons and without expressing my opinion on the question whether the notice under S.7(2) is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, I would uphold the order of the District Judge, Gwalior, and dismiss this petition with costs". 16. In view of the concluding words reproduced above, it is not correct to say that my learned brother Dixit J., ever meant that notice was not necessary. In fact he left the question somewhat open though, in the case before him, he held that one notice (which was by the way given after the Vidhan had come into force) was enough, whether the prayer was from the landlord to enhance the rent or from the tenant to reduce it, because both where in respect of the fixation of proper rent. The facts of the case referred to above are easily distinguishable. 17. The facts of the case referred to above are easily distinguishable. 17. As to whether notice under S.7 of the Vidhan is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit under the Vidhan, I do not think that there can be two opinions about it. Where the law in unmistakable terms says that a notice should be given before the commencement of proceedings, then the non-compliance with the provision is fatal. Both on authority and on reason, I hold that under S.7 of the Vidhan, a notice must be given before the commencement of proceedings, and, if it is not given, as in the instant case, the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. 18. The second ground on which the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is challenged is this: In para.6 of the application dated 28-4-1950 (which is the basis of this suit) it is stated that the cause of action accrued on 14-10-1948. This means that this suit is filed for fixation of rent from 14-10-1948. It is argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the Controller has exercised jurisdiction from a point of time which is much before the appearance of Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act No.15 of 1950) under which he was appointed and there is nothing in the Vidhan to show that he is authorised to fix the rent retrospectively. The point is not without force. This aspect of the matter has been entirely overlooked both by the Rent Controller as well as the learned District Judge and there is no doubt that the objection strikes at the root. 19. Furthermore it is contended that since the case relates to the fixation of rent from 14-10-1948, the forum for it was civil Court, where a suit had been instituted. It is urged that the Rent Controller, who was appointed in 1950 under the Vidhan, cannot usurp the power of the civil Court, when the cause of action is alleged to have accrued in 1948. The Rent Controller can in no way acquire jurisdiction over a case that had been properly instituted. In support of this contention I have been referred to - 'AIR 1953 Madh-B 13 (F)'. It is a revision which arose out of rent control proceedings and in which the effect of the Vidhan was considered by my Lord the Chief Justice Shinde. In support of this contention I have been referred to - 'AIR 1953 Madh-B 13 (F)'. It is a revision which arose out of rent control proceedings and in which the effect of the Vidhan was considered by my Lord the Chief Justice Shinde. It was held that the Vidhan did not take away the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try a suit that was properly instituted and was pending before a civil Court. In other words, it was held that in pending suits relating to fixation of rent, the jurisdiction of the civil Court continued and that the Rent Controller acquired no jurisdiction to try such suits. Relying on - 'C.P. Bannerjee v. B.S. Irani', AIR 1949 Bom 182 (M), it was observed that any legislation which takes away the existing jurisdiction of a forum, unless it has been made specifically applicable to pending actions, will not affect the jurisdiction of that forum to try pending actions properly entertained by it at the time of their institution. I think the contention must prevail. 20. From the above discussion it appears that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the order passed by him being in flagrant violation of law, attracts the application of Art.227 of the Constitution. For reasons stated above, I allow the revision with costs throughout and set aside all the proceedings in this case, because for want of jurisdiction they are null and void. Revision allowed.