JUDGMENT M.H. Kidwai, J. - On the night between the 10th and the 11th October, 1950, the three houses of Umrao Gaderia, Chutta Ahir and Tulsi Teli, facing each other in village Bakania were looted by dacoits said to number between 30 and 40. Param Sukh (P.W. 1), a neighbour, was woken up by the noise of the dacoits and went to Nimsar, where the police was posted in connection with Mela duty, for help. At the temple of Lalta Debi he met Head Constable Hem Singh and some Constables including P.W. 4 Ram Saran and told them about the dacoity. The Head Constable directed him to the Station Officer Misrikh, Sub-Inspector Ram Karan Singh (P.W. 38) who was staying in a Dharamshala nearby. The Sub- Inspector recorded a first information report dictated by Param Sukh, (Ex. 12), and proceeded to the spot immediately with the police Constables armed with muskets but they adopted different routes so as to reach the spot from two different directions. 2. The dacoity was still in progress. There was an exchange of fire between the dacoits and the police party. Most of the dacoits managed to escape with much of the stolen property but Chunnu was beaten down with lathis and arrested on the spot with some stolen property, Ram Dayal who had a pistol, Ram Lal and Badlu received gunshot injuries and were also arrested immediately: Ram Dayal and Ram Lal being arrested at the scene of the dacoity while Badlu who had managed to creep away was captured in a bajra field. 3. Various other persons were arrested on various dates and all, except the four persons arrested on the spot, were put up for identification on the 11th of November and the 13th and 21st December, 1950. After the completion of investigations the persons who had been identified and the four persons caught on the spot were prosecuted and Badlu, Chunnu, Ram Dayal, Ram Lal, Faqirey, Chaudhi, Bhikari, Bindra, Jia Lal, Tilak, Gulzari, Puttu, Sukha, Maiku and Dularey were committed to stand their trial in the court of Session at Sitapur, while Ram Singh and Lachhman were discharged. 4. In the Sessions Court Chunnoo pleaded that he was not arrested on the spot but at the mela. Ram Dayal, Ram Lal and Badlu pleaded that they were together proceeding about their lawful business and were implicated because of police enmity. 4. In the Sessions Court Chunnoo pleaded that he was not arrested on the spot but at the mela. Ram Dayal, Ram Lal and Badlu pleaded that they were together proceeding about their lawful business and were implicated because of police enmity. Puttu, Faqirey, Bindu, Bhikari, Maiku, Jia Lal and Chaudhi also pleaded enmity with the police. Sukha pleaded enmity with the village Chaukidar. Gulzari and Tilak pleaded enmity with local zamindars. Dularey pleaded enmity between his samdhi and the witnesses. 5. The prosecution produced 40 witnesses. Of these only P.W. 1 Param Sukh, P.W. 2 Dalla son of Chutta, P.W. 3 Shrimati Mohana, daughter-in-law of Umrao, P.W. 4 Constable Ram Saran, P.W. 5 Shrimati Jinka, wife of Umrao, P.W. 6 Umrao himself, P.W. 7 Kishen, son of Chutta, P.Ws 8, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 Mangrey, Pragi, Simma, Pitambar. Bishnu, Shankar, Natha, and Jhalloo neighbours, P.Ws. 9 and 11 Chiddu and Misri, sons of Umrao, P.W. 10 Jai Rani, daughter of Tulsi, P.W. 13 Narain brother of Tulsi, P.W. 34 Tulsi and P.W. 38 Sub-Inspector Ram Karan Singh deposed to the factum of the dacoity and the participation of the accused in it. The rest are more or less formal witnesses. 6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted all the accused before him, except Gulzari, against whom he did not consider that there was sufficient evidence. All the persons convicted have appealed, but only Chunnu, Ram Dayal, Badlu, Tilak and Jia Lal Appellants in Appeals Nos. 76 and 98 of 1952 are represented by counsel; the others have filed jail appeals. Their appeals are Nos. 181 to 189 of 1952. 7. Ram Dayal was also convicted in a separate trial u/s 19(f) of the Arms Act. He has appealed in that case also and his appeal is No. 77 of 1952. 8. Manna was tried separately in respect of the same case and he has also been convicted. He has filed an appeal through counsel which is No. 427 of 1952. 9. He has appealed in that case also and his appeal is No. 77 of 1952. 8. Manna was tried separately in respect of the same case and he has also been convicted. He has filed an appeal through counsel which is No. 427 of 1952. 9. The appeals came up for hearing before one of us but at that hearing a point of law was taken as to the validity of the trial by the Sessions Judge since it was contended that there was not one dacoity, but three,-the dacoity in each house being treated as a separate offence, that separate and distinct charges should have been framed and that they should have been tried separately by reason of Section 233 Cr.P.C. It was further contended that, if by reason of Section 239(c) read with Section 234 Cr.P.C. the three offences could be tried together, separate charges should, in any case, have been framed. Failure to do this was at least an irregularity and, since it has caused prejudice to the accused, the trial was bad and the convictions should be set aside. In support of this contention reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the Appellants upon Ganno and Ors. v. King Emperor 11 O.W.N. 731, Criminal Revision No. 103 of 1949 decided on the 18th October, 1949, Raj Narain and Ors. v. The State 1953 A.W.R. (H.C.) 290. and Jai Dayal and Anr. v. The State 1953 A.W.R. (H.C.) 632. Since the matter is of considerable importance and requires an authoritative decision, the appeals were referred to a Division Bench for disposal. We have now heard full arguments in the case. 10. Section 233 Cr.P.C. requires a separate charge to be framed and a separate trial to take place "for every distinct offence of which a person is accused." The use of the word "distinct" is of great significance and the legislature having inserted it, we must, so far as possible, give it a meaning and not treat it as redundant. "Every distinct offence" cannot be treated as having the same meaning as every offence". The only meaning that the word "distinct" can have in the context in which it occurs is to indicate that there should be no connection between the various acts which give rise to criminal liability. "Every distinct offence" cannot be treated as having the same meaning as every offence". The only meaning that the word "distinct" can have in the context in which it occurs is to indicate that there should be no connection between the various acts which give rise to criminal liability. If there is such a connection, one action is not "distinct" from other actions and each of them, even if it constitutes an offence, does not constitute a "distinct" offence. 11. The sole ground upon which it is contended that there were three separate dacoities in the present case is that three different persons living in three separate houses were the victims. This is not a proper criterion. There is no difference in principle between such a case and a case in which the victims are three members of a family living jointly in one house but each having a separate room for his personal use and each having his separate personal property. It is not even contended that in the latter case there are three separate dacoities and three separate charges should be framed. 12. It is true that the offence of dacoity was completed the moment that the dacoits removed goods from any one of the three houses and that they could all have been convicted for dacoity even if they had not proceeded to loot any other house. This also is no criterion. As soon as the dacoits remove any one article, no matter how small its value, the offence of dacoity is completed and all persons participating may be convicted for dacoity, but it does not follow that any other property stolen thereafter from other rooms or even the same room, would become the subject-matter of a distinct offence and a separate charge would have to be framed. Such an interpretation of the law would create an impossible situation and, while it is true, that the benefit of every doubt, even in the matter of interpretation must be given to the accused, a construction which would defeat the very object of the law must be avoided if it is reasonably possible to do so. 13. Such an interpretation of the law would create an impossible situation and, while it is true, that the benefit of every doubt, even in the matter of interpretation must be given to the accused, a construction which would defeat the very object of the law must be avoided if it is reasonably possible to do so. 13. On the other hand it is equally impossible to say that because the same group of persons are accused of offences of the same nature committed on the same night within a short time of each other and at the same place or at places in close proximity to each other, there was only one transaction and only one offence was committed. The question really turns upon the circumstances of each case. For instance, a group of persons commits a dacoity in a particular house and is then running away because the villagers have assembled. While passing another house in the same village only a short distance away they find that it has a deserted appearance, and they enter and loot it. In such a case it might well be contended that two separate offences were committed and two separate charges should have been framed. The cases upon which the Appellants learned Counsel relied were really cases of this nature. 14. In Ganno and Ors. v. King Emperor 11 O.W.N. 731, the same group of persons robbed different persons between the hours of 6 and 9 in the evening at different places on the Kaoria-Colonelganj Road. They were charged with having committed six different dacoities but there was only one trial and the learned Sessions judge justified this on the ground that all the offences were committed in the course of the same transaction within the meaning of Section 239(d) Cr.P.C. Nanavutty, J. held: Now it is quite clear that every offence of dacoity committed by the accused was complete as soon as the person attacked was robbed and his property taken away from him. The mere fact that in the course of one night six dacoities were committed by a gang of dacoits will not make these six dacoities from part of one and the same transaction. 15. If we may say so with respect the decision of the learned Judge was perfectly correct. The charge itself indicated that there were six different offences. The mere fact that in the course of one night six dacoities were committed by a gang of dacoits will not make these six dacoities from part of one and the same transaction. 15. If we may say so with respect the decision of the learned Judge was perfectly correct. The charge itself indicated that there were six different offences. On the facts proved note of the offences was in any way connected with each other except that the culprits were common. The evidence required to prove them would be different. Even if, by chance, some witnesses were the same, they would have to prove entirely different facts in respect of each offence. The six charges were rightly framed u/s 233 Cr.P.C. 16. Once separate charges have been framed u/s 233 Cr.P.C. a joint trial could only take place where only one individual was involved, if the conditions laid down either in Section 234 or in Section 239 were fulfilled and, where several persons were concerned, if the conditions of Section 239 were fulfilled Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 239 correspond to Sections 234 and 235 respectively. Section 239(c) and Section 234 deal with the case of offences of the same kind committed even at long intervals of time provided that the interval is not more than 12 months in all. Under these sections, however, only three of such offences can be tried together and obviously the trial of six similar offences would not be justified. 17. Section 235 and Section 239(d) do not deal with offences of the same kind but with different offences. In this case there is no limitation as to the number of offences which might be tried together, but the condition is that they must be the result of acts done in the same transaction. This is made perfectly clear by the illustrations to Section 235, and a very common instance is a riot in which persons may be charged under Sections 14, 148, 323, 325 and 304/149 in one trial. It is obvious that in the case before Nanavutty, J. it could not possibly be said that any one of the six dacoities arose out of any act done during the course of any preceding or succeeding dacoity. Section 239(d) Cr.P.C. did not, therefore, justify a joint trial and a conviction resulting from, a joint trial had to be set aside. 18. Section 239(d) Cr.P.C. did not, therefore, justify a joint trial and a conviction resulting from, a joint trial had to be set aside. 18. Sapru, J. in Criminal Revision No. l03 of 1949, decided on the 18th October 1949 followed the case of Ganno and Ors. v. King Emperor 11 O.W.N. 731, and held: "There is no force in the argument that as the offences were committed on one and the same night they must be deemed to form part of a series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction." 19. We see no reason to differ from this exposition of the law. In that case it was assumed that two separate and distinct dacoities had been committed. We do not know on what data this conclusion was based but we see no reason to doubt the correctness of the inference drawn by the learned Judge. On the basis of two separate dacoities Section 239(d) Cr.P.C. would have no application. The learned Judge was, however, considering, as the language used by him indicates, only Section 235 and 239(d) Cr.P.C. His attention does not seem to have been drawn to Section 239(c) Cr.P.C. read with Section 234 Cr.P.C. and we cannot say that his decision would have been had he been called upon to consider those sections. 20. We would like to make it clear at this point that Sections 234 and 239(c) Cr.P.C. are not mandatory but are permissive. If each of the dacoities (or other offences) were to be proved by distinct and separate evidence and this was likely to lead to confusion in the trial, the Court might well and indeed should refuse to try more than one offence at one time. That might have been one of the considerations present in the mind of Supru, J. when he set aside the trial and the conviction resulting from in. In the present case, as we will presently show, that consideration does not apply. 21. In Raj Narain and Ors. v. The State 1953 A.W.R. (H.C.) 632, our learned brother Brij Mohan Lal, J. followed the two earlier decisions. In the present case, as we will presently show, that consideration does not apply. 21. In Raj Narain and Ors. v. The State 1953 A.W.R. (H.C.) 632, our learned brother Brij Mohan Lal, J. followed the two earlier decisions. In that case, although the dacoities were committed the same night in the same hamlet by the same persons, it was assumed that there were 8 distinct dacoities and on this assumption it was held that it could not be said that they were committed in the course of the same transaction. The criterion laid down is that in order to constitute one transaction there must be some continuity of purpose. We respectfully agree that this is the true criterion. In the present case the evidence which we will discuss later, does establish a continuity of purpose. 22. The last case upon which reliance was placed was that of Jai Dayal and Anr. v. State (3). In that case also there were separate and distinct offences although they were all committed by the same group of persons at the same time and place within a short space of time. It was held that the framing of a composite charge in such a case infringed the provisions of Section 233 Cr.P.C. and that if it was shown that the accused had been prejudiced the trial was vitiated. 23. In the present case the position is entirely different. It cannot be said that the looting of the houses of three persons were distinct offences. It is true that the looting commenced at Umrao's house, and then the dacoits went to Chutta's house and finally to Tulsi's house, but there is sufficient evidence to prove that the looting of all the houses was carried on simultaneously. After all the dacoits had to commence with some house or other but the fact that they commenced with Umrao's house does not mean that they had completed ransacking it before passing on to the next house. 24. After all the dacoits had to commence with some house or other but the fact that they commenced with Umrao's house does not mean that they had completed ransacking it before passing on to the next house. 24. Parana Sukh (P.W. 1) states that when he came back with the sub-inspector he saw "dacoits going in and coming out of these houses." The same statement is made by P.W. 4 Constable Ram Saran, who was one of the police party, P.W. 8 Mangrey, a neighbour, P.W. 9 Chiddu, P.W. 21 Bishunu, P.W. 23 Natha and P.W. 24 Jhalloo, P.W. 3 Mohana, daughter-in-law of Umrao, also states that the dacoits left her house only when the police arrived which obviously means that they were still looting her house while the houses of Chutta and Tulsi were being looted. P.W. 6 Umrao also says that when the police party arrived the dacoits were in front of his house as well as the houses of Chutta and Tulsi. Even, however, if the ransacking of all the houses was not going on at the same time and the three houses were looted one after the other, that would not have the effect of proving three "distinct" offences. There would even in such a case be sufficient continuity of purpose to make it one offence. 25. It was in connection with the looting of the three houses that gunshots were exchanged between the dacoits and the police. The witnesses are all the same and except for the four persons caught on the spot the rest of the accused were sent for trial as a result of identification by various persons. It would be impossible for the identifying witnesses to connect any accused person with the looting of any particular house. All that is said is that they were seen coming in and going out of the various houses during the course of the dacoity. It is obvious, therefore, that if the cases were dealt with separately the evidence would have to be exactly the same in each case and would prove exactly the same facts. There was thus only one dacoity and it is unnecessary for us to consider whether, if there were several dacoities, a composite charge has caused any prejudice to the accused. 26. There was thus only one dacoity and it is unnecessary for us to consider whether, if there were several dacoities, a composite charge has caused any prejudice to the accused. 26. The trial not having been vitiated by any illegality or irregularity the question that arises is how far the case against each of the accused is established. 27. In the remaining part of the judgment their lordships have dealt with the individual cases of the Appellants.