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1954 DIGILAW 178 (MAD)

East India Match Factory v. State of Madras

1954-04-14

RAJAGOPALA IYENGAR, SATYANARAYANA RAO

body1954
Judgment :- RAJAGOPALAN, J. The questions that arise for determination in these two petitions are the same. The assessees were manufacturers and dealers in matches in the State of Madras. The assessments in dispute related to 1950-51, that is, after the Constitution of India came into force. The assessee in T.R.C. No. 117 of 1953 denied his liability to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 57, 393-10-6. The turnover in dispute in T.R.C. No. 133 of 1953 was Rs. 5, 90, 619-9-0. The turnover represented the sales of matches to buyers outside the State of Madras and the matches sold were sent to them out of Madras. What the assessees claimed in the first instance even before the Tribunal was that they were entitled under Section 7 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act to rebate of one half of the tax levied on the sales. During the arguments before the Tribunal the assessees claimed that the sales themselves came within the purview of Article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto of the Constitution, and that the sales were not subject to any tax in the State of Madras under the Madras Act. The Tribunal rejected that contention and granted them rebate under Section 7 of the Act, even which the department had refused. The only point argued before us was whether the turnover was liable to sales tax under the Madras Act. Article 286 runs :- "(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place - (a) outside the State; or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Explanation :- For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty first day of March, 1951." It is not necessary to refer to Article 286(3). In exercise of the powers vested in the President by the proviso to Article 286(2) of the Constitution, the President promulgated an Order, C.O. No. 7 of 1950, which came into force on the very date the Constitution came into force. It cannot be disputed that the turnover in dispute in these two cases was liable to sales tax under the Madras Act before 26th January, 1950. Whether the President's Order under the proviso to Article 286(2) of the Constitution saved the right of the Madras State to tax such sales up to 31st March, 1951, is the question. That the turnover in dispute was that of inter-State trade of the assessees within the meaning of Article 286(2) of the Constitution cannot be in dispute. The goods sold by the assessees were despatched for delivery to the buyers in India but outside the Madras State. Were Article 286(2) alone to be considered, the ban imposed by that clause was not in operation till 31st March, 1951. The President's Order was issued under the proviso to Article 286(2). The right of the Madras State to tax such inter-State sales upto 31st March, 1951, could not be denied. Were Article 286(2) alone to be considered, the ban imposed by that clause was not in operation till 31st March, 1951. The President's Order was issued under the proviso to Article 286(2). The right of the Madras State to tax such inter-State sales upto 31st March, 1951, could not be denied. The contention of the assessees was that the State of Madras could not invoke the benefit of the proviso to Article 286(2) and of the President's Order issued thereunder as the sales in question came within the scope of the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) and the State of Madras had no right at all to tax such sales.It is not every inter-State sale that attracts to itself the provisions of the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a). With reference to inter-State sales effected in Madras, the Explanation could apply only to sales in which the goods have been actually delivered as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consumption in a State other than Madras. That the delivery was the direct result of the sale, and further that the delivery of the goods was for the purpose of consumption in the State in which they were delivered have to be proved as facts. The necessary proof to sustain the claim advanced at a late stage before the Tribunal was not placed before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal had no occasion to find as a fact that the delivery of the goods in question was for the purpose of consumption in the States in which they were delivered. The assessees offered to file affidavits before us to prove that the delivery was for consumption in the States in which the goods were delivered within the meaning of the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a). It is not for us sitting in revision to reopen questions of fact. There was not material enough for the assessees to invoke the benefit of Article 286(1)(a) with the Explanation thereto, whatever the scope of the Article and the Explanation was. In that case, only Article 286(2) could apply and if it did, the proviso and the President's Order issued thereunder justified the levy of the tax by the State of Madras up to 31st of March, 1951. In that case, only Article 286(2) could apply and if it did, the proviso and the President's Order issued thereunder justified the levy of the tax by the State of Madras up to 31st of March, 1951. We do not consider it necessary to remand the cases for further enquiry, whether the requirements of the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) were satisfied by the assessees in these two cases. In his exhaustive review on the scope of the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) in the State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. the learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court, pointed out more than once that what the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) dealt with were in reality inter-State sales or purchases. The learned Chief Justice then explained : "The effect of the Explanation in regard to inter-State dealings is, in our view, to invest what, in truth, is an inter-State transaction with an intra-State character in relation to the State of delivery and clause (2) can, therefore, have no application". The scope of the legal fiction that was created by the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) was discussed, and the learned Chief Justice observed : "The statutory fiction completely masks the inter-State character of the sale or purchase which, as a collateral result of such masking, falls outside the scope of clause (2)". In the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Travancore-Cochin v. S.V.C. Factory the same learned Chief Justice again delivering the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court observed :- "........ if ........ the purchases were effected by the employment of firms doing business as commission agents outside the State, and the deliveries were made through normal commercial channels, the transactions would partake of an inter-State character and fall under clause (2). In that case, it would be unnecessary to enquire further whether they would be covered by the Explanation to clause (1) (a), as they would be clearly taxable under the President's Order C.O. No. 7 of 1950 to which reference has been made already, as it was admitted that sales tax was validly levied on such purchases before the commencement of the Constitution. As the taxability of such purchases on either view of the facts was not disputed, no arguments were addressed to us on the scope of clause (2) and the Explanation to clause (1)(a), as has been stated." * That, as we understand the judgment in Travancore case seems to limit the scope of the observations of the Supreme Court in the earlier Bombay case No doubt it is the converse of the case the Supreme Court had to deal with in the Travancore case that we have to consider in the case before us. In view however of the clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the Travancore case which we have set out above, we have to hold that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the turnover in dispute in the case of each of the assessees was taxable. After the Constitution came into force, the Madras General Sales Tax Act was adopted under the Adaptation of Laws Order, Fourth Amendment, 1952, and Section 22 was added, and Section 22 was given retrospective effect with effect from 26th January, 1950, on which date the Constitution came into force. Section 22 really adapted the language of Article 286. Clauses (1) and (2), the arrangement of the sub-section, and the Explanation in Section 22 appear to have anticipated the decision of the Supreme Court in the Travancore case Thus, neither the ban imposed by Article 286(1)(a) or by Article 286(2) nor the ban imposed by Section 22 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, which itself was founded on Article 286(1) and (2), applies to the levy of sales tax under the Madras Act on the turnover in dispute. These petitions are dismissed with costs, Rs. 125 in each petition. Petitions dismissed.