JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - Dulichand has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the prayer that this Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari, quashing and setting aside the orders of Judicial Members of the Board of Revenue dated the 26th of November 1951, and 9th December, 1952, in second appeal No. 84 of 1946-47 (Bhikhey and Ors. v. Dulichand and others) and in review application No. 50 of 1951-52 (Dulichand v. Bhikhey and others) respectively. There is a further prayer that opposite party No. 1, Judicial Members, Board of Revenue, be directed to re-hear and decide the second appeal afresh after giving reasonable notice and opportunity to the parties and after hearing their counsel on merits and according to law. 2. The facts given in the petition show that Bhikhey and others, opposite-parties Nos. 2 to 5 filed a suit for division of a holding u/s 49 of the U.P. Tenancy Act against the Petitioner and opposite-party No. 6 in the court of the Assistant Collector, First Class, Etah. The Assistant Collector, after proceedings in the suit, passed a final decree on 29th June, 1946, and divided the holding and the rent between the various parties to the suit. Opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 were not satisfied with the shares allotted to them in the partition and, consequently, they filed an appeal in the court of the Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, which was dismissed on 28th April, 1947. They preferred a second appeal in the Board of Revenue which came up for hearing on the 9th of Match, 1951. On that day, an application was filed in court which purported to be a compromise. This compromise was sent for verification to the lower court where the Petitioner refused to verify it. When it came back to the Board of Revenue, opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 applied that the compromise be recorder and a decree passed in accordance with it. On the return of the compromise, the case was heard by one Member of the Board of Revenue, Shri J.O.N. Shukla, on the 20th of November, 1951. He passed his judgment on 22nd November, 1951, allowing the appeal and giving effect to the terms of the alleged compromise of the 9th of March, 1951. On the return of the compromise, the case was heard by one Member of the Board of Revenue, Shri J.O.N. Shukla, on the 20th of November, 1951. He passed his judgment on 22nd November, 1951, allowing the appeal and giving effect to the terms of the alleged compromise of the 9th of March, 1951. The case was then sent to another Member of the Board of Revenue, Sri T.N. Srivastava, on the 26th of November, 1951, who concurred with the order passed by Sri J.O.N. Shukla on the 22nd of November, 1951. Before giving his concurrence, Shri T.N. Srivastava did not give any hearing to any of the parties. The Petitioner, being aggrieved by these orders of 22nd November, 1951, and 26th November, 1951, by the two learned Members of the Board of Revenue, filed an application for review before the Registrar of the Board of Revenue on 14th December, 1951. That application was dismissed by one Member of the Board of Revenue on 9th December, 1952. The petition and the affidavit filed in support of it do not make it clear as to who that Member of the Board of Revenue was. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, when asked, informed me that the application for review was dismissed by Shri Siddique Hasan, another Member of the Board of Revenue and not by either of the two Members who had passed orders on 22nd November, 1951, and 26th November, 1951. This was also admitted by the learned Junior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the Members of the Board of Revenue. The order of dismissal was passed summarily without giving any bearing to the Petitioner. 3. On these facts, it has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the order of Shri T.N. Srivastava dated the 26th of November, 1951, is liable to be vacated on the ground that it was passed by him without giving any hearing to the parties in the appeal. Learned Counsel contended that that or er(sic) was not validated and protected by the provisions of the U.P. Board of Revenue (Declaration of Procedure and Validation) Act, 1953, as that Act was ultra vires the U.P. Legislature because it contravened the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel contended that that or er(sic) was not validated and protected by the provisions of the U.P. Board of Revenue (Declaration of Procedure and Validation) Act, 1953, as that Act was ultra vires the U.P. Legislature because it contravened the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel further contended that the order on the review application of the Petitioner passed on 9th December, 1952, was also void on two grounds: One ground was that it was passed by one Member of the Board of Revenue and not by the whole Board of Revenue which would mean all the Members of the Board of Revenue at that time. The second ground was that the order was passed without giving any opportunity to the Petitioner to be heard in support of that application ignoring the principles, of natural justice and was consequently void. 4. So far as the order, dated the 26th of November, 1951, is concerned, there is no doubt at all that the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the U.P. Board of Revenue (Declaration of Procedure and Validation) Act, 1953, have the effect of validating that order even though it was passed by Sri T.N. Srivastava without giving any hearing to the two parties in the appeal. Learned Counsel's contention that this Act was void as it infringed the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution did not appear to me to have any sense at all. Learned Counsel's contention was that, under this Act, provision was made for the procedure to be adopted by the Board of Revenue for passing judgment and validating it in cases instituted by persons coming to the Board of Revenue in appeal, reference or revision but no similar provision was made for persons coming to the Board of Revenue and moving applications for review. This Act, therefore, created discrimination between persons who came in appeal, reference or revision as against persons who came up to the same Board of Revenue to invoke its review jurisdiction. I cannot possibly understand how it can ever be contended that the legislature was bound to provide exactly the same procedure for decision of review applications as it may provide fort decisions of appeals, references or revisions. By no stretch of imagination can the persons seeking one remedy be considered to belong to the same class as persons seeking a different remedy. By no stretch of imagination can the persons seeking one remedy be considered to belong to the same class as persons seeking a different remedy. On the face of it, the argument is absurd. Article 14 of the Constitution has no application and the ground taken for invalidating this Act has no force at all. In this view, the order of the 26th of November, 1951, is a valid order passed in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Member of the Board of Revenue who passed that order, and consequently, this Court cannot interfere with it under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. So far as the order in review is concerned, of the two grounds pressed by learned Counsel, one appears to me to have no force at all. It has been contended by learned Counsel that the Board of Revenue had no power to summarily reject the application without giving a hearing to the Petitioner as such procedure offended against the principles of natural justice. It is impossible for me to think of any principles of natural justice which require that a person moving an application before a court, invoking its discretionary powers, must necessarily be granted a right of hearing in support of that application. Of course, if he had been the opposite party, it might have been argued that no order against him could be passed to his prejudice without giving him a hearing. So far as the applicant, who comes to court invoking its discretionary powers, is concerned, it is for him to put all his grounds for invoking such powers in the application itself and, at the stage when the court sits down to decide whether it will admit the application and issue notice to the opposite-party, the court need not give any hearing to the applicant at all. 6. There is, however, the second ground that has been taken by the Petitioner to challenge the order passed on the application for review under the provisions of Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. That section indicates that the application has to be decided by the "Board of Revenue". 6. There is, however, the second ground that has been taken by the Petitioner to challenge the order passed on the application for review under the provisions of Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. That section indicates that the application has to be decided by the "Board of Revenue". It was actually decided by only one Single Member, Shri Siddique Hasan, and it appears that there is no warrant for the procedure of such an application being decided by any Single Member of the Board of Revenue who may, by chance, have the application laid before him. On behalf of the opposite-parties, reliance was placed on Rule 170 of the rules framed by the Board of Revenue u/s 293 of the U.P. Tenancy Act to show that a Single Member of the Board of Revenue could pass an order on an application for review and such an order by a Single Member would be deemed to be the order of the Board. Rule 170 does not, however, apply to applications for review before the Board of Revenue. This rule is as follows: 170-When the hoard has distributed its appellate business among the Members, the order of a single Member is the order of the Board, but no decree or order coming under the consideration of the Board in appeal shall be modified or reversed without the concurrent judgment of two Members of the Board. 7. The Board of Revenue, when sitting to exercise its jurisdiction u/s 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act to review its own judgment is certainly not engaged in its "appellate business." It may be that the review was of a judgment which was passed in the second appeal which was heard by the Board of Revenue, so that the judgment, which was sought to be reviewed, was passed in the course of the "appellate business" of the Board but the subsequent proceedings for review would be in exercise of its special jurisdiction of reviewing its own judgment and would not be in exercise of its appellate powers or be a part of its "appellate business". In this connection, it may be noticed that the rules, which were framed by the Board of Revenue u/s 293 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, only lay down the procedure for appeals, references and revisions. In this connection, it may be noticed that the rules, which were framed by the Board of Revenue u/s 293 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, only lay down the procedure for appeals, references and revisions. Rules 161 to 163 lay down the procedure for presentation of an appeal and, below Rule 163, there is a note which lays down that: the above procedure should be observed mutatis mutandis in dealing with applications for review under both the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, and the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901. 8. This note was obviously introduced because a review application is not an appeal. A procedure has to be prescribed for the presentation of the review applications and, by this note, the Board of Revenue made rules for presentation of the appeal applicable to presentation of review applications with modifications consequential to the difference in the nature of a review application and an appeal. No such note has been made under Rule 170 or in any subsequent rule to indicate that the rules following Rule 163, which govern procedure in appeals before the Board of Revenue, are also to apply to decisions by the Board of applications for review. Consequently, Rule 170, as framed by the Board, cannot govern the business of the Board in dealing with review applications cannot be laid before any Single Member of the Board of Revenue so as to give the order of that Single Member the status of the order of the whole Board of Revenue. The order passed by Shri Siddique Hasan in this case cannot, therefore, be treated as an order of the Board of Revenue. 9. It was contended by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that since Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act uses the word 'Board', it must be held that any order under that section must be passed by all the members of the Board constituting it at the time when that order was passed. There is the alternative possibility that Order XLVII of the CPC may apply to a review application before the Board of Revenue in which case, ordinarily, an order on a review application would have to be passed by the same Member or Members who originally passed the order sought to be reviewed, as laid down in Rule 5 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears to me that, in either case whether Order XLVII of the CPC does or does not apply, the order could not be passed by one Single Member, who had not passed any of the two orders sought to be reviewed, and that order must, therefore, be held to be without jurisdiction in any case. That is the only relief that can be granted in this writ petition. The order passed by Shri Siddique Hasan must be set aside. It is not necessary for me to lay down whether all the Members and, if not, which of them must pass orders on this application for review. In a petition for issue of a writ of certiorari, it is not permissible for this Court to give any such direction though it might have been possible to do so by issuing a writ of mandamus. I do not think that it is a fit case where a writ of mandamus need be issued. Further, it has to be noticed that though learned Counsel for the Petitioner wants a direction to be issued to the Board to decide that review application and has contended that all the Members of the Board of Revenue must sit to decide that application, he has not made all the Members, of the Board of Revenue opposite parties to this petition. He has restricted his petition to the Judicial Members of the Board of Revenue only. The word 'Judicial' refers to a designation given to certain Members only by the State Government. There is a Member who is not designated as a Judicial Member of the Board of Revenue and his being omitted from the array of opposite parties disentitles the Petitioner to ask for any direction to the Board of Revenue as a whole about the procedure to be adopted by the Board in dealing with his review application. 10. Consequently, the petition is allowed to the extent that the order passed on 9th December, 1952, on the review application of the Petitioner is quashed as being without jurisdiction. The rest of the prayers in the petition are rejected. Considering the circumstances of this case, I make no orders as to costs.