Judgment Imam, J. 1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent against the decision of Agarwala J., who affirmed the decision of the First Additional District Judge of Patna. 2. The plaintiff had instituted a suit for a declaration that he was not liable to pay holding tax having regard to the provisions of S, 84, Clause (2), Bihar Municipal Act, (Bihar and Orissa Act 7 of 1922). The finding of all the Courts below, including the Court of trial, was that the holding is used for religious purposes and in their opinion it was exclusively used for these purposes. That view was upheld by Agarwala, J. On this question of fact, it is not possible to permit any arguments to toe made in Letters Patent appeal. Section 84 of the Act reads as follows : "(1) The tax on holding shall not be imposed at a rate exceeding twelve and a half per centum on the annual value of holdings; except in the Patna City Municipality, in which it shall nob exceed ten per centum on such annual value. (2) Any holding which is used exclusively as a place of public worship or religious assemblage, or as a Dharamsala, or as a mortuary, or which is duly registered as a public burial or burning ground under Sec.248 shall be exempted from the tax on holdings." The point of view raised by the Municipality has been that as the plaintiff, the Sajjadanashin of the Khankah, lives in a building in the holding in question it could not be said that the holding was used exclusively as a place of public worship or religious assemblage. That the holding was used as a place of public worship or religious assemblage has been found by the Subordinate Judge, the Additional District Judge and Agarwala, J. As to whether on account of the Sajjadanashin residing in the holding with his family altered the position is what we have to consider. In my opinion, mere residence is not the test. It has been found by the Subordinate Judge and the Additional District Judge that the presence of the Sajjadanashin at the Khankah in the holding concerned is essential and that the real purpose of the Khankah cannot be served without his presence there. In my opinion, mere residence is not the test. It has been found by the Subordinate Judge and the Additional District Judge that the presence of the Sajjadanashin at the Khankah in the holding concerned is essential and that the real purpose of the Khankah cannot be served without his presence there. There is also reference to the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, which was accepted, that there is an assemblage of persons at the time of Urs for religious purposes in the building where the Sajjadanashin resides and that the disciples stay there at the time of the Urs. The very purpose of these gatherings at the time of the Urs is for religious purpose, particularly as on the occasion of the Urs the saint who is buried at the Khankah is remembered and his religious teachings are referred to. Without the presence of the Sajjadanashin, therefore, the purpose for which the Khankah stands could not be achieved or given effect to. It seems to me, therefore, that as the Sajjadanashin is an integral part of the institution, his mere residence at the Khankah would not deprive him of the claim which he makes for exemption under Section 84, Clause (2) of the Act. That the Sajjadanashin is an integral part of the institution and the central figure therein and that the existence of the Khankah depends upon his personality has been recognised by this Court in -- Mahomed Kazinv V/s. Abi Saghir, AIE 1933 Pat 33 (A). The decision in the case of -- P. W. Monie V/s. Revd. Robert Scott, AIR 1918 Bom 88 (E), is relevant and the principle arising from that decision is applicable to the present case. 3. In my opinion, the view taken by the Subordinate Judge, the Additional District Judge and Agarwala J. was one which correctly expressed the law and there is no merit in the present appeal which is dismissed with costs. Das, J. 4 I agree.