Judgment :- 1. This Revision Petition arises out of a prosecution started in respect of a bigamous marriage. The complainant is the first wife of the 1st accused who married her in the month of Medom 1106. Her case is that during the subsistence of that marriage the 1st accused took the second accused also as his wife by marrying her in the year 1122. The parties are Nairs governed by the provisions of the Travancore Nair Act. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate who tried the case found that the allegations made by the complainant are true and that the elements of the offence of bigamy punishable under S. 497 of the Travancore Penal Code had been made out. Accordingly the 1st accused was convicted of the offence under that section and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100 the alternative sentence in case of default of payment of fine being rigorous imprisonment for a further period of 2 months. The 1st accused took the matter in appeal to the Sessions Court at Mavelikara. The learned Sessions Judge found the appellant accused not guilty of the offence under S. 497 and accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted him. The complainant has preferred this petition seeking revision of that order on the ground that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge as to the essential elements constituting the gist of the offence of bigamy is unsustainable in law. 2. On the evidence on record the learned Sessions Judge found that the following facts have been conclusively proved: (i) The 1st accused legally married the complainant in the month of Medom 1106. (ii) The 1st accused had filed summary petition No. 40/16 in he District Munsiff's Court at Adoor, praying for a dissolution of the marriage between himself and the complainant and as per the final order passed by the learned Munsiff on that petition on 29.9.1122 said marriage was dissolved. (Ext. I is copy of that order). (iii) It was when this order of dissolution was in force that the 1st accused married the 2nd accused on 29.10.1122, as is proved by the Marriage register, Ext. B. (iv) As per the decision of the High Court in A.S. No. 204 of 1124, which was an appeal against the order Ext. (Ext. I is copy of that order). (iii) It was when this order of dissolution was in force that the 1st accused married the 2nd accused on 29.10.1122, as is proved by the Marriage register, Ext. B. (iv) As per the decision of the High Court in A.S. No. 204 of 1124, which was an appeal against the order Ext. I dissolving the marriage between the complainant and the 1st accused, the order of the Munsiff dissolving the marriage was set aside and a fresh enquiry was directed. As a result of such enquiry Summary Petition No. 40/1116 was ultimately dismissed. (Ext. D is copy of the judgment in A.S. No. 204/1124 and Ext. E is copy of the final order passed on Summary Petition No. 40/1116. The first order Ext. I was set aside by the judgment of the High Court in A.S. No. 204/1124 only on 31st October 1950 and Ext. E the final order dismissing the summary petition was only on 9.2.1953. 3. From these facts it is clear that when 1st accused married the 2nd accused on 29.10.1122 the order Ext. I by which his marriage with the complainant had been dissolved, was in force. No doubt that order was subsequently set aside and his petition for dissolution of that marriage was itself dismissed. The legal effect of such a final order is that there has been no effective order dissolving the marriage between the complainant and the 1st accused and that the said marriage will be deemed to have been in force all along so far as the civil rights of the parties to that marriage were concerned. But in a prosecution under S. 497, the accused's criminal intention in the act complained of against him is of greater importance and significance than the question of any civil right as between himself and the complainant. Criminal intention or guilty knowledge must be made out against the accused before the act complained of can be held to constitute a penal offence. This position has been fully explained in R.V. Dolman (1949 All England Law Reports, Vol. I page 813 at 814). In dealing with the offence of bigamy, Streatfiled, J., observed as follows in that case: "but the person accused must have a culpable, guilty knowledge that he is doing something unlawful. This position has been fully explained in R.V. Dolman (1949 All England Law Reports, Vol. I page 813 at 814). In dealing with the offence of bigamy, Streatfiled, J., observed as follows in that case: "but the person accused must have a culpable, guilty knowledge that he is doing something unlawful. Accordingly, it has been held now for many years that, even although there is a subsisting marriage, it is open to an accused person to defend himself on a charge of bigamy by showing that he had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that his real wife was dead. If he believed that she was dead although she was not in fact dead, ti would follow that when he afterwards went through a form of marriage, he believed he was entering into a lawful marriage with the second woman, and, therefore, there would not be that guilty knowledge and appreciation of wrong doing which is necessary to constitute this offence." In that particular case the defence of the accused was that he happened to enter into the second marriage because he was satisfied that his first marriage was in fact null and void for, the reason that the first wife had already been legally wedded to another person and that it was without the knowledge of the subsistence of that marriage that he happened to marry that lady. In dealing with the defence it was pointed out that if he had reasonable grounds to believe at the time of his second marriage that his first marriage was void and if he had honestly believed so, even though his impression happened to be erroneous, he could not be held to have committed the offence of bigamy in entering into the second marriage. In Karim Baksh v. Emperor ((1918) Indian Cases 40) the defence to a charge for the offence of bigamy was that he happened to enter into the marriage complained of after the first marriage of the lady had been declared void by competent court. As a matter of fact her first marriage which was performed during her minority had been declared void in an action brought by her after she came of age. It was only an ex parte decree which, however, was subsequently set aside and the suit itself was withdrawn. As a matter of fact her first marriage which was performed during her minority had been declared void in an action brought by her after she came of age. It was only an ex parte decree which, however, was subsequently set aside and the suit itself was withdrawn. The accused was not proved to have had any knowledge of these subsequent developments and it was found that when he entered into that marriage with the lady he had information only about the ex parte decree declaring the first marriage void. The defence of the accused that he was acting under the bona fide impression that the first marriage of the lady already been declared void was accepted as a good defence to the charge of bigamy levelled against him. 4. There are indications in S. 497 of theTravancore Penal Code (corresponding to S. 494 of the Indian Penal Code) that guilty knowledge about the subsistence of the first marriage is essential to constitute the offence of bigamy. The first exception to the section states that the section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction. The next exception states that the section does not extend to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time, provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge. What the section states is that "whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine". It was clear from the expression "having a husband or wife living" that it is not enough that the individual contemplated is alive at the relevant period, but also that his or her earlier marriage also is subsisting in law. Only when both these conditions are satisfied can it be said that such husband or wife was alive at the relevant period. In the present case the complainant, who is the first wife of the 1st accused, was undoubtedly alive when the marriage between accused 1 and 2 took place on 29.10.1122. But her marriage was dissolved on 29.9.1122 as per the order Ext. I passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. No doubt there was the possibility of that order being reversed in appeal. It was equally possible that the said order being confirmed by the appellate court. In spite of such possibilities the fact is there that the order dissolving the marriage was in force when the second marriage took place. The appeal against that order was filed only in the year 1124, and as such it is clear that the second marriage took place long prior to the date of the filing of that appeal. There is thus nothing to suggest that when the first accused entered into the marriage with the second accused on 29.10.1122 he had any fraudulent or dishonest intention to defeat the complainant or that he had any guilty knowledge that Ext. I order dissolving the first marriage was likely to be upset by a superior court. Thus the plea of the first accused that he entered into the second marriage in all good faith and after the honest impression that his earliest marriage with the complainant had been put an end to by the order Ext. I passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, has to be accepted as a valid defence and as a sufficient answer to the charge of bigamy levelled against him in this case. It follows, therefore, that the learned Sessions Judge's order acquitting the accused does not call for any interference in revision. 5. The result is that this revision petition is dismissed. Dismissed.