JUDGMENT : NEWASKAR, J. 1. Decree-holders Nabbobai w/o Gyarasiram and Priyabai w/o Govindram obtained a preliminary mortgage-decree on 31-8-1951 against Saiyad Hasan Gani and eight others for Rs. 6805-8-6 together with interest at As 12 per cent. P.M. pendente lite on the principal sum. of Rs. 4637-4-0 and future interest subsequent to the date of the decree at As. 8 per cent. P.M. on the entire decretal amount of Rs. 6905-8-6. 2. This decree was ordered to be made final on the application of the plaintiffs-decree-holders on 12-1-53 and actual decree was drawn up on 29-1-53. Thereafter on 1-4-53 decree-holders aforesaid applied for execution of the said final decree but instead of usual prayer for sale of the property described in the final decree they applied for attachment of the compensation money in respect of the mortgaged property in the hands of the claims officers of Gird owing to the circumstances that by reason of notification issued by the Madhya Bharat Government under S. 3(1) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act No. 13 of 1951, the mortgaged property, being a Zamindari property, had vested in the Government on 2-10-1951. 3. An ex parts order prohibiting the amount of compensation money being paid to the mortgagor judgment-debtor was passed on 4-8-53 by the Civil Judge, Gwalior in this execution petition and a notice was issued to the judgment-debtors to show cause why the order be not made absolute. On the cause being shown, the learned Civil Judge held on 25-8-53 that it is open for the civil courts to attach the compensation money in the hands of a Claims Officer as there is no bar for this being done under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. He however reserved for further consideration the question whether it is open for the decree-holders to apply for attachment of compensation money in execution of a mortgage-decree for sale without obtaining a personal decree under the provisions of O. 34; R. 6, Civil P.C. 4. This latter question was decided by the learned Judge on 21-9-1953 by holding that it is not open to the decree-holders to attach compensation money in the hands of the Claims Officer without first obtaining a personal decree under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P.C. He therefore vacated his first order dated 4-8-1953 whereby he had ordered such attachment. 5. This latter question was decided by the learned Judge on 21-9-1953 by holding that it is not open to the decree-holders to attach compensation money in the hands of the Claims Officer without first obtaining a personal decree under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P.C. He therefore vacated his first order dated 4-8-1953 whereby he had ordered such attachment. 5. Decree-holders preferred appeal against this order on 24-9-1953 challenging the propriety of this latter order. This appeal was numbered as Civil First Appeal No. 23/53. Judgment-debtors too preferred appeal against the order dated 25-8-1953 on 1-10-1953 challenging the correctness of the view regarding the competency of the Civil courts to attach the compensation money under the circumstances of the case. This latter appeal is numbered as Civil First Appeal No. 27 of 1953. Both these appeals were fixed for hearing before the Full Bench along with Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3 of 1953 and both are being disposed of by this judgment. Question directly involved in both these appeals and particularly in Civil First Appeal No. 23 of 1953 is whether it is open for the decree-holder, who has obtained a final decree for sale in respect of a Zamindari property in Madhya Bharat in a mortgage suit, to apply for its execution as against the compensation money in the hands of the Claims Officer concerned without having recourse to the procedure laid down in the Act for the determination of a secured debt. Second question, besides the one indicated above, though not specifically raised and decided in the lower Court, which arises for consideration by reason of the facts of this case stated above is whether a final decree for sale obtained after the property had vested in the State on 2-10-51 is valid and executable ? As both the questions are pure questions of law arguments were allowed to be addressed before the Full Bench on both these questions. 6. I propose to answer them as follows. 7. It will be logical, in my opinion, to take the second question first because in case such a decree is held to be illegal and void execution of such a decree is out of question. 8. 6. I propose to answer them as follows. 7. It will be logical, in my opinion, to take the second question first because in case such a decree is held to be illegal and void execution of such a decree is out of question. 8. In this case it is not disputed that preliminary mortgage decree was properly passed on 31-8-1951 before the property had vested in the Government and the question in dispute is that after 2-10-51, subsequent to the mortgage property having ceased to be available for satisfying the mortgage-decree, was the passing of final decree for sale of that property for realization of the dues of the plaintiff decree-holders legal. 9. It is contended on behalf of the decree-holders that there is nothing illegal in passing a final decree against the mortgage property because by reason of very terms of S. 73(2) mortgage security is substituted by the compensation which now stands as the security for the satisfaction of the mortgage dues and the mentioning of mortgage property instead of compensation money is immaterial. All that was material, according to the learned counsel, was whether the amount of money indicated in the preliminary decree was paid or not and in case it is found that no payment had been made the rights and obligations previously determined remain intact, and the property mortgaged could be directed to be sold for the realization of the amount of the decree. Even if this latter direction be considered to be infructuous due to change of events which have taken place subsequent to the passing of the preliminary decree it will be deemed to have been substituted by a direction for realization of the decretal amount out of the compensation money by reason of S. 73(2), T.P. Act. 10. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, a direction for sale of the mortgaged property, could be read as a direction for realization of the amount of the decree out of the compensation money which represents the proceeds of compulsory acquisition by the State. Reliance in this connection is placed on the decision reported in - 'Rai Baijnath Goenka v. Rameshwar Prasad Singh', AIR 1922 PC 54 (A). 11. Reliance in this connection is placed on the decision reported in - 'Rai Baijnath Goenka v. Rameshwar Prasad Singh', AIR 1922 PC 54 (A). 11. On the other hand on behalf of the judgment-debtors it is contended firstly that after 2-10-1951 the mortgaged property ceased to exist for the purpose of realization of the decretal amount out of the same and a decree as against that property was against a non-existing property and hence invalid and secondly that even assuming such a decree to be valid no execution could be levied on the basis of such decree unless the plaintiff decree-holders obtain a personal decree under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P.C. on the assumption that the mortgaged property had ceased to exist. 12. It is this latter contention of the judgment-debtor which has found favour with the trial court. 13. First I shall consider whether the final decree thus passed is invalid. 14. Final decree in this case is passed without regard to the fact that the mortgaged property had vested in the Government free of all encumbrances and all that remained with the judgment-debtors mortgagors is a right to the compensation money in the hands of the Claims Officer appointed under the Act. 15. Does the final decree for that reason become void and unexecutable ? 16. It is no doubt true that in the case of a mortgage suit a mere preliminary decree for sale in spite of the fact that it determines the amount payable by the defendant and contains a direction to pay the same within a specified time is not executable because of two reasons viz., (i) the defendant is given the time to make the payment and (ii) plaintiff is given the right to apply for sale of the mortgaged property in case no payment is made. 17. A preliminary decree for sale in the case of a mortgage suit determines the amount due and payable to the plaintiff on the date of preliminary decree and contains a direction for its payment by a particular date and a further direction that in case the payment is so made the plaintiff shall deliver to the defendant all documents relating to the mortgaged property and shall retransfer the property to the plaintiff. 18. 18. Final decree for sale on the other hand deals with both, the eventualities viz., (i) where payment is made by a specified date, (ii) where no payment is made. If payment is made the final decree would direct the plaintiff to deliver up all documents relating to the mortgaged property and would further direct a retransfer of the property and to deliver possession if necessary. But if no payment be made it would, on application of the plaintiff direct the sale of mortgaged property and would make a further direction as to the application of the sale proceeds towards the discharge of the decretal debt. Thus it will appear that final decree performs three functions. It determines that no payment, as required by preliminary decree is made. Secondly it directs sale of mortgaged property and thirdly it directs application of sale proceeds. 19. If before the final decree is passed mortgaged property is substituted by another security in the form of compensation money the matter could be viewed from two points of view. Either it is a case of one mortgaged property being substituted by another security and a final decree directing payment out of this fund may be justified or treating the final decree as a determination that no payment had been made by the defendant towards the satisfaction of the amount determined toy the preliminary decree, the court executing the decree can regard the direction for sale to be superfluous in view of the fact that the mortgaged property is already converted into the form of money and proceed to apply the compensation money towards the satisfaction of the decree by reason of S. 73(2), T.P. Act. 20. In my opinion, first course suggested above would be appropriate where no final decree has been passed. In that case, on an application made on behalf of the plaintiff the original court can award final decree against the substituted security. But, where final decree is already passed as against the original property the directions pertaining to the mortgaged property can appropriately be read as those pertaining to the substituted security by reason of S. 73(2), T.P. Act and the court executing the decree can secure realization and application of the fund standing as substituted security. There is no just reason why the doctrine of substituted security cannot apply in execution. 21. There is no just reason why the doctrine of substituted security cannot apply in execution. 21. Moreover, assuming that, strictly speaking, the proceeding for a direction to enable the plaintiff to lay his hand on the compensation money instead of mortgaged property be more appropriate to the suit rather than to the decree Section 47 is wide enough to allow this to be done by treating an application for execution as against the compensation money as a suit for a direction for realization out of the same. 22. In - ' AIR 1922 PC 54 (A)', the respondents, in that appeal before their Lordships, or those whom they represented owned in the ijmali share fourteen Annas and one Dam out of sixteen annas of the village Lohara and shares in villages Padmaot and other villages. The revenue due in respect of ijmali share was in arrears in 1901 and the ijmali share was sold by auction held on 9-9-1901 by the Collector and was purchased by one Baijanath Goenka who was placed in possession as the purchaser. Application to the Collector for partition has been made of the entire Mahal in 1878 and the proceedings were still continuing. The partition had not been completed before the auction of 1901 referred to above. 23. In 1902, a suit was brought by the respondents or those whom they represented and others for setting aside the auction sale and for possession against Baijanath and in the suit a decree was passed on 30-6-1904 setting aside the sale and directing delivery of possession of properties. But before this date the proceedings for partition had been completed and Baijanath Goenka was allotted and given possession of property different from that which he had obtained in auction. The decree of subordinate court passed in ignorance of the changed circumstances was first set aside by the High Court of Calcutta but was restored by His Majesty in Council. When in execution of this decree, plaintiff applied for possession of those land which fell to the share of Baijanath in the Collector's partition objection was taken that the decree as it stood was not executable against the property not mentioned in the decree as a separate suit would be necessary or at least an application to His Majesty in Council for variation of the decree passed by them. 23. 23. Their Lordships repelled that contention holding that the questions as to what were such, substituted shares were questions which arose, within the meaning of S. 47, Civil P.C., between the parties and related to execution and satisfaction of the decree. 24. It is clear from their Lordships' decision that though the decree for possession of specified properties was passed in ignorance of the situation existing at the time of passing of the decree yet after the plaintiff's right to the properties in suit was determined his prayer in execution for possession of those other properties that had been substituted for properties in suit by the partition effected by the Collector was considered by their Lordships as one relating to execution and satisfaction. There is no reason in this case too not to regard plaintiff's application for realization out of substituted security as one relating to execution and satisfaction of the final decree for sale though on the date of the final decree there had been no property of the nature described in the decree to which it would attach more particularly as no sale would now be necessary. 25. The matter can, moreover, be looked at from another point of view. Ordinarily when a suit is brought by the plaintiff on the basis of right inuring to him on the date of the suit, determination of the suit ordinarily involves determination of such rights as they exist in the parties on the date of the suit. And any moulding in the relief which the plaintiff might be required to resort to can some times appropriately be regarded as the one relating to execution and satisfaction of those rights thus determined unless the original court before passing its judgment or the court of appeal takes notice of subsequent events and directs the moulding of such a relief. 26. The latter course is permissible but failure to follow the same for some reason or other can not render the decree invalid or void. 27. It is open for the decree-holder to say "I was entitled to recover my dues by the sale of the mortgaged property on the date of the suit. If that property is later acquired by Government by compulsory purchase my rights to get my money remain intact. 27. It is open for the decree-holder to say "I was entitled to recover my dues by the sale of the mortgaged property on the date of the suit. If that property is later acquired by Government by compulsory purchase my rights to get my money remain intact. Only effect is that the sale is now unnecessary and I can straightway obtain my dues from the fund which too is charged for my dues by reason of S. 73(2), T.P. Act. Because one step in the process of realization of my dues is rendered unnecessary right crystallised by the decree cannot be lost. It is accelerated instead." I think this, in nut-shell, is the correct position. 28. I am therefore of the opinion that the final decree in this case is not invalid but is executable and it is open for the decree-holder to obtain realization of his dues out of the compensation money. 29. As regards the view of the trial court viz., execution can only be levied after obtaining a personal decree under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P.C., it is clearly incorrect. The mortgaged property is not totally destroyed in all shapes and forms as available security for the satisfaction of the decree so as to render resort to O. 34, R. 6 necessary at this stage. The mortgaged property is substituted by another security and therefore it is not necessary at this stage for the decree-holder first to obtain a personal decree and then to proceed against the compensation money. 30. In this case some confusion is introduced by reason of decree-holder applying for attachment of the compensation money. Although it could be said that, in case the compensation money is subject to a charge in respect of the decretal amount, no attachment of the same would be necessary and that strictly speaking this might be correct yet where charge exists super-imposition of superfluous attachment cannot render it less effective but will serve the purpose of bringing it to the notice of the person in charge of the fund. There is nothing to indicate that decree-holders abandoned their charges as against the fund. I therefore hold that the decision of the lower court on this point is clearly erroneous and the decree as it stands is executable without resort to a proceeding under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P.C. 31. There is nothing to indicate that decree-holders abandoned their charges as against the fund. I therefore hold that the decision of the lower court on this point is clearly erroneous and the decree as it stands is executable without resort to a proceeding under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P.C. 31. As regards the first question whether resort to procedure under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act for determination of secured debt is compulsory, I am of the opinion that jurisdiction for determination of secured debt conferred upon the Claims Officer is only attracted in case either the creditor or the debtor applies to the said officer under S. 18, Cls. (1) and (2). In the present case, there are no allegations to this effect brought to our notice. 32. For these reasons order of the Lower Court dated 21-9-1953 which is the subject-matter of Civil First Appeal No. 23 of 1953 is set aside and execution is directed to proceed according to law from the stage it was when order in question was passed. 33. In the view that I take judgment-debtor's appeal, if at all it be competent, will have to be dismissed. In my opinion however order of the Lower Court dated 25-8-53 is not a final order determining the rights of parties but is merely interlocutory and as such not appealable. 34. The result is that Civil First Appeal No. 23/53 is allowed with costs and decree-holder's execution petition is directed to proceed from the stage it was when order dated 21-9-1953 was passed. 35. Civil First Appeal No. 27/1953 is dismissed with costs. 36. SHINDE, J. – I agree. 37. DIXIT, J. – I agree. Order accordingly.