Judgment Das, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff, presented under the Letters Patent, is from a decision of Rai, J., D/-4-4-1951, in Second Appeal No. 1686 of 1949. The facts, so far as they are material for the decision of the questions agitated before us, can be stated very briefly. The original plaintiff was one Jodha Rai. He was the son of one Khedu Rai. Khedu Rai had a brother called Ramtahal Rai. Ram-tahal Rai had four sons, Udit Rai, Sudit Rai, Isar Rai and Gaya Rai. The widow of Udit Rai was Mt. Pati Kuer. The said Musammat, who was defendant 2 in suit, sold 2 bighas 1 katha and 14 dhurs of land by a registered sale deed, dated 27-2-1942. The sale was in favour of defendant No. 1. The consideration for the sale was a sum of Rs. 474/-. Both the original plaintiff and original defendant 1 died during the pendency of the suit in the Court of first instance. The present appellant was substituted in place of the original plaintiff as being his grandson. It was found by the Courts of fact that the last male holder of the property in dispute was Udit Rai, and on his death Mt. Pati Kuer succeeded and held a widows estate in the inheritance which consisted of about 4 bighas of land only. Those 4 bighas of land were subject to a rehan for Rs. 175/- only. Pati Kuer sold 2 bighas 1 katha 14 dhurs to the original defendant 1 and the consideration consisted of and was said to have been applied to four items of money, viz., (a) a sum of Rs. 175/- went to discharge the dues under the rehan bond of 1907; (b) a sum of Rs. 32/- was applied towards payment of money which Mt. Pati Kuer had borrowed for her maintenance; (c) a sum of Rs. 111/- was paid in cash to Mt. Pati Kuer; and (d) a sum of Rs. 156/- was said to have been paid in discharge of the dues under a handnote dated the 7th of Jeth, 1348 Pasli, in favour of one Dharamdeo Raj. It was found by the Courts of fact that Jodha Rai, the original plaintiff, was the next reversioner, and Udit Rai left no daughter. Pati Kuer; and (d) a sum of Rs. 156/- was said to have been paid in discharge of the dues under a handnote dated the 7th of Jeth, 1348 Pasli, in favour of one Dharamdeo Raj. It was found by the Courts of fact that Jodha Rai, the original plaintiff, was the next reversioner, and Udit Rai left no daughter. On the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts of fact the only material question that fell for decision in the appellate stage was if the sale of 2 bighas 1 katha and 14 dhurs of land by Mt. Pati Kuer was justified by legal necessity. The learned Munsif found that legal necessity had been established for a part of the consideration only, namely, a sum of Rs. 207/-, consisting of the sum of Rs. 175/- which went to discharge the dues under the rehan bond of 1907 and a sum of Rs. 32/- which was applied towards payment of the money which Mt. Pati Kuer had borrowed for her maintenance. With regard to the rest of the consideration, the learned Munsif found that there was no justifying legal necessity. Accordingly, he gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to have the sale set aside on payment of Rs. 207/- to the purchaser. The first Additional Subordinate Judge of Chapra heard the appeal first and he came to the finding that the sale was completely justified by legal necessity. A second appeal was then preferred to this Court. This appeal was allowed and, the case was remanded to the lower appellate Court for consideration of one of the points then in dispute, namely, if Mt. Pati Kuer was in possession of the lands as a maintenance holder or as a Hindu widow. After remand the learned. Subordinate Judge affirmed the findings of the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal. Then. a second appeal was again taken to this Court by the defendants. Rai J. who heard the appeal appears to have gone into the question of fact as to whether the rest of the consideration of Rs. 474/- minus Rs. 207/-, was for justifying legal necessity. In the concluding part of his judgment Rai, J. observed as follows: "It has been established on evidence in the, present case that Mt. Rai J. who heard the appeal appears to have gone into the question of fact as to whether the rest of the consideration of Rs. 474/- minus Rs. 207/-, was for justifying legal necessity. In the concluding part of his judgment Rai, J. observed as follows: "It has been established on evidence in the, present case that Mt. Pati Kuer was leading a helpless life and it is really to her credit that she could so long save the meagre properties left by her husband. It is only when she became infirm due to old age that she was compelled to sell a portion so that she might get back possession of at least about a bigha and a half. In this view of the matter, I think the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants are well merited." In the result, Rai J, set aside the judgment and. decree passed by the Courts below and dismissed, the suit. 2. Mr. B.N. Mitter, appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, has rightly pointed out that it was not open to Rai J., to go behind the findings of fact arrived at by the final Court of fact in a second appeal. Mr. Mitter has pointed out that there was really no evidence for the finding of Rai J. that the sum of Rs. 111/- which was paid to the widow in cash was necessary for purposes of cultivation. Mr. Mitter has also pointed out that the final Court of fact had clearly found that there was no reliable evidence in support of that part of the case of the creditor which related to the alleged payment of Rs. 156/- to Dharamdeo Rai. It agree with Mr. Mitter that it was not open to Rai J., to reopen questions of fact in second appeal. 3. This brings me to the real question in this appeal, namely, whether on the findings of fact arrived at by the final Court of fact the principle-laid down in -- Sri Krishan Das V/s. Nathu Ram, AIR 1927 PC 37 (A) should apply. Rai, J., did reopen certain questions of fact, but he referred to the decision of -- AIR 1927 PC 37 (A) and held that the principle laid down therein applied to this case. Let me first state clearly the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts of fact. Rai, J., did reopen certain questions of fact, but he referred to the decision of -- AIR 1927 PC 37 (A) and held that the principle laid down therein applied to this case. Let me first state clearly the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts of fact. The learned Munsif found clearly enough that the widow had inherited only 4 bighas of land from her husband and all these 4 bighas were subject to a possessory mortgage executed in 1907. It was also found that the widow had inherited no other property and when she was young and active, she earned her livelihood by labour; but when she became old and infirm she had no means of livelihood and wanted to get back the lands which were in possession of the mortgagee. For that purpose she borrowed money from defendant 1. The sum borrowed was Rs. 474/- and out of it she paid Rs. 175/- to the mortgagee and Rs. 32/- towards the money which she had borrowed previously for her maintenance. The learned Munsif found that it was necessary for the widow for her maintenance to redeem the mortgage and sell a part of land so that she might save at least about a bigha and a half for her maintenance. The learned Munsif went to the length of observing "There is no doubt that Rs. 175/- on the basis of the zarpeshgi bond (Ext. 1) was an antecedent loan and apparently any person dealing with the widow would be satisfied about that necessity, especially when the widow was to get khas possession of some of the zarpeshgi land." These findings of the learned Munsif were affirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge who was the final Court of fact. It is true, as has been pointed out by Mr. Mitter, that the learned Subordinate Judge found that the creditor had made no enquiry as to whether any money was due to Dharamdeo Bai, but both the Courts below were satisfied that the sale itself was justified by necessity and the creditor had made a bona fide enquiry and was satisfied about the necessity of the sale by reason of the urgency of redeeming the mortgage for her maintenance. The question, therefore, is if in view of the findings arrived at by the Courts of fact with regard to the rest of the consideration the sale is vitiated. The question, therefore, is if in view of the findings arrived at by the Courts of fact with regard to the rest of the consideration the sale is vitiated. 4. The legal position is now well settled. As observed by their Lordships in -- AIR 1927 PC 37 at p. 39 (A), the principal question which falls to be answered in such cases is whether the sale itself is one which is justified by legal necessity. The same view was again expressed by their Lordships in -- Niamat Bai V/s. Din Dayal, AIR 1927 PC 121 (B) and again in -- Gauri Shankar V/s. Jiwan Singh, AIR 1927 PC 246 (C). It is true that those were cases of a sale by the manager of a joint family, but the principle laid down in those decisions was applied by the Privy Council to the case of a sale by a widow in the case of -- Suraj Bhan Singh V/s. Sah Chain Sukh, AIR 1927 PC 244 (D). Their Lordships condemned the practice which had grown up of subjecting the consideration paid for a sale, which is itself justified by legal necessity, to an arithmetical analysis in order to find out if the consideration not accounted for was small or large. Since those decisions it is now well recognized in law that if the sale itself is justified by legal necessity and the purchaser pays a fair price for the property sold and acts in good faith and after due enquiry as to the necessity for the sale, the mere fact that part of the price is not proved to have been applied to purposes of necessity would not invalidate the sale. It is obviously impossible for the purchaser to see the application of the price for each and every item of necessity mentioned in the document. It is, therefore, not relevant in the present case to consider whether a large part of the consideration or only a small part of the consideration has been applied to legal necessity. The true question is if the sale itself was justified by legal necessity. It is, therefore, not relevant in the present case to consider whether a large part of the consideration or only a small part of the consideration has been applied to legal necessity. The true question is if the sale itself was justified by legal necessity. It is not disputed in this case that the purchaser paid a fair price; nor is it disputed that there was necessity for a sale of a part of the lands to get back the remaining land for the maintenance of the widow and that the purchaser was satisfied about the necessity of a sale of a part of the lands of the widow in order to save about one bigha and a half of the lands for her maintenance. Once it is found, as was found by the Courts of fact, that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity and the purchaser acted honestly and paid a fair price for the land sold, any arithmetical calculation or analysis as to the various items which constituted the consideration and their application to the alleged purposes of necessity was irrelevant. There can be no doubt that on the findings arrived at by the Courts of fact in this case and independent of what Rai, J. said about the payment of Rs. 111/- and Rs. 156/- the sale itself was justified by necessity, the necessity being the maintenance of the widow by redeeming the mortgage which was subsisting from before. 5. I am satisfied that the principle laid down in -- AIR 1927 PC 37 (A) was correctly applied in this case. The Courts below misunderstood the legal position when they resorted to an arithmetical analysis, and the finding as to legal necessity for the sale at which they arrived was vitiated by reason of the aforesaid misconception of the legal position. If the law is correctly understood, then there is no escape from the position that the sale in this case was justified by legal necessity. Mr. Mitter relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in -- Bhagwati Charan V/s. Hirday Singh, AIB 1952 Pat 160 (E) to which I was a party. The principle laid down in -- AIR. Mr. Mitter relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in -- Bhagwati Charan V/s. Hirday Singh, AIB 1952 Pat 160 (E) to which I was a party. The principle laid down in -- AIR. 1927 PC 37 (A) was not applied in that case, because there was no finding that the sale itself was justified by necessity; on the contrary, there was a finding that the creditor did not act honestly or bona fide, after due enquiry, as to the necessity for the sale. That decision, therefore, is of no help to the appellant in the present case. I may also observe that in any view of the matter, the Courts below were wrong in passing a decree setting aside the sale on payment of Rs. 207/- to defendant 1 within a month from the date of the decree. It is well settled that an alienation made by a widow or a limited heir of property inherited by her, without legal necessity, is not binding on the reversioners; but it is nevertheless binding on her so as to pass her own interest (that is, her life interest) to the alienee. The sale cannot, therefore, be set aside during the life time of widow. However, in the view which we have taken, this question does not require any further consideration. 6. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the decision of Rai, J. is correct, though not exactly for the reasons which he has given in support of that decision. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Imam, J. 7 I agree.